FM 34-3
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
MARCH 1990
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited
FIELD MANUAL
NO 34-3
Preface
CHAPTER 1 -
CHAPTER 2 -
CHAPTER 3 -
CHAPTER 4 -
Distributio
*FM 34-3
HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington, DC, 15 March 1990
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
1
Table of Contents
The Intelligence Mission
The AirLand Battle
The Battlefield Area
The Intelligence Analysis System
The Intelligence Cycle
Directing
Collecting
Processing
Dissemination
Order of Battle
Order of Battle Factors
Order of Battle References
Order of Battle Records
Enemy Combat Effectiveness
Arbitrary Unit Designators
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
Purpose of Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield
Development and Use of Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield Products
Weather Analysis
Threat Evaluation
Threat Integration
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
During Peacetime
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1-1
1- 4
1-6
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2-1
2-2
2- 3
2-18
3- 1
3-1
3-6
3-11
3-28
3- 28
4- 1
4-3
4-5
4-21
4-24
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4-34
n restriction: Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited.
This publication supersedes FM 34-3, 13 January 1986.
Page
CHAPTER 5 - Analysis in Depth 5-1
Meeting User Requirements 5-1
Determining the Risk Factor 5-3
The Threat Model 5-5
Biases 5-11
CHAPTER 6 - Situation Development 6-1
Enemy Capabilities 6-1
Enemy Courses of Action 6-3
Working Situation Map 6-4
Factors of Analysis 6-7
Techniques of Analysis 6-9
CHAPTER 7 - Target Development 7-1
Decide 7-4
Detect 7-8
Del iver 7-12
CHAPTER 8 - Intelligence Support of Electronic 8-1
Warfare Operations
Intelligence Collection to Support 8-1
Electronic Warfare
The Effects of Terrain and Weather on 8-2
Electronic Warfare
Intelligence Required for Electronic 8-2
Warfare Support Measures
Intelligence Required for Electronic 8-2
Countermeasures
Intelligence Required for Electronic Counter- 8-3
Countermeasures
CHAPTER 9 - Counterintelligence Analysis 9-1
Counter Human Intelligence Collection 9-2
Counter Signals Intelligence Collection 9-3
Counter Imagery Intelligence Collection 9-3
Other Intelligence Support to Cl Analysis 9-3
Multidiscipline Counterintelligence 9-13
Intelligence Support to Combatting Terrorism 9-13
CHAPTER 10 Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency 1o ' 1
Support of Counterinsurgency Operations 10-2
Intelligence Estimate 10-2
Processing Information 10-3
Dissemination 10-12
Order of Battle 10-12
Page
APPENDIX A - Report Formats A-1
APPENDIX B - Automation Support to Intelligence Analysis B-1
APPENDIX c - Indicators of Enemy Courses of Action c-1
APPENDIX D - Enemy Strength Computations D-1
APPEND IX E - Terrain Analysis in Intelligence Preparation E-1
of the Battlefield
GLOSSARY
REFERENCES
1 NDEX
Glossary -1
References -1
Index -1
PREFACE
This publication describes the processes, procedures, and techniques
used to produce all-source intelligence. It focuses on intelligence
production at echelons at corps and below and amplifies the doctrine
contained in FM 34-1. It provides guidance for intelligence staff
officers, warrant officers. NCOs, and intelligence analysts at all skill
levels. it is designed for use by the active Army and reserve components
(RC).
This publ ication implements international standardization agreement
(STANAG) 2077 and quadripartite agreement 511. it is in compliance with
STANAGS 1059, 2033, 2044, 2149, 6004, and 6010: quadripartite agreements
170, 295, 354, 492, 523, 528, and 593; and air agreement 101/3D. The
proponent of this publication is Headquarters, United States Army Training
and Doctrine Command (HQ TRADOC), Submit changes for improving this
publication on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank
Forms) and forward it to the Commander, US Army Intelligence Center and
School (USAICS), ATTN: ATSI-TD-PAL, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7000.
CHAPTER 1
THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION
Intelligence is a key element of combined arms operations. It enables
commanders to use their combat power effectively to win the decisive
battles and it helps them identify and attack high payoff targets (HPTs).
Intelligence is an important part of every combat decision.
The dramatic improvements in intelligence collection systems have
greatly enhanced the availability of battlefield information from many
different sources. Battlefield information, however, is of limited value
until it has been analyzed, Through analysis, this information becomes
intelligence. The intelligence analyst integrates the seemingly
insignificant bits of information from multiple sources to produce an
overall picture of the battlefield. This picture reduces the
uncertainties about the battlefield and the situation. Analysis generates
the intelligence the commander needs to successfully fight on the modern
battlefield.
This chapter describes the commander’s intelligence requirements. It
describes how these requirements are generated and the factors that affect
them. It addresses those elements within the intelligence and electronic
warfare (IEW) system that plan, coordinate, and execute intelligence
analysis operations.
THE AIRLAND BATTLE
Intelligence is a vital part of the AirLand Battle. AirLand Battle is
the current US Army doctrine for fighting in a mid- to high-intensity
conflict. It is an extended, integrated battle involving the use of all
available air and land forces. It is extended because the battle is
fought from the forward edge of the area of operation (AO) to the rear
boundary as a single, continuous battle (deep, close, and rear
operations) . It is integrated in that nuclear and chemical weapons, when
released by the national command authority, are merged with electronic and
conventional weapons in all operations.
AirLand Battle Doctrine is offensively oriented. Its success depends
on the ability of friendly forces to take the initiative from the enemy
and to carry the fight into the enemy’s rear. The simultaneous attack of
forward enemy forces and the deep attack of follow-on echelons is inherent
in the battle. Its objectives include the diversion, delay, destruction,
or attrition of enemy fol low-on echelon forces before they can take part
in the close operation. Figure 1-1 shows a sample deep attack.
The commander orchestrates a combination of offensive and defensive
operations to defeat the enemy and gain the initiative. The commander
uses defensive and offensive operations to destroy enemy first-echelon
forces and deep-attack to simultaneously delay, disrupt, and manipulate
enemy follow-on forces. The commander anticipates, creates, and exploits
windows of opportunity, using flexible battle planning, to gain the
initiative through offensive operations. By effectively employing
maneuver and fire support assets, manipulating the enemy, and expertly
1-1
Figure 1-1. Deep attack.
using the weather and the terrain, the friendly commander can successfully
defeat a superior enemy force.
To gain the initiative, the commander must—
® See the enemy early and determine the capabilities and intentions
of the enemy.
0 Find and track enemy follow-on echelons.
0 Identify enemy high-value targets (HVTs), targets which if
successfully attacked, will contribute to the degradation of
important enemy battlefield functions,
0 Identify, locate, and develop the required targeting data for the
attack of HPTs, which if successfully attacked, will contribute to
the success of friendly plans.
0 Detect enemy weaknesses and develop the necessary data to support
the exploitation of these weaknesses.
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"Effectively use electronic warfare (EW) to support the AirLand
Battle while protecting friendly use of the electromagnetic
spectrum.
"Determine the enemy’s capability and guard against that
capability.
"Protect friendly forces and operations from enemy intelligence
collection operations.
"Use the weather and terrain to friendly advantage.
IEW support is vital to the successful planning and execution of the
AirLand Battle at all echelons. Intelligence support at brigade and
battalion levels focuses primarily on the close operation, while at
division it focuses on both close and deep operations. Corps is the focal
point for intelligence operations that support rear and deep operations.
Intelligence support of close operations supports the commander’s risk
analysis and consideration of mission, enemy, terrain, troops available,
and time (METT-T). As such it must be the first step in planning.
Intelligence operations reduce risk by identifying the enemy's most likely
courses of action, and so al low the commander to concentrate or disDerse
forces as appropriate. Intelligence also provides administrative and
logistic personnel, engineers, air defense artillery (ADA) staffs, and
other planners with guidelines about the expected situations and enemy so
they may make the best use of scarce assets.
To conduct deep operations the intelligence system supports the . .
commander’s need to look deep, find and follow enemy follow-on forces, and
detarmine their capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions. The
commander must designate the HPTs and decide where and when to attack them
to achieve the greatest benefit to the operation. The commander conducts
deep attacks against designated HPTs to ‘“shape”’ the battlefield by forcing
the enemy commander to deviate from established plans and to create
favorable conditions for friendly commanders conducting close operations.
To facilitate deep operations, corps-level intelligence planning must
focus its attention on analyzing and estimating enemy capabilities,
intentions, and likely courses of action at least 72 hours in advance. At
division-level, intelligence planners must perform this same function at
least 24 hours in advance.
Intelligence support of rear operations supports the commander’s need
to identify enemy capabilities, intentions, and likely courses of action
to interdict friendly combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS)
functions, and to inhibit the ability of the friendly commander to
flexibly employ the reserves. The intelligence planner must consider all
means and measures available to tha enemy, to include sabotage,
unconventional warfare, airmobile or airborne assaults, nuclear, chemical,
and conventional long-range strikes, deception, and the employment of
maneuver forces in deep exploitation or raiding operations.
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THE BATTLEFIELD AREA
Commanders consider the battlefield in terms of the time and space
necessary to defeat an enemy force or complete an operation before the
enemy can reinforce. They view the battlefield as having two distinct
areas: the AO and the area of interest (Al).
The AO is that portion of an area of conflict necessary for military
operations. The AO is assigned by the next higher commander and
designated by lateral and rear boundaries. It carries with it the
authority and responsibility to conduct operations therein. The commander
must coordinate with adjacent commanders before conducting maneuver and
fire support (FS) activities outside the designated AO.
The Al is that area of concern to the commander which includes the AO
and areas adjacent thereto. It includes areas forward of, and to the
flanks and rear of the AO. It encompasses areas either occupied by enemv
forces that could jeopardize friendly mission accomplishment and/or which
includes the objectives of friendly current or planned operations.
Each commander determines his own Al. The commander generally relies
on higher headquarters and adjacent units to provide information and
intelligence about enemy forces in that area. Figure 1-2 shows the
battlefield areas of division.
Battlefield areas are important to the intelligence analyst because
they help focus the information requirements of commanders concerning the
weather, terrain, and enemy forces from battalion to echelons above corps
(EAC). Specific information requirements are dependent on the mission and
the tactical situation. Usually, in conventional operations, information
requirements (IR) on enemv forces are based on the one-up and two-down
formula. Commanders require detailed information about enemy forces at
their equivalent levels of command as well as at one level above and two
levels below their own. For example, brigade commanders need information
about enemy regiments (equivalent level), enemy divisions (one-up), and
enemy battalions and companies (two-down). Generally, the enemy forces of
concern to each commander are found within the command’s AO and Al.
The IEW mission includes four major tasks: situation development,
target development, EW, and counterintelligence (Cl).
Situation development (discussed in Chapter 6) provides commanders
with the intelligence they need to make sound tactical decisions. It is a
continuing estimate of the situation that projects enemy intentions and
the effects of the weather and terrain. Situation development helps
cormnanders—
0 Find and follow enemv forces.
0 Determine enemy capabilities, vulnerability ies. and intentions.
0 Identify the enemy main effort.
1-4
"Determine how the weather and terrain will affect friendly and
enemy operations.
"Detect opportunities to exploit enemy weaknesses and seize or
retain the initiative.
"Assess the relative value of enemy combat systems, which serves as
a basis for selecting HVTs.
Target development (discussed in Chapter 7) provides combat
information, targeting data, and correlated target information which
support the commander’s tactical plans. It focuses on HPTs which have
been selected, through the targeting efforts of the G2 or S2, the G3 or
S3, and the fire support element (FSE), and approved by the commander.
Target development identifies, locates, and tracks HPTs until thev are
neutralized. Target development operations must provide sufficiently
accurate targeting data to attack by fire, maneuver, or electronic means.
Situation and target development provide the intelli gence required to
fight the AirLand Battle. Both are distinct tasks, but are interrelated
and totally integrated to provide an accurate picture of the battlefield.
1-5
EW (discussed in Chapter 8) exploits, disrupts, and deceives the enemy
command and control (C 2 ) system while protecting friendly use of
communications and non-communications systems. It is a significant force
multiplier when integrated and employed with fire and maneuver. EW
consists of the following functions:
'EW support measures (ESM), which provide commanders the capability
to intercept, identify, and locate enemy emitters.
"Electronic countermeasures (ECM), which provide commanders the
capability to disrupt enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
"Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM), which are used to
protect friendly command, control, and communications (C 3 ) systems
against enemy radioelectronic combat (REC) activities.
Cl (discussed in Chapter 9) includes specific actions which support
the protection of the friendly force. Enemy commanders, to succeed
against friendly forces, must employ all-source intelligence systems to
collect information about friendly forces. Depriving enemy commanders of
vital information about friendly forces is crucial to friendly success on
the battlefield. Cl enhances the operations security (OPSEC) of the
command by supporting the following actions:
° Countering the hostile intelligence threat.
° Safeguarding the command from surprise.
"Deceiving the enemy commander.
"Countering enemy sabotage, subversion, and terrorism.
"Developing essential elements of friendly information <(EEFI).
THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS SYSTEM
The intelligence analysis system is a single, integrated system that
extends from battalion level to national agencies. Figure 1-3 shows the
all-source intelligence system.
The system includes the directors, coordinators, producers, and
executors. All are linked together both laterally and vertically to
ensure a coordinated and effective effort. Figure 1-4 shows the common
IEW structure.
Analysis elements are the heart of the intelligence system. They
include--
"Intelligence officers and their staff sections.
"Echelons above corps intelligence centers (EACICs).
1-6
Figure 1-3. All-source Intelligence system.
COORDINATORS
G2 AND S2
INTELLIGENCE
Cl
SECURITY
G3 AND S3
OPERATIONS
EW
OPSEC
DECEPTION
DIRECTOR
FORCE COMMANDER
PRODUCERS
02 SECTIONS
EACIC
TOC SUPPORT ELEMENTS
BlCCs
EXECUTORS
UNIT COMMANDERS
Ml, CAVALRY,
ARTILLERY,
MANEUVER,
ENGINEER,
AVIATION AND
ALL OTHERS.
Figure 1-4. Common IEW structure.
1-7
"Tactical operations center (TOC) support elements at division and
corps levels.
"Technical control and analysis elements (TCAEs) organic to
military intelligence (Ml) combat electronic warfare and
intelligence (CEWI) battalions at division-level and Ml CEWI
brigades at corps-level.
"Battlefield information coordination centers (BICCs) at maneuver
and artillery battalions and brigades.
INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR, COORDINATORS, AND PRODUCERS
The intelligence director (commander), coordinators (staff), and
producers (such as EACICS, TOC support elements, TCAEs, and BICCs) play
the major roles in intelligence analysis.
Commander
The commander plays a critical role in intelligence analysis. The
commander determines what intelligence is needed to plan and execute an
operation. The commander provides guidance to the staff to ensure that
the analysis effort is integrated with the other functional systems of the
command and that it is focused on critical requirements and priorities.
The commander, with the intelligence and operations staffs, accomplishes
the planning, directing, guiding, and decision making that generate
intelligence analysis and keep it going. The commander approves or
modifies the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) recommended by the
G2.
Staffs
While the commander approves the PIR for the command, every staff
officer in the command needs intelligence to support the functions under
their staff responsibilities. However, the staff officers that are most
involved with intelligence requirements are the G2 or S2, the G3 or S3,
and the FS coordinator (FSCOORD).
G2 or S2 . The G2 or S2 manages intelligence operations. This officer is
responsible for intelligence production and for determining the enemy’s
intentions. The G2 or S2 recommends PIR, based on the commander’s
guidance and concept of the operation. The officer manages the collection
effort, supervises al i-source analysis, and ensures that combat
information and intelligence are disseminated rapidiy. The G2 or S2
develops the intelligence estimate. The officer ensures a team effort in
planning, supervising, and executing iEW operations within the command.
G3 or S3 . Second only to the commander, the G3 or S3 is the primary user
of intelligence. As the principal planner and coordinator of unit
operations, this officer relies heavily on intelligence support. The
operations officer completes the estimate of the situation and recommends
which friendly courses of action are feasible and which should be
adopted. These estimates are based on the METT-T, of which a major part
1-8
is provided by intelligence. The G3 or S3 IRs are the same as, only more
detailed than, those of the commander. The operations officer plays
a key role, in conjunction with G2 or S2, in developing and recommending
the PIR.
The G3 or S3 also has staff responsibility for EW, OPSEC, and
battlefield deception (BAT-D). This officer relies on intelligence to
plan and coordinate each of these functions.
Fire Support Coordinator . The FSCOORD plans and coordinates FS. Th is
officer needs intelligence for FS targeting and target development. The
FSCOORD, G2 or S2, and G3 or S3 coordinate very closely in selecting HPTs
and developing targeting data for attacking HPTs.
Tactical Operations Center Support Elements
The TOC support elements provide dedicated intelligence support to the
G2 or S2. TOC support elements, which are assigned to the headquarters
and headquarters company (HHC) of the division, or the operations
battalion of the corps Ml brigade, perform intelligence collection
management (CM), analysis, and dissemination functions. The all-source
production section (ASPS) or equivalent element within the TOC support
element performs intelligence analysis. Other TOC support element
sections are collection management and dissemination (CM&D) and Cl
analysis, which support the G2: and the EW and OPSEC staff elements, which
support the G3. There is also an informal targeting team formed in the
DTOCSE and CTOCSE to assist in the targeting effort.
The ASPS works under the staff supervision of the G2 or S2. It
develops and maintains the intelligence data base. It develops
intelligence from unprocessed information and other intelligence
products. It performs IPB, assists the G2 or S2 in developing the
intelligence estimate, and develops the analysis of the battlefield area.
It also develops situation and targeting data to support maneuver, fire,
and other battlefield functions. Each ASPS coordinates with other TOC
support elements to ensure that all available data is evaluated and to
exchange analysis approaches, techniques, and ideas for solving common
intelligence problems.
Technical Control and Analysis Element
The TCAE, in addition to managing the signals intelligence (SIGINT)
collection and EW assets, performs SIGINT analysis for the command. It
maintains the enemy electronic order of battie (EEOB) and technical data
bases. It analyzes and correlates ESM and SIGINT data from all sourcesto
update the EEOB and technical data bases needed to produce SIGINT. It
passes SIGINT data to the ASPS for correlation with information and
intell igence from other sources.
Battlefield Information Coordination Centers
The BICCs are organic to maneuver brigades, battalions, and other
support units. They consist of analysts who operate within their unit
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TOCS as an integral part of the S2 section. They provide an organic
intelligence management, production, and dissemination capability. BI CCs
vary in the size and type of support they provide, For example, maneuver
unit BICCs concentrate on both situation and target development, while
artillery unit BICCs are almost exclusively interested in target
acquisition (1A) and development.
INTERACTION OF ANALYSIS ELEMENTS
Close coordination and interaction between analysis elements make the
system function effectively. Analysis elements at all echelons exchange
requirements, information, and intelligence both laterally and vertically
throughout the system. At the same time they disseminate combat
information and intelligence to maneuver, FS, and other units that need
it.
1 -1 o
CHAPTER 2
THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE
Intelligence operations follow a four-phase process known
intelligence cycle. The intelligence cycle is oriented to the
mission. Supervising and planning are inherent in all phases
cycle. Figure 2-1 shows the intelligence cycle.
as the
commander’s
of the
Figure 2-1. The intelligence cycle.
The intelligence cycle is continuous. Even though the four phases are
conducted in sequence, all are conducted concurrently. While available
information is processed, additional information is collected, and the
intelligence staff is planning and directing the collection effort to meat
new demands. Previously collected and processed information
(intelligence) is disseminated as soon as it is available or needed.
This chapter describes the procedures outlined above and the
processing phase of the intelligence cycle.
DIRECTING
The intelligence effort begins by determining requirements,
establishing their priorities, and communicating information or
intelligence collection orders (to subordinate elements) and requests (to
2-1
higher and adjacent units). This is accomplished by the commander and the
intelligence and operations staff. Sources of information or intelligence
requirements include the following:
"Commander’s planning guidance, concept of the operation, and
stated requirements.
"METT-T analysis by intelligence and operations staffs.
° Requests for intelligence information (Rlls) from higher,
adjacent, allied, and subordinate units and elements, and from other
staff elements within the command.
The highest or most important IRs are designated as PIRs. The
commander chooses PIRs based in part on the recommendation of the G2 or
S2. PIRs are those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an
anticipated and stated priority in the task of planning and decision
making. However, an excessive number of PIRs degrades efforts to focus
relatively scarce intelligence collection resources on the most essential
intelligence requirements.
IRs are those items of information regarding the enemy and the
environment needing collection and processing to meet the intelligence
requirements of the commander. IRs can either support PIRs or be
stand-alone requirements of a lesser priority than PIRs. Both PIRs and
IRs serve as the basis for collection and intelligence efforts.
Intelligence analysts in the ASPS advise the G2 regarding the PIRs and
IRs. They analyze METT-T factors and the commander’s guidance and concept
of the operation to determine what intelligence and information is
needed. The ASPS reviewa the existing data base to identify information
that is already available and that which must be acquired. They pass
requirements for new information to the CM&D section as additional
collection requirements. Figure 2-2 shows the directing phase from the
commander’s intent to the commander’s requirements.
COLLECTING
Based on requirements, the CM&D section manages the collection effort.
The CM&D section develops a collection plan that is keyed to the PIRs and
IRs. It continuously updates the collection plan as the situation
changes.
The ASPS assists the CM&D section in planning and supervising the
collection effort. The ASPS helps convart intelligence requirements into
specific information requirements (SIR). SIR are keyed to indicators (see
Appendix C) which when integrated with other indicators and factors
present on the battlefield may provide clues to the enemy’s most probable
course of action. The ASPS monitors incoming reports, advises the CM&D
section when PIR or IR are satisfied, identifies naw requirements, and
determines when previously requested information is no longer needed.
2-2
* PIRsrecommended by G2and approved by the commander
Figure 2-2. Commander’s requirements and guidance.
Collection operations generate information from various sources. This
information is fed into the ASPS. The ASPS—
"Reports combat information immediately.
"Processes information to develop the intelligence needed for
tactical decisions and targeting.
PROCESSING
Processing is the phase in the intelligence cycle in which information
becomes intelligence. It consists of three operations:
"Recording. Recording is the reduction of information to writing
or some other form of graphical representation and the arranging of
this information into groups of related items.
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0 Evaluation. Evaluation is the determination of the pertinence of
information to the operation, reliability of the source or agency,
and accuracy of the information.
0 Analysis. Analysis is the determination of the significance of
the information, relative to information and intelligence already
known, and drawing deductions about the probable meaning of the
evaluated information.
Processing is a continuous operation. The analyst processes new
information as it is received without waiting for additional information.
Intelligence derived from fragmentary information is essential,
particularly during fast-moving operations or when the information
concerns an HPT. Normally there is a time lag between the time an enemy
target presents itself and the time the information becomes available to
an element that can react to it. Complete information about a target or a
situation is seldom available. The analyst continuously identifies
information gaps and attempts to acquire information to complete, confirm,
or refute fragmentary information. This information must assist the
corrmander to generate and apply combat power. It helps the commander to
strike critical units or areas, and to achieve and retain the initiative.
Figure 2-3 shows information processing.
* Should only be done with perishable and critical combat Information in which extensive evaluation will Impact on It's timeliness.
Figure 2-3. information processing.
2-4
The sequence for processing varies with the nature and urgency of the
information. Information is normally recorded first: however, if it
contributes to the development of urgent intelligence, it is recorded
simultaneously with or after evaluation and analysis. Combat information
or partially developed intelligence that is needed immediately is
disseminated before it is completely processed. Information that is not
of immediate value is processed before it is disseminated.
Evaluation and analysis may occur simultaneously followed by immediate
dissemination. For example, information from a reliable source may
indicate that the enemy is about to launch a major attack, In this case,
recording is of secondary importance, and the intelligence report that an
attack is imminent is disseminated as soon after receipt as possible.
Reporting of information to higher and lower echelons occurs
concurrently with processing, For example, to speed target execution
time of HPTs, a commander orders lower headquarters to report all
information concerning specified enemy units, areas, or activities before
the processing cycle is complete. Lower headquarters make similar
requests of higher headquarters,
A sound collection program that effectively uses collection assets
results in a heavy volume of information. Some information may be of no
use to the collecting unit, but of great value to adjacent, higher, or
lower units. This includes many reports which may appear insignificant
and unrelated to other information. However, when these reports are
analyzed along with other available information, definitive and
predictable patterns of enemy activity often emerge.
Today, most information is processed manually. Emerging automatic
data processing (ADP) systems help the analyst process greater volumes of
information faster and mors accurately. Appendix B describes ADP support
to intelligence analysis. Developing and maintaining an intelligence data
base is essential to processing. The data base is the basis for analyzing
new information neaded for situation and target development as well as CM,
EW, and Cl operations. When possible, intelligence data bases are created
for contingency areas during peacetime. Initially, data base information
and intelligence are collected by researching available literature
pubt ished by various agencies and sources, including the following:
"Central
° Defense
"National
"US Army
° Unified
Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Intelligence Agency (DIA).
Security Agency (NSA).
Intelligence Agency (USAIA),
and specified commands.
"Theater commands.
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"Allies.
"Open sources.
The analyst identifies gaps in the data base and passes requirements
to the collection manager. As information is received from the various
collection agencies, it is correlated with existing information in the
data base to assess its significance. Combat information, often highly
perishable in nature, is disseminated immediately.
RECORDING
Recording information into the data base makes evaluation and analysis
easier and more accurate and facilitates preparation of intelligence
reports by conveniently drawing together all available information on a
specific subject. The recording means used must be adequate to handle the
volume of information and intelligence received and to serve the needs of
those who must have access to it. Means and techniques of recording must
permit timely dissemination of information and intelligence.
Recording is more complex at higher command echelons. At division
level and above, ADP systems assist in the recording function. Some of
the more common recording devices are listed below. Others are used when
required.
"Intel ligence journal.
"Intel ligence files.
"Situation map (SITMAP).
"Intelligence workbook.
"Coordinate register.
"Order of battle (OB) records.
Intelligence Journal
The journal is an official, permanent, and chronological record of
reports and messages that have been received and transmitted, important
events that have occurred, and actions taken in response. Accuracy and
completeness are essential , since various elements of the headquarters
will refer to it later. It covers a specified time period, usually 24
hours. Journal entries should reflect--
“An accurate and concise statement of the message, report, or
event.
"A notation about the sender or individual making the report, to
include unit duty position and section: for example, S3 1/60
Infantry Battalion.
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°The time of receipt or dispatch and method of transmission.
"Action taken as a result, to include dissemination given to
reports, other information received, and other internal G2 recording
(workbook, SITMAP),
Journal entries are concise and record the time and essential facts.
As a minimum the journal entries include—
"Purpose, subject, and conclusions of conferences.
"Command decisions and summarizations of plans.
"Movements of enemy units, one echelon above and two echelons below
your own level,
"Significant messages (radio, radio teletypewriter (RATT),
hard-copy, overlays, photos, and any other verbal or written
reports) transmitted and received.
"Incidents of enemy activity.
"Friendly patrol activity.
"Liaison activities.
"Changes in personnel within the staff see”t ion.
"Summaries of written messages and orders.
"Summaries of action based on enemy and fr iendly activity.
Figure 2-4 shows a partially completed intelligence journal
(DA Form 1594).
Intelligence Files
Intelligence files permit ready access to all available information.
The files most commonly maintained are the journal fiII e, reference file,
and OB file.
Journal File . The journal file contains all previously recorded journal
sheets and supporting materials. Supporting material referenced on the
journal sheet is filed in chronological sequence. It includes copies of
orders, periodic reports, messages, memoranda, conference notes, map
overlays, and other material required to support the journal entries. Th e
journal number is annotated on the supporting document. The unit SOP
normally describes procedures for maintaining a journal. One good method
is to begin the annotation with the letter “J,” followed by the date and
an entry number. The fifth entry on June 23d would read “’J-23-05.”
2-7
DA » mov*M 1594 RRKVtOUS KDITIOM or THIS FORM IS OMOLITK. ^ ^
2-8
Reference File . The reference file includes all information that is not
of immediate interest but may be of future value. Information is
cross-indexed to permit easy retrieval.
OB File . The OB file is discussed in Chapter 3.
Working Situation Map
The working situation map (SITMAP) is the primary analytic tool at all
echelons. It is a temporary graphic display of the current dispositions
and major activities of the enemy. Information about friendly forces on
this map usually is limited to boundaries; locations of command posts
(CPs) of higher, lower, and adjacent units; reconnaissance units; the
forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), and forward line of own troops
(FLOT) . The level of detail of the working SITMAP will be proportionate
to the echelon at which it is maintained.
Generally, enemy maneuver units are posted which are two echelons
below that of the friendly unit. Enemy units, regardless of size, in our
rear area are always posted because of the amount of damage they can do to
administrative and logistical nodes.
Enemy headquarters (especially regimental and higher levels) and CS
and CSS asset locations are also posted. The SITMAP reflects enemy unit
identification, disposition, and boundaries; major roads or trails for
movement of personnel, weapons, and equipment; and locations of, for
example--
"Automatic weapons (battalion SITMAP only).
"Supporting mortars (battal ion SITMAP only).
"Antitank guns (battalion SITMAP only).
“Artillery,
"Air defense artillery.
"Minefields.
"Roadblocks.
"Entrenchments.
"Obstacles.
"Defensive positions.
"Logistics and command facilities.
"Aircraft and helicopter staging areas.
"Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) contaminated areas.
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"Ground surveillance devices.
"Smoke screens.
When plotting enemy activities and dispositions, indicate the latest
time at which the activity was observed or the disposition confirmed. The
S2 ensures that the working SITMAP and supporting overlays are maintained
as simply as possible and that authorized conventional signs, mil itary
symbols and abbreviations are used. See FM 101-5-1 for authorized
abbreviations and map symbols. Explain any deviations from these symbols
in the marginal data on the map or overlay, Necessary classification
markings also must appear in the margins of maps and overlays.
Rather than attempting to plot all entries on a map by means of
conventional or Improvised military symbols, the S2 uses a number or
letter to plot the area where the activity was observed. A corresponding
letter or number then is entered into a space alongside the map and a
notation entered as to the activity observed. Use a number or letter that
is easily cross-indexed to the journal or message file for a complete
report. Ensure that the number or letter indicating an activity in the
journal file matches that on the working SITMAP (see “action taken” column
in Figure 2-4).
Care must be taken to prevent overcrowding the map, One method of
doing this is to group entries by categories on a series of acetate
overlays. Use separate overlays to display separate categories of
information. A typical separate overlay might show fortifications or
potential targets or details of OB. An enlarged sketch map also is
prepared to cover overcrowded areas. This allows the presentation of
additional details.
The working SITMAP (discussed in this chapter) and the OB SITMAP
(discussed in Chapter 3) are two separate items. Although the same types
of information are recorded on each, their functions differ. The G2 or S2
uses the working SITMAP for recording and analyzing. The OB SITMAP
normally is less cluttered than the working SITMAP.
Maintenance of the OB SITMAP at brigade and battalion levels usually
is a joint S2 and S3 action. At higher levels, each section maintains a
separate SITMAP. Plotting the friendly situation is the responsibility of
the S3, while the enemy situation is the responsibility of the S2. During
operations, personnel from either section map or plot friendly or enemy
entries on the SITMAP and perform other processing functions.
When the intelligence and operations staffs use separate maps, ensure
that acetate overlays are readily interchangeable between these maps.
This permits easy comparison of the current enemy situation (G2 or S2 map)
with the disposition of friendly forces (G3 or S3 map), and easy
comparison of enemy obstacles, barriers, and minefield with planned
routes of march.
Examples of separate SITMAP overlays are—
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"Enemy fortifications.
"High value targets.
"Obstacles.
"OB data.
"Friendly reconnaissance patrols.
"Surveillance activities (include the ground coverage of each
system).
The maintenance of the working SITMAP takes precedence over ail other
recording means during combat operations. In a fast-moving situation,
particularly at the maneuver battalion level, it is the oniy recording
device used.
The working SiTMAP is continually purged of information that is not
current or otherwise no longer needed. Purging keeps it neat and
uncluttered, making it more useful as an analysis tool. Map overlay
tracings or periodic photographs of the SITMAP provide a permanent record
of the situation. These records provide a reference to past enemy
activity and help determine patterns of enemy movement and dispositions.
Use the working SITMAP to make sound tactical decisions; its primary
intelligence uses are to--
“Display the enemy disposition and situation.
"Provide a basis for comparison to determine the significance of
newly received data about enemy forces. IPB situation and event
templates provide a basis for comparison.
"Provide a background and basis for briefings and other required
intelligence reports.
"Provide the basis for overlays which graphically portray the enemy
situation.
"Assist in the determination of movement patterns of guerrilla or
insurgent forces.
"Show possible intelligence gaps which require redirection of the
collection effort. For example, the need to locate and identify
enemy units reported for the first time.
For secondary intelligence use, post the following information in the
margin of the working SITMAP or on charts or cards nearby:
"Computations of enemy personnel and weapon strengths and
weaknesses.
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"Organization charts of specified enemv units.
"Summaries of weather and terrain data.
"A listing of PIR and IR.
"Notations about the current patrol plan.
"Movement computations.
"A listing of friendly attachments.
° Alisting of unlocated enemy units believed to be in the AO.
"Probable courses of action.
"Battle damage assessment (BDA).
Chapter 6 describes how the SITMAP is used in situation development.
Intelligence Workbook
The intelligence workbook contains information arranged by subject
heading. This arrangement helps to sort, evaluate, interpret information,
and prepare intelligence reports. It is not a permanent record and it is
not distributed to an outside agency. The workbook is kept current with
obsolete entries deleted. At higher echelons, analysts maintain separate
workbooks on various subjects.
There is no prescribed format for the workbook. At division and lower
headquarters, use index tabs to label information in the intelligence
summary (INTSUM). At corps and higher levels, use index tabs to label
information in the periodic intelligence report (PERINTREP).
Record incoming messages and reports; for example, information
concerning a newly identified armor unit could be recorded under index tab
3A, NEW UNITS, as well as index tab 2B, ARMOR. A message that furnishes
information on different subjects results in several entries: each entry
contains only that subject information. For example, a message containing
information on the locations of a reserve armor unit and an artillery unit
results in extracts under item 2B, ARMOR and under 2C, ARTILLERY. Base
each entry in the workbook on an incoming message and include a reference
to the journal serial number of that message. For example, J2, 091200
April, from 20th Engr Cbt Bn: “Bridge at LINDEN AB 910246 destroyed by
bombing. Estimated out of action for 30 hours.’” The J2 refers to the
journal serial number and the date-time group (DTG) entered refers to the
time of occurrence of the event. The intelligence officer makes written
comments on the evaluation of the information and its possible
significance following the appropriate entry.
Figure 2-5 shows a sample intelligence workbook which might be used at
corps and higher levels.
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INTELLIGENCE (G2) WORKBOOK
a OTHER HEW TACTICS > WEAPONS
3A ORDER OF BATTLE NEW UNITS I
3B HEW PERSONALITIES |
3C ENEMY MOVEMENTS |
HEADQUARTERS.
PLACE:
CLASSIFICATION
3D FHFUV (TBCHCru /viai
2Z P’Hfcwwn 1 >mmj
31 ENEMY EQUIP. DESTROYED, CAPTURED |
1 3F ENEMY PRISONERS Of WAR 1
4 COUNTER INTELUGMCE
5 WEATHER
1
I TERRAIN
7A ENEMY CAPABILITIES
n enemy
7C CONCLUSIONS
Figure 2-5. Irttelligence workbook.
EVALUAT ION
Evaluation includes determining the pertinence of information, the
reliability of the source or agency through which the information was
derived, and its credibility. Evaluation of information at the lower
echelon is a simple step compared to the procedures employed at higher
echelons. From the viewpoint of the brigade or battalion S2, information
which relates to the unit’s AO and Ai is pertinent; information relating
to areas outside the area of interest may or may not be pertinent. The
brigade or battalion S2 may not be able to judge the reliability of a
source because the S2 may not have repetitive contact with that source.
This difference between higher and lower echelons is because information
received from higher headquarters normally has been processed, evaluated,
and interpreted and the information collected by organic agencies at lower
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echelons generally is acquired by direct observation or actual contact
with the enemy.
Pertinence
pertinence is the examination of information to determine whether or
not the information is-
“Pertinent with regard to the enemy or to the battlefield area.
Information that relates to a unit’s AO or Al normally is pertinent.
‘Needed immediately, and if so, by whom? Of possible present or
future value, and if so, to whom?
Reliability
The source of information and the agency by which it was collected are
both evaluated for reliability. The principal basis for judging the
reliability of a source or an agency, other than troop units, is previous
experience with the source. Criteria for evaluating troop units include a
knowledge of their training, experience, and past performance.
The headquarters closest to the source or agency is ordinarily the
best judge of its reliability. Consequently, a higher headquarters
normally accepts the reliability evaluation performed by a reporting
headquarters. It does, however, consider the reliability of the reporting
headquarters itself.
Credibility
Credibility means the probable truth of the information. Judgment of
credibility is based on the answers to the following questions:
“Is it possible for the reported fact or event to have taken place?
“Is the report consistent within itself?
“Is the report confirmed or corroborated by information from
different sources or agent i es ?
“Does the report agree or disagree in any way with other available
information?
“If the report does not agree with information from other sources
or agencies, which one is more likely to be true?
The most reliable method of judging the accuracy of a report is by
comparing it with similar information which already may be available in an
intelligence file or workbook. When possible, the intelligence officer
obtains confirming or refuting information through different agencies and
from other sources.
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Marked differences in the evaluation of the accuracy of information
may occur between higher and lower echelons. The reason for this
difference is because higher echelons, which have more sources of
information and intelligence than lower echelons, have a greater
opportunity to confirm, corroborate, or refute the accuracy of reported
data. Regardless of the source, reevaluate the accuracy of incoming
information and intelligence at each echelon. Thus, the role of higher
echelons in evaluating the credibility (or probable truth) of information
differs somewhat from its role in evaluating the reliability of the source
(again, usually done best by the echelon closest to the source),
The evaluation rating of each item of information is indicated by a
standard system. Reliability is shown by a letter; accuracy by a
numeral . The lowest headquarters possible assigns the evaluation ratings.
Indicate the reliability of the source and agency as follows:
A - completely reliable.
B - usually reliable.
c - fairly reliable.
D - not usually reliable.
E - unreliable.
F - reliability cannot be judged.
A rating of “A” indicates only the most unusual circumstances. For
example, this evaluation is given when it is known that the source has
long experience and extensive background with the type of information
reported. A rating of “B” indicates a source of known integrity. A
rating of “’F” indicates there is no basis for estimating the reliability
of the source.
Agencies ordinarily are rated A, B, or C. However, when the source
and the collecting-reporting agency are evaluated differently, only the
lower degree of reliability is indicated.
Indicate the credibility of information as follows:
1 - confirmed by other sources.
2 - probably true.
3 - possibly true.
4 - doubtfully true.
5 - improbable.
6 - truth cannot be judged.
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If it can be stated with certainty that the reportsd information
originates from a source other than that for already existing information
on the same subject, it is classified as “confirmed by other sources” and
is rated “’I.”’
If no proof in the above paragraph can be established, and if no
reason exists to suspect that the reported information comes from the same
source as the information already available, it is classified as “’probably
true” and is rated “2.’
If the report is confirmed in essential parts by information already
available, it is classified as “probably true’” and is rated “2.”
If the investigation reveals that the raported facts, on which no
further information is yet available, are compatible with the previously
observed behavior of the target, or if the known background of a person
leads to the deduction that the person might have acted as reported, the
information raceived is classified as “possibly true” and is rated “3.”
Reported but unconfirmed information, which contradicts the estimate
of the development or the known behavior of the target, is classified as
“doubtful” and is rated “’4”’ if this information cannot be disproved by
available facts.
Reported information which is not confirmed by available data and
contradicts the experience hitherto assumed to be reliable with regard to
the development of a target or issue is classified as “improbable” and is
rated "5.” The same classification is given to reported information that
contradicts existing data on a subject originally given the rating “’I” or
“ 2 .”
If the investigation of a report reveals that a basis for rating 1 to
5 is not given, the reported information is classified as “truth cannot be
judged’” and is rated “6.”
The statement “truth cannot be judged” is always preferred ovar the
inaccurate use of ratings 1 to 5. If there is no sound basis for rating
1 to 5 because of the complete absence of other information on the same
target, it must be rated 6.
The Scale 1 to 6 does not represent progressive degrees of accuracy.
Recognition must be given to the rating represented by the numeric symbol.
Although both letters and numerals are used to indicate the evaluation
of an item of information, they are independent of each other. A
completely reliable agency may report information obtained from a
completely reliable source which, on the basis of other information, is
judged to be improbable. In such a case, the evaluation of the
information is A-5. A source known to be unreliable may provide raw
information that is accepted as accurate information, when confirmed by
reliable sources. In this case, a report is evaluated E-1. A report
evaluated F-6 may be accurate and should not be arbitrarily discarded.
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A report disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent units should
contain the evaluation for each item of information; for example, ‘“The
division artillery of the enemy 46th Tk Div can fire nuclear rounds of
0.5 kt yield (C-3).”
The evaluation and interpretation of information atthe brigade and
battalion is a simplified mental process: thus, the standard evaluation
rating has little if any application. This system assists the G2 or S2 in
processing information received from other headquarters and in evaluating
information disseminated to other headquarters.
ANALYSIS
The processing of information continues with analysis, which cons iSts
of three steps: assessment, integration, and deduction. It is during this
phase of the intelligence cycle that information becomes intelligence .
Assessment
Assessment is the sifting and sorting of evaluated information to
update significant elements with respect-to the mission and operations of
the unit. The first and most important step towards proper assessment is
a clear understanding of the unit's mission and the commander’s intent.
All information gathered is viewed in relation to what the commander wants
to accomplish. Assessment also requires judgement and a thorough
knowledge of military principles, the characteristics of tha AO, and the
enemy situation, to include enemy doctrine and past practices.
Assessment at headquarters above division level often involves
detailed research with greater difficulty caused by the increased volume
of information. Regardless of the level , individuals who assess
information must relate their efforts to the unit’s mission to avo id
wasted time and effort.
Integration
Integration is the combination of the elements isolated in assessment
with other known information to form a logical picture or hypothesis of
enemy activities or the influence of operational area characteristics on
the mission of the command. In the process, more than one hypothesis may
be formulated based upon existing intelligence.
Integration, particularly the development of hypotheses, requires the
same good judgment and thorough background knowledge essential to making a
good assessment. In formulating hypotheses, the intelligence officer
avoids preconceived opinions and hypotheses based solely on personal
experience or preference. The officer attempts to adopt the role ofthe
enemy commander in the development of these hypotheses.
After they are formulated, all hypotheses are analyzed and tested.
Analysis of an hypothesis includes determining the indications that should
exist if the hypothesis is a valid one. Testing includes verifying the
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existence or nonexistence of these indications within the limitations of
available time and means.
Integration may be a mental process completed in a few moments or it
may be a lengthy process involving the collection of a large volume of
additional information.
Deduction
The last step in the analysis of information is deduction. Meaning is
deduced from the hypotheses developed; these are than tested and
considered valid as a result of integration. Deduction answers the
question: “What does this information mean in relation to the area of
operations, the enemy situation, and the friendly commander’s intent?” The
answer provides a useful conclusion which can serve as a basis for
determining future enemy courses of action and for keeping the
intelligence estimate current. Deduction should also answer the question:
“What does this information mean in relation to the enemy’s use of
tactical deception or counterdeception?" ‘The resulting answer reduces
friendly vulnerability to being deceived and the false belief that
battlefield deception operations are being believed by the enemy.
DISSEMINATION
The final step is to disseminate intelligence or information.
Dissemination is not limited to regular reports. Critical Pieces of
information are passed quickly to those who can use them. The G2 or S2
always is aware of this and prepares to use any form of communication,
from RATT to courier, to pass vital reports. Intelligence is of no value
on the battlefield when it becomes history.
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CHAPTER 3
ORDER OF BATTLE
OB intelligence is an integral part of intel I igence analysis at all
levels. Intelligence analysts consider OB intel I igence. They integrate
it with other intelligence pertaining to weather, terrain, and other
METT-T factors to determine Threat capabilities, vulnerabilities, and
probable courses of action.
This chapter describes the OB analysis process and the tools used to
develop and integrate OB.
OB is the identification, strength, command structure, and disposition
of the personnel, units, and equipment of any foreign military force.
During counterinsurgency operations, or whenever they become militarily
significant, include guerilla and insurgent forces, associated agent nets,
and the insurgent auxiliary and support structure in the Threat data base,
Data is developed in many fields outeide the scope of OB, but all
intelligence is related ultimately to it. For example, technical
intelligence (Tl) produces intelligence on the capabilities of weapons
systems, but OB intelligence determines the effect of weapon capabilities
and characteristics on enemy tactics, combat effectiveness, and
organization.
ORDER OF BATTLE FACTORS
The OB consists of evaluated information on enemy, allied and neutral
forces, including--
0 Composition.
0 Disposition.
0 Strength.
0 Tactics.
0 Training.
0 Logistics.
0 Combat effectiveness.
0 Electronic technical data.
0 Miscellaneous data.
COMPOSITION
Composition is the identification and organization of units. It
appl ies to specific units or commands as opposed to type units. Unit
3-1
identification often is called the key to OB intelligence because it leads
to the answers to many questions concerning the enemy, Unit
identification consists of the complete designation of a specific unit by
name or number, type, relative size or strength, and (usually)
subordination. Through identification, the OB analyst develops a history
of the composition, training, tactics, and combat effectiveness of an
enemy unit. The identification of a specific unit within an organization
alerts the analyst to the possible presence of other unidentified or
unlocated units of the sama organization.
Organization is the physical structure of a unit and the relationship
of the various elements within the structure. Knowledge of the
organization of a unit or military force aids in developing accurate
intelligence on current strength, and combat efficiency. Further Threat
capabilities as they relate to tactics, training, and logistics are
difficult to assess accurately without knowledge of the current
organizat ion.
The basic self-sufficient tactical unit (normally a combat division)
is considered when developing intelligence concerning composition. In
some countries, the field army is considered the basic self-sufficient
tactical unit. In others, it is the regiment. The importance of this
concept I ies in the term “’self-sufficient.”’ Units subordinate to
self-sufficient tactical units, although capable of limited independent
action, cannot sustain themselves over relatively long periods of time.
Subordinate units seldom are employed independently or separately from the
basic self-sufficient tactical unit. For example, a new Soviet motorized
rifle regiment (MRR) is reported in the AO, Knowing that the division is
the Soviets’ basic self-sufficient tactical unit and the three MRRs of a
motorized rifle division (MRD) seldom are employed independently, the
presence not only of a new regiment but of a new MRD is given tentative
acceptance. When one of these regiments is located, suspect that the
remaining elements of the division also are in the area.
DISPOSITION
Disposition consists of the location of Threat units and the manner in
which these units are deployed tactically (or administratively in times of
peace) . In addition, disposition includes the recent, current, and
projected (or probable) movements of Threat units.
Location refers to a geographical area or position occupied by a unit
or units. Knowledge of the strength and location of a Thraat force
assists the intelligence officer in determining the capabilities of the
force and its effect upon the accomplishment of the friendly mission.
Data of this type is collected during peacetime and form the basis for
assessing capabilities during the initial period of hostilities.
Tactical deployment is the relative position of units with raspect to
one another or to the terrain. Tactical formations are designed for
executing the various tactical maneuvers and usually are based upon
doctrine. If this deployment is predetermined, it leads to an accurate
appraisal of probable Threat courses of action. The knowledge of how
3-2
units are arranged in echelon indicates (if the Threat assumes the
offensive) which units are used in the initial attack and which units are
employed in supporting and reserve roles. Tactical deployment with
respect to terrain also is important. A study of disposition with an
analysis of the terrain leads to conclusions concerning Threat
capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action. Accomplish
this through the IPB process detailed in FM 34-130.
Movement of units is part of disposition. Movement is the physical
relocation of a unit from one geographical point to another. Patrol
activity may be an indication of planned movement but, in itself, is not
movement. Movement is significant because it automatically changes the
tactical deployment of the opposing forces. When a Threat unit has moved,
is moving, or possibly will move in the future, it becomes capable of
executing a number of actions which affect the conduct of the battle (or
the current political situation). Such a unit moves into an attack
position, moves to reinforce or to replace a unit, or performs other
missions. In view of these possibilities, movement of a unit becomes
important. The 06 analyst must continually monitor unit movements in
order to provide correct and detailed data on Threat dispositions.
STRENGTH
Strength describes a unit in terms of personnel, weapons, and
equipment. Information concerning strength provides the commander with an
indication of enemy capabilities and helps determine the probable courses
of action or options open to Threat commanders. A lack of strength or a
preponderance of strength has the effect of lowering or raising the
estimate of the capabilities of an opposing force. Likewise, a marked
concentration or buildup of units in an area gives the commander certain
indications of enemy objectives and probable courses of action. During
peacetime, changes in the strength of potential Threat forces are
important factors which may indicate changes in the enemy’s intention.
Appendix D describes enemy strength computations.
TACT ICS
Tactics in OB intelligence include tactical doctrine as well as
tactics employed by specific units. Tactical doctrine refers to the
Threat’s accepted principles of organization and employment of forces for
the conduct of operations. Tactics, on the other hand, describe the
manner in which units conduct an operation. From a knowledge of tactical
doctrine, the OB analyst knows how the Threat may employ forces under
various conditions and in certain type situations or special operations.
Units normally are expected to perform according to certain patterns
within the framework of their tactical doctrine. Ail Armies establish
basic principles and patterns for the employment of infantry, motorized
rifle (MR), tank, and artillery units in the offense and defense. Of a
more specific nature, special ized tactical doctrine a certain unit employs
in given situations during combat or training activities is analyzed,
because it indicates possible changes in Threat doctrine. Doctrinal
templating, as detailed in FM 34-130, is one method of graphically
portraying enemy tactics.
3-3
TRAINING
Individual and unit training contribute significantly to the combat
effectiveness of any military organization. The thoroughness, degree, and
quality of individual training which the recruit, specialist,
noncommissioned officer (NCO) , and officer receive are major factors in
determining the overall efficiency of an armed force. Unit training,
normally conducted in seasonal cycles from small unit exercises to
large-scale maneuvers, is an essential part of the training necessary for
a unit to operate at its full potential. Each type or phase of training a
unit accomplishes adds to its capabilities and effectiveness.
Specialized training that a unit receives may point to its ability to
undertake certain missions beyond its normal doctrinal capabilities or
responsibilities. Therefore, it is easier to appraise the combat
effectiveness of a unit when the degree and quality of its training are
known, as well as any specialized training it undertakes.
LOGISTICS
Logistics closely relates to combat effectiveness. The adoption of a
course of action depends on the abil ity of the logistical system to
support that action. With knowledge of the current capabilities of a
unit’s logistical support structure, make a more accurate evaluation of
its capabilities, strengths, and combat effectiveness. Also, the
locations of elements of a unit’s logistical support structure indicate
the disposition of maneuver formations and CS elements. Categories of
logistical information include--
O
All classes and types of supply.
® Supply lines of communication.
® Logistical requirements.
0 Procurement methods.
0 Distribution priorities and procedures.
0 Transportation networks and modes.
0 Installations and logistical control points.
0 Terminals.
0 Evacuation and salvage procedures.
0 Maintenance.
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COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS
Combat effectiveness describes the abilities and fighting quality of a
unit. Numerous tangible and intangible factors affect it. Combat
effectiveness affects the capabilities of a unit or army and is predicted
by analyzing-
personnel strength.
"Amount and condition of weapons and equipment.
"Status of training.
"Efficiency of the officer and NCO corps.
"Quality of leadership.
"Length of time a unit has been committed in combat.
"Traditions and past performance.
"Personality traits of the unit commanders.
"Geographical area in which committed.
"Morale, esprit, health, discipline, and political reliability (or
belief in the cause for which they fight).
"Status of technical and logistical support of the unit.
"Adequacy of military schooling at all levels.
"National characteristics of the people.
ELECTRONIC ORDER OF BATTLE
Electronic OB information is required to conduct EW. This data
includes communications and noncommunications equipment parameters, such
as emitter type and nomenclature (including encoding equipment),
modulation, multiplex capability, pulse duration, pulse repetition
frequency, bandwidth, associated weapons systems, and other technical
characteristics of electronic emissions. They also include critical
communications nodes such as CPS and logistical control points. They
support Threat electronic order of battle (EOB) templating.
electronic technical data, a more accurate evaluation of the enemy’s
vulnerability to electronic countermeasures (ECM) and deception is made;
signals intercept and direction finding (DF) for the production of SIGINT
is made easier; and support is given to electronic counter-countermeasures
(ECCM) by assessing the threat EW capabilities.
3-5
MISCELLANEOUS DATA
Miscellaneous data includes supporting information needed by an
analyst to develop other OB elements. Miscellaneous data includes basic
intelligence described as "know your enemy.”
Personality files contain information on certain characteristics and
attributes which describe individual members of a military force. A
knowledge of personalities is important in identifying units and, in some
cases, predicting the course of action the unit will take. Personality
data, therefore, is valuable because the tactics and combat efficiency of
particular units are often closely related to key individuals within its
command structure.
Unit history includes information and intelligence on the elements of
a specific unit; on present and past parent units; personalities who have
commanded the unit; and other details like past performance and activities
which describe, limit, or clarify the capabilities of the unit concerned.
The development of unit history is important in determining the
capabilities and limitations of a unit. Military or paramilitary units,
like individuals, develop characteristics which distinguish them from
other units. Just as they consider the various qualifications and traits
of threat personalities, OB personnel also must consider a Threat unit as
a personality in analyzing its capabilities and limitations. Information
on uniforms and insignias is an important part of “’know your enemy”
intelligence. This information assists in establishing unit
identification and organization and in determining morale and esprit de
corps.
Some foreign armies use systems of code numbers, names or false
tactical markings to conceal true designations (or affiliations) of units,
field post numbers (FPNs) (unit mailing address), and vehicle
identification or side numbers. These systems, when properly analyzed,
are valuable sources of information that are related to unit composition
and disposition.
The OB analyst is able to recognize and appreciate the capabilities
and limitations of foreign weapons and equipment. Although technical
intelligence agencies are primarily concerned with the determination of
weapons and equipment characteristics and capabilities, the analyst uses
this intelligence to analyze the effects of these items on the
organization, disposition, tactics, and combat effectiveness of the
mil itary force.
ORDER OF BATTLE REFERENCES
THIS SECTION IMPLEMENTS STANAG 2077
Standard OB references are published by higher echelons during
peacetime. They form the basis for lower echelon OB efforts.
3-6
ORDER OF BATTLE BOOK
An OB book is a summary of all basic intelligence concerning the
composition, d isposition, identification, subordination, and strength of a
foreign nation’s military forces. It includes all units from the var bus
services that function in a ground or ground support role. It normally is
published at EAC by the service departments and by the DIA. Allied
nations, particularly the NATO nations, also publish OB books. The level
or echelon of units shown depends on the level of command for the intended
user. Generally, this is at least one echelon above and two echelons
below that of the intended user. During peacetime, units which form only
on mobilization are identified as such.
The OB book includes the following information for each unit:
"Identification, to include:
-- Numerical designator and type of unit.
-- Nationality (if more than one nation’s forces are included in
the OB).
"FPN.
"Subordination (parent unit)
"Subordinate units.
"Location, to include:
-- Place name (and country if deployed abroad).
-- Installation number or name (if applicable).
-- Military geographic region (if applicable).
— Universal transverse mercator (UTM) coordinates (supplement
with geographic coordinates whenever possible).
"Category and effective strength.
The following data also is included:
"Code name or code number (enemy assigns official name or number).
"Nickname (unofficial popular name).
"Honors or honor titles.
"Unit insignia.
"Latitude and longitude of subject (in addition to UTM
coordinates) .
3-7
"Commander’s name, rank, initials and specialty, and those of other
key personnel.
"Combat effectiveness (including any data on special ized training).
"Signature equipment.
"Turret numbers, vehicle registration numbers, or other tactical
identification signs.
“Any other data at the discretion of the originator for example ,
basic encyclopedia (BE) or target data inventory (TDI) numbers.
The structure of an OB book varies, However, it normally contains
three sections:
Section 1. General
Section I contains the table of contents, explanatory notes and
glossary of terms, acronyms, and abbreviations used in the document,
summary list of major changes since the document was last issued, and
summary chart of current dispositions.
Section ll 0 Detailed Order of Battle
Section II contains formations or un ts grouped according to their
subordination and echelon. For example, military district, region, front
level formations, and units follow immediately after the district, region,
and front headquarters to which they are subordinate. While the same
methodology is applied at all other leveils of command within a district,
region, or front formation, the inclusion of units subordinate to
regiments is optional. Units of unknown subordination are included at the
end of each district, region, or front and are identified clearly as such.
Section III. Sumneries or Supporting Documentation
Section III contains any additional summaries or supporting
documentation, such as maps. The use of orientation maps of the nations
dealt with in the OB book is an important visual aid, especially when the
units being dealt with are superimposed. For a large country like the
USSR, include an orientation map for each military district.
Annually issue or emend OB books. While the timing and degree of
amendment are left to the discretion of the originators, an amendment
normally is published when substantial changes to publ ished OB holdings
are detected. The date of information (DOI) for the contents of the OB
book is taken to be the information cut-off date. Any amendments to the
OB book should indicate their own 001.
ORDER OF BATTLE HANDBOOK
The OB handbook, which is often referred to as a “handbook of military
forces,”’ is a summary of basic intelligence on a foreign nation’s
3-8
political or governmental structure and military establishment, including
its tactics and doctrine. It includes more technical data, such as the
logistical system used and the characteristics of weapons and equipment.
Like the OB book, higher US and allied commands publish the handbook.
The OB handbook normally deals with only one country. It deals with
two or more countries in separate parts, especially when these countries
are closely associated with each other by pact, geographically, or in some
other way. As a minimum it contains—
"History, governmental, and political structure. A short history
of the nation and a comprehensive description of its governmental
and political structure.
"Armed forces organization. A description of the nation’s military
establishment (including paramilitary and an expll anation of how C2
of the ground forces is affected).
"Ground forces organization. A complete explanation of the
organization and composition of all the various types of ground
force units and formations. The organization and composition of a
nonground force unit also is included if that unit is likely to be
placed under command or in support of the ground forces in time of
war.
"Logistical support organization. An explanation of the logistical
system the ground forces employs from ministerial level to the
lowest echelon.
° Strategic and tactical doctrine. An explanation of the nation’s
strategic and tactical military doctrine, especially at combat
levels of command.
“Reserve forces or mobi I ization. A description of reserve forces,
the mobilization system and times required for mobilization.
In addition, the OB handbook includes—
"Military education and training. A description of the military
education and training system and an explanation of the personnel
recruitment and selection process.
"Uniforms and insignia. A full description of all armed forces
uniforms, ranks, and insignia.
"Weapons and equipment. A listing and brief description including
characteristics of the various types of weapons and equipment found
in the ground forces. The list includes weapon and equipment’s
country of origin, availability of technical expertise, and
likelihood of resupply of equipment and spares.
3-9
° At lies. A list of likely military and political allies, and type
of support each may render.
The contents of the OB handbook are organized in the sequence shown
above. When included, organizational and tabular data are presented as
follows :
“Armed forces organization,, governmental and political structure.
Organizational charts are to support the narrative description of
these subjects where possible. There is no format for such charts.
“Organizational structure. Depict organizational structure for
each type of unit, Within NATO, the-symbols depicted in STANAG 2019
rapresent the various units, formations, or installations. Arrange
the organizational diagrams in the following sequence: headquarters,
combat units, CS units, service support units.
“Tables of personnel , weapons, and equipment. Produce the tables
according to STANAG 2077. Figure 3-1 shows a sample equipment list.
Amend OB handbooks periodically. The timing and degree of amendment
are left to the discretion of the originator. They should, however,
initiate amendment action whenever you detect a substantial change to
intelligence contained in the handbook or whenever you have a number of
minor amendments.
INSTALLATION HANDBOOKS
Ideally, installation handbooks contain complete information
concerning every military installation in every city in the county or Al.
They are useful, particularly during peacetime, for establishing which
forces are already in place. During wartime, the usefulness of
installation handbooks decreases somewhat. However, they still indicate
likely reserve mobilization and training centers. Two particularly useful
handbooks are the Automated Installation Intelligence File (AI IF) and the
Contingency Planning Facilities List (CPFL).
MISCELLANEOUS REFERENCES
Other publications and periodicals prepared at department! and area
command levels are of value to the OB analyst. These references may deal
specifically with OB or with any or all phases of tactical, operational,
and strategic intelligence. Specialized technical intelligence agencies
provide detailed evaluations of equipment. The Soviet Battlefield
Development Plan provides current and projected Soviet battlefield
capabilities. The CIA produces studies on general mil itary capabilities,
and economic factors which impact on military capabilities. Civilian
organizations under contract to the Department of Defense (DOD) make
special studies on various subjects concerning foreign and enemy military
forces. These studies usually are detailed, technical in nature, and
provide a wealth of special information not otherwise available.
3-1o
Equipment lists are to conform to the format shown above. The sequence and numbering of
equipment are to be established by Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
according to STANAG 2077.
Figure 3-1. Equipment list.
ORDER OF BATTLE RECORDS
The OB analyst uses various recording aids in organizing and
cataloging OB information. The OB analyst creates OB records and files
through a compilation of information available in the references discussed
above. Subsequently, they are used continuously to produce current
intelligence and to update other intelligence records, like the SITMAP and
IPB products. OB files facilitate easy reference and comparison of OB
information collected at various times from various sources. Each
intelligence processing element decides which aids to maintain. The type
used depends on the echelon of command and the local situation. Some
common recording aids are:
"Unit workbook.
“0 B workbook.
"O B SITMAP.
“0 B card file.
0 Personal ity file.
"Military installation file.
° Organizational worksheet.
"Strength worksheet.
Other file systems or forms are developed locally for special
situations.
UNIT WORKBOOK
The format of the unit workbook depends upon the structure of the
foreign army being monitored. Typically, it consists of a collection of
OB cards supplemented by supporting documentation and is arranged by type
of unit or in numerical sequence. Minimally this documentation includes
organization and strength worksheets with the workbook being updated as
new information is received. The enemy parent unit listed on the unit
worksheet should agree with the analyst’s level of command.
The analyst normally maintains records for enemy units one level above
and two levels below the command’s. In some special purpose units, three
levels or more down are followed as well. Review information from units
three levels down to develop identities on units two levels down. List
personalities on the worksheet as a ready reference to the personalities
of the enemy unit. Note and use unit, postal, and vehicle numbers on the
worksheet to determine OB changes or to confirm current data. Note
details which may reveal any facet of the enemy unit’s OB or indicate the
source of information in the remarks column. Enter reports of branch
insignia, number and type of weapons, and statements of local residents in
this column in abbreviated form. Include the data and the source of
information for each entry. The installation column of the worksheet
shows the numerical designation assigned to a particular enemy
installation when plotted on a sketch, map sheet, or town plan attached to
the workbook. For consistency and to facilitate exchange of information
between headquarters, use installation numbers Previously assigned by
theater or MACOM, Figure 3-2 shows a sample unit workbook. Figure 3-3
shows a sample page from the unit workbook.
ORDER OF BATTLE WORKBOOK
The OB workbook aids the analyst in sorting, evaluating, and
interpreting information and in preparing intelligence reports.
3-12
CLASSIFICATION
UNIT WORKBOOK
ASPS, X CORPS
CLASSIFICATION
headquar ters
FRONT HQs and TROOPs]
1 CAA
2 CAA
1
3 CAA
1 TANK ARMY
107 MRD
3 TANK DIVISION
5 TANK DIVISION
ARTILLERY BRIGADE
SAM BRIGADE
SSM BRIGADE
MISCELLANEOUS
5 MRD
tt
7 MRD
Figure 3-2. Sample unit workbook.
There is no prescribed format for the OB workbook. At corps level and
higher, the OB workbook is tabbed to conform with paragraphs of the OB
annex of the PERINTREP (see Appendix A). This makes it easier to extract
needed information for the production of intelligence reports.
Information is entered under the appropriate haading or headings as
either a complete report or a digest of the original report. All entries
contain a journal date and number in addition to identification of the
source. Comments added after each entry show the significance of tha
report when compared with the overall tactical situation. Figure 3-4
showa how information is organized in an OB workbook.
3-13
Parent Unit
SUBORDINATE
UNITS
CITY
COORDINATES
INSTL
PERSONALITIES
ID OR
CODE NO
REMARKS
Dlv Hq
Stein
PV818147
1 and 3
Commander
COL Crechin
EPW no 26,
Captured
2 Feb 68
96 Mech Rifle
Regt
Delltach
PU820934
4
Commander
COL Kurtheve
16181
Document
Captured
19 Mar 68
145 Mech Rifle
Regt
Ellenburg
PU852961
2
LTC Shrenko
16182
Deaerter
21 Mar 68
3d Bn
Glad bach
PV891024
1
Gladbach
residents rpt
battalion
subordinate
to Hqs In
Ellenburg,
3 Feb 68
43 Med Tk
Regt
Linburg
PV863106
3
Commander
COL Reshvic
Agent Report
26 May 68
358 Trans-
Bn
Lehrt
PV825158
1
16195
OB Bank
Figure 3-3. Sample page from unit workbook.
ORDER OF BATTLE S I TUAT ION MAP
The 06 SITMAP is a graphic portrayal of current threat OB, either
confirmed or unconfirmed. It shows identification and disposition of the
opposing units and any other information which will assist in developing
the threat 06.
As a general rule, threat units one echelon above and two echelons
below the analyst’s own level of command are plotted by using the
appropriate symbols in FM 101-5-1. For example, division plots maneuver
regiments and battalions; corps plots maneuver divisions and regiments.
Plot higher units to tha extent practicable. The foregoing information is
only a guide. Analysts at theater level who are responsible for
publication of OB books may plot separata battalions. Peculiarities of
unit organization, the tactical situation, and time and personnel
available within the analysis section determines more precisely what is
plotted and what is omitted on OB maps. Enter the time and date of the
information to the left of each symbol or plot. During counterinsurgency
operations, however, it may be necessary to plot guerilla or insurgent
units down to the squad level, since, depending on the situation and the
3-14
CLASSIFICATION
COMPOSITION
area, there may be no larger units operating against friendly forces.
Figure 3-5 shows the OB SITMAP. The OB SITMAP contains the same types of
information as the working SITMAP (described in Chapter 2), except it is
kept in a less cluttered state so it is better integrated with G3 or S3
operational maps and for briefing purposes. At battalion and brigade
levels, S2 and BICC officers often do not keep separate working and
briefing OB SITMAPS.
Prepare the OB SITMAP as an overlay. Like other overlays, the OB
SITMAP contains titling data. This data includes:
0 Overlay title.
3-15
041430
XX
HI
m.
Located Units (by type)
Unlocated Units
Committed Forces
Unit
No.
Wpn
Recon Bn, 38th GMRD
114th Tk Rqt, 38th GMRD
MRb
6
Ul Ind Tk Bn, 38th GMRD
TB
2
80 T-64
SSM Bn, 38th GMRD
Reinforcement
MMR
1
TR
1
94 T-64
ITB
1
51 T-64
Fire Support
SSM Bn
1
SS-21
Arty Bn
8
18xBM-21
MRL
18x152mm
SP How
72x122mm
How
36x122mm
SP How
Figure 3-5. Order of battle situation map with caption box.
3-16
"Map sheet name.
"Map sheet number.
"Map series.
"Map scale.
0 Prepared _.
A caption box on the OB SITMAP is an annotation containing information
which helps to identify and explain the OB situation graphics. Although
any number of caption boxes are used, normally three types are necessary:
strength, unlocated units, and legend.
The entries in the strength caption box usually consist of strength
computations in numbers of personnel, types of units, and weapons and
equipment categorized as committed forces, FS, and available
reinforcements. Reconnaissance elements which are part of an opposing
maneuver unit are considered as reinforcements, if uncommitted.
Assumptions like these are made to portray probable enemy capabilities.
The OB analyst must be aware of what is not known about the enemy.
The unlocated units caption box lists existing unlocated units. These
units pose a threat to the accomplishment of the friendly mission, and
maximum effort must be directed toward establishing the disposition of
unlocated units in the AO.
When it becomes necessary to improvise symbols for enemy units,
include a legend caption box on the OB SITMAP. Within this caption box,
explain the exact meaning of each, improvised symbol.
ORDER OF BATTLE CARD
The analyst uses OB cards to maintain complete and accurate data on
enemy units. The format of the card is standardized within NATO to
facilitate the exchange of information and intelligence among allied
forces. The standard recording system (whether manual or automated) is
based on a card entitled “’Order of Battle Card.’” Such cards are
maintained in wartime, at all levels including division and lower when
directed by higher headquarters or when desired. Normally, keep one card
for each enemy regiment and independent battalion within a friendly unit’s
AI.
Information on the OB card includes--
"Identification (numerics) designation, type of unit, and
national ity) .
“FPN .
"Subordination (parent unit) .
3-17
Subordinate formations or units.
0 Location (place name and UTM coordinates).
0 Table of major equipment (including war establishment and current
effective strength).
0 Combat effectiveness and category (where applicable).
The OB card contains the following optional information:
"Code name (offical name assigned by the enemy for convenience or
as a cover) .
"Honorific title.
0 Nickname (unofficial popular name).
0 Insignia.
0 Commander.
0 Unit history.
0 Signature equipment (including significant quantities).
0 Turret numbers, vehicle registration numbers or other tactical
identification signs.
"Miscellaneous.
Record validity dates and source references on the back of the card.
Also record information subject to frequent changes on the back of the
card. This includes-- ,
"Unit locations.
"Strength.
"Combat effectiveness.
Figure 3-6 shows the front and back sides of the 08 card.
PERSONALITY FILE
A personality file records personality data on designated categories
of individuals. The development of the personality file is probably one
of the most difficult analytic functions, particularly for the personnel
in Threat units at division level and below.’ However, much information is
available through open-source I iterature and intelligence information
reports (HRs). This file provides reference material used in the
development of other OB intelligence. Information on key military figures
3-18
Figure 3-6. Order of battle cards.
(Front)
BASIC COMPOSITION OVERALL LIST
1. Tactical Symbol
0
2. Formation or Unit
3. Superior Formation
or Unit
4. Nickname
5. Insignia or Personnel
Equipment
11 5 GTR
6. Initial Strength
7. Code Number
8. Code name
9. Location
10. FP Number
$5 %
11. Coordinates (UTM)
12. Commander
13. Nationality,
Formations or Unit
14. Effective Strength (%)
15. Combat Effectiveness
IT. o
LTL MPfctLV
Yakov
UR
8*-
S5%
Consecutive
Number
Subordinate
Units
Location
Coordinates
(UTM)
Installation
FP Number
(Date)
Code Name
or
Code Number
Commander
Initial
Strength
Effective
Strength
a.
b.
c.
d.
a.
1.
9-
h.
1.
I-
dx
i OTtt
HB9S
7L WB
Pft 1*5*1
n(V5
Son&tocw
P5 uVIHt
Vh5K
History:
Miscellaneous:
Back)
Figure 3-6. Order of baffle cards (continued).
3-20
is of significant value in the establishment of unit identification,
tactics, and combat effectiveness. Keep the file in alphabetical order.
The card (or sheet) contains information concerning the individual’s
name, rank, current assignment, date and place of birth, civilian
education, political affiliation, nicknames, and physical peculiarities.
The file also contains the individual’s schools, qualifications, awards,
decorations, chronology of assignments, campaigns, engagements,
demonstrated performance in leadership assignments, and important
activities participated in, as well as character traits I ike morals,
reputation, appearance, and mannerisms, published articles (which may
identify areas of concentration and expertise), and cliques with which the
individual is associated (may indicate influences and upward mobility
prospects). Each entry records the source and date of the information.
The personality file also includes information which aids the friendly
commander, G2, and G3 in deception planning and operations. This includes
habits that make the opposing commander and staff vulnerable to deception,
the most likely deception targets, the degree of freedom the cormmander
allows subordinates, how the commander reacts to new situations, and how
the fear of the unknown influences the commander’s actions. Figure 3-7
shows a suggested format for biographies used in personality files
required by STANAG 2077. Similar files may be maintained for key staff
officers and other categories of key personnel.
A. Name.
B. Date of Birth.
C. Place of Birth.
D. Civilian Education.
E. Military Education.
F. Foreign Languages.
G. Medical History.
H. Personality Traits.
I. Foreign Travel.
J. Other categories of Information as deemed appropriate.
Figure 3-7. Biography.
3-21
MILITARY INSTALLATION FILE
During peace time, higher echelons maintain military installation
files normally to facilitate publication of installation handbooks. A
collation or explanatory sheet contains all information that has bean
collected on each installation to include the number and types of
buildings and their capacities, personnel uniforms and insignia, and major
items of unit equipment. Maps, town plans, or sketches showing the
location of each installation within the city supplement this file.
Figure 3-8 shows a sample military installation file.
ORGANIZATIONAL WORKSHEET
The organizational worksheet provides a convenient method of showing
types of units within an armed force. Organizational worksheets depict
the complete breakdown of all units from the highest type headquarters to
the lowest unit, including personnel and major wsapon strengths. Since
this is rarely possible on a single sheet of paper, prepare a chart
showing the general organization of the major unit and individual charts
for each of its subordinate units. Prepare principal weapons and
equipment charts to supplement organizational charts. Figure 3-9 shows a
sample MRR organizational worksheet.
STRENGTH WORKSHEET
Use the strength worksheet to maintain a running numerical tabulation
of the enemy’s personnel and equipmant strengths. This information is
recorded on committed units, FS units, and reinforcements. Figure 3-10
shows a sample strength worksheet.
COORDINATE REGISTER
When personnel and time are available, the brigade and battalion BICCs
maintain a coordinate register. The coordinate register provides the
lower echelon intelligence officer with a workable counterpart to the
extensive intelligence files and workbooks that are maintained at higher
echelons. It graphically illustrates the situation over a small
geographical area. It is compact enough to be carried with ease for ready
access.
The register is usually a looseleaf notebook. Each page represents a
single grid square on the operational map which covers the geographical AO
and Al. This geographical area should include the enemy area, friendly
area, and areas of concern on both flanks.
The coordinate register contains two types of pages. One type is for
written entries which describe enemy activities, locations, weapons, and
similar items. The DTG and map coordinates precede these entries. The S2
adds personal comments or notations to any entry. Figure 3-11 shows a
coordinate register page with written entries.
3-22
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3-23
PERSONNEL
TANKS
ARTILLERY |
ADA j
"_ 1
SMALL ARMS
122mm
120mm
SA-9 flsA-7 1
ZSU
ATGM
ATGL
AGS 17
LMG
SP How
Mort
23-4
Regt HQ
65
3
3XMRB *
1290
18
27
99
18
108
Tk Bn
165
40
2
SP How Bn
220
18
18
18
AA Missile
Artillery Bn
60
4
4
AT Missile Btry
40
9
9
Recon Co
55
4
3
Engr Co
60
4
Sig Co
50
Cml Def Co
35
Mtr Transport
70
Co
Maint Co
70
4
Medical Co
25
Supply and
Service Pit
20
TOTAL
2225
40
18
18
4
30
4
9
140
18
129
* Strength and
equipment figu
res are ci
imulative.
Figure 3-9. Organization worksheet motorized "rifle regiment.
3-24
3-25
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111th Guards Motorized Rifle Equipment
Category
Personnel
Tanks
Artillery
APC or
IKT
Remarks
Type
T-64
122mm
How (2S1)
152mm
How(2S1)
120mm
Mort
BMP-1
i. Committed
Forces
Losses
Full
Str
Losses
Full
Str
Losses
Full
Str
Losses
Full
Str
Losses
1st MRB(-)
50
13
6
2nd MRB(-)
35
13
6
RSI
2. Reinforcements
3rd MRB
10
6
4th TB(-)
10
14
3. Ftre Support
Arty Bn or 111
GMRR
18
18
Totals
105
40
11
18
3
18
0
18
3
Note: Additional columns and rows may be added to encompass additional unit or weapons systems.
| TEM
LOCAL
TIME
COORD
GRID SQUARE 32U NA2815
STATEMENT
NOTES
H
092235
28381539
MG fires on recon pit from A Co.
Have next pit check this area.
2
092318
?
Veh noise - Tk? - Heard direct N of
A Co OP 2 28321507.
Ask air OP to look
3
100600
Special OB report on wpns
and fortifications.
Div wants more info on
wpns strength.
280215323 to
28141527
Trenches and bunkers.
281415227 to
28221529
Wire.
28611545 to
28781551
Platoon on line has 2 MG’s.
Same MG as yesterday?
Check this!
28811551 to
29001599
Extensive trenches and firing PSNS.
4
102335
28391530 to
28691541
B Co pit rpts wire and AP mines.
New since 081800.
5
110600
28431588
Res unit (co?) in general area.
(From Div PIR).
6
110630
28381557
Med tk spotted by L plane.
How many more?
■
111320
28731584 and
28151564
Active mortars.
B
120010
28611564
Flash from small cal arty not over
75.
AT? AA? Gun? RR or
bazooka? Ask higher HQ.
Figure 3-11. Coordinate register with written entries.
The second type schematically represents a single grid square.
Entries are plotted on the square in the same manner used to plot the
enemy SITMAP. This page shows graphically any data applicable to a single
grid square. Figure 3-12 shows how an enlarged grid square is drawn and
entries are made.
The coordinate register is used to--
“Determine enemy dispositions and routes of movement.
"Predict enemy intentions and main effort.
"Plan reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) operations.
“Brief and debrief patrols.
3-26
“Plans FS.
“Brief the commander and staff.
“Assist in IPB.
“Reveal enemy perceptions of how the terrain will sup port maneuver
against them.
Data from the coordinate register is plotted on a vert j c a I aerial
photograph that has been annotated with grid lines. A sea le of 1:25,000
3-27
or larger is desirable. By plotting selected OB information on the photo,
an analysis of the terrain is conducted simultaneously with a correlation
of information on the enemy. The photo provides an excellent means of
briefing commanders down to platoon level on the AO and the enemy
situation. Targeting is accomplished in a more precise manner by using a
photo instead of the traditional 1:50,000 map. While not common in mid-
to high-intentsity conflict these photos are especially useful in LIC.
The coordinate register is reviewed when the unit moves to a new area,
when new data is added, and when obsolete data is deleted. Timely
maintenance of the coordinate register is not practical in fast-moving
high-intensity situations like pursuit, delay, and exploitation. The
coordinate register would, however, be very valuable in a relatively
static situation or in a low-intensity conflict (LIC).
Whenever possible, maintain the register on strong semitransparent
bond paper. The transparency of bond paper is sufficient to allow the use
of a grid scale underneath the schematic page. This allows a more
accurate and rapid plotting of, or reference to, the entries.
The scale of the schematic page normally is a matter of SOP. Such
standardization assists in dissemination of intelligence data from higher
to lower echelons. For security reasons, the friendly situation normally
is not plotted in the coordinate register.
ENEMY COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS
A number of factors, some tangible, others not, determines the combat
effectiveness of enemy units. Of these factors, only the personnel and
equipment strength lend themselves to factual analysis, and only major
items of equipment, like tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and
artillery weapons lend themselves to detailed quantifiable analysis. This
is because personnel strength fluctuations are extremely difficult to
assess accurately. Appendix D describes procedures for computing
personnel and equipment strength. The following states the combat
effectiveness of a unit:
“The 133 MRR is estimated to be at 80 percent effective
strength. Evidence of low morale suggests that the unit is
less combat effective than the estimated effective strength
may indicate.”
ARBITRARY UNIT DESIGNATORS
The identification, by title, of a particular unit or formation on the
battlefield is difficult during war. Although it is argued that such
precise identification is not important and that one enemy division is as
much of a threat as another, this ignores the problems of collation,
dangers of double counting, and comfusion. To deal with this problem,
NATO and national formations apply a unique arbitrary unit designator
(AUD) to unidentified enemy format iens.
There are two types of unidentified enemy formations:
3-28
"Formations which are well known except for their actual title.
“Formations seen on the battlefield whose history, background, and
title are unknown.
SHAPE allocates the AUDs. They appear in NATO and national OB
summaries in peacetime in the columns normally filled by unit title. Use
these AUDs in war also.
The AUDS consist of a prefix, a number, and a suffix.
The prefix consists of a three-digit alphanumeric distinguishing code
that indicates the number and nationality of the corps that originates the
AUD. The following are examples:
“The 1st British Corps uses IUK.
“The 2d German Corps uses 2GE.
“The 7th US Corps uses 7US.
A two-letter distinguishing code indicating the NATO formation and
allocating the AUD is an optional method of establishing prefixes.
Figure 3-13 shows these AUD prefixes.
Each national corps allocates blocks of numbers between 000 and 999 to
their own headquarters and subordinate formations. Similarly, divisions
may, if they wish, suballocate numbers to their subordinate formations.
Al I formations of a corps and corps headquarters, however, use the same
pref lx.
After the prefix and number is a suffix indicating--
“The nationality of the enemy formation.
“The type of formation.
Do not change the actual numbers allocated by a particular national or
NATO formation normally unless an unidentified enemy is recognized
separately by two formations, each of which allocates its own AUD. Under
such circumstances, the relevant superior headquarters, having agreed that
an unidentified enemy formation is present, will either--
“Accept one of the already allotted AUDs, but replace the prefix
with its own.
“Allocate a new AUD.
In either case, inform both of the originating formations.
As an example of an unidentified enemy with two allotted AUDs, a
division of the 2d German Corps and a division of the 1st British Corps
separately detect the presence of an unidentified Soviet MRD in the area
3-29
SHAPE .SH
AFNORTH.AN
COMNON .NN
COMSONOR. SN
COMBALTAP . BA
COMLANDJUT. JA
COMZEALAND . ZE
AFCENT. AC
NORTHAG. NG
CENTAG . CG
AFSOUTH . AS
LANDSOUTH . LS
LANDSOUTHEAST.SE
AMF(L).AM
Figure 3-13. Arbitrary unit designator.
of the intercorps boundary and each gives it an AUD using the block of
numbers al located to them by their own corps (2GE369 UR MRD and 1UK473 UR
MRD, respectively). Each corps adopts the AUD allocated by its division.
The corps HQ knows from which division the AUD originated by the
number appl ied. HQ NORTHAG agrees that an Ul UR MRD is present and
decides to retain the German (GE) number but allocates it a NORTHAG
prefix. From then on, until positively identified or changed by Allied
Forces, Central Europe (AFCENT), or SHAPE, the unidentified formation is
known as NG369 UR MRD. If for some reason it is changed by AFCENT or
SHAPE, apply an AFCENT or SHAPE prefix.
3-30
CHAPTER 4
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
IPB is a tool to aid the commander and staff in determining where and
when to use limited resources to achieve decisive results. IPB applies to
all ph ases of the AirLand Battlefield; close-in, deep, and rear operations
synchronization are all supported by the IPB process.
For planning the close-in phase of the operations, IPB provides a
guide for the initial allocation and employment of combat power. Through
event templating, it is possible to identify where the enemy probably will
thrust if attacking, or where the enemy will concentrate forces if
defending. Through terrain and weather analysis and templating
techniques, it is possible to determine where friendly forces can best
move, shoot , and communicate, and where to place friendly strength against
enemy weakness. During tactical operations, IPB supports the use of fire
and maneuver to achieve a tactical advantage. Event templating
facilitates following enemy forces and determining their probable course
of action. Decision support templates (DSTs) enable the commander to
apply combat power in a timely manner.
IPB is especially useful as a tool for planning and fighting the deep
operations. Through threat evaluation, enemy critical nodes and HVTS are
identified readily. Event templating determines the optimum time and
place to interdict the enemy to achieve maximum delay, disruption,
destruction, and when and where to achieve decisive exploitation of
identified weakness. it facilitates the identification and location of
deep targets in time to strike them at the optimum time and place in a
manner which constrains and causes the collapse of close-in enemy actions.
AirLand Battle concepts were introduced in Chapter 1 of this manual, and
an application of IPB and collection in deep operations and maneuver plans
is further explained in FM 34-130.
When planning rear operations, IPB allows the commander to efficiently
focus friendly efforts. Capacity and trafficability of supply routes are
identified. Avenues for the commitment of reserves become apparent, as do
the choke points which the enemy will attempt to target. The analyst
studies drop zones (DZs) and landing zones (LZs) and the air approaches to
them, and provides the commander information about the rear area threat.
The most advantageous locations for support areas can also be found. Al I
of this permits the commander to use friendly forces in the most
economical method possible, which frees assets for the close-in and deep
operations.
IPB is an essential part of staff planning. Initially, the G2 uses it
to develop intelligence about the enemy, weather, and terrain that the
commander and staff need to complete their planning. The analysis of the
AO and the intelligence estimate primarily embody this intelligence.
While IPB does not replace these documents totally, use it as an aid to
their development. It aleo converts much of the written material into
4-1
graphics which are understood easily, analyzed, and appl ied to the
planning process.
The intelligence estimate is a key to the decisionmaking process.
Through IPB, the estimate is presented in a graphic format. This enables
the commander and staff to see, rather than visualize mentally, where both
friendly and enemy forces can move, shoot, and communicate. It provides a
graphic data base for comparing friendly and enemy courses of action.
Weather and terrain overlays tell us not only where the enemy moves,
shoots , and communicates but where friendly units accomplish these
functions as well. Just as the G2 uses templating to determine enemy
courses of action, the G3 uses templating techniques to compare friendly
courses of action.
IPB helps the G2 determine—
“Where to look.
“When to look.
“What to look for.
“What to look with.
“What to expect to see.
IPB helps the G3 determine—
“Where to maneuver, shoot, jam, and communicate.
“When to maneuver, shoot, jam, and communicate.
“What friendly resources to maneuver, shoot, jam, and Communicate
with.
“What enemy assets to maneuver, shoot, and jam.
“What results to expect.
IPB is vital to the commander’s estimate and tactical decisions
regarding the concept of the operation because it produces an accurate
comparison of friendly and enemy capabilities and courses of action. It
enables the commander to see friendly and enemy vulnerabilities and
opportunities and to determine where, when. and how to support forces to
ensure success.
Successful preparation and application of IPB products depend on the
intelligence analyst’s ability. The intelligence analyst must know both
enemy and friendly maneuver doctrine; must understand what a mission
statement involves; and must focus efforts to support the mission. To
provide the commander with the intelligence required to make a high
quality decision, the analyst must also coordinate extensively with other
staff sections. These include the G3 or S3, the FSE, AD, engineers,
4-2
battlefield deception elements, and USAF weather teams. Other sections,
such as the G5 and G4 or S4 become involved in rear area IPB. Each of
these sections and others have data which are vital to IPB. Each of these
sections also has requirements which are filled by IPB. Use of this
manual and FM 34-130 helps the analyst succeed in supporting the commander
effectively.
IPB influences every stage of an operation and is continuous. It
begins with a staff estimate process, which involves interaction from all
the staff sections.. Because battlefield conditions and tactical
situations change, IPB must be dynamic. The products which result from
IPB are often perishable, and must be updated to remain val id. Figure 4-1
shows how the staff sections interact during the IPB process. Chapter 4
of FM 101-5 describes in detail why IPB is conducted prior to an
operation.
Conducting IPB and knowing how to apply its products, are two
different processes. This chapter explains how the intelligence analyst
utilizes IPB to assist the commander and staff in the successful planning
and execution of AirLand Battle. A more detailed description of the IPB
process is available in FM 34-130.
PURPOSE OF INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
The key to effective IPB application centers around the G2 or S2 staff
understanding what can be accomplished with it. Much time and effort is
expended without purpose if IPB is conducted in a vacuum.
The analyst’s objective when applying the IPB process is to reduce
battlefield uncertainties as they relate to terrain, weather, and enemy.
During the IPB process, the graphics produced aid the commander and staff
in planning and synchronizing more effective operations. IPB focuses the
S2’s intell igence collection effort where it is most effective. IPB also
assists the commander in the decision-making process. For a detailed
description of how IPB assists in decision making read Chapter 4,
FM 101-5. IPB helps the commander control the battle by describing what
the enemy’s most likely course of action is, including when and where it
will occur and how the enemy’s follow-on forces affect the battle.
In situation and target development, the IPB product shows the
commander when to most effectively attack enemy forces by fire and
maneuver and when to seize the initiative. Using the IPB graphics, the
intell igence analyst can identify and prepare the attack of HPTs as they
move onto the battlefield. This reduces the effectiveness of the enemy’s
forces, causing them to be disrupted and delayed, and presenting further
targets for maneuver or FS missions. In threat integration of IPB, the
analyst uses analysis models to forecast events on the battlefield.
The IPB process, if applied properly and with purpose, contributes
immeasurably to mission accomplishment. However, as with any predictive
instrument, IPB will never achieve 100 percent accuracy.
4-3
Figure 4-1. The planning process,
DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION
OF THE BATTLEFIELD PRODUCTS
Graphics are basic to IPB analysis. Often intelligence is
communicated best with pictures. The analysis of the battlefield and the
intelligence estimate are not replaced, but merely assisted by graphics.
These graphics become the basis for intelligence and operational planning.
Currency is maintained through graphic renewal or update. Right now most
aspects of IPB analysis are prepared manually. Preparing graphics by hand
is slow and time-consuming. Properly prepared, graphics are relatively
simple and inexpensive to maintain. The benefits of graphic analysis and
display of intelligence are worth the initial investment of time and
resources. It is therefore incumbent upon the G2 or S2 to make maximum
use of available time and personnel to produce those graphics which are
most beneficial to the commander. Particularly at brigade and battalion
level, all personnel must be capable of conducting the IPB process.
Additionally G2s or S2s at each echelon should provide subordinate unit
S2s as many IPB products as possible. This saves time and permits the
subordinate level S2 to expand on higher level IPB products or produce
others unique to the unit mission.
The graphics produced during the IPB process have numerous purposes
and functions. A good analyst knows what to accomplish from each.
Terrain and weather factor overlays, for example, help depict the effects
of terrain and weather on potential friendly and enemy courses of action.
Further on in the IPB process, analysts produce four
templates--doctrinal, situation, event, and decision support. Figure 4-2
gives the description and purpose of each template. These templates help
the analyst to deduce and analyze enemy capabilities, predict their most
likely courses of action, identify information gaps, and determine TAIs.
In other words, the graphics produced during the IPB process help in
conducting analysis.
APPLICATION OF INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
The IPB process begins with the mission. Upon receipt of a mission,
the commander analyzes the situation and has the staff present a situation
update. From this initial information, the commander conducts mission
analysis and restates the mission. The commander then sets the staff
planning process in motion by providing planning guidance and intent. The
commander also determines initial PIRs.
Using the commander’s guidance, the staff begins to prepare their
estimates. The IPB process primarily takes place during the estimate
process.
The intelligence analyst considers the amount of available time and
the number of soldiers on staff who can conduct IPB. Giving due
consideration to resources, the analyst initiates the IPB process with the
intent to produce sufficient graphic products to assist the commander and
staff in their planning.
4-5
As a minimum, the analyst prepares a modified combined obstacle
overlay (MCOO), a situation template depicting how the enemy looks at the
most critical moment on the battlefield, an event template from which to
develop the R&S plan, and a DST.
The G2 or S2 applies IPB to assist the analytical process and
accomplish as much of the process as possible to support the commander in
what little time is available. Time is the analyst’s greatest enemy as
there is never enough of it. If there is time for only one situation
template, the analyst prepares the one most critical to the commander’s
mission. This is why it is so important for the G2 or S2 staff to
understand the commander’s intent. Time spent initially providing
guidance and establishing specific tasks for each member of the G2 or S2
staff who conducts IPB, goes a long way towards a more complete IPB
product which contributes to the commander’s successful mission
accomplishment.
TEMPLATE
DESCRIPTION
PURPOSE
WHEN PREPARED
Doctrinal
Enemy doctrinal deployment for
various types of operations without
constraints imposed by the weather
and terrain. Composition, formations,
frontages, depths, equipment numbers
and ratios, and HVTs are types of
information displayed.
Provides the basis for
integrating enemy doc¬
trine with terrain and
weather data.
Threat
Evaluation
Situation
Depicts how the enemy might deploy
and operate within the constraints
imposed by the weather and terrain.
Used to identify critical
enemy activities and
locations. Provides a
basis for situation and
target development and
HVT analysis.
Threat
Integration
Event
Depicts locations where critical events
and activities are expected to occur and
where critical targets will appear.
Used to predict time-
related events within criti¬
cal areas. Provides a
basis for collection opera¬
tions, predicting enemy
intentions, and locating
and tracking HVT.
Threat
Integration
Decision
Support
Depicts decision points and target areas
of interest keyed to significant events
and activities. The intelligence estimate
In graphic form.
Used to provide a guide
as to when tactical deci¬
sions are required rela¬
tive to battlefield event.
Threat
integration
Figure 4-2. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield templates.
4-6
BATTLEFIELD AREA EVALUATION
Battlefield area evaluation (BAE) as the first step in the IPB process
sets the stage for the rest of the process.
During the conduct of BAE, the intelligence analyst studies the
battlefield area to focus the IPB effort. The analyst studies the
battlefield to obtain a general feel for how terrain and weather affect
operations. The AO has been provided.
Delineation of the Al is done to direct a portion of the collection
effort (with support from higher headquarters) against enemy forces which
can directly influence the unit’s mission. The G2 and G3 or S2 and S3
determine the Al based on how much time the commander needs to react to a
threat. For example, if the enemy has the potential to enter the
battalion AO via one of the flanks, and the battalion reserve needs two
hours to move to most areas on the flanks, then based on an enemy
doctrinal advance rate of 6 kilometers per hour (kph), the analyst would
probably extend the Al on the flanks to at least 12 kilometers (kms). The
analyst must understand the mission, the commander’s intent, and both
friendly and enemy capabilities.
METT-T and the commander’s concept of the operation determine the Al.
Once the Al is established, the analyst informs higher command of the area
it covers so they can assist in collection.
During the BAE phase the analyst studies the battlefield to determine
significant areas and considerations to be studied in more depth during
the remaining IPB phases.
Terrain Analysis
The intelligence analyst has one primary objective when conducting
terrain analysis -- to reduce the commander’s battlefield uncertainties as
they relate to terrain. Terrain analysis emphasizes the use of graphics
to portray the effects of terrain on operations.
The G2 or S2 depicts via graphic products--
"Terrain which impedes or hinders maneuver and mobility.
"Terrain which does not restrict maneuver and mobility.
"Avenues of approach (AAs) and mobility corridors (MCs).
The lower the level at which the analyst works, the less time the
analyst may have to prepare terrain factor overlays. The analyst must
prepare those overlays which support the commander’s mission and intent.
This requires the G2 or S2 to prioritize and set time lines as to what the
analyst should accomplish.
4-7
Modified Combined Obstacle Overlays
The intelligence analyst prepares a MCOO. This overlay is a
combination of various overlays or if done as one overlay, then simply is
a graphic representation of what should be highlighted about the terrain.
It is based on OCOKA (observation and fields of fire (FofF), concealment
and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and AA and MCs).
Terrain analysis at division level and higher benefits from engineer
terrain teams or detachments attached to G2 staffs assisting in terrain
analysis. Time constraints may not permit receipt of engineer terrain
products by brigade and battalion S2s. The intelligence staff must train
in the conduct of terrain analysis to be capable of producing their own
terrain graph ics. Appendix E of this manual, Terrain Analysis in IPB,
provides the analyst basic guidelines for conducting terrain analysis.
For a detailed description of how to conduct terrain analysis refer to
FM 34-130.
Terrain analysis focuses on the military aspects of terrain known as
OCOKA. Chapter 4 of FM 34-130 provides a detailed description of OCOKA.
The following guidelines are important to the analyst when applying
OCOKA.
Observation and Fields of Fire . Observation involves the type of units
(both friendly and enemy) which are on the ground. The analyst asks
questions such as:
"To what degree does vegetation or relief obscure tha observation
of friendly or enemy units?
“How will the ground unit be observed from the air?
The analyst focuses on the time of attack or expected tima of enemy
penetration into the main battle area (MBA). Also the analyst considers
what night observation devices both forces possess. These factors impact
on the conduct of the battle.
Another important factor is how the friendly force looks from the
enemy’s perspective. This principal applies to all other OCOKA factors as
well. The distinction is made clear to the commander by providing details
versus generalities.
Observation also influences the capability for R&S and TA. In the IPB
context, this refers to optical and electronic line of sight (LOS). Many
battlefield systems require LOS to function effectively. These include
radios, radar, intercept and direction finders, jammers, direct fire
weapons, human vision, and binoculars.
Air defense (AD) TA and weapons require LOS from their positions to
air targets. The analyst considers the anticipated flight altitude
relative to the elevation of adjacent terrain.
4-8
The effects of terrain and weather on these systems influence the
commander’s view of the battlefield. What is important for the analyst to
consider when studying the terrain is to study it based on the battlefield
systems available to the commander and the threat. Again, because time is
limited, the analyst prioritizes those battlefield systems most critical
to the mission.
LOS overlays graphically illustrate the effects of terrain on friendly
and enemy observation and FofF. The horizontal visibility or FofF overlay
combines the LOS effects of vegetation and elevation features. The
relative capabilities of direct fire weapons, communications, and
collection and TA systems become apparent. This overlay assists in
identifying key terrain with greater precision. Figure 4-3 shows
horizontal LOS FofFs. This is the type of overlay that the engineer
terrain team prepares at division or higher. If assigned to brigade or
battalion level, the analyst requests this overlay for the Al.
Figure 4-3. Horizontal LOS fields of fire.
Concealment and Cover . Concealment is protection from observation or
surveillance. Cover is shelter or protection from fire either natural or
artificial. The analyst discerns the difference between concealment and
cover . The two are not combined when examining the terrain for their
effects. The analyst examines concealment to distinguish it from ground
and aerial observation.
4-9
The analyst decides the type forces which concealment may or may not
impact; for example, concealment may be good for soldiers on foot, yet
poor if riding in tracked vehicles.
The analyst addresses cover from direct and indirect fires. The
analyst identifies (particularly important at battalion level) points
within the AO where concealment and cover are critical to successful
mission accomplishment.
Obstacles. Obstacles, whether artificial or natural, are very important
considerations in the conduct of terrain analysis. Obstacles
significantly impact on a force’s ability to maneuver or move rapidly
through an area. The analyst should not assume that an obstacle for
friendly force units is an obstacle for threat units also. The wise
analyst examines obstacles separately from the point of view of both enemy
and friendly force units and acknowledges that obstacles are different and
impact differently depending on the type of battlefield operating system
that is used.
Key Terrain . Key terrain is any point or area on the ground whose control
or seizure provides an important tactical advantage. Any terrain which
increases a unit’s abil ity to apply combat power or decreases the
opponent’s abil ity to apply theirs is considered key terrain.
Decisive terrain is that terrain which, if not controlled or if
controlled by the opponent, significantly degrades the commander’s ability
to successfully accomplish the mission. For example: The Fulda River in
West Germany, and in particular the crossing sites on it, is considered
decisive terrain for US forces defending against Threat forces approaching
from the east. On the other hand, the Harm River, 6 km east of the Fulda
River, while it is considered key terrain for a unit in the defense,
probably is not considered decisive terrain because--
°The Harm River hinders enemy movement across it (particularly if
covered by fire); but it does not prevent movement because it is
narrower and easier to cross than the Fulda.
0 It is not an obstacle to movement because it is narrower and much
easier to cross.
Avenues of Approach and Mobility Corridors . AAs are routes by which a
force reaches key terrain or an objective. AAs are evaluated in the
following terms:
“Maneuver support potential .
“Access to key terrain and adjacent AAs.
“Degree of canalization.
“Concealment and cover.
“Observation and FofF.
4-1 o
"Obstacles.
MCS are subsets of AAs. MCS are areas within the AA which permit
movement and maneuver. They permit friendly and enemy forces to advance
or withdraw in doctrinal configuration, and to capital ize on the
principles of mass, momentum, shock, and speed.
The intelligence officer or analyst should not get caught up on
whether a piece of terrain is an MC. It is important that the analyst
identify, based on knowledge of friendly and enemy assets, routes which
either force will most likely use. Later in IPB, the analyst focuses
collection resources on them.
When determining AAs and MCs, the analyst uses the one-up, two-down
rule. The analyst determines AAs for enemy forces one echelon above and
MCS for forces two echelons below the level of command conducting the
analysis.
In determining AAs and MCS, the analyst keeps in mind the type force
for which they are developed, the unit mission, and the potential enemy
force mission. If an air threat exists the analyst develops air AAs. If
time is short, the analyst seeks assistance from higher commands. The
analyst may even involve the unit air defense artillery (ADA) officer.
The analyst carries the AA through the enemy’s immediate and
subsequent objectives. When on the offense, the analyst identifies
potential enemy counterattack AAs and if possible AAs within the AO for
friendly force units. The analyst also identifies MCS for friendly units.
In determining friendly AAs and MCS the one-down, two-down rule applies;
that is, the analyst identifies potential AAs for subordinate elements one
echelon below the command conducting the analysis and MCS for subordinate
elements two levels below. The battalion S2, for example, identifies
company size AAs and platoon size MCS.
TERRAIN DATA BASE DEVELOPMENT
The analyst compares terrain product requirements with the terrain
data base to identify gaps. In addition to standard topographic maps
covering the Al, the following sources are helpful:
“Current intelligence estimate and analysis of the AO from higher
headquarters.
“Special terrain studies and products prepared by US or
host-country agencies, special maps, charts, and geodetic studies.
“Current photography.
“Actual terrain reconnaissance.
TERRAIN FACTOR MATRIX DEVELOPMENT
The terrain factor matrix provides a guide for terrain analysis. The
matrix develops from an analysis process whereby terrain factors are
4-11
identified and correlated with specific types of combat operations and
battlefield functions. The terrain factor matrix assists the intelligence
analyst in identifying the types of terrain products needed. Figure 4-4
shows the terrain factor matrix.
COMBINED OBSTACLE OVERLAY DEVELOPMENT
When the terrain factor overlays are stacked and registered, the
uncoiored portion represents areas in which a force moves unimpeded. Also
highlighted are areas which facilitate a maneuver element’s ability to
shoot and communicate. The overlays show significant terrain features
that are further developed in the analysis process. Through graphic
terrain factor analysis, the terrain team and the S2 section focus on
terrain areas that are significant for further analysis.
FACTORS
FUNCTIONS
Surface
Configuration
(Slope)
Surface
Materials
(Soils)
Vegetation
Weather
Effects
On Terrain
Transportation
Obstacle
(Linear)
Built-up
Areas
Surface
Drainage—
(Hydrology)
(Observation and
Fields of Fire
X
H
X
X
X
H
Concealment
and Cover
X
X
X
H
Assembly
Areas
X
X
X
X
X
X
Key Terrain
X
X
X
X
X
(Ground Avenues
Of Approach
X
H
X
X
X
H
■
X
Air Avenues
of Approach
X
X
X
X
H
■
X
Weapon Sites
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
DZ and LZ
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Maneuver
X
X
X
X
X
X
ma
X
LOC and MSR
X
X
X
n
Barriers and
Fortifications
X
H
X
X
X
H
X
Line of Sight
X
X
X
a
Communication
Sites
X
n
X
X
X
H
EW Sites
X
n
X
X
X
n
a
1
E
Figure 4-4. Terrain factor matrix.
4-12
The combined obstacle overlay incorporates all pertinent terrain
factors which assist the analyst in identifying mobility areas and
deducing trafficability rates for AA analysis.
Figure 4-5 is an example of a combined obstacle overlay. The overlay
is particularly important because it integrates al 1 obstacles into one
graphic display. This greatly simplifies further analysis of AAs and MCS.
Crosshatching indicates the obstacles and the blank areas indicate freedom
of movement.
Figure 4-5. Combined obstacles overlay.
The effects of weather on mobility should not be ignored Through the
cooperative efforts of terrain and weather teams, weather eff ects are
integrated with the terrain analysis. As a result, the comb ned obstacles
overlay reflects average weather-induced terrain conditions. Excessive
precipitation affects soil density, slope, river stage, and visibility.
Cloud cover (CC) prolongs the drying period. Normal SLOW-GO traffic
conditions may convert to NO-GO conditions which impact on both friendly
and enemy force movements. The intelligence analyst prepares combined
obstacles overlays that reflect at least normal weather effects on
mobility. Based on a review of historic weather patterns, the analyst
associates specific weather factors with specific time periods.
Figures 4-6 through 4-8 show—
"Obstacles with dry soil.
4-13
"Obstacles created by wet soil.
"Combined obstacles w ith wet soil.
The combined obstacles overlay provides a basis for identifying AAs
and MCs. Having determined where the enemy cannot move without
difficulty, the analyst focuses attention on those areas where the
opposing force can move. Figure 4-9 shows normal requirements for
identifying AAs and MCS.
<f &
COMBINED OBSTACLES
(Dry Soil)
Vegetation Impeding
movement.
Hydrology (rivers)
Figure 4-6. Obstacles with dry soil.
The combined obstacles overlay usually reveals one or more MC. Since
regiments normally advance along separate MCS, each division AA should
contain regimental MCS. The start point of an attack begins at enemy
assembly areas and terminates at their objective.
A convenient technique for identifying AAs is to place a doctrinal
template over a potential AA and visualize the enemy force moving through.
Ask: Is there sufficient maneuver space? How does the enemy look while
approaching critical points on the battlefield, such as the FEBA? How
does the enemy look when considering attrition? An enemy force fighting
through a covering force takes losses. To the attrition add the fact that
the enemy has a narrower front when attempting a breakthrough. The
analyst uses this information to depict a more realistic AA. When
briefing on the AAs, the S2 or analyst must “talk” the commander through a
visualization of the enemy force fighting along the AA. Figure 4-10 shows
what the commander needs to see.
4-14
The analyst moves the template along the avenue from projected enemy
assembly areas to the objective. An AA is never completely free of
obstacles, but it provides for relatively free movament. Obstacles
generally parallel the direction of movement.
The analyst selects alternative AAs. If they partially overlap, the
analyst should not be concerned. The most direct route to the objective
normally is a viable option.
LINE OF SIGHT ANALYSIS
In terrain and weather analysis, the terrain team determines LOS for
weapons, communications, TA, intelligence collection, and R&S systems.
Direct fire weapon systems like the antitank guided missile (ATGM), the
self-propel led antiaircraft gun, and the tank need good FofF to
successfully engage the enemy forces at maximum range. fm radio
communications, forward observers, TA and surveillance radar systems, and
SIGINT need optical or electronic LOS to the target. Terrain and weather
factor overlays assist in analyzing LOS limitations. LOS analysis helps
determine where ground forces can best shoot and communicate and the most
likely low altitude air approaches into the AO. In LOS analysis, the
analyst considers the following factors:
"Terrain elevation.
4-15
IF YOU ARE AT
AVENUES OF APPROACH
MOBILITY CORRIDORS
DIVISION
RECEIVE ARMY AA FROM PARENT
CORPS
DEVELOP DIV AA FOR SUBORDINATE
BDE
RECEIVE REGT MC FROM
PARENT CORPS
DEVELOP BN MC FOR
SUBORDINATE BDE
BRIGADE
RECEIVE DIV AA FROM PARENT
DIV
DEVELOP REGT AA FOR SUBORDINATE
BNS
RECEIVE BN MC FROM
DIV
DEVELOP CO MC FOR
SUBORDINATE BN
BATTALION
RECEIVE REGT AA FROM PARENT
BDE
RECEIVE CO MC FROM
BDE
DEVELOP PLT MC
Figure 4-9. Avenues of approach and" mobility corridors matrix.
"Tree and vegetat ion he ight above elevat ion.
0 Height of built-up areas.
“Density of ground vegetation at full growth.
“Terrain factors, such as defiles, which are not apparent because
of contour spacing.
4-16
"Effects of weather, such as fog or precipitation that obscure
observation.
The effects of seasonal changes on LOS should be readily apparent.
Winter vegetation compared to summer full growth alters LOS significantly.
The limitations of the standard military map is overcome through imagery
analysis (1A) and ground reconnaissance. Imagery analysts and terrain
specialists are trained in LOS analysis.
Direct fire weapons systems require horizontal or ground LOS. As a
rule, 4,000 meters (m) is considered the maximum range for unaided direct
fire weapons. Horizontal LOS overlays also depict friendly LOS.
Figure 4-10. Selecting avenues of approach.
4-17
Figure 4-11 is a horizontal LOS overlay depicting FofF. Areas of maximum
LOS are color-coded to aid analysis. Other range parameters are colored
for easy identification. Heavily forested areas would not necessarily
obscure LOS. Depending on the density of vegetation, LOS might penetrate
100 m or might penetrate 100 m or more of the forest. The height of
ground vegetation and the seasonal density (taller than 1 m) might degrade
LOS. This illustrates why an analyst must know the terrain of each
battlefield system that is being analyzed.
While ground-based systems need horizontal LOS, airborne systems use
oblique or vertical LOS. An attack helicopter armed with machine guns and
rockets rel ies on LOS from the aircraft to the target. Standoff weapon
systems that pop up from behind masking terrain require accurate LOS and
positioning data. Airborne R&S systems, such as the side-looking airborne
radar (SLAR), have similar needs for LOS data. Analysis of vertical and
oblique LOS from an enemy AD and target perspective helps identify the
best air avenues of approach (AAAs) into enemy airspace.
Determining how terrain and weather conditions along each AA affects
radio and other means of field communications is probably the area least
considered by most analysts because of their general lack of knowledge of
communications systems. The corps or division signal officer assists in
determining the advantages and limitations of each AA to enemy
communications systems. The SIGINT analyst also assists in this effort.
Most AAs do not offer unlimited options for the employment of
communications and noncommunications systems. The intelligence analyst
prepares a communication-noncommunication overlay of potential sites for
4-18
each MC. Having done this, the analyst compares each and makes some
initial determinations as to which is most favorable. |_qs information
also is essential to electronic deception since this operation requires
knowledge of where friendly signatures are observed. Figure 4-12 shows
terrain masking and horizontal LOS.
Figure 4-12. Horizontal line of sight.
4-19
AVENUES OF APPROACH ANALYSIS
In AA analysis, the intelligence analyst selects the AAs and AAAs that
best support the capabilities to move, shoot, and communicate. The
analyst considers each avenue in relation to each friendly or enemy
capability, and then lists and compares the advantages and disadvantages
of each. This is not merely a matter of counting advantages and
disadvantages, but requires detai lad analysis and sound judgment.
This analysis is not to determine which AAs the enemy selects, but
rather to determine which best supports the capability to move, shoot, and
communicate. Figure 4-13 shows how an analyst depicts AAs on an overlay.
Once the most viable AAs are selected, the analyst prepares an overlay
depicting each AA and MC. MCS are subsets of AAs and both are shown
together. When weather is a consideration, the analyst prepares an
overlay for each season.
4-20
APPLICATION OF WEATHER FACTORS OVERLAYS TO ANALYSIS
Similar to terrain analysis, the G2 or S2 produces graphic weather
overlays to help facilitate analysis of weather effects on friendly and
enemy battlefield operations.
The analyst prioritizes which military effects of weather generally
have the greatest impact on the unit and threat force. Time does not
al low the analyst to cover all aspects nor to depend solely on the weather
teams. Prioritizing becomes critical when operating at battalion or
brigade level because there is little time available.
The analyst focuses on each weather factor, examining its effects
separately for both friendly and enemy forces. Using weather factor
analysis, the analyst identifies specific vulnerabii ities and significant
benefits which contribute to the command’s successful accomplishment of
the mission.
The analyst should not generalize weather effects. The analyst should
seek details which are useful . The best way to be successful at this is
to track weather effects on unit operations during training exercises,
catalog these for future reference, and discuss with subordinate
commanders what critical weather effects are needed to operate
successfully. By doing this, the weather analysis supports operations and
the ana! ystt maximizes what little time exists for other IPB requirements.
WEATHER ANALYSIS
Analyzing the cl imate and weather in the AO helps to determine their
effects on friendly and enemy operations. Terrain and weather analysis
are insepa-able, because the tactical environment requires that climate,
weather, and terrain information be considered concurrently. The products
of weather analysis are applied in terrain and threat integration.
Weather has a significant impact on both friendly and enemy
operations. The weather is analyzed in detail to determine how it affects
both friendly and enemy capabilities to move, shoot, and commnunicate. A
detailed discussion of weather analysis is found in Chapter 4, FM 34-130.
Weather factor overlays are integrated with the terrain overlays to
predict the battlefield araas where friendly and enemy forces can
maneuver.
The weather team analyzes climatic data to determine the
characteristics of weather in the AO. The terrain team analyzes the
effect of weather on tactical operations and, together, the teams
integrate weather data and overlays with the terrain analysis and
overlays.
The weather analysis team prepares a matrix to define the required
analysis and specific weather requirements and determine which overlays
are required to support the operation. The matrix isolates militarily
significant weather factors and provides the capabi I ity to correlate
4-21
weather effects with specific combat operations. Examples of weather
subfactor overlays produced by the weather analysis team include fog,
cloud coverage (summer or winter), rain and snow, and weather effects on
slopes. The overlays, along with the combined obstacle overlay, identify
where forces maneuver on the battlefield.
At brigade and battalion level the S2 requests those IPB products
which address weather effects for their AO from higher headquarters.
Commanders and staffs must understand and consider weather factors in
tactical planning. They must recognize the tactical significance of
weather effects and the risks or opportunities they present. While
considering the effect of weather on all aspects of a mission, the S2
concentrates on weather impact on mobility and LOS. The effects of
weather are integrated with the enemy and terrain through IPB; this
integration is described in FM 34-81 and FM 34-130. A detailed
description of weather effects is in the Weather Effects and Information
Handbook (Draft) July 88, USAICS.
Low visibility is beneficial to offensive and retrograde operations
and detrimental to defensive operations. In the offense, it conceals the
concentration and maneuver of friendly forces, enhancing the possibility
of achieving surprise. Low visibility hinders the defense because
cohesion and control are difficult to achieve, R&S are impeded, and TA is
less accurate. These disadvantages are offset partially by extensive use
of illuminants, radar, sound detection, and IR devices. In some
instances, using smoke and obscurant aerosols locally reduces visibility.
When examining effects of visibility keep in mind friendly and enemy
capabilities.
In all operations, restricted visibility prevents or limits the use of
aerial systems. The analyst must explain how visibility affects aerial
systems.
Wind speed and direction, both on the surface and aloft, usually favor
the upwind force. Wind favors the use of either NBC or conventional
weapons by the upwind force. Wind of sufficient speed reduces the combat
effectiveness of the downwind force by blowing dust, smoke, sand, rain, or
snow on personnel and equipment. The upwind force has better visibility
and advances easier and faster. Strong winds limit airborne and aviation
operations.
Strong surface winds and gusts cause injury to personnel (especially
paratroopers in their descent), damage to materiel and structures, false
radar returns, and restrictions on visibility by blowing sand, dust, and
other materials. Generally, winds above 20 knots create such effects.
Smoke operations generally are ineffective at wind speeds greater than 7
knots, As the surface wind increases at low temperatures, either
naturally or enhanced by vehicle movement, windchill becomes a critical
consideration . The windchill factor adversely affects improperly clothed
personnel and impedes activity in unsheltered areas. Wind speed also
affects the d istance that sound travels. Winds are beneficial because
4-22
they improve trafficability by helping dry the soil. A windchill index is
available in FM 34-81.
The primary significance of precipitation is its effect on the state
of the ground, visibility, personnel effectiveness, and the functioning of
some equipment. Ground status affects trafficability; heavy rain makes
some unsurfaced roads and off-road areas impassible. Heavy rains make all
roads in low-lying areas impassible. Both rain and snow drastically
reduce personnel effectiveness by limiting visibility (causing discomfort,
increasing fatigue, and creating other physical and psychological
problems) and the persistence of chemical weapons thus creating NBC hot
spots . Precipitation also adversely degrades the quality of some supplies
in storage. Snow accumulation of one inch degrades trafficability and
reduces the effectiveness of mines. Generally, more than one inch (2.54
centimeters (cm)) per hour or 2 inches (5.08 cm) in 12 hours of
precipitation is considered critical for tactical operations. Snow fall
exceeding 2 inches (5.08 cm) in 12 hours, 6 inches (about 15 cm)
accumulated on the ground, or drifts of about 2 feet (.6 m) also have a
significant effect on operations requiring mobility.
The type and amount of CC, as well as the height of cloud bases and
tops, influence both friendly and enemy aviation operations. Extensive CC
reduces the effectiveness of air support. This effect becomes more
pronounced as CC increases, as cloud bases lower, and as conditions that
are frequently associated with clouds, such as icing, turbulence, and poor
visibility aloft increase. In relatively unstable air, clouds are
associated with strong vertical currents, turbulence, and restricted
visibility aloft. Generally, close air support (CAS) and aerial resupply
operations require a ceiling of 1,000 feet (305 m) or more.
Clouds affect ground operations by limiting illumination and
visibility, They also determine the types, intensities, and amounts of
precipitation. Clouds, since they trap incoming heat from the sun and
rising heat from the earth, tend to make temperatures near the earth more
homogeneous. Temperature and humidity both affect air density. Air
density decreases as the temperature or humidity increases; thus,
efficiency of aircraft propulsion reduces in areas of high temperature or
high humidity. Although temperature and humidity may not directly affect
a particular tactical operation, extremes reduce personnel and equipment
capabilities, and may necessitate a reduction of aircraft payloads.
Tactics that are effective in one climatic zone may be ineffective if
used in another. The high temperatures and humidity found in the tropics
are conducive to the growth of dense fol iage, which drastically affects
operations. In arctic climates, cold weather periods--
0 Create an almost constant need for heated shelters.
0 Cause difficulty in constructing fortifications.
0 Increase the dependence on logistic support.
0 Necessitate special clothing, equipment, and combat skills.
4-23
A combination of temperature and wind speed produces a windchill
factor . A windchill factor of -26°F (-32°C) is considered the
critical value for personnel and equipment operating in cold weather, The
opposite extreme, 120°F (49°C), is considered the critical value for
personnel and equipment operating in hot weather, Similar restrictions
occur in the desert where temperature difference of over 50°F (IO°C)
occur between night and day in shelters without air conditioning or
heaters.
At division and corps, updating the weather data base is continuous,
particularly during periods of increased tension or combat. During these
periods, the intelligence analyst compares current and forecasted weather
with historic patterns to determine deviations. Updates are forwarded to
subordinate commands.
The analyst uses the weather data base as the foundation for analyzing
the effects of weather on combat operations. This analysis begins with an
evaluation of the mission, threat, Al, and friendly capabilities. While
the analyst considers the effects of the weather on personnel and
equipment, the primary concern is with their impact on mobility and LOS.
WEATHER FACTOR ANALYSIS MATRIX DEVELOPMENT
The weather factor analysis matrix (see Chapter 4, FM 34-130) assists
the analyst in organizing the analysis task, defining Specific weather
requirements, and determining what weather factor overlays are required to
support mission planning. The matrix isolates those weather factors that
are militarily significant and correlates their effects with specific
combat operations and supporting functions.
THREAT EVALUATION
During the threat evaluation phase, the intelligence analyst examines
enemy forces utilizing the nine OB factors.
The objective for the intelligence analyst during this phase is to
determine enemy capabilties, vulnerabilities, and strengths. Also the
analyst determines how the enemy would operate doctrinally If not
restricted by terrain and weather. The G2 or S2 analyzes the enemy based
on known information maintained in the enemy OB file. Information gaps
identified are translated into Rlls and sent up the intelligence chain to
be answered. Maintaining a detailed enemy OB file is a continuous
process. The S2 section maintains one for each of the unit’s contingency
and normal operating areas. The intelligence analyst uses the enemy OB
together with current information and the mission to develop an HVT list.
The S2 and staff develop an HVT list by imagining how the enemy would
fight, relative to the friendly force mission. The S2’s or analyst’s goal
is to identify enemy assets an enemy commander would consider valuable or
critical for the accomplishment of the mission. In thinking through the
enemy plan an analyst considers how the friendly element’s mission and
intent affects the enemy mission.
4-24
For example, if an analyst is thinking through an enemy attack and
knows that the friendly force is in prepared positions with extensive
obstacles and barriers throughout the perimeter, it is a logical
assumption that the enemy commander will want substantial engineer support
to breach friendly obstacles. The enemy commander may not be aware of the
obstacles, yet engineer assets in fact are critical to the enemy battle
plan. Enemy engineer units therefore become HVTS. The G2 or S2 provides
this and other HVTS in the form of a HVT list to the G3 or S3 and the FSE
so target priorities are established and planned for.
By analyzing probable enemy actions, the analyst enhances the
probability of mission success by determining HVTS which can become enemy
vulnerabilities if acted on by the G3 or S3 and the FSE.
The analyst develops doctrinal templates during the threat evaluation
phase. Before creating doctrinal templates, the analyst determines which
enemy echelon is the focal point for analysis. US commanders are
interested in enemy echelons one level above their own because that is the
enemy echelon that directs a battle against them. Enemy maneuver elements
are templated for units two echelons below that of the US commander,
because those are the ground force units in direct contact with the unit.
Knowledge of enemy doctrine provides a starting point for doctrinal
templates. For example, doctrinal templates may be required to reflect
the sequential order of an enemy unit in the attack from its assembly area
to the ultimate objective. The sequence may be as follows:
"Tactical march formations.
° River crossing (hasty, deliberate)
"Breakthrough.
"Envelopment.
"Exploitation.
"Pursuit.
One method of determining which operations and units should be
templated is to develop a matrix. The matrix shows which types of
operations and units that are expected to be encountered and provides a
clear record of what has been determined. Figure 4-14 showa an operations
or unit matrix,
It is also important to prepare doctrinal templates of battlefield
functional systems. The functional system templates generally expand
information that is reflected in the primary doctrinal templates. For
example, a template depicting an enemy division in a river crossing is
expanded by a subset depicting the deployment of engineer bridging and
pontoon equipment.
Again, not every possible enemy action and subset is templated.
4-25
^ Types of Operations
Types of Units
Movement to
Contact
Meeting
Engagement
River
Crossing
Attack
Against a
Defending
Enemy
Pursuit
Motorized Rifle Division
X
X
■a
MM
X
Motorized Rifle Regiment
X
n
X
X
Motorized Rifle Battalion
X
X
X
Independent Tank Battalion
X
X
X
Tank Division
X
m
■a
X
X
Tank Regiment
X
X
X
X
X
Tank Battalion
X
X
Figure 4-14? Operations or unit" matrix.
A matrix is an easy way to lay out the information to be analyzed and
recorded, Using a matrix, the analyst looks for those battlefield
functional systems in certain types of operations that tell the most about
how the enemy operates in relation to the mission. Figure 4-15 shows the
types of operations on a battlefield functional systems matrix.
THREAT INTEGRATION
The objective of threat integration is to integrate enemy doctrine
with the terrain and weather analysis done in previous IPB phases. This
further reduces uncertainty as to how the enemy fights. Members of the
staff analyze potential courses of action during this phase to advise the
commander of the best course of action to accomplish the mission.
To assist the staff, the G2 or S2 produces situation, event, and
decision support templates. FM 34-130 provides a detailed description on
how to prepare these templates. This chapter discusses how the analyst
should apply these templates in order to support the staff planning
process.
SITUATION TEMPLATE
The situation template depicts how the enemy adjusts doctrine to
terrain and weather effects throughout the battlefield. Knowledge of
enemy doctrine is critical to developing and using situation templates for
analysis.
4-26
N. Types of Operations
Types of N.
Battlefield systems
Tactical
March
Formations
Meeting
Engagement
River
Crossing
Attack Against a
Defending Enemy
Pursuit
Tactical Rockets and Artillery
X
X
X
X
X
AD
X
X
X
X
X
Communications
X
X
X
X
REC
X
X
X
X
Missiles
X
X
Reconnaissance
X
X
X
Rear Services
X
X
X
C 3 of MRD
X
X
X
X
X
C 2 of MRR
X
X
X
X
X
Engineers
X
X
X
X
Figure 4-15. Battlefield functional systems matrix.
During this phase the analyst takes doctrinal templates and visualizes
where the enemy force will place assets on a particular point on the
ground. By doing this, MCS within each AA become apparent.
As enemy forces move along AAs and MCs, they do so sequentially. The
analyst follows the enemy by sequentially and situationally templating
their movement.
Because of time constraints, apply situation templating initially to
critical areas on the battlefield. These are based on the friendly force
mission and what the commander feels are critical battlefield points and
areas. By applying situation templates the analyst usually depicts
expected enemy movements along an AA for the commander and staff. This
contributes to the planning process by allowing the commander to get a
“visual feel” for the enemy’s plan.
PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
PIRs are the expression of the commander’s information needs. When
recommending PIRs, the intelligence analyst keeps in mind the commander’s
intent. The analyst limits the PIR to a few questions. These PIRs must
seek answers to questions critical to the successful accomplishment of the
unit's mission.
4-27
While PIRs are general in nature, they must be specific enough to
identify the critical information required. For example if the brigade is
preparing defensive positions in anticipation of an attack, then a PIR
could be: When will the enemy attack? A more specific PIR would be:
When will the enemy attack and where is the main effort? This PIR, if
answered, helps the commander prepare a more effective defense
particularly if time is short. Knowing where the main effort is helps the
commander prioritize defensive preparations.
EVENT TEMPLATE
Situation templating is the basis for event templating. Event
templating is the identification and analysis of significant battlefield
events which provide indicators of an enemy course of action. It is a
projection of what most likely will occur if the enemy adopts a particular
course of action. By knowing what the enemy can do and comparing it with
what the enemy is doing, it is possible to predict what the enemy will do
next. Because there are normally several courses of action which lead to
the enemy’s objective, each must be identified. Event templates are then
developed for each course of action. This is because the enemy course of
action which the analyst identifies as the most probable may not be
selected for reasons of deception or other factors known only to the
enemy. The analyst must be able to shift attention quickly between
courses of action during the battle.
The event template is a critical analytical tool for determining the
enemy’s posture and movement. Knowledge of when and where enemy activity
is likely to occur on the battlefield provides indicators of enemy
intentions. Indicators may be negative (that is, things that do not
happen may be just as critical as what does happen). The projection of
battlefield events occurs through situation development during the
prehostility or predeployment phase of the IPB process and is verified or
refuted during combat operations.
While visualizing the enemy force moving along an AA or MC, critical
areas become apparent. These areas are significant because they are where
significant events and activities should occur. If the analyst’s
hypothesis is correct, it is within these areas that targete appear. The
intelligence analyst designates these areas as named areas of interest
(NAIs) .
An NAI is a point or area, often along an identified MC, where enemy
activity (or inactivity) confirms or denies a particular enemy course of
action. NAIs also fall outside of a MC. For example, there may be
activity on key terrain, such as high ground, in support of movement on an
adjacent MC.
The event template and its NAIs are the basis for intelligence
collection, R&S, and analysis because they--
"Focus attention on areas where the enemy force must appear if it
uses a particular MC.
4-28
0 Frame militarily significant events by time and location within
an NAI.
0 Compare events in one NAI with events occurring in the NAI of
other MCs to determine enemy intentions.
It is important to develop event templates as quickly as possible.
Refine them further as time permits. Early preparation permits quick
development of an R&S plan. R&S assets are focused on NAIs to obtain the
greatest payoff in relation to limited assets. The primary goal of an
analysis is to apply the event template to the collection of information
which supports the mission planning effort.
EVENT ANALYSIS MATRIX
The event analysis matrix (EAM) supports the event template. It
correlates the expected events and activities within each NAI and adds the
dimension of time. Through analysis of enemy doctrinal movement rates and
the effects of the terrain and weather on their mobility, estimate the
time required for the enemy to move between NAIs.
The analyst prepares an EAM for the primary AA and each MC within it.
Figure 4-16 shows a sample EAM. Due to time limitations and staff size,
most EAMs are prepared at division level or higher.
Before combat, the EAM and event template illustrate possible enemy
courses of action as a basis for comparing friendly courses of action.
During combat operations, they focus on enemy probable courses of action.
Event templating enables the G2 to develop precise collection
requirements, maximizing the effectiveness of I imited resources over
extended areas against a vast array of enemy targets. It assists the
intelligence analyst in determining where to look, when to look, and what
to look for. Situation and event templates enable the collection manager
to establish collection priorities based on those courses of action the
enemy is most likely to adopt. Framing movers and emitters, the primary
indicators of events and activities, in time and location, allows the
collection manager to determine the optimum mix of collection sensors.
Event templating also serves the G3 by tell ing-
“Where and when to shoot, jam, and maneuver.
"What to shoot, jam, and maneuver against.
Event templating is the vital link between the success of the
commander’s tactical concept and intelligence requirements and the
collection, planning, and execution needed to fulfill those requirements.
DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE
The DST is a logical extension of event templating; it relates events
of the event template to the commander’s decision raquirements. The DST
4-29
is not the sole responsibility of the G2 or S2. Production of the DST and
synchronization matrix is a shared responsibility, involving the entire
staff or their representatives. The G2 or S2 provides information about
the enemy. The G3 or S3 guides the effort and ensures that it supports
the commander’s intent.
A properly prepared DST portrays the enemy’s most likely course of
action and possible target areas of interest (TAIs) along with time phase
lines (TPLs). It also depicts decision points (DPs) which relate to the
use of fire, maneuver, and CSS.
COORDINATES
AVENUE OF APPROACH II
FM: NB 606330-NB 650333
TO: NB 462181-NB 494132
MOBILITY CORRIDOR A
FM: NB 670300
TO: NB 468158
NAMED AREA
OF INTEREST
DISTANCE
(kms)
RATE OF
MOV (kph)
ESTIMATED
TIME
EVENT OR ACTIVITY
OBSERVED
TIME
NAI NO. 1
NB 649288
RD JUNCTION
A. RECON ELM
B. ADV GUARD
30 km
1.5 hrs
C.
NAI NO. 4A
NB 647264
CHOKE POINT
30 km
1.5 hrs
A. RECON ELM
B. ADV GUARD
C.
NAI NO. 4
NB 601222
RC JUNCTION
A. RECON ELM
9 km
30 min
B. ADV GUARD
C.
NAI NO. 3
NB 561220
BRIDGE
40 km
—
2 hrs
A. RECON ELM
B. ADV GUARD
C.
NAI NO. 7
NB 480180
RD JUNCTION
A.
B.
C.
Figure 4-16. Event analysis matrix.
4-30
Target Areas of Interest
Areas along each AA and MC where the comnander influences the enemy
through fire and maneuver are TAIs. The TAIs are normally areas which
were earl ier identified as NAI. They are areas where we delay, disrupt,
destroy, or manipulate the enemy force. They are also areas suitable for
attacking HVTS.
A TAI is an engagement area or point, usually along an MC, where the
interdiction of enemy forces by maneuver, fires, or jamming deprives or
reduces a particular enemy capability. It also may cause enemy forces to
abandon or require the use of unusual support to continue operations. In
the latter option, TAIs are terrain-dependent to inhibit or deny movement.
Sample TAIs include—
"Key bridges.
"Road junctions.
"Choke points.
”DZS and LZS.
"Known fording sites.
The TAIs are significant because they constitute a basis for
allocation of attack resources. The identification of TAIs is a joint
effort of the intelligence, operations, and FSE staffs. The intelligence
staff evaluates enemy forces and the effect of interdiction on their
capabilities. The operations staff and FSE consider the availability of
interdiction resources, the effects of interdiction on the accomplishment
of friendly missions, and priorities for the use of available resources.
Part of determining TAIs involves target value analysis (TVA). TVA is
a joint activity of intelligence, operations, and FSE personnel. Through
analysis of enemy doctrine, TVA names and provides the basis for locating
enemy elements which are key to the enemy’s success. These enemy elements
are known HVTS.
A second category of targets is the HPT. Destruction of an HPT is
advantageous to friendly operations. The commander designates the HPTs.
For example, suppose the enemy must cross a wide, deep river in a friendly
sector as part of a probable attack. Enemy engineer assets are very
important to the enemy commander’s success. The engineer units and
equipment are HVTs because without them the river crossing is impossible.
The friendly commander, briefed on this HVT, designates the enemy engineer
assets as HPTs because their destruction is of great value to the friendly
defense plan. This particular HPT is prioritized among other HPTs for
location by intelligence personnel and subsequent attack by lethal and
nonlethal means.
4-31
An analyst must have an in-depth knowledge of enemy doctrine to
determine potential HVTS, CPS, missile units, and logistics points on
situation and event templates. This knowledge helps in cueing collection
assets to possible HVT locations designated as TAI for the DST.
Decision Points
Following the selection of TAI, the analyst identifies DPs. The
availability and capability of friendly fire and maneuver systems largely
influence the location of DPs; therefore, their selection is primarily a
G3 or S3 function. However, this task requires the efforts of both the G3
or S3, the G2 or S2, and their respective staffs.
DPs identify those battlefield events which may require tactical
decisions and the no-later-than time when these decisions are made for the
commander to retain available options. Decisions are made early enough to
ensure implementation in time to achieve the desired effects; however,
they cannot be made until there are indications that particular
battlefield events will occur and their locations determined with a high
degree of confidence.
DPs associate projected enemy locations with specific points on the
battlefield. Comparing times required to implement decisions, enemy
movement rates, and distances determine DPs. For example, if it requires
two hours to implement a decision, it must be made while the enemy is at
least two hours from the TAI where the event will occur. These decisions
include more than fire and maneuver; they also include decisions such as
donning mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear, and employing
smoke. Enemy doctrinal movement rates that the analyst develops are
adjusted to compensate for the effects of the terrain, weather, and
friendly action on mobility. They provide the basis for computation.
The DST depicts the TAI and DPs. Figure 4-17 shows a sample offensive
DST with synchronization matrix.
Decision Support Matrix
A decision support matrix supplements the DST. This matrix relates
each DP to the event or associated TAI or NAI requiring a friendly
reaction. Decisions are made by the time enemy forces pass DPs or a set
of options which were available are negated. Other information from the
IPB data base, like enemy composition and probable deployment, supports
the DST.
Intelligence provides a basis for tactical planning and execution.
Detailed planning is accomplished during the static period, as an 8- to
10-day battlefield scenario does not allow time for detailed planning.
Event and decision support templates are the results of detailed
intelligence planning that is accomplished during static conditions. They
are the basis for all tactical planning. These templates are the filters
through which all information and intelligence are directed to the
commander. They are relevant to the commander’s needs, as expressed in
PIR and IR, because they are keyed to important battlefield events and
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4-33
PIR-DEF POSN
PIR 2 ECH
C CO MAIN
ATK
CONSOL
CONTINUE
DP 2 AND 3
COMMIT
RESERVES
CASTAI 2,3
HPT-MBA
ARTY TAI 7
HPT— 2d ECH
DPI SMOKE TAI5
RED/TIGHT
YELLOW/FREE
YELLOW/FREE
time and space factors known to be of interest to the commander. The DST
is the vital link between the conmmander’s intelligence needs and the
resultant actions the commander and staff require.
The commander is vitally concerned with wresting the initiative from
the enemy commander; that is, forcing the enemy commander to choose a less
desirable course of action through design rather than chance. The DST
frames the commander’s opportunities and options and ensures timely and
accurate decisions. This provides the means to influence enemy actions
rather than just react to them.
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD DURING PEACETIME
This chapter has emphasized the vital role that IPB plays in preparing
for the next battle. During peacetime, IPB builds an extensive data base
for each potential area in which a unit is required to operate. It
analyzes this intelligence data base in detail to determine the impact of
the enemy, weather, and terrain on operations and presents this
information graphically. IPB is initiated any time the commander faces a
new enemy or receives a new mission. It is a continuous process which
supports planning and execution for all operations.
4-34
CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS IN DEPTH
Analysts do not find intelligence. Analysts develop intelligence
through evaluating, assessing, integrating, and interpreting information.
This intelligence focuses on the commander’s needs. It must support the
commander’s decision to concentrate or disperse forces on the
battlefield. It must provide information to assist the commander in
targeting and defeating the enemy. This chapter addresses some of the
techniques and tools which the intelligence analyst uses to manage
intelligence production.
Analysts face daily problems. These challenges vary from the simple,
such as finding information, to the complex, such as predicting specific
enemy courses of action. The analyst makes decisions regarding what, how,
and when the commander can use information to support the battle. This
information often means the difference between winning and losing on the
battlefield, so it is vital that analysis be both accurate and timely.
This information and analysis influences decision making. Although the
analyst does not make decisions for the commander, the commander cannot
make qual ity decisions without’ the information that analysts provide.
MEETING USER REQUIREMENTS
The ultimate user of intelligence is the commander. The analyst
produces intelligence that the user specifically needs. Through stated
PIRs and IRs, the commander drives intelligence production and focuses
efforts. The commander’s IRs often pertain to varied areas on the
battlefield. For example, intelligence required to support the rear
battle is different from that required for the deep battle. Different
staff sections require different information, yet all of this supports the
commander’s needs on the battlefield.
It follows then, that to satisfy user requirements, the analyst must
understand what those needs are. Figure 5-1 lists some of the factors
which an analyst should consider in developing an intelligence product.
If the analyst and the user do not look at information or problems from
the same perspective, the intelligence will not support requirements.
As a simple example, suppose the user asks for a list of locations
where a river may be bridged. The analyst considers the enemy’s tanks,
which weigh about 40 tons, and provides such a list. If the user plans to
cross these bridges with American tanks, which weigh about 60 tons, the
list of locations is useless. Clearly, the analyst has failed to
understand the user’s needs.
In the tactical environment, the analyst and the user see the mission
as fighting the same enemy in a specific geographic area. From the
knowledge each has about the tactical situation, both develop conceptual
mode Is, The analyst and the user create some type of theoretical
5-1
ABOUT THE USER:
ABOUT THE PRODUCT:
• What does the user want to know?
• Is the product directly usable?
• What does the user already knpw?
• Is the most significant information
• What are the user’s areas of
up front?
uncertainty?
• Are the user’s areas of uncertainty
• What is the user’s time frame for the
addressed?
requested information?
• Is the product understandable or is
• What does the user need to know to
more information needed?
understand the product?
• Are the user’s requirements
• What is the user going to do with
addressed directly?
the product?
• Is there ariy nonessential informa-
• What is the last time a product was
tion in the product?
given to the user?
• Is the product adapted to the means
• How did the user react to the
of communication?
product?
• Is the product at the user’s needed
• How should the user react or not
level of description?
react to this product?
• Has the credibility of this product
• How will uncertainties affect the
been established?
user’s reaction to this product?
Figure 5-1. Developing an intelligence product.
representation of the tactical situation. These conceptual mode Is have
common factors wh ich both anal yst and user share. These common factors
are termed “a shared conceptual model .“
Without a shared conceptual model, the user and analyst cannot
communicate. Effective communication allows the analyst to understand the
user’s requirements and to tailor the product to them.
Communication allows analysts to interpret what the user wants and
fill in any missing intelligence pieces. This is easily done through
feedback.
Feedback greatly improves the quality of any intelligence product. If
user and analyst communicate during the development of a product, the
shared conceptual model is refined. This allows the analyst to orient on
those areas important to the user and to eliminate nonessentials.
Refinement of the “model”’ sensitizes the analyst to areas of uncertainty
and the criticality of time in a given situation. The analyst, in turn,
al lows the user to understand the risk inherent in any estimate and the
basis for assumptions made.
Face-to-face communication is the best form of feedback. It is also
the best way to develop a shared conceptual model. Ambiguous words or
ideas can be instantly clarified, pictures or sketches can be drawn, and
maps consulted, When face-to-face communication is not possible, the
analyst speaks with staff officers or other representatives of the user.
If a standard of performance has been established or is described in SOP,
the analyst uses this as a measure of current efforts.
5-2
DETERMINING THE RISK FACTOR
Uncertainty is what the job of intelligence is all about. To succeed,
the analyst handles uncertainty from a number of sources. While objective
ground truth is found in the laboratory, it is not part of analysis of the
battlefield. The analyst frequently deals with ambiguous or even
misleading information.
The analyst’s greatest concern is uncertainty, the commander’s is
risk. Good analysts translate uncertainty into risk. Figure 5-2 shows a
graph of risk functions to consider. Risk increases as enemy lethality
moves from low to high. When a range of uncertainty is added to the
estimate of lethality, the potential danger becomes even greater. The
degree of risk a commander will accept governs the amount of uncertainty
the analyst reports.
For example, under a very high level of uncertainty, the commander
faces between one and three enemy tank divisions. The analyst admits the
level of uncertainty involved, while collecting and processing information
to reduce the uncertainty. The level of uncertainty that the analyst
Figure 5-2. Translating uncertainty to risk.
5-3
accepts is driven by the degree of risk the commander accepts. The
commander is unable to properly plan for battle knowing only that friendly
forces face “between one and three enemy tank divisions”. The same
commander is not concerned about facing 10 or 12 enemy tank battal ions;
the commander employs the same plan regardless, in facing 10, 11, or 12
battalions. The analyst does not waste time reducing the level of
uncertainty beyond reporting “10 to 12 tank battalions" because the
commander is satisfied with the given degree of risk.
Risk is a voluntary exposure to danger, however unavoidable it might
be under the circumstances. In combat, there is always risk in not
preparing response to a potential enemy action whether or not that action
has a high possibility of execution. Risk increases in response to
potential danger and decreases when the enemy threat credibility goes
down.
Risk increases when—
“Enemy force lethality increases.
“Warning time decreases. (Crises occur when warning time is less
than the required preparation time; the worst-case situation is
when there is total surprise and no warning.)
“The number of enemy options increases. (If the enemy’s plans
are ambiguous, then friendly forces might not plan effective
responses to all of the enemy opt ions.)
“The number of friendly options decreases. (If fewer options are
available for countering the threat, there is a greater chance
that the available options will not work.)
“The enemy’s knowledge of the battlefield environment, including
friendly forces increases.
Risk decreases when—
“The enemy force lethal ity decreases.
“There is greater warning time.
“The enemy has fewer options.
“The number of friendly force options increases.
“The friendly force knowledge of the battlefield environment,
including enemy forces, increases. Knowing how the environment
affects combat operations allows the commander to exclude
unworkable courses of action and to gain maximum effectiveness
from others.
The analyst’s uncertainty plays a key role in the evaluation of the
enemy and the amount of risk accepted. Uncertainty may arise for many
5-4
reasons. First, there is uncertainty about the enemy’s intent: “What is
the enemy’s real objective? What are the various means of achieving this
objective?”’ Second, there is uncertainty in evaluating the capabilities
of the enemy force to achieve these objectives. Third, there is
uncertainty in other factors (lethal ity, warning time, enemy and friendly
options, and environmental conditions). Fourth, there is uncertainty that
the method of response will produce the desired outcome.
THE THREAT MODEL
The threat model is a portrayal of the enemy. It allows the analyst
to piece together information, identify information gaps, speculate and
predict, and do problem solving. Most importantly, the threat model
allows some of the risk in a given situation to be quantified. There will
always be inaccuracy in a model, and so there will always be uncertainty.
Still, based on the model, an analyst can look for changes in a real-worid
situation to identify patterns, trends, and activity levels. Creating
such a model requires a knowledge of—
"Physical objects such as weapons, vehicles, and radar.
"Organizational structures of enemy and friendly forces.
"Battlefield environment, including terrain, hydrology, and
weather.
Once developed the model is refined and maintained, or it will lose its
validity.
Threat models incorporate white elements (battlefie Id geography and
environment conditions) , red elements (the enemy force (or threat), and
blue elements (the friendly force). The three elements of white, red, and
blue form an organizational structure from which the analyst can mentally
picture the battlefield. Figure 5-3 illustrates elements of the threat
model.
Thinking white is understanding the elements of the environment as
they affect the battle. In threat modeling, development of the white
framework comes first. It is the white framework that anchors the threat
model to the real world. The white framework is made up of space and
time.
Developing the geographic framework of the battlefield is as simple as
plotting the battlefield on a map. The dimensions of the battlefield
encompass the unit’s AO and Al.
The map is a model of the real world. The topographic map contains a
wealth of information about the battlefield environment, including
descriptions of terrain, roads, and population centers. The highly
detailed military map contributes more information to the threat model.
Time in the threat model is a sequence of time-period snapshots (or
windows) within which events occur. The analyst compresses threat model
5-5
Figure 5-3. Elements of the threat model.
time to bring events closer together or expand it to make individual
events more distinguishable. Overlaying time windows helps in seeing
patterns of events or distinguishing changes. In the threat model snapshot
sequence, one of the snapshots represents the current time frame. A
sequence of snapshots al lows the analyst to fol low courses of action from
the current time frame to the eventual outcome of the battle. Each
snapshot represents an overlay of information on the battlefield
geography. Figure 5-4 shows this.
Thinking red is seeing the battle from the enemy’s viewpoint. The red
element of the threat model is anchored in the real world. Enemy forces
use the political and military policies of the foreign nations involved.
The enemy combat force is an extension of political policies that are the
source of the conflict that creates the battlefield situation.
Next, in threat model ing, plot the red element, including locations
and likages of the political, military, and combat organizations on the
battlefield. The highest echelon of enemy organization plotted depends on
the echelon of interest to the friendly force commander. For example, the
strategic-level threat model has all aspects of the civil ian and mil itary
5-6
Figure 5-4. Seeing the battlefield.
force structure, whereas a division-level threat model shows only the
locations of the red forces up to army level.
The organization of red elements follows some form of hierarchical
structure, connected by lines of communication (LOC). The LOC shows the
relationships between units for command, control, and coordination. The
LOC is overlaid on the geographic structure and relates to physical
communication paths like roads, transmission lines, or electromagnetic
transmission paths. Figure 5-5 shows the three techniques.
Thinking blue refers to seeing the battle from the friendly
commander’s point of view. The threat model takes on its full meaning
when the blue element is introduced along with white and red. The targets
of red threat are blue elements; the components of the friendly force are
blue elements.
5-7
Fill out the RED War Plan with three techniques:
1. Start with enemy doctrine to structure the war plan.
2. Exploit intelligence sources to fill in details.
3. Use analogies to fill in missing Information.
Figure 5-5. Red elements three techniques.
The most common failing of analysts is their inability to “think
blue”. Analysts become extremely knowledgeable about the enemy, knowing
nearly exact numbers of equipment, biographies of commanders, and unit
histories, but they cannot see how friendly forces operate. It does
little good to understand enemy aviation without understanding some of the
characteristics of friendly air defense. While there are staff officers
who are experts in friendly systems and tactics, the analyst must still
have a familiarity with blue doctrine and tactics. This returns to the
need for a shared conceptual model.
In plotting the location of units in the white framework, the analyst
is concerned with the location of those combat units that information from
the threat model supports. Figure 5-6 lists some information sources for
developing the blue element of the threat model.
• Operations plan for the friendly force. • Friendly force doctrine.
• Mission plans. • RED view of friendly forces.
• Situation reports from operational elements. • Mirror imaging.
Figure 5-5. Information sources for developing the blue element.
Figures 5-7, 5-8, and 5-9 show checkl ists of white, red, and blue
questions that are asked when creating the threat model.
5-8
What is the geography of the battlefield?
What is the culture of the country area?
What is the history of conflicts in this region?
What is the attitude of the local population toward the enemy force? toward the friendly force?
What is the academic, economic, and technological level of the local population?
How is the local population armed?
How is the population distributed in the region?
What local cultural features (airfields, railways) can be exploited for military purposes?
How predictable is the weather in the area?
How does the weather affect operations, personnel, trafflcability, equipment, and communications?
During what time frame will hostilities occur?
How much time is available for preparation?
Figure 5-7. Checklist of white questions.
What is the enemy’s doctrfne?
What are the enemy’s tactics?
How does the enemy prepare war plans?
How does the enemy train?
What are the enemy’s objectives?
How is the enemy equipped?
What is the enemy’s strategy?
How is the enemy force sustained?
What are the enemy’s operational plans?
What are the enemy’s courses of actions?
How is the enemy force structured?
Figure 5-8. Checklist of red questions.
5-9
What are the BLUE principle* of war?
What are the friendly objectives?
What are the friendly force resource*?
What is the commander’s mission?
What resources does the have at his disposal?
What are the priority information needs of the commander?
What are the information needs to execute the mission?
Figure 5-9. Checklist of blue questions.
Given a model of how the battlefield should appear in a certain
situation, the analyst develops and tests hypotheses of how the enemy may
act. An hypothesis is an explanation that accounts for a set of facts and
that can be tested by further investigation. It is a set of logically
related propositions and an outcome. An hypothesis can be proven false
based on evidence, but it can never be proven correct in advance. The
best that the analyst can do is rank order several hypotheses or assign
rough probabilities to them, Whan seeking evidence to support or reject a
hypothesis there are several considerations for the analyst:
0 The enemy can be engaged in deception. The course of action
selected by the enemy does not have to be the best, but only
adequate. Deception efforts then can be mounted which support
the most obvious course of action.
0 Sensors can collect only in the areas where they look. If
targeted at one specific area, they may not collect information
in another. This information not collected may have confirmed or
denied a particular course of action.
0 Indicators may be redundant to several hypotheses,
0 Several sensors may collect the same piece of information. This
can give undue weight to a hypothesis.
0 Some small indicator may be vital to a certain course of action.
Large scale river crossings, for example, require engineer support.
If that support is conclusively absent, a river crossing cannot
occur, no matter what else supports that hypothesis.
0 The evidence gathered in one area may not be representative of the
whole battlefield. For example, the enemy has 15 battalions of
artillery available. Sensors report 4 battalions in the north and 2
in the south. This does not conclusively indicate a total of 10
battalions in the north and 5 in the south. The true disposition
may be 4 in the north and 11 well camouflaged battalions in the
south .
5-1 o
When selecting an hypothesis as “most likely” or rejecting it out of
hand, all of the above issues come into play. These errors in thinking
may lead to false alarms or rejecting perfectly good ideas. Other errors
also exist which affect analysis. They are called biases.
£J ASES
If a single term best describes the factors that interfere with
successful analytic thinking, it is bias. A bias is a subjective
viewpoint. It indicates a preconceived notion about something or someone.
Analysts must recognize biases and be aware of the potential influence
they can have on judgment.
Biases can have a positive influence on analysis. With a iack of
information, a preconceived notion gives a starting point for thinking
about a situation. However, biases are generally bad because they obscure
the true nature of the information. The analyst must recognize several
categories of biases so as not to be misled or drawn into the wrong
conclusions during the analysis process. Biases are cultural,
organizational , personal, and cognitive (perception).
CULTURAL BIASES
Cultural biases begin forming at an early age and continue throughout
a lifetime. They interfere with the ability to think in the same manner
as the enemy (think red). Analysts need considerable background
information on culture and social mores to perceive a situation In the
same way the enemy perceives it. If analysts do not have this experience
or information and decide to depend upon their own values when looking at
a situation, the analysis is likely to be wrong. The reason for this is
that different cultures tend to view similar situations differently.
ORGANIZATIONAL BIASES
Most organizations have specific policy goals. Any analysis done
within these organizations may not be as objective as the same type of
analysis done outside the organization. Some of the problems that occur
from a subjective internal analysis range from an unconscious altering of
judgment because of exposure to selective information and common
viewpoints held among individuals, to deliberately altering a judgment to
provide what the commander wants to hear. “Best case” analysis is a good
example.
“Best case’” is where an analyst preeents the situation in the most
optimistic light so as not to anger the commander. This frequently
underestimates the enemy’s capability while overestimating friendly
capability.
PERSONAL BIASES
Personal biases come from past experiences. If a thought pattern
previously led to success, analysts may continue to follow this pattern.
5-11
Even if the situations have nothing in common, the tendency to follow the
methods that were successful in the past is very strong.
COGNITIVE BIASES
The all-source analyst evaluates information from a variety of sources
(including HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, and open sources). Each source has
strengths and weaknesses. The degree of reliability, completeness, and
consistency varies from source-to-source and even from message-to-message.
This variance often creates doubt about the reliability of some sources.
The cognitive biases that cause analysts the most problems are
vividness, absence of evidence, oversensitivity to consistency,
persistence of impressions based on discredited evidence, and
availability.
Vividness
Clear and concise information has a greater impact on thinking than
abstract and vague information. Even if the vague piece of information
has more value as evidence, the tendency is to disregard faster than you
would eliminate a clear piece of information.
Absence of Evidence
Lack of information is by far the most common problem, especially in a
tactical environment. This does not mean that analysts should be content
with the information on hand; they always want more. Analysts shouldn’t
hold back information because it is not conclusive. It rarely is.
Instead the analyst should--
"Realize that information sometimes is missing.
"Identify areas where information is lacking and consider
alternative hypotheses.
"Adapt and adjust judgments as more information comes in.
"Consider whether a lack of informs”t ion is normal in those areas
or whether the absence of information is itself an indicator.
Oversensit ivity to Consistency
Consistent evidence is a major factor for confidence in the analyst’s
judgment. On the one hand, consistent information is appropriate. On the
other hand, information may be consistent because it’s redundant, or it
may come from a small or biased sample. The analyst considers if the
evidence is representative of the total potentially available information.
If it is not, or if it is not known, then the confbence level is low,
regardless of the consistency. The analyst must be receptive to
information that comes in from other sources regardless of whether it
supports the hypothesis or not.
5-12
Persistence of Impressions Based on Discredited Evidence
Whenever the analyst receives evidence, there is a tendency to think
of things that explain the evidence. These connections create
impressions. Although the analyst discredits the evidence, the connection
remains, and so do the impressions. An example is a clandestine source
under hostile control. If the source has a record of passing accurate
information, the analyst tends to judge all information that is passed
according to previous accuracy. The analyst may doubt the validity of the
report claiming that the source is under hostile control or may
rational ize the inaccuracy in some other way. Either way, the evidence is
based on previous information and not on current indicators. This is one
way an enemy could launch a deception operation. This is important. An
analyst who “reasons away” information contrary to pet hypotheses does the
commander a disservice. Analysts must be professional and capable of
saying, “I was wrong,” before the situation is lost.
Availability
The ability to recall past events influences judgment concerning
future events. Since memory is more readily available, and is more
acceptable, it is easy to rely upon memory instead of seeking a proper
sample to pred ict events.
Overcoming bias is a vital step to proper analysis. Any of the above
biasas reduces the quality of analysis performed.
5-13
CHAPTER 6
SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
Situation development enables commanders to see and understand the
battlefield in sufficient time and detail to make sound tactical
decisions. It helps locate and identify enemy forces; determine their
strength, capabilities, and significant activities; and predict their
probable courses of action. Situation development helps the commander to
effectively employ available combat resources where and when the decisive
battles will be fought. Also, it helps prevent the commander from being
surprised.
This chapter describes the analysis phase of situation development.
It also describes how information is converted to intelligence to satisfy
the commander's PIR. Analysis in support of situation development
continues the IPB process and portrays significant aspects of the enemy,
weather, and terrain in support of the decision-making process. This
portrayal is baeed on the analysis of information from all sources that
previously has been recorded, cataloged, and evaluated in a manner to
facilitate effective analysis. This intelligence data base is
continuously updated to ensure the information in it is current and
accurate.
Automation increases the capability to manipulate large volumes of
information from many sources and assist in the analysis process.
However, analysis continues to be a human function. Information is
interpreted by an analyst who adds the element of judgment, which is
essential “to effective intelligence analysis.
History provides many examples of intelligence failures that are
directly attributable to faulty analysis by people. In some cases, the
indicators were present, but were either not recognized or were
misinterpreted due to the analyst’s preconceptions of the situation. In
others, the analysis was correct, but was not presented in such a way that
decision makers would accept it.
The primary product of intelligence analysis is the intelligence
estimate. The estimate provides the best possible answer to the
commander’s PIR that is available at the time. The estimate is dynamic,
constantly changing with the situation. Thus, analysis is conducted
continuously with the information available. The available information
almost always is incomplete. The analyst uses what is known about the
enemy, weather, and terrain from the IPB to estimate what is not known.
In addition, the analyst determines the enemy’s capabilities, which are
the basis for predicting probable courses of action.
ENEMY CAPABILITIES
Enemy capabilities are courses of action which the enemy can take to
influence the accomplishment of the friendly mission. They indicate--
“What the enemy can do.
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“When the enemy can do it.
“Where the enemy can do it.
“In what strength the enemy can do it.
The PIR normally are about enemy capabilities. Estimates of enemy
capabilities and their probability of adoption impact significantly on the
friendly commander’s scheme of fire and maneuver for accomplishing the
mission. By integrating the enemy’s tactical doctrine, characteristics of
the AO, and time and space factors as developed through IPB, the analyst
estimates enemy capabilities with a reasonable degree of confidence.
Enemy actions that would have little effect on friendly operations, would
not benefit the enemy, or are not tactically feasible are not considered
enemy capabilities. For example, an enemy force normally disengages its
troops in an adjacent area to free these for commitment within our sector
or zone. However, in some circumstances, this is not a viable enemy
option. Therefore, in those circumstances this capability normally is not
considered as an option.
Generally, there are four tactical courses of action open to the enemy
in conventional operations: attack, defend, reinforce, or conduct a
retrograde movement. These are divided into a variety of more specific
courses of action. For example, an attack may be a penetration, an
envelopment, or other variations of an attack. A retrograde movement may
be a delaying action, a withdrawal, or a retirement.
Some enemy capabilities refer specifically to the support of combat
forces rather than the capabilities of the combat forces themselves.
Support capabilities include--
0 U s e of NBC weapons.
“EW.
Support capabilities always are considered, especially when enemy
implemental ion of them will significantly affect the accomplishment of the
friendly mission.
The analyst considers when the enemy can implement a capability. Time
is a critical factor in the Air Land Battle; the friendly commander relies
on time to defeat enemy first-echelon forces before follow-on echelon
forces are committed to the battle. The friendly commander needs an
accurate estimate of when enemy forces are employed to decide how to fight
the battle. The analyst considers the following factors in estimating
when an enemy force will be employed:
“Mobility capabilities.
“Disposition.
“Doctrinal rates of movement.
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"Characteristics of the terrain, LOC, trafficability, and
obstacles.
"Time required for displacement, assembly, emplacement, and closing
on the battle area.
Integrating information on the enemy and the battlefield environment
determines where the enemy implements a capability. The enemy
composition, disposition, and weapons and equipment dictate how well the
enemy moves, shoots, and communicates--the activities vital to most enemy
courses of action. Analysis of existing and forecasted weather conditions
and military aspects of the terrain reveals how they affect enemy
capabilities in various parts of the AO. AAs and MCS determine where the
enemy moves on the ground. LZS and DZS determine where the enemy employs
airmobile, air assault, or airborne forces. Suitable beaches determine
where the enemy launches an amphibious assault. The location of suitable
assembly areas, firing positions, and targets determines where the enemy
launches NBC weapons. Also, the location of suitable defensive positions
determines where the enemy defends. Terrain factor overlays, which are
developed during IPB, identify specified aspects of the terrain. They
help the analyst determine where the enemy implements various
capabilities.
The strength
primarily on the
forces. Chapter
for computation.
in which an enemy implements a capability depends
composition, disposition, and strength of available
3 describes the 06 files which provide the necessary data
Appendix D describes how to compute enemy strength.
The IPB data base is the key in determining enemy capabilities.
Doctrinal and situation templates assist the analyst in estimating enemy
capabilities. The avent template and EAM help the analyst determine when
and where the enemy can implement a capability. Using the working SITMAP,
the analyst continuously monitors the enemy situation. The analyst
compares the working SITMAP with IPB templates and adjusts the
capabilities accordingly. The analyst also follows the friendly operation
to determine which enemy capabilities have the greatest effect on the
friendly operation.
ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION
The ultimate objective of intelligence analysis is to answer the PIR
with an acceptable degree of confidence. This normally involves a
determination of the enemy’s most likely courses of action and the
probability the enemy adopts those courses of action. Like capabilities,
the analyst determines the enemy's probable courses of action in terms of
what, when, where, and in what strength. The probable courses of action
provide the basis for predicting enemy intentions. By accurately
estimating the enemy’s intentions, the analyst provides the answers to
critical uncertainties which impact on the commander’s tactical decisions.
indicators are the basis for situation development. The analyst
integrates information from all sources to confirm indicators of enemy
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activities. As indicators are detected and confirmed, PIRs are answered.
Appendix C lists common indicators.
WORKING SITUATION MAP
The working SITMAP is the basic analytical tool at all levels. I t
provides a graphic presentation of the battlefield for the analyst,
commander, and staff. The working SITMAP integrates significant
information from al I sources in a graphic representation that is easy to
comprehend. All intelligence records are used with the working SITMAP to
develop the enemy situation and intelligence estimate. The analyst posts
all practical information to the working SITMAP. Such information may
include strength, activity, or last known location. An “as of” time must
always accompany map information. This allows outdated intelligence to be
removed and assists in monitoring enemy progress. The analyst maintains
separate records of information that cannot be posted and uses them to
back up and expand the information on the working SITMAP. Other records
normally are more permanent than the working SITMAP. The significant
information about the enemy and the terrain becomes apparent when posted.
The analyst uses the working SITMAP to—
0 Identify critical relationships.
0 Evaluate, compare, and integrate information and intelligence from
all sources.
0 Track enemy forces.
0 Identify indicators.
0 Wargame opposing courses of action.
0 Identify uncertainties.
Critical relationships help to determine the composition of enemy
units, assess their capabilities and probable courses of action, and
identify exploitable weaknesses. The analyst identifies critical
relationships by comparing separate items of information on the working
SITMAP and by comparing the working SITMAP with other intelligence
records.
By comparing known information about an enemy unit (posted on the
working SITMAP) with the appropriate doctrinal template and the OB book,
the analyst identifies unknown elements of an enemy unit. For example, if
two motorized rifle battal ions (MRBs) of an MRR have been identified,
located, and posted on the working SITMAP, the third MRB is most likely
deployed nearby. The doctrinal template helps the analyst determine the
most likely location of the third MRB. This comparison also helps the
analyst identify and locate enemy HVTS I ike CPS and AD weapon sites.
Figure 6-1 shows an example of a doctrinal template. Critical
relationships become more apparent when the doctrinal templates are
compared with known unit locations plotted on the working SITMAP. Further
doctrinal templates of Soviet-style forces are available in GTA 30-1-24.
6-4
|--- 7.5km---1
REGARDLESS OF OPERATIONAL FRONTAGE
NOTE: For clarity, support units and observation posts are not depicted.
Figure 6-1. Doctrinal template tank regiment main attack (div slice).
6-5
The working SITMAP makes it easier to evaluate and compare information
from different sources. The analyst compares incoming information with
the information previously posted to the working SITMAP for compatibility
with existing data. This comparison also helps to integrate new
information with existing information and to determine its significance .
The working SITMAP provides a record of the latest location of enemy
forces. As new information on enemy locations is received, the analyst
compares it with information on the old location. This indicates the
direction and rate of enemy movement. It also helps determine the
accuracy of reports. For example, if the time a unit is observed in a new
location (compared with the location and time the unit was last observed)
indicates unusually rapid movement that significantly exceeds the
doctrinal rates, the analyst is alerted to a problem. Either the old or
the new report is inaccurate, or the two reports may not concern the same
unit. It might alert the analyst to the possibility of an enemy deception
operation. The analyst uses the IPB event template and EAM to project
enemy movement. By comparing these with actual enemy movement as
indicated on the working SITMAP, the analyst predicts the enemy’s probable
course of action and predicts when and where the enemy implements it.
The working SITMAP is vital in recognizing and evaluating indicators.
Most indicators are associated with patterns of enemy activity, which
become apparent on the working SITMAP. For example, an indicator of
attack is the massing of artillery well forward. The working SITMAP
reveals the location, density, and movement of enemy artillery. A careful
analysis of the working SITMAP helps the analyst identify artillery
groups, their composition, disposition, and location in relation to the
FLOT. By comparing the working SITMAP with doctrinal and situation
templates, the analyst better identifies significant patterns of enemy
activity and associates them with specific indicators.
The working SITMAP is well-suited for wargaming opposing courses of
action. Wargaming integrates friendly and enemy capabilities and possible
courses of action with the weather and terrain. It helps both the
operations and the intelligence staffs to analyze opposing courses of
action. This is vital to preparing the estimate of the situation and the
intelligence estimate. It also helps the analyst predict the enemy
reaction to friendly courses of action.
The analyst uses the working SITMAP to clarify uncertainties. For
example, if the analyst identifies two MRBs that are subordinate to a
particular MRR, further knowledge of the enemy’s organization tells the
analyst that there is a third MRB that has not been located.
The IPB templates are important analytical tools when used with the
working SITMAP. Comparison of templates and the working SITMAP
systematizes analysis and increases the accuracy of the estimate.
Situation and event templates depict projected enemy activities while the
working SITMAP depicts the actual observed enemy activities. By comparing
and integrating the two, the analyst predicts future enemy activities with
greater accuracy.
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FACTORS OF ANALYSIS
The analyst must understand the dynamics of the AirLand Battle to
accurately analyze the forces that occupy it and the impact of the
environment on those forces.
The analyst understands the enemy’s tactical doctrine and the other
forces that impact on the execution of that doctrine. The following
suggestions are some techniques for developing enemy capabilities and the
relative probability of their adoption. These techniques help the analyst
use available information effectively to find the right answers to
critical uncertainties.
The analyst considers the enemy’s use of mass and economy of force.
The enemy commander, like the friendly commander, has limited combat
resources. The enemy commander uses mass and economy of force at the
optimum times and places to accomplish the mission. Rather than dissipate
the forces across the entire battlefield, the enemy commander weights the
main effort to ensure combat superiority at the decisive time and place.
Once the analyst determines how the enemy commander uses mass and economy
of force on the battlefield, the enemy’s most probable course of action
becomes more apparent. The enemy uses follow-on echelons to mass combat
power at decisive times and places on the battlefield. In the AirLand
Battle, the analyst locates and tracks these enemy follow-on echelons and
predicts where and when they will be committed. Situation and event
templates used with the working SITMAP help the analyst predict where the
enemy will mass.
On a nuclear battlefield, massing presents new opportunities and
dangers. Nuclear weapons are substituted for massing of other forms of
combat power, yet some concentration of enemy forces is required to
successfully exploit strikes.
Analysts identify the composition of enemy force at least one echelon
above their own. The mass and economy of force problem is resolved at
each enemy echelon. The higher echelon commander’s decision on a maneuver
scheme and the allocation of combat power and support impacts directly on
enemy capabilities within the analyst's unit’s zone or sector.
Identifying the enemy composition facilitates construction of a
composite picture of the total enemy force structure, including
information on identified and unidentified units, located and unlocated
units, total reinforcements, types and amounts of CS or CSS, and the
availability of special capabilities (river crossing, EW, intelligence
collection). In addition, detailed analysis of enemy composition assists
in quantifying the degree of uncertainty that still exists. This judgment
affects the degree of confidence an analyst has in estimating. Most
intelligence judgments are inductive generalizations based on fragmentary
evidence. By comparing available information with the composition and
organization of the enemy force, the analyst determines what percentage of
the total picture of the enemy force is known, and what percentage remains
uncertain. For example, agencies report that four enemy artillery
batteries have displaced forward. The analyst generalizes that enemy
6-7
artillery is displacing forward, an indicator of attack. However, if the
composition of the enemy force indicates a total of 40 available
batteries, the analyst must recognize that the judgment is based on only
10 percent of the picture. Ninety percent is still uncertain. It is
vital that analysts be conscious of the degree of uncertainty remaining in
the situation.
Analyze the significance of enemy activity outside your zone or
sector . Consider the big picture when assessing the meaning and
significance of enemy activity in your AO. Enemy boundaries are not
identical to friendly boundaries. Events outside your boundaries may be
part of the enemy commander’s scheme of maneuver. Analysis of events
outside a unit’s AO provides indicators or helps focus the collection and
analysis efforts within that unit’s AO. Events that occur within a
friendly unit’s AO require correlation with events outside the AO if they
are to be correctly interpreted. This is related to and facilitated by
the determined composition of the opposing enemy force.
Review enemy tactical doctrine. Enemy commanders are trained to
follow their own tactical doctrine. Though some enemy commanders are more
or less innovative, most consciously or unconsciously apply doctrine when
confronted with a specific mission, threat, and AO.
Enemy tactical doctrine presents many of the indicators of enemy
capabilities and probable courses of action. It relates directly to how
the enemy uses mass and economy of force in operations.
The enemy’s tactical doctrine is depicted on doctrinal templates when
possible. Doctrinal templates depict unit formations; frontages and
depths for attack, defense, and other operations; characteristic
dispositions associated with particular courses of action; allocations of
CS and CSS; and information on specialized military operations like river
crossings and air assault operations. Event templates depict the
doctrinal sequence in which the enemy conducts operations. The IPB
templates and the working SITMAP are the basis for comparing the enemy’s
tactical doctrine with actual events.
Consider how the weather and terrain affect enemy capabilities and the
enemy commander’s choice of a course of action. Weather and terrain are
physical constraints which facilitate or alleviate the adoption of
specific courses of action. These constraints have a major impact on how
the enemy commander allocates resources. Weather and terrain force enemy
commanders to apply special methods of operations. They may require
changes in weapons and equipment or in the way they are used. The weather
and terrain may give rise to new force structures and organizations.
Paragraph two of the intelligence estimate addresses the effects of
the weather and terrain on friendly and enemy operations (see Appendix A).
Through continuous IPB and analysis, the analyst relates the enemy force
structure and tactical doctrine to the constraints imposed by the weather
and terrain, particularly on the AAs.
6-8
To relate enemy dispositions and physical constraints of the weather
and terrain, there are four specific techniques used to determine how the
enemy appl ies mass and economy of force.
The first technique is to determine the enemy unit boundaries and
relate them to AAs. Boundaries frequently are identified through the
location of enemy reconnaissance and cavalry units (which often have
distinctive, easily identified equipment), terrain and doctrinal analysis
of enemy prisoner of war (EPW) capture locations, and other techniques.
This technique helps determine mass and economy of force and the enemy
commander’s perceptions of AAs.
The second technique is to compute enemy strength in terms of
committed forces, reinforcements, and supporting weapons for the entire
AO, then recompute for each AA. Determine whether enemy combat power and
support are distributed evenly or whether one option is weighted.
Appendix D describes how to compute enemy strength.
The third technique is to analyze enemy allocations of available LOC.
Military forces usually allocate roads to tactical units for logistical
support and tactical movement. If this allocation is determined through
analysis of enemy boundaries and traffic patterns, it indicates the
enemy’s probable course of action and assists in identifying enemy support
priorities.
The final technique is to identify potential enemy objectives and
relate them to enemy dispositions and AAs. Determine which avenue is
weighted by locating unit boundaries, computing unit strength, identifying
allocation of LOC, and identifying the distribution of combat power.
TECHNIQUES OF ANALYSIS
The following techn iques of analysis helps the anal yst identify the
presence of indicators.
PATTERN ANALYSIS
Pattern analysis helps the analyst identify indicators of enemy
activity. Pattern analysis is based on the premise that the enemy’s
course of action results in certain characteristic patterns that are
identified and correctly interpreted. Ideally, paragraph 3d of the
intelligence estimate (Appendix A) should identify the presence of these
indicators. The analyst is faced with the problem of organizing and
recording incoming information and adding it to existing information so
that meaningful relationships are clarified. The working SITMAP and IPB
templates are the primary tools used to organize information. Indicators
can be ambiguous and incomplete. The analyst identifies the patterns of
activity or tip-offs which characterize the operations of specific enemy
units.
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WEIGHTING INDICATORS
Weighting indicators helps resolve ambiguity. In combat, intelligence
analysts usually are confronted with conflicting indicators. Enemy forces
may portray patterns associated with attack, defense, and delay
simultaneously. Conflicting indicators result from--
0 Deliberate deception.
0 Bad execution.
0 Temporary indecis ion.
0 Transition between missions.
0 Random activity.
0 Incomplete or inaccurate information.
0 Ambiguity of the indicator itself.
When confronted with ambiguous or conflicting indicators, analysts
weigh some indicators more heavily than others to determine the enemy’s
actual intent. This is not a problem of simple mathematics. The enemy’s
actual course of action may not have the most indicators. Analysts
develop a methodology for identifying those indicators which are most
highly characteristic of a course of action. There are several techniques
which, individually or in combination, assist in this process.
Origin of the Indicator
One technique of determining the enemy’s intent is to consider the
origin of the indicator; that is, the reason why the enemy force presents
a particular pattern or tip-off. In brief, al I indicators stem from
either military logic, doctrinal training, organizational constraints,
bureaucratic constraints, or the personal ity of the enemy commander.
Military Logic . Mi I itary logic implies, and military experts agree, that
solutions to many m i litary problems are obvious. For example, all modern
armies employ artil lery forward for attack and echeloned in-depth for
defense. Violation of military logic usually implies the loss of combat
power or support at some critical point during an operation.
Doctrinal Training . A nation’s tactical doctrine includes military logic
and much more. Most doctrine begins where military logic ends. Military
experts sometimes disagree on the ideal solution to a specific military
problem. For example, US and Soviet doctrine agree on deploying artillery
forward in the attack, while they disagree on using artillery in a direct
fire role. Just as terrain and weather are physical constraints on the
enemy’s adoption of a course of action, enemy doctrine and training are
mental constraints. Soviet emphasis on detailed, repetitive training is
designed to inbreed a sort of reflex action which enhances the value of
doctrinal indicators. Though individual commanders display more or less
6-10
imagination and creativity in its application, indicators based on
doctrine and training are generally reliable.
Organizational Constraints . Organizational structure represents a special
case of doctrine. The ideal composition of a division (size,
organization, weapons, and organic support) is debatable. The military
experts have resolved this issue in radically different ways.
Organization influences include a nation’s strategic commitments, economic
resources, geography, threat perceptions, historical experience,
alliances, personnel and equipment resources, and a myriad of other
factors. The tactical organization resulting from these factors causes
identifiable patterns to develop when employed. A US division generally
has three subordinate maneuver headquarters contrasted with four in a
Soviet division, and differences in the composition and structure of the
division base imposes distinct patterns concerning US and Soviet
operations.
Bureaucratic Constraints . Identifying bureaucratic constraints as a
source of indicators shows that military units are large organizations and
must establish routines and SOPS to function efficiently. This imposes
patterns in planning, execution, logistics support, and other activities,
though there are general similarities in routines and procedures of
comparable units, there are likely to be significant variations which can
be identified and exploited locally.
Personality of the Commander . The enemy commander is the final source of
indicators. Each commander has a unique history of personal training,
experience, success, failure, and idiosyncrasies. Many are creatures of
habit, prone to repeat what has worked in the past; others are creative
and innovative. All are captives of their experience to some degree. It
is the commander who must apply, and mix military logic, doctrine, and
organization to accomplish the mission. The commander’s personality is
one major source of deviation from established doctrinal norms, The
importance of personality is recognized in that biographic intelligence is
a major component of strategic intelligence. US tactical OB doctrine
classifies personality as a subcategory under miscellaneous factors.
In general, indicators are weighed, with the role of the commander
being considered a variable. In the case of a strong, innovative, or
eccentric commander (Patton or Rommel), personality is more important than
doctrine or training; while the personality of a methodical, traditional
commander ranks last.
Principle of Mass Indicators
Another technique is to weigh the indicators which reflect or are
based on the principle of mass. Military units normally conduct deception
operations with the same force constraints in which they accomplish their
actual mission. The enemy commander often conducts deception with the
least outlay of scarce resources. Indicators based on a major confirmed
commitment of combat resources are more likely to reflect the true
situation. In a nuclear environment, massing is not required to achieve a
favorable combat power ratio; thus, mass is not a reliable indicator.
6-11
Analysts identify the enemy’s capability to concentrate fires of potential
nuclear del ivery systems.
Other Indicators
The last technique is to weight those indicators which are most
difficult to fake.
Quantify Probable Relationship . Quantify the probable relationship
between the presence of specific indicators and the enemy’s adoption of a
particular course of action. If the enemy commander intends to adopt a
particular course of action, what is the probability that a specific
indicator is present? The answer is subjective, but it is based on the
analyst’s knowledge of and experience with the enemy, the analyst’s
professional judgment, and to some degree, the mathematical probability of
specific indicators associated with enemy courses of action.
Analyze the Time Sequence of Events . It takes time for an enemy force to
prepare, move, and execute an operation. Time, mass, and space
relationships are a major tool in exposing deception. Since deception is
often conducted with the least outlay of combat resources, close analysis
of information from different sources which report on the same location,
at the same time, or concerning the same enemy unit may reveal significant
discrepancies.
Assess the Enemy’s Combat Effectiveness . Such assessments are based on an
analysis of both tangible and intangible factors. Tangible factors
include personnel and equipment strength. Intangible factors include
morale, training, political reliability, and other factors. While combat
effectiveness bears directly on a unit’s capabilities and probable courses
of action, there is no scientific method of determining it. It requires
the analyst’s subjective judgment of the impact of both the tangible and
intangible factors.
WARGAMING FRIENDLY AND ENEMY CAPABILITIES
Consider the enemy G2’s perception of the friendly force. Though
enemy capabilities exist independently of their assessment of friendly
forces, the enemy’s choice of alternative courses of action does not.
Determine the enemy's perception of friendly capabilities through analysis
of the collection capabilities, known collection activities, and
inadvertent disclosures by friendly forces which might have been monitored
by enemy intelligence. Detailed analysis of potential disclosure enables
the analyst to partially reconstruct the enemy G2’s working SITMAP.
Mentally wargame advantages and disadvantages of identified enemy
capabilities from the enemy commander’s point of view. This is a valuable
analytical technique, but potentially dangerous if it becomes
mirror-imaging.
Avoid preconcert i ons. The analyst must remember that the objective is
not to prove a prior judgment. Experience suggests that preconceptions
are the analyst’s principal nemesis. Even if the techniques recontnended
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above are creatively employed, there is a danger that the analyst who has
reached and expressed a preliminary judgment unconsciously begins to seek
and weigh evidence which confirms the initial estimate and dismisses or
passes over inconsistent or conflicting information. The analyst should
not be concerned about the answer, as long as it is the right answer. The
analyst reserves judgment, maintains objectivity, remains aware of
uncertainties, tolerates dissent, and constantly tests working theory
against available evidence. Where practical, the analyst considers
establishing a “devil’s advocate’ system to test, challenge, and think the
unthinkable.
6-13
CHAPTER 7
TARGET DEVELOPMENT
Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the
appropriate response to them taking into a count operationa I requiremen ts
and capabilities. An efficient, organized targeting effort is critical to
the success of AirLand Battle operations. A target is a geographical
area, complex, or installation planned for capture or destruction by
military forces. Attacking HPTs that are least affordable to lose, strips
the enemy of the initiative and forces the enemy to conform to friendly
battle plans.
Targeting has always been a complex effort. Large numbars of sensors
under the control of different agencies are closely coordinated to be
efficient and must rapidly report fleeting or dangerous targets. The wide
variety of attack means and munitions are compared to the particular
vulnerabilities of many different types of targets. Targeting is a
multidisciplined effort, requiring interaction between FS, intelligence,
EW, operations, and plans cells.
The object of targeting is to disrupt, delay, or limit those enemy
capabilities which could interfere with the achievement of friendly
objectives. Do not confuse disrupt, delay, and limit with suppress,
neutral ize, and destroy. The latter relate to the amount of damage
inflicted upon a target. Disrupt, delay, and limit apply to the effect
that the damage has upon the target as it pursues a course of action. A
further clarification of disrupt, delay, and limit is available in Annex A
to FM 6-20-10. The staff recommends how a target is engaged.
Targeting is based on the friendly scheme of maneuver and tactical
plans. It includes an assessment of the weather, terrain, and enemy to
identify those enemy formations, equipment, facilities, and terrain which
are attacked or control led to ensure success. Targeting is an integral
part of the planning process which begins with the receipt of a mission
and continues through the development of the approved plan. The targeting
process includes the development of a prioritized list specifying what
targets are to be attacked, and what is required to defeat the target.
Figure 7-1 shows the staff functions during the targeting process.
This process supports the commander’s decision on which broad attack
option to use to engage the targets: maneuver, EW, FS, or a combination
thereof; and the determination of the echelons that engage the target. An
assessment of the attack is then conducted to determine the effectiveness
of the targeting process. Although the targeting process is more cornnonly
associated with high and medium intensity conflicts, it also appl ies to
LIC. While spread sheets and target sheets currently do not exist for
LIC, the concept of key personnel meeting together to determine the most
important targets to strike in support of the friendly maneuver commander
HVTS and to detect and attack those targets still applies. The targeting
methodology is characterized by three functions: decide, detect, and
deliver. These three functions are inherently intertwined. Figure 7-2
shows the three functions of the targeting process.
7-1
Receive guidance on:
Commander’s intent.
HPT.
Attack criteria.
Lead time between decision points and TAIs.
Develop:
Future MCOO.
Situation and event templates.
Explain enemy courses of action as part of wargaming. Based on friendly courses of
action, refine event template. Assist in development of HPT matrix and target selection
standards.
Based on commander’s approval or changes of CoA, HPT, attack guidance:
Publish collection plans and SORs.
Brief ASPS, CM&D, TCAE, as appropriate on CoA, HPT, TSS, attack guidance.
Ensure all analysts and collectors understand commander’s intent.
Collect information.
Pass HPT related information and intelligence immediately to FS.
Pass other intelligence and target damage assessments per SOP.
Ensure information collection and intelligence production supports any FRAGOs.
Figure 7-1. The targeting process checklist.
7-2
The DECIDE function is the planning associated with a successful
targeting effort. It requires close interaction between the commander,
intelligence and operating staffs, FS personnel, and various other CS
agencies. The staffs must have a clear understanding of the unit’s
mission, the commander’s concept of the operation and intent, and the
commander’s initial planning guidance with respect to target priorities.
With this information, the staff officers prepare their respective
estimates. From the standpoint of targeting, the FS, intelligence, and
maneuver estimates are interrelated and require close coordination between
the respective elements. The DECIDE function provides a clear picture of
the targeting priorities applicable to the tasking of TA assets,
information processing, the selection of an attack means, and the
requirement for post attack assessment. Specifically, the DECIDE function
is designed to answer the questions:
0 What is it we need to look for?
0 Where and when can it be found?
0 Who can locate and identify it?
0 Which attack option should be used?
0 Will target damage assessment (TDA) be required or possible?
In the DETECT function, the priorities developed in the DECIDE
function are translated into the TA taskings found in the subordinate
unit’s portion of the OPORD and in intelligence and FS annexes. All TA
assets available to the commander are fully utilized. As the TA assets
gather information, they report their findings back to their controlling
headquarters which in turn pass pertinent information to the tasking
7-3
agency. The information gathered is processed to produce valid targets.
Not all the information reported benefits the targeting effort, but it may
be valuable to the development of the overall situation. The target
priorities developed in the DECIDE function help to expedite the
processing of targets. As these targets are developed, appropriate attack
systems are tasked in accordance with the commander’s guidance and
requirements of the attack system managers.
The DELIVER function is the execution portion of the targeting
process. It consists of the selection of the appropriate attack means for
a given target, the tasking of that attack system, and the execution of
the attack by the specified means. If TDA reveals that the commander’s
guidance has not been met, then the entire targeting process continues
focusing on this target.
The targeting effort is continuous. The intelligence, operations, and
FS officers comprise the core of the effort at all echelons. Other staff
officers that are involved with planning and controlling of firepower and
TA also participate. The other staff officers that assist in the process
include representatives of the Air Force (AF), the staff weather officer
(SWO), the aviation officer, the chemical officer, the Army airspace
control officer, the EW staff officers, and the engineer.
The rest of this chapter describes, in detail, the functions required
to plan and engage targets successfully using the DECIDE-DETECT-DELIVER
methodology.
DECIDE
Decisions are critical to the targeting process. They create the
guidelines for the acquisition and engagement of targets. Establishing
these guidelines at the beginning of the DECIDE function allows for a
unity of effort and efficiency that would otherwise not be achieved.
The decisions that are made are reflected in visual products. The
decisions made are what targets should be acquired and attacked, where and
when will the targets likely be found and who can locate them, how the
targets should be attacked, and is TDA required. The products are the HPT
matrix (what targets should be acquired and attacked), target selection
standards (TSS) (what assets can produce targets), the collection plan
(where and when should targets be found and who can find them), and the
attack guidance matrix (how targets should be attacked). The collection
plan is a G2 or S2 product that is important to the targeting process but
is not discussed in detail in this chapter. See FM 34-2 for discussion of
collection plans.
The commander and staff plan for future operations by projecting one
or more alternative courses of action based upon a mission analysis, the
current and projected battle situation, and anticipated opportunities. IPB
is an important process that assists the commander and staff in developing
courses of action.
7-4
The process begins with the receipt of a mission, which higher
headquarters assigns or the commander deduces. The mission statement
directs the focus toward a course of action, in a particular area, against
a specific enemy. The commander then, either with or without input from
the staff, performs mission analysis. This analysis considers tasks that
are performed, the purpose behind the tasks, and the constraints on the
unit, resulting in a restated mission.
The restated mission provides the basis from which to start the staff
estimate process. The intelligence estimate provides key support to
target development. Target development is one of the four IEW tasks:
situation development, target development, EW, and Cl.
IPB AND TARGET DEVELOPMENT
IPB provides most of the information for the intelligence estimate
which impacts on the target development process. IPB is a continuous,
systematic approach to analyzing the enemy, weather, and terrain in a
specific geographical area. This approach evaluates enemy capabilities
and predicts enemy courses of action with respect to specific battlefield
conditions.
It is important for the analyst to understand the effects of
battlefield conditions, especially obscurants, on targeting. Such
conditions drive the need for remote sensors and redundant systems to
ensure proper coverage. The analyst must “see” the battlefield as it is,
and not just as it appears on a map.
The initial IPB effort produces doctrinal templates which convert
enemy OB into graphics and aids in the initial identification of potential
HVTS. HVTS are those assets that the enemy commander feels are critical
to the successful accomplishment of the mission.
Situation templates assist the refinement of HVTS for specific
battlefield and courses of action. Concurrent with situation template
development is an examination of enemy decision and logic trees associated
with each potential course of action. This identifies likely “fail paths”
that provide indications of what might happen if the enemy commander’s
plan fails and what actions comprise the enemy commander’s failure
options. The “fail path” evaluation leads to an identification of
critical enemy functions associated with each enamy course of action and
general HVTS associated with each function. Through BAE, terrain
evaluation, and weather analysis, the enemy course of action is associated
with a specific battlefield. Situation, event, and decision support
templates are developed to identify critical enemy activities and any NAIs
where specific enemy activities or events or lack therefore wil 1 help to
confirm or deny the enemy’s adoption of a particular course of action.
Additionally, DPs or decision phase lines, TAIs, and HPTs are identified.
HPTs are those HVTS that are acquired and successfully attacked to ensure
the success of the friendly commander’s mission.
7-5
TARGET VALUE ANALYSIS
IPB analysis considers terrain, weather, enemy doctrine, and current
enemy actions to arrive at conclusions of what the enemy wi I | do; the
courses of action. Target value analysis (TVA) is a methodology which
identifies potential HVT sets within a given tactical situation. If
successfully countered, they provide a tactical opportunity. This
methodology provides a relative ranking of worth of target sets. TVA
begins when the analyst adopts the place of the enemy commander. The
analyst, in coordination with the G3 or S3, FSO, and other staff members,
wargames the operation. The purpose of wargaming is to finalize
individual staff estimates and to develop a friendly and enemy DST. A
by-product of this is the determination of the enemy assets that are
critical to the success of the enemy mission-HVTS. Target spread sheets
and target sheets are tools used in identifying HVTS. The information
found on these documents is produced during the IPB and wargaming
process. More information on the development and use of these targeting
tools is available in Annex A of FM 6-20-10.
HVTS and HPTs
An HVT is a target whose loss to the enemy can be expected to
contribute to substantial degradation of an important battlefield
function. HPTs are HVTs which, if successfully attacked, contribute
substantially to the success of friendly plans. The G2 or S2 section,
together with the FSO and other staff, nominate HVTS to be HPTs. The key
to HPTs is that they are based on the friendly concept of the operation
and support the friendly force commander’s scheme of maneuver. The
development of HPTs from HVTS is done during the wargaming process. As
the different options are fought by the staff, the G2 or S2 identifies
specific HVTS. The staff discusses or wargames different courses of
action to develop the HPTs. The HPTs for a specific phase of a battle are
recorded on the DST as are the means decided on to deliver the attack.
HVTS include enemy C 2 points, air defense artillery (ADA) assets, and
engineering equipment. If friendly forces were planning an air attack the
enemy C 2 and ADA might be HPTs, while engineers probably would not.
Discussion on templating and IPB is available in Chapter 4 and FM 34-130
The process of designating an HVT as an HPT requires careful staff
coordination. The G2 and collection manager evaluate HVTs at different:
points in the battle to determine if collection assets are capable of
detecting them and providing the necessary target resolution, for example,
time, location, and so forth, to permit effective action (DELIVER). HPTs.
because of their importance, receive priority in the allocation of
detection systems. This priority is weighed against the same systems for
situation development.
The FSO uses target sheets and the knowledge of friendly weapons
systems to determine if there exists a capability to attack the HVT with
lethal assets. The EW officer and others assist the FSO with regard to
non-lethal systems. Availability of a weapon system should not affect the
attack since HPTs have precedence over other targets. Using the
capabilities of the systems to attack the targets, the G2 or S2 analyzes
7-6
and predicts the enemy’s response to each. This analysis determines if
the attack of the HVT is necessary to ensure the success of friendly
operations. The commander uses it in developing attack guidance. The
HVTs that meet the criteria of being acquirable, attachable, and capable
of ensuring friendly success are designated HPTs. In most instances, the
analyst chooses to target enemy elements that have been designated
“critical nodes.’” A critical node is an element, position, or
corrrnunications entity whose disruption or destruction immediately degrades
the ability of a force to command, control, or effectively conduct combat
operations. HPTs are formatted for easy reference in an HPT matrix. The
G3 or FSO prepares this matrix and gives it to the commander for
approval . The selection of HPTs, which also are critical nodes, are
facilitated by a number of already existing enemy studies. Selection of
these critical nodes, coupled with other TVA efforts, al lows friendly
forces to best determine those enemy elements which are HVTS or HPTs.
TARGET SELECTION STANDARDS
TSS are criteria by which personnel determine which systems produce
valid targets, and which require some form of confirmation before their
targets are considered for attack. The development of TSS is a joint
function of the G2 and G3 sections and requires that the capabilities and
limitations of collection assets be known. The CM section of the G2
provides the majority of these capabilities and limitations.
TSS do not determine that the information that the sensor receives is,
in fact, a target. The analyst determines that. TSS reflect the system’s
capabilities to produce targets. TSS are dynamic. The effects of weather
and terrain on both the Collection assets and enemy equipment are taken
into account. TSS are keyed to the tactical situation. Great care is
taken to deal with potential enemy deception, and to ensure the
reliability of the source or agency that is reporting. TSS are designed
to allow targeting personnel in the TOC to readily distinguish between
targets and suspect reports. TSS are developed for all TA systems
available.
Target location errors (TLEs) are the accuracies to which the assets
can locate various targets. The source’s TLE and the timeliness of
information are considered. It is an inherent responsibility for the FSE
to decide which systems have acceptable TLEs for targeting purposes in a
specific tactical situation.
ATTACK OPTIONS
Knowing target vulnerabil ities and the effect an attack on them has on
an enemy operation al lows a staff to propose the most efficient available
attack option. A primary decision here is whether to disrupt, delay, or
limit the enemy.
The opportunity to disrupt, delay, or limit is annotated next to the
target sets on the target spread sheet. It is emphasized that these are
guidelines and each target is attacked based on its own merits.
7-7
Once the staff decides whether a target is best disrupted, delayed, or
limited, they select attack options. Utilizing the situation template and
MCOO, the risk to an asset versus its effectiveness is assessed. The
decision on what attack option to use is made at the same time as the
decision when to acquire and attack the target. Coordination is required
when an attack with two different means, for example, EW and CAS, is
decided upon. These decisions are recorded on the DST and are made during
the wargaming process. This requires that the proper coordination be
performed in a timely manner.
ATTACK GUIDANCE
The commander approves the attack guidance, as recommended by the
staff. This guidance details the specific HPTs to attack, when and how
they should be attacked, and any attack restrictions, The staff developed
and defined all this information during wargaming. Figure 7-3, the attack
guidance matrix, shows a format that this information is put in. The
matrix consists of a column for target categories, specific HPTs, how
targets should be attacked, when they should be attacked, any
restrictions. For a detailed explanation on using the attack gu idance
matrix, refer to FM 6-20-10.
DETECT
DETECT is the next critical function in the targeting process. This
function is perhaps the most important area for future planning. The G2
or S2 is the principal figure in directing the CM effort to detect the
targets identified in the DECIDE phase. The G2 or S2 works closely with
the FAIOs and FSOS to determine requirements for accuracy, identification,
and timeliness for collection systems. The intelligence section is
responsible for ensuring that the collection system asset managers
understand these requirements.
TARGET DETECTION MEANS
The detection of targets is accomplished using all available assets.
Key to the detect function is a focus on the HPTs designated during the
DECIDE phase of the targeting process. This is accomplished by the CM
section of the G2. Every targeting asset is aware of what the commander
designates as HPTs.
Field Artillery Target Acquisition Means
Several detection assets are presently organic to the FA at both corps
and division.
Field Artillery Battalions . FA battalions in DS of maneuver brigades
provide each maneuver battalion headquarters with a FSE to help plan,
direct, and coordinate FS operations. The FSE provides fire support teams
(FIST) to each of the maneuver battalion companies. Forward observers
(FOs) from each FIST are deployed at both company and platoon levels and
may accompany reconnaissance patrols or help to man observation posts
7-8
CAT
HPT
WHEN
HOW
RESTRICTIONS
_
(C3)
1
46,48
1
N EW
COORD ATK WITH EW
(FS)
2
1,2,7
A
N
DNE MRL OLDER THAN 10 MIN.
(ADA)
3
58
P
SIG 2
SEAD PROGRAM 120800A
(ENGR)
4
P
N
COUNTERMOBILITY PROGRAM %
(RSTA)
S
85
P
EW
(REC)
s
103,105
P
N
(POL)
7
A
D
ACCY 0-200 M PER TDA REQ
(AMMO)
8
A
D
(MAINT)
9
P
25%
NOT HIGH VALUE OR PAYOFF
(LIFT)
10
P
N
NOT HIGH VALUE OR PAYOFF
(LOC)
11
P
N G3
NOT HIGH VALUE OR PAYOFF
CAT
=
Target Category (from TVA)
HPT
Designated high payoff target; these targets have priority for engagement Target numbers
from TVA target sheets
How
=
How target Is attacked
—S:
Suppress
—N:
Neutralize
—D:
Destroy
—EW:
Jamming or other offensive EW means
— X%:
Specified percentage of casualties or damage
—G2:
Coordinate attack with G2 (any other person or element could be Indicated)
When
-
When the target should be attacked
— 1 :
Immediately. Interrupt other nonlmmedlate attacks if necessary
—A:
As acquired. Attack as assets are available
—P:
Plan. Include target In a program of fires or file for later attack when the situation changes
Restrictions
—
Any constraint on the attack of targets. Such constraints could be accuracy, time since
acquisition, required coordination, or munition restrictions by amount or type. Other notes
such as "TDA requites” or “Missile target only” could be included.
DNE:
Do not engage
'
Other abbreviations could be used as required by unit mission or SOP.
Figure 7-3. Sample attack guidance matrix.
(OPs) . They are the grass roots of the FA’s TA effort. They observe the
battlefield to detect, identify, locate, and laser designate targets for
suppression, neutralization, or destruction. They report both target ing
data and combat in formation to the maneuver battalion FSO and S2 using
either organic or supporting communications means. The capability of the
FIST to provide real time combat information cannot be emphasized enough.
The battalion FSO receives in formation from and passes information to the
FIST. The FSO continually exchanges targeting data and combat information
with the brigade FSO and elements from the DS FA battalion. The FSO
coordinates with the battalion S2 and S3 to identify and verify targeting
data and combat information derived from the overall collection effort.
The FSO is both a producer and a consumer of combat information.
7-9
Radar Assets . FA TA assets are the principle means for locating active
indirect fire weapons.
Moving target-locating radar (MTLR) detects, locates, and identifies
wheeled vehicles (light or heavy), tracked vehicles, and dismounted
personnel . MTLR is used for surveillance of critical areas such as AAs.
Mortar locating radar detects and locates enemy mortars and artillery
quickly and accurately enough for immediate engagement.
The DS FA battalion S2 has staff supervision responsibility for the
radar. This officer coordinates with the division artillery (DIVARTY)
targeting officer, the DS FA battalion S3, and the FSO at the maneuver
brigade to ensure that both FS and maneuver coverage requirements are
met. Cueing instructions are required. Ml sources provide specific
guidance to orient radar assets before the enemy fires.
Combat Observation Laser Teams (COLTS) . COLTS organic to each heavy and
light division provide a TA capability previously not available on the
battlefield. They are equipped to direct the engagement of targets.
Aerial Fire Support Officers . Aerial FSOS and TA aircraft are organic to
the division and the corps. These assets are highly mobile and cover a
much larger area than ground observers. Assuch, they are particularly
good target detection assets. Targeting data and combat information are
reported to the FSO at the maneuver brigade or battalion, the DIVARTY TOC,
or the fire direction center of the DS artillery battalion.
Air Defense Artillery TA Assets
The forward area alerting radar (FAAR) of the AD units provides a deep
look capability that can detect the location and movement of enemy air
assets. The integration of corps and theater AD efforts enable friendly
forces to obtain an air picture that can potentially cover the entire area
of interest for the echelon in question. Future concepts allow input
directly from theater AD assets into division air situation updates.
Collation of this AD information with other combat information enables us
to locate major enemy air assets, airfields, and refuel ing and rearming
points. Many of these become HPTs in support of the friendly scheme of
maneuver.
DETECTION PROCEDURES
The collection of combat information is integral to the entire DETECT
process. It is essential that all TA assets be used in the most effective
and efficient manner possible. Avoid duplication of effort among the
various assets unless such duplication is desired to confirm the location
or nature of a target. At corps and division, the CM&D section develops
and actively manages the collection plan to avoid such duplication. At
the same time, the CM&D section ensures that no gaps in planning
collection exist. This allows timely combat information to be collected
to answer the commander’s intelligence and TA requirements. This combat
information enables analysts to develop the enemy situation as well as
conduct target development.
7-1 o
To detect the desired HPTs in a timely, accurate manner, clear and
concise taskings are given to those TA systems capable of detecting a
given target. The FS personnel provide the G2 or S2 with the degree of
accuracy that the targets must be located with to be eligible for attack.
The G2 or S2 matches accuracy requirements to the TLEs of the collection
systems. This matching allows the G2 or S2 to develop a more detailed set
of TSS based not only on the acquisition system but also upon the HPTs’
acceptable TLEs that the G2 or S2 gives. These acceptable TLEs cannot be
placed in an SOP as they depend on the situation. Collection efforts
focus on those NAI and TAI that the IPB process identifies during the
DECIDE phase. Knowledge of the target type and its associated signatures
(electronic, visual, thermal) enable friendly forces to direct the most
capable collection asset to be tasked for collection against a given
target. The asset is positioned in the most advantageous location based
on friendly estimates of when and where the enemy target is located.
The decision to limit, disrupt, or delay a given HPT results in a
requirement to detect that target. Information needs, to support the
detection of the target, are expressed as PIR and IR. Their relative
priority is dependent on the importance of the target to the friendly
scheme of maneuver coupled with the commander’s intent. The PIR and IR
that support detection of a target are incorporated into the unit’s
overall collection plan. The collection manager translates the PIR and IR
into SIRS. The collection manager considers the availability and
capabilities of all collection assets within their echelon as well as
those assets available to subordinate, higher, and adjacent units (to
include joint or combined force assets).
As various assets collect the combat information to support target
development, this information is forwarded through the IEW system to the
intelligence analyst at the G2 or S2 staff. The analyst uses this combat
information to perform both situation and target development. When the
analyst detects a target, the target is passed immediately to the FS
element to determine if the target is an HPT, its priority, and if it
meets the TSS. Close coordination among the intelligence staff and the
FSCOORD is essential to ensure that these targets are passed to an attack
system which engages the target. To ensure that this occurs in a timely
manner the FAIO must have access to the ASPS. One technique is for the
FAIO to be physically located in the ASPS or CM&D. Procedures are
establ ished for cueing the FAIO as the predesignated HPTs are identified.
ASPS personnel are aware of HPT. When an HPT is discovered it is passed
without delay to FSE personnel . Usually, a member of the ASPS
hand-carries the intelligence. This allows for consultation at a map and
for intelligence to be placed into context with the overall situation.
The FAIOs coordinate with their respective G2s and FSES to paes the
targets directly to the fire control element at the DIVARTY TOC or, if the
commander approves, directly to a firing unit. This results in the most
efficient and timely engagement of those targets which the FS has
designated in advance for engagement.
7-11
The passing of targets and suspect targets to the staff is
accomplished by a number of means. It is important that essential.
Information that is passed for proper analysis and attack takes place. As
a minimum, the target report includes:
"Date-time group (DTG) of acquisition by the sensor.
"Description of the target.
"Size of the target.
"Target location.
"TLE.
The spec i fic forms and formats for passing target iinformat ion are
specified in the unit SOP.
The DTG is important as the target’s perishability or vuleerability
window is analyzed. This impacts on the urgency of the attack or the
denial of attack based upon the likelihood of the target having moved.
The target description and target size are required to determine
attack means, intensity of attack, number of assets to be corrrnitted, plus
other technical considerations. They are used to compare with the attack
guidance matrix. The target’s location is given as accurately as possible
within the confines of timeliness.
DELIVER
The DELIVER portion of the targeting process executes the target
attack guidance and supports the commander’s battle plan once the HPTs
have been located and identified. This portion of the process has two key
elements—the attack of targets and the TDA of those targets.
ATTACK OF THE TARGETS
The attack of the targets satisfies the attack guidance that was
developed in the DECIDE portion of the targeting process. The attack of
targets requires a number of decisions and actions. The decisions are
described as a set of tactical and technical decisions. Determining the
time for the attack, the attack system, and the required effects on the
target are the tactical decisions to make. Based upon these tactical
decisions, the technical decisions describe the precise attack means, the
unit to conduct the attack, the time of the attack, and in the case of FS
assets, the number and type of munition. The actions in the attack of the
targets are the actual physical attack of the targets by lethal or
non-lethal means. The time of attack of the target is planned or by
opportunity.
Planned Targets
Planned targets are evaluated initially to determine if the DF has
been reached or a trigger event has occurred. If either of these has
7-12
occurred and the resources that were identified to be used against the
target are available, the target is attacked. If the decision is to
attack now, a check is made to determine if the attack system, that we
earlier allocated for the attack of that target, is available. If so, the
attack is conducted with that system. If the allocated attack system is
not available, a decision is made on which other attack asset to use. If
the decision is made to defer the attack, the staff identifies the new DP
to the intelligence or acquisition system.
Targets of Opportunity
Targets of opportunity are evaluated initially as to when they should
be attacked. This decision is based on a number of factors such as the
activity of the target, how long the target can be expected to stay in its
current location (target perishability) and the target’s payoff, relative
to the payoff of the other targets currently being processed for
engagement. If the decision is made to attack now, the target is
processed further. If required, additional information is requested from
the intell igence or acquisition systems. If the decision is made to defer
the attack, then a DP is determined and described to intelligence or
acquisitions systems. Additionally, an assessment of the avai lability and
capabilities of attack systems to engage the target is made. If the
target exceeds either availability or capability of the unit’s attack
systems, then the target should be nominated to a higher headquarters for
attack.
DESIRED EFFECTS
The desired effects on the target are determined. As mentioned
earlier, we either delay, disrupt, or limit the target, based either on
time or terrain, This determination was made earlier in the case of
planned targets. For targets of opportunity, the staff makes the
determination. This decision is made based on the payoff of the target
and the constraints on availability of attack systems and munitions. The
determination of the desired effects is required before selecting an
attack system.
TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
Assessment of the effects of an attack always is desirable and is
required for certain important targets. The same assets that acquire
targets often provide data on the effectiveness of the attack. The
decision on which targets require assessment is made in the DECIDE
function of the targeting process. Assessment may take many forms besides
the determination of the number of casualties or equipment destroyed.
Other information of use includes whether the targets are moving or
hardening in response to the attack, changes in deception efforts and
techniques, increased communications efforts as the result of jamming, and
whether the damage achieved is having the expected effect on the enemy’s
combat effectiveness.
Assessments also are made passively through the compilation of
information regarding a particular target or area. An example is the
7-13
cessation of fires from an area. If an assessment is to be made of an
attack, the key personnel ensure that the intelligence or acquisition
systems must receive adequate warning so the necessary sensors are
directed at the target at the appropriate time. The assessment results
cause battle plans and earl ier decisions to be changed. If necessary, the
decisions made during the DECIDE portion of the process are reexamined.
IPB products, the HPT matrix, the TSS, the attack guidance matrix, and the
entire battle plan are updated. Assessment allows friendly forces to tune
our efforts to achieve the greatest result with the least amount of
expenditure or risk.
7-14
CHAPTER 8
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS
EW is an IEW function that plays a critical role in the AirLand
Battle. Intelligence support is essential to maximize the effectiveness
of EW operations. This chapter describes how intelligence supports EW
operations.
There is a special relationship between EW operations and
intel I igence. EW, situation development, target development, and Cl are
the four major tasks of the IEW mission. ESM, one of the three EW
functions, supports both situation and target development. EW operations
are not unique, however, because they require intelligence to be
successful and also result in the acquisition of additional intelligence.
Both maneuver and FS operations share this characteristic. EW is most
effective when integrated and employed with FS and maneuver. Planning
this integrated employment requires information that permits a comparison
of the courses of action open to the commander. Sources of intelligence
that provide support to EW operations and describe the intelligence used
for specific EW functions are outlined below.
EW requires careful staff coordination to be effective. This includes
coordination within the staff as well as coordination with the Ml unit
executing the plan. The interactions involved are very similar to those
seen in target development. The G3, in coordination with the G2 and the
Ml unit, is responsible for the integration of ECM into the fire and
maneuver scheme. The synchronized use of ECM and lethal attack requires
the electronic warfare section of the G3 to coordinate closely and
constantly with the FSE. To do this, the EWS and the FSO will often be
collocated. ESM are also carefully coordinated between the G2 and the Ml
battalion. The G2 ensures the ESM efforts are matched to the commander’s
PIR and targeting requirements. As these requirements change, the G2
coordinates with the Ml unit to update collection efforts.
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION TO SUPPORT ELECTRONIC WARFARE
The collection of intelligence to support EW is a multidiscipline
effort. HUMINT, IMINT, and SIGINT all contribute to the support of EW
operations. HUMINT provides invaluable information, such as captured
enemy communications-electron ics (C-E) operation instructions or an
agent’s photograph of an enemy code book contents.
IMINT provides location information important to jamming or intercept
attempts and accurate data on the probable frequency ranges of enemy
emitters. The size and shape of emitter antennas obtained from imagery
provide indications concerning frequency data and other technical
characteristics. A picture of an enemy CP or operational weapons site
provides information about which types of emitter signals, both
communications and noncommunications emissions, are associated with each
other and with specific enemy deployments or weapon systems employment.
8-1
This information permits complex node analysis and parametric analysis of
intercepted signals. This type analysis contributes to SIGINT support of
EW.
Since SIGINT deals directly with information obtained from intercepted
enemy signals, it provides the greatest volume of intelligence support to
EW operations. SIGINT include the same functions as ESM. The Drimary
difference between ESM and SIGINT is how the information is used’,
Generally, ESM produces combat information that can be used for target
development (jamming and FS), maneuver, or threat avoidance with little
systematic analysis or processing. SIGINT requires more extensive
processing to produce intelligence. ESM and SIGINT are mutually
supporting. Information collected through ESM is processed to produce
SIGINT, which is essential to support EW. See FM 34-40, Electronic
Warfare Operations, for a complete discussion on conducting EW operations.
THE EFFECTS OF TERRAIN AND WEATHER ON ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Signal propagation is affected significantly by terrain and
atmospheric conditions. An analysis of these effects is included in any
successful EW planning. The IPB techniques described in Chapter 4 of
this manual and further discussed in FM 34-130, Annex F, provide a useful
tool for evaluating and graphically displaying the effects of the terrain
on EW operations. The analyst creates templates to depict possible enemy
deployment of electronic systems for C 3 , reconnaissance, TA, and REC.
The analyst then compares the effects of the terrain on the employment of
these assets based on a knowledge of signal propagation principles.
Templates depicting locations of friendly ECM and ESM assets and knowledge
of their capabilities also are used to help select friendly EW assets for
employment against specific targets and indicate potential future
deployment sites.
INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED FOR ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT MEASURES
The requirement to intercept, identify, and locate the sources of
Threat electromagnetic emissions demands an extensive Threat electronic OB
data base. Intercept operations require detailed intelligence on enemy
frequency allocation and signal operating procedures. Identification is
assisted by a knowledge of operating procedures; language recognition, to
include special ized jargon, dialects, and code words; technical parameters
of signals associated with specific functions or echelons; and the
collocation of several types of emitters in a recognizable pattern which
can be associated with a type of function or deployment. DF provides
location data for ESM. As information is collected through ESM and used
to support ECM, it also is compared with and integrated into data base
information to be used for future ESM collection.
INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED FOR ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES
Jamming and electronic deception operations depend on current ESM data
and all the intelligence required for successful ESM operations. Target
receivers are jammed if LOS considerations permit it and the known
frequency on which it is operating is capable of being jammed by friendly
8-2
ECM assets. However, indiscriminate jamming of target receivers is not
the most efficient use of ECM assets. The most effective jamming
requires information on the enemy’s C 3 system so that the effects of
disrupting a particular communications link is anticipated. This expected
effect then is integrated into the commander’s scheme of fire and
maneuver.
Electronic deception operations depend heavily on intelligence. Both
manipulative and simulative electronic deception require intelligence on
the Threat SIGINT and ESM capabilities and a knowledge of friendly
emission patterns and profiles. It would serve no purpose to simulate a
friendly C 2 net or radar surveillance system if the opposing force
cannot intercept or recognize these transmissions. Even the most simple
imitative communications deception attempt, one designed to fool the
operator of a clear voice net for only a few minutes, requires some
knowledge of the target station’s identity and the purpose of the net. A
more sophisticated effort, one designed to confuse an enemy decision
maker, requires not only detai led knowledge of the enemy communications
system but also intelligence concerning the enemy decision-making process.
If the deception effort involves intrusion into or imitation of an
encrypted signal, the intelligence support may require an extensive
multidiscipline effort. See FM 90-2A (C), Electronic Deception, for
detailed discussion on electronic deception operations.
INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED ELECTRONIC COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURES
ECCM is divided into those measures designed to counter both ESM and
ECM. The anti-ESM effort requires much of the same intelligence support
required by manipulative and simulative electronic deception. The primary
intelligence required concerns the enemy SIGINT and ESM capability
evaluated in terms of the assessed vulnerabilities of friendly systems to
such efforts. The counter-SIGINT effort requires technical information
on the capabilities of enemy jammers and any intelligence on the
capability of opposing forces to accomplish electronic deception.
FM 34-60 provides detailed doctrine on counter-SIGINT operations. Threat
doctrine on deception and information on the availability of the equipment
necessary for Threat forces to implement deception activities is
important. Multidiscipline intelligence efforts to obtain information on
enemy ECM equipment before it is deployed is necessary if effective
counter-countermeasures are to be established.
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CHAPTER !3
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
Because the hostile intelligence collection threat arraved against US
Forces and agencies is multidiscipline, Countering tnat threat aiso must
be multidiscipline. Such an approach recognizes the need for a single
program which counters all Foreign Intelligence Services collection as
well as an analysis capability to bring it all together. The
multidiscipline counter intelligence (MDCI) analytical effort is dependent
upon information provided by the all-source intelligence system. It is
found at various echelons of command. Specifically--
°The Cl analysis section (CIAS) at division and corps,
"The Cl analysts within EACIC at theater Armv commands.
°The intelligence and threat analysis center (ITAC) at DA.
MDCI analysis is by no means exclusive to Army agencies, but is a
crucial activity of DOD. MDCI analysis operates through the DIA, and
other federal agencies such as the CIA and the FBI. Highly trained,
experienced, and skilled specialists perform MDCI analysis using the
latest technology and modern methods of directing, processing, and
disseminating.
The Cl analyst uses the tools and skills identified in this chapter
and Chapter 4, and as described in detail in FM 34-60. The intelligence
analyst focuses on “how we see the enemy”; the Cl analyst focuses on this
and “how the enemy sees us.” The Cl analyst must also focus on how to
counter the enemy’s collection efforts. Where the intelligence analyst is
a subject matter expert on the enemy, the Cl analyst, in addition to
having an in-depth understanding and expertise on foreign intelligence
collection capabilities, must have a good working knowledge of the
friendly force.
The CIAS must be collocated to integrate information fully with the
ASPS. It must have access to all-source data that can be screened for Cl
use.
The CIAS is under the staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of
Staff G2 and is found in the table of organization and equipment (TOE) of
the EACIC at theater level; the corps tactical operations center support
element (CTOCSE) at corps level; and the division tactical operations
center support element (DTOCSE) at division level . An all-source mix of
special ists is assigned to the CIAS to integrate their various skills and
produce the MDCI analytical products required by the commander at each
echelon. CIAS products are critical to the function of the G3 OPSEC and
deception cells,
The CIAS mission is a diverse and all-encompassing MDCI analytical
effort. The CIAS:
"Analyzes the multidiscipline intelligence collection threat
targeted against friendly forces.
"Assesses enemy intelligence collection threat vulnerabilities and
susceptibility to friendly deception efforts.
"Supports friendly vulnerability assessment.
"Along with the G3 OPSEC staff element, develops, evaluates, and
recommends countermeasures to the commander. These countermeasures
reduce, eliminate, or take advantage of friendly force
vulnerabilties.
"Supports rear operations by identifying collection threats to rear
area units and installations, to include low level agents
responsible for sabotage and subversion.
"Nominates targets for exploitation, neutralization, or
destruct i on.
"Develops and maintains a comprehensive and current MDCI data base.
"Tasks friendly intelligence collection resources through the CM&D
section.
The CIAS focuses on hostile HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT collection.
COUNTER HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
Working in a concerted MDCI environment, counter human intelligence
(C-HUMINT) analysts incorporate their efforts into the overall CIAS MDCI
analysis product. C-HUMINT analysis includes:
0 Analyzing and assessing the espionage, terrorism, subversion,
treason, sedition, and sabotage threat.
0 Analyzing enemy HUMINT collection capabilities and activities, and
further analyzing how those collection capabilities can affect the
friendly command.
0 Analyzing level I (enemy controlled agents or partisan collection)
and level II (diversionary and sabotage operations conducted by
unconventional forces) threats.
0 Recommending countermeasures and deception.
0 Nominating targets for exploitation, neutralization, or
elimination.
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COUNTER SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
Working in a concerted MDCi environment, counter signals intelligence
(C-SIGINT) analysts incorporate their efforts into the overall CIAS MDCI
analysis product. C-SIGINT analysis includes:
"Analyzing and assessing enemy SIGINT col lection capabilities and
activities.
"Comparing enemy collection systems capabillites against friendly
targets.
"Identifying, analyzing, and assessi ng friendly electronic patterns
and signatures.
"Analyzing friendly vulnerabilities against enemy SIGINT collection
efforts.
"Subsequently recommending countermeasures and deception.
"Nominating enemy SIGINT targets for exploitation, neutral ization,
or destruction.
COUNTER IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
Working in a concerted MDCI environment, counter imagery intelligence
(C-IMINT) analysts incorporate their efforts into the overall CIAS MDCI
product. C-IMINT analysis includes:
"Analyzing and assessing enemy imagery collection capabilities and
activities, to include-grouBif, and space threat systems.
Threat systems include anything from hand-held cameras, to satellite
platforms or fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft and unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV).
"Measuring enemy co I lection systems against friendly targets.
"Identifying, analyzing, and assessing friendly patterns,
signatures, and vulnerabilities for subsequent development and
recommendation of countermeasures and deception.
"Nominating enemy IMINT systems for exploitation, neutralization,
or destruction.
OTHER INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO Cl ANALYSIS.
MDCI cannot be conducted without the support of all three intelligence
discipl ines-SIGINT, HUMINT, and IMINT. These disciplines are used to
collect critical information on enemy collection, analysis, and
dissemination systems. Analysts extract the information from the
al l-source data base within the CIAS to determine enemy collection
capabilities and operations. These systems, coincidentally, collect a
great deal of intelligence on friendly forces. This intelligence is vital
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in evaluating friendly profiles and thereby determining their
vulnerabilities. If the situation warrants, Cl analysts can task friendly
collection systems to specifically collect intelligence on friendly forces
for the CIAS through the CM section.
The Cl mission mandates a wide range of functions and tasks that are
accomplished in peace and at all intensities of conflict. Cl operational
activities perform such functions as investigations, operations, andl
collection. Their products are of great value to the MDCI analyst. To
get the Cl operational reports, the CIAS closely interfaces with the CM&D
section to identify those items of Cl interest coming into the CM&Dfrom
operational Cl personnel . The CIAS must task and receive answers to those
taskings through the CM&D section.
ANALYTICAL PRODUCTS
Each of the specialties assigned to the CIAS has individual
responsibilities and skills which enable the production of
single-discipline analysis products. When these products are combined
into a comprehensive product, an MDCI product emerges. The CIAS then uses
the MDCI product to nominate targets for exploitation, neutralization,
destruction, or elimination. The MDCI products also provide OPSEC or
deception planners with critical information required for their
operations. Various specialists within the CIAS create the products
discussed in the following paragraphs.
Counter Human Intel I i gence Products
C-HUMINT analysts maintain the C-HUM|NT data base. Usj ng this data
base, they produce:
"Association matrixes.
"Activities matrixes.
"Time event charting.
"HUMINT communication diagrams.
° L i n kdi agrams.
"HUMINTT situation overlays.
"HUMINT-related portions of the threat assessment.
"Black, gray, and white lists.
The analytical techniques used in HUMINT analysis enable the analyst
to visualize large amounts of data in graphic form. These analytical
techniques, however, are only tools used to arrive at a logical and
correct solution to a complex problem; the techniques themselves are not
the solution.
9-4
There are three basic techniques (tools.) used as aids in analyzing
HUMINT-re Iated problems. They are time event charting, matrix
manipulat ion, and link diagraming. Used together, these techniques are
c r i t i c a Ito the process of transforming diverse and incomplete bits of
seemingly unrelated data into an understandable overview of an exceedingly
complex situation. See FM 34-60 for detailed discussion on these
techniques.
Counter Signals Intel I igence Products
C-SIGINT analysts maintain the C-SIGlNT data base. Using this data
base, they produce:
"Threat fixed-base SIGINT matrixes. These are developed from the
enemy collector characteristics data base and the threat fixed
station data record.
“Mobile SIGINT matrixes. These are developed from enemy collector
characteristics data base and threat OB and location data records.
"A system quick-reference matrix, providing a quick-reference of
capabilities and limitations of those SIGINT systems which will most
likely threaten that portion of the friendly command for which the
analyst is responsible. This matrix is developed through
manipulation of the data base to gain quick access to information
concerning those systems which are the most likely threats to the
corrrnand.
"SIGINT direction charts, portraying areas or targets of threat
SIGINT concentrations. This is accomplished through integrating the
EEOB overlay with the friendly electromagnetic overlay to determine
areas susceptible to collection.
“SIGINT situation overlays. These are a continuous graphic update
of the EEOB which depicts known or suspected threat SIGINT or REC
positions. These overlays are continuously compared with the
friendly electromagnetic overlay to identify susceptibility to
collection.
"SIGINT-related portions of the threat assessment.
Counter Imagery Intelligence Products
C-IMINT analysts maintain the C-IMINT data base. Using this data base
they produce:
"Threat SATRAN matrixes. (The definition for SATRAN is classified.
See FM 34-60A for explanation.) These are designed to identify when
and where a system is active and also show the collection
characteristics of the system.
9-5
"Threat intelligence collection flight matrixes. These are similar
to the SATRAN matrix, but are concerned “with other platforms used by
the threat. Tracking these collection systems continuously allows
the analyst to analyze threat IMINT collection patterns.
"System component quick-reference matrixes, including threat
system’s capabilities and processing times. This file is a part of
the data base which equates to an OB file on threat IMINT systems.
“IMINT situation overlays. These overlays are the paths from the
SATRAN and threat intelligence collection flight matrixes depicted
on the friendly operations graphics. This identifies areas
susceptible to collection.
"IMINT-related portions of the threat assessment.
COLLECTIVE CIAS PRODUCTS
The CIAS collectively prepares MDCI analytical products, jnciudjng:
"Rear operations IPB (ROIPB) products.
"MDCI graphic summaries (MDCISUM).
"MDCI threat assessments.
"MDCI situation overlays.
"MDCI estimate.
Chapter 3 of FM 34-60 includes a detailed description on how a CIAS
functions and details how to prepare single discipline and MDCI products.
The individual products of C-HUMINT, C-SIGINT, and C-IMINT analysts
become the analytical tools used to produce the MDCI collective products.
A brief description of each collective product follows.
Rear Operations Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
IPB is an analytical tool used throughout the Ml community. When a
greater need for intelligence support to rear operations surfaced, the IPB
process evolved into a new dimension and ROIPB surfaced. However, ROIPB
is not confined to the geographical boundaries of the rear area alone. In
addition to analyzing information of the enemy collection threat located
above and beyond the FLOT, it looks at the total friendly AO from the FLOT
back. It does not dupl icate the IPB efforts of the ASPS, but rather
complements their efforts. To avoid duplication, the CIAS must closely
interface with the ASPS.
Like IPB, ROIPB is key in preparing for the next battle. Dur ing
peacetime, ROl PB builds an extensive data base for each potential area in
which threat i ntelligence collectors or battalion size or smaller units
might operate. It analyzes this intelligence base in detail to determine
9-6
the impact of enemy, weather, and terrain on operations and presents it in
graphic form. It has the added ingredient of assisting in the assessment
of friendly courses of action from the enemy’s perspective.
Like IPB, ROIPB graphics can assist the commander in identifying
targets as they enter the battle area. ROIPB and IPB threat evaluation
and integration use the same analytical technique: templating. ROIPB
templates are similar to IPB templates in the MBA. ROIPB templates
provide a comparative intelligence data base that enables the Cl analyst
to graphically portray enemy intelligence collection and small unit
capabilities; depict probable courses of action before and during the
battle; and confirm or refute predictions. Like IPB templates, ROIPB
templates are dynamic and require continual review. For additional
details concerning RIOPB see FMs 34-130 and 34-60.
Multidiscipline Counterintelligence Summary
The MDCISUM is a graphic portrayal of the current enemy situation from
a Cl point of view. It graphically displays known enemy collection units,
as well as level I and II threats within the friendly area. The MDCISUM
ordinarily covers events within a 12-hour period. It portrays friendly
targets which have been identified as potential enemy objective during the
specified time frame. A clear and concise legend appears on each MDCISUM
which contains: time period covered by the MDCISUM, map reference
information, and symbols clearly identifying friendly and enemy
information. Figure 9-1 shows a sample MDCISUM.
J
The use of-colors enhances an MDCISUM: but once reproduced, the
disseminated product is black and white. Therefore, use dots, dashes, and
slashes to ensure consumer understanding; explain these symbols in the
legend. Subsequent MDCISUMs will not repeat information contained on
previous MDCISUMs unless that information is critical to the current
MDCISUM.
Multidiscipline Counterintelligence Threat Assessment
The MDCI threat assessment is a four-paragraph statement which is
publ ished as often as necessary and when significantly changed, depending
on the situation and the needs of the commander. As a general rule, the
MDCI threat assessment is disseminated through CM&D with every third or
fourth MDCISUM. The MDCI threat assessment provides justification for
MDCI target nominations, a primary goal of MDCI analysis. Figure 9-2
shows an example of the format and substance of an MDCI threat assessment.
Multidiscipline Counterintelligence Situation Overlay
The MDCI situation overlay is a composite of the functional area
overlays prepared by the subject matter experts assigned to the CIAS. The
MDCI situation overlay incorporates the most important information from
each of the other overlays. The functional area overlays serve as
<working” overlays, while the MDCI overlay is the master overlay and
serves as the briefing overlay. It should be ready for briefings at all
9-7
9-8
1. ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING PERIOD _ TO _ (LIST DTGs)
A. HUM I NT: Summarize all known HUM I NT activity during reporting
period in one paragraph. Compile data from HUMiNT situation overlay,
matrixes, link diagrams, and MDCISUMs.
B. IMI NT: Summarize all known IMINT activity during the reporting
period in one paragraph. Compile data from iMINT situation overlay,
matrixes, pattern and analysis charts, and MDCISUMs.
C. SIGINT: Summarize all known SIGiNT activity during the '•sporting
period in one paragrap.n. Compile data from SIGINT situation overlay,
matrixes, direction charts, and MDCISUMs.
D. OTHER: Summarize all other enemy activity that is not already
addressed using the same analytical toois.
2. INTELLIGENCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT FOR THE PERIOD _ TO_(LIST
DTGs)
Briefly assess the intelligence damage to the friendly units for which
the assessment is being prepared. Assessment is based on enemy collection
activities that were traced, analyzed, and reported i r. MDCISUMs and were
measureG against the friendly force operations Drofiie and countermeasures
implemented by the friendly force. Coordination with G3 OPSEC staff
element is essential in preparing this paragraph.
3. PROJECTED ENEMY ACTIVITY ASSESSMENT FOR THE PERIOD _ TO _
(LIST DTGs)
A. HUMINT: Using the same analytical tools identified in paragraph
1A, above, plus IPB, project or assess enemy HUMiNT activity for the next
repor ting period.
B. IMINT: Using the same analytical tools identified in
paragraph IB, above, pius IPB, project or assess enemy IMINT activity for
the next reporting period.
C. SIGINT: Using the same analytical toois identified in paragrach
1C, above, plus IPB, project or assess enemy SIGiNT activity for the next
reporting period.
D. OTHER: Using the same analytical tools identified in paragraph
1C, above, plus IPB, project or assess all other enemy activity for the
next reporting period that is not otherwise addressed in the HUMINT,
IMINT, or SIGINT assessments.
4. TARGET NOMINATIONS:
A. EXPLOITATION: Using aforementioned information and all other MDCi
analytical tools, identify any targets worthy of exploitation. Provide
Figure 9-2. MDCI threat assessment.
9-9
recommended rime frames, locations, methods of exploitation,
justification, and any other pertinent data.
8. NEUTRALIZATION: Usinc aforementioned information ano a!1 other
MDC! analytical tools, identify any targets worthy of neutralization.
Provide recomtianded time frames, methods of neutralization, locations,
justification, and-any other pertinent data.
C. DESTRUCTION OR EXPLOITATION: Using aforementioned information and
all other MDC! analytical tools, identrfy any targets wormy of
destruction or elimination. Provide recommended metnods for engagement,
time frames, locations, justification, and any other pertinent data.
NOTE: A,’* target nominations must have G2 or G3 aoorova! before
dissemination or presentation to trie commander or designated
representative for decision. Coordination with approoriate elements,
consistent with type nomination, is essential.
Figure 9-2. MDCI threat assessment (continued).
CLASSIFICATION
Headquarters
Place
Date, Time, and Zone
MDCI Estimate Number ■
References: Maps, charts, or other documents.
1. Mission: The restated mission determined by the commander. ..
2. The Area of operations: Summarizes the aina lysis of the AO.
a. Weatner :
(1) Factors . Include light data and either a weather forecast or
climatic information, as appropriate. Use appendixes for graphic
representation or weather factors ana other detailed information.
(2) Effect on enemy courses of action . Discuss the effects of
weather on possible enemy courses of action (for example, sabotage,
subversion, raids, air operations) in terms of mobility, concealment, and
logistic sustainability. Discuss in terms of ievei i or II threat, and
enemy all-source intelligence collection operations.
b. Terrain :
(1) Existing situation . Use graphic representatives where
possible especially in regard to cover, concealment, and logistic
Figure 9-3. MDCI estimate.
9-1 o
sustainabi S.ity. Use annexes for .datai led- information. information
covering observation, fields of fire, obstacles, Key terrain, and .
approaches to the probable target aid in determining insurgent terrain.
Also, consider graphics for critical facilities and buildings.
(2) Effect on enemy courses of action . Discuss in the same
manner as for effects of weather in a(2) above. Discuss in detail those
areas favorable and unfavorable to the levels of threat I or II enemy
all-source intelligence collection oppiortun i t ies.
(3) Effect on own courses of action . Discuss in the same manner
as for effects of weather in a(2) above. Note the positive or detrimental
effects on response forces and defensive measures.
c. Other characteristics . Include in subparagraphs any of the
following factors or characteristics which are pertinent to friendly area
activity (emphasis on rear area): population, ethnicity, religious makeup,
literacy rate, medical considerations, economic stabiIity, transportation,
mass media, public services, and current poIitica! situation.
3. Enemy situation . Information on the enemy which will permit later
development of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities and refinement of
these capabilities into specific course of action and their adoption.
a. Disposition . Reference may be made to overlays, enemy situation
maps, or previously published documents. Location of potential threat
forces may be difficult to pinpoint, but the greater the detail, the more
thorough the analysis. Separate by level and type of threat (that is,
combat (level i and II threats) or intelligence).
b. Comoosition . Summary of the OB of conventional level I and II
threats,_ inteI I igence co!Iection units and elements, and the structure or
organization of p.aram i I i tary and/or terrorist groups! Separate by levei.
and type of threat.
c. Strength . The purpose "of th-is listing fs to 'assist in developing
enemy caoabiUties and vulnerabilities. ConventionaI and inteIIigence
threats are discussed as in a regular intelligence estimate. Terrorist,
paramilitary and other threats need to be assessed based on support from
populace, monetary base, supplies, armament, personnel, and any other
pertinent considerations. Subparagraphs, stroul d be used to address the
different threats. Separate by level and type, of threat..
d. Recent and present significant activities , items of information
are listed to provide bases for analysis to determine relative probability
of adoption of specific courses of action and enemy vulnerabilities.
Enemy failures to take expected act ions are listed as well as positive
information. Such a discussion should include recent all-source
collection activities, terrorist actions, and other indications.
e. Peculiarities and weaknesses . For conventional and intelligence
collection threats, discuss as in an intelligence estimate. For
Figure 9-3. MDCI estimate (continued).
9-11
terrorist, paramilitary, or other unconventional threats, discuss such
pertinent information as leadership (key personalities), equipment,
finances, and relations with the local populace.
4. Enemy capabiIities . Based on all the previous information and
analysis, develop and list enemy capabilities to conduct operations
against the friendly area, with emphasis on the rear area. The listing
provides a basis for analyzing the available information to arrive at
those capabilities that the enemy can adopt as specific courses of action
and their relative probability of adoption. Items should be separated by
levels and type of threat.
a. Enumeration . State what, when, where, in what strength, and by
what method for each enumerated threat.
b. Analysis and discussion . Each enumerated threat is discussed in
terms of indicators of adoption or rejection. The intent is to assess the
likelihood of a given threat taking a given action. This paragraph must
consider all information previously recorded in the estimate. Some
threats may not have any indicators of rejection listed due to
insufficient data.
5. Potential enemy targets . Based on all previous information and
analysis, develop, to the extent possible, a listing of potential enemy
targets. Identify, at a minimum: target identity, capability, location or
projected location, and projected intentions. Ascertain if targets can be
exploited, neutralized, destroyed, or eliminated. Use subparagraphs
and/or annexes as needed.
6. Cone I usions .
a. Effects of AO on own courses of action . Indicate weaknesses in
ability of response forces to react and in defensive measures.
b. HVT analysis based on the CARVE format (criticality,
accessibility, recuperabiIity, vulnerability, and effect) . Such targets
range from bridges to friendly units, public services, and key
facilities. Complete for both friendly and enemy targets.
c. Probable enemy courses of action . Courses of action are Iisted in
order of relative probability of action. However, insufficient data may
only permit the probable level of threat for a given target.
d. Enemy vuInerabiIities . List the effects of peculiarities and
weaknesses that result in vulnerabilities that are exploitable.
Annexes (as required): Annexes may include graphic analysis products
which support the estimate such as link diagrams, association matrixes,
ROIPB products, or black, white, and gray lists distributed to units
requiring them.
CLASSIFICATION
Figure 9-3. MDCI estimate (continued).
9-12
times. Ordinarily, the C IAS operations NCO is responsible for maintaining
the overlay; however, its preparation is a collective effort of all
members of the CIAS.
MULTIDISCIPLINE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
The CIAS identifies the multitude of intelligence collection
capabilit ies of adversaries on the battlefield. it then narrows the
capabilit ies as accurately as possible to the actual collectors within an
area, their targets, and the collectors technical characteristics. The
CIAS also provides information to the battlefield deception (BAT-D) staff
on the characteristics of friendly equipment so that an “as close as
possible’” replication of a friendly force is displayed to enemy
collectors. This is done during the development of the deception story in
the planning process.
On today’s technical battlefield, the friendly force assumes that
hostile collectors are analyzing friendly patterns of C 3 to find HVTS.
In friendly communications, mostly secure, the enemy must locate the
communications externals that identify specific units or nodes. In
electronic deception, these communications externals are replicated down
to and including specific anomalies in friendly transmissions. Currently,
analysis of such signals parameters is extremely difficult. C-SIGINT
analysts research technical bulletins, coordinate with C-E staff members
and maintenance personnel to collect this information as accurately as
possible for the deception staff. As friendly deception equipment evolves
into the future and becomes more sophisticated, friendly capability to
provide the needed detail of support also must expand.
BAT-D elements become one of the main consumers of the integrated MDCI
products. They use the MDCI estimate and graphic summary to determine
where best to execute deception based on the collection effort.
Specific needs and requirements for BAT-D are passed through G3
channels to the CM&D at each echelon. The CIAS researches its data base
to satisfy these needs with existing intelligence information. If the
CIAS cannot satisfy the requirement immediately, it is validated and
returned to the CM&D for appropriate tasking and requirements management.
When the information is finally collected, it is passed through the CM&D
to the CIAS for analysis and product development. It is then passed to
deception planners so they can develop deception plans or execute the
deception mission.
Since adversaries change the focus of intelligence collection as often
as necessary, the CIAS analyzes its efforts continuously and passes the
changes to the deception cell rapidly. This enables deception personnel
to change focus and evaluate their effectiveness.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO COMBATTING TERRORISM
Terrorist activities are an ever-increasing threat to Army units,
personnel, equipment, and operations, in peacetime and during conflict.
Cl personnel play a major role in supporting the force protection mission
9-13
through investigation, operation, and intelligence collection directed at
terrorist groups and activities. The CIAS has an additional analytical
role, using C-HUMINT techniques in this manual and fully explained in
FM 34-60.
The MDCI threat assessment is an effective product for providing
information to support the command force protection mission. The process
includes educating the force on the threat, evaluating past activities of
terrorists, maintaining a current data base, using pattern analysis, and
predicting future activities and incidents. The CIAS also recommends
offensive and defensive measures that may be effective in combatting
terrorism.
Combatting terrorism is a shared mission among all members of the
Army. The relationships between the operations staff, intelligence staff,
and military police must be “locked in” completely to be effective. There
are many other players who provide information to the process and to the
intelligence analysis mission. Using the techniques of C-HUMINT analysis,
the friendly goal is to track activities and associations, to predict the
next terrorism act, to determine who is performing the act, when and
where, and to get the information to decision makers who can do something
about it.
9-14
CHAPTER 10
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY
Recent history is characterized by the occurrence of numerous
insurgences in developing nations. The US government has taken the
responsibility to assist, upon request, selected emerging nations in
developing political stability, economic strength, and social progress.
Thus, the US may become involved in a LIC, either in an advisory and
assistance capacity or as a combatant. The analyst plays an important
role in all LIC operations including foreign internal defense and peace
keeping. The focus in operations such as these is different than in
counterinsurgency. Here the analyst is concerned with political questions
such as, “How can the people be made to support tha government?” and ’Who
is the enemy?”’
This chapter describes how information from all sources is analyzed to
produce intelligence to support counterinsurgency. LIC includes
counterinsurgency, but also foreign internal defense, peacetime
contingence ies, and terrorism counteraction. These last three areas are
beyond the scope of this FM.
When the level of US participation with a host nation is sufficient to
be considered a combined activity, a combined intelligence operation is
carried out. Combined intelligence operations facilitate more effective
collection and production capabilities. The host country provides
detailed knowledge and access to the populace, while the US Army provides
technical expertise, management, and advice. There are often varying
degrees of US and host nation cooperation.
The primary responsibility of intelligence personnel engaged in LIC is
to produce intelligence to support the prevention or defeat of an
insurgency. To defeat an insurgency, information is collected and
intelligence produced on virtually all aspects of the internal defense
environment. When insurgents are known to be receiving aid from an
external power, it is necessary to obtain information on the role of the
external power in the insurgency.
The target of the intelligence collection cycle (described in Chapters
1 and 2) for LIC differs from mid- to high-intensity conflicts only in its
application to the production of specific intelligence required for
counterinsurgency operations. In planning, for example, information is
not only needed on the armed insurgents but also on their underground
organization and their relations with the populace as well. In collecting
information, the local population represents one of the most lucrative
sources of information. In processing information into intelligence,
sociological, economical, and political requirements have equal or even
higher priority than conventional military needs. In addition to military
users, US, host nation, and allied governmental, law enforcement, and
intelligence agencies are valid users of intelligence products.
1 o-l
SUPPORT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
A sound collection program and proper use of the various collection
agencies and information sources result in a very heavy volume of
information which flows into the intelligence production element. The
insurgent environment and its base area system and political and military
tactics dictate that intelligence requirements can only be met by
reporting minute detai Is on a great variety of subject areas. Each one of
these details appear unrelated to others and insignificant by itself; but
when mapped and chronologically recorded over long periods of time and
analyzed with other details reported, they lead to definitive and
predictable patterns of insurgent activity.
For example, as in a conventional conflict, IPB is conducted before
and continues throughout a LIC. IPB not only helps identify patterns of
insurgent activity, but helps use these patterns to predict future
actions. Appendix E, FM 34-130 fully addresses IPB in support of LIC.
Insurgents usually recognize their shortcomings in military posture.
The insurgent makes maximum use of the weather, the terrain, and the
population, employing secrecy, surprise, and simplicity. Combat plans and
orders are usually simple, comprehensive, and repetitive in order to be
executed by widely separated forces. Therefore, the insurgent’s solution
to a problem is composed of a system or systems which together are
complex, but apart are independent, having simple, logical, and uniform
characteristics. In developing a pattern analysis or IPB products, it is
important to chart insurgent and friendly tactical actions. As actions of
friendly forces disturb the 'environment and patterns of insurgent
activities, it forces the insurgent into unanticipated and unrehearsed
situations which can be exploited tactically. Communications intelligence
(COMINT) is used to obtain direct insights into insurgent operations and
plans. IPB helps the intelligence analyst answer two basic questions:
“Where can we expect to find the enemy?
“Where can we expect not to find the enemy?
The data to be developed and compiled by subject matter varies
considerably with the intensity of the insurgent’s operations. The types
of overlays and categories of subjects plotted, therefore, vary
extensively according to the needs. Using a graphic keying system and
color schemes on large-scale maps greatly facilitate data analysis when
superimposing transparent overlays.
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
IPB provides a basis for the intelligence estimate. As with mid- and
high-intensity operations, IPB products are used extensively in the
estimate. There are, however, some significant differences from these to
estimates that support LIC in general and counterinsurgency specifically:
10-2
"Emphasis is placed on different parts of the estimate. The
mission statement, for example, may be more difficult to compose
because of the wide scope of low-intensity operations and their
relationships with the internal defense program.
"Emphasis is accorded nontactical considerations, such as
psychological, political, sociological, and economic factors.
"Factors are to be compared during the deliberative process.
Advantages and disadvantages of various courses of action may be
more complicated than when terrain, weather, and a visible, tangible
enemy are the chief factors to be considered.
The intelligence estimate for a LIC operation, as in any situation, is
based on all available intelligence and considers everything of
operational significance. See Appendix A for an example of a LIC
intelligence estimate.
The initial intelligence estimate helps to point out gaps in the
intelligence data base. These gaps are a basis for determining
requirements.
A basic requirement in low-intensity operations is a thorough
understanding of the target area. Knowledge of the target society
requires a complete understanding of the internal and external forces at
work, those supporting the integrity of the society, and those engaged in
subverting it. Only when these factors are thoroughly understood can
actions be effected. All available assets are used to provide this
intelligence.
Commanders, intelligence staffs, and analysts recognize the impact
that political, economic, and sociological factors have on tactical
operations of the insurgent and friendly forces. This applies even to a
very narrow, confined, and localized situation. Therefore, an intense and
continuing study of local history and developments, contemporary
personal ities, aspirations, and motivations is made. Because political,
sociological, and economic factors are overlapping and interdependent,
collation and interpretation of this data are extremely intricate and
seldom are reduced to a formula similar to OB for mid- and high-intensity
conflicts.
PROCESSING INFORMATION
Processing is the step in the intelligence cycle whereby information
becomes intelligence. It consists of recording, evaluating, integrating,
and interpreting. Chapter 2 describes information processing. Certain
considerations are unique to the internal defense environment. To
determine insurgent capabilities and courses of action and to provide the
intelligence needed for all facets of LIC, the intelligence analyst is
guided by an awareness of these considerations.
10-3
RECORDING
As in mid- and high-intensity situations, LIC requires large amounts
of information on a continuous basis which are promptly compared with
existing information and intel i igence to determine their significance. To
a large-degree, the extent of the recording effort depends upon the
insurgent activity in the area and the analysts available to maintain and
analyze the recorded information. All of the recording aids mentioned
below, however, serve a unique and useful purpose in the overall
intelligence production effort. Chapter 2 provides a detailed description
of the journal, journal file, intelligence files, and intelligence
workbook. Variations in recording devices which are unique to LIC occur
in the use of annotated overlays and working files.
Annotated Maps
Depending on the echelon of responsibility, the state of insurgent
activity in the area, and the degree of knowledge of the enemy, the
intelligence analyst requires at least two annotated maps: the incident
map and the insurgent SITMAP. Each of these recording devices normally is
a transparent overlay covering a large-scale topographic map of the area.
Unlike the workbook, which is maintained for individual use, the incident
and insurgent SITMAPS provide a ready guide for briefing the commander,
the civil authorities, or other interested parties. If activity in a
particular area is limited, consideration is given to the combination of
the two maps. Other annotated maps are valuable aids for recording
information, depending on the needs in a particular headquarters’ tactical
area of responsibility. These special purpose overlays include records
o f - -
“Mining and booby trap incidents.
“Insurgent names or codes for local terrain features, such as
villages, areas, and trails.
“Insurgent assassination or resource collection attempts.
“Other significant activity.
It may be necessary to enlarge, with significant detail, certa in Als,
either by drawing portions of the map to a larger scale, or by making a
mosaic from aerial photos. Past, present, and potential insurgent
activity must be visible with a detailed ahd thorough understanding^ of the
environment. Comparison of the several annotated maps maintained often
assist the intelligence officer in estimating the enemy’s intentions and
capabilities or to establish trends.
Incident Map . The incident map or overlay provides historical cumulative
information on trends and patterns of insurgent activity. Properly
maintained, the entries enable the intelligence officer to make judgments
about the natuure and location of insurgent targets, the relative intensity
of insurgent interest in specific areas, insurgent control over or support
from the population, and potential areas of insurgent operations.
10-4
Judgments concerning insurgent operations also require knowledge of
terrain factors and insurgent limitations.
insurgent Situation MaQ . The SITMAP or overlay is prepared as part of the
IPB process, and is modified as necessary by information from the incident
map. It is difficult to pinpoint insurgent installations and dispositions
with the same degree of confidence as in a conventional tactical
situation. The insurgents can displace on short notice, making a report
outdated before it is confirmed. While the SITMAP presents an uncertain
and hypothetical picture, composed less of firm information than of
reports of fleeting targets, estimates, and abstractions, it graphically
substantiates the trends or patterns derived from the incident map. The
analyst can then improve the economy and effectiveness of the R&S effort.
Trap Map . The trap map or overlay is used if the insurgent has a
capability for sabotage or terrorist action. Data is directly annotated
on the map on which the situation overlay is placed, or it can be kept
separately. This map portrays particularly attractive target locations
for insurgent sabotage or terrorism, such as road and railroad bridges,
communications centers, theaters and assembly halls, and places where the
terrain favors ambushes and raids. Such areas are identified and analyzed
as part of the area study. They are plainly marked on this map with
attention directed to possible insurgent access and escape routes.
Photographs which are keyed to the map also supplement this effort.
Population Status Map . This consists simply of an overlay to the SITMAP.
Essentially, this map portrays the attitudes of the population, whether
disaffected, loyal, or doubtful. Colors are used effectively to designate
these conditions.
Personalities and Contacts Map . What is known initially about the
insurgent situation primarily is information concerning locations and
activities of individual agents of espionage, agitation, organization, and
liaison. The appearances, movements, meetings, and disappearances of
these agents are recorded on a personalities and contacts map or overlay.
A large-scale map is required (a city street map or town plan if an urban
area is involved). Deviations from regular patterns of movement are
detected in this manner. Depending upon the number of personalities under
surveillance, the regularity of their habits, and the variety of reports
received on them, it is necessary to maintain a separate overlay for each
subject. Old overlays are filed for comparison. Each agent’s route is
portrayed in a different color, and regularly traveled routes
distinguished from new routes. Observations are dated and incidents noted
by symbol. Depending upon the amount of insurgent activity, this map is
combined with the incident map.
Working Files
The intelligence worksheet and the annotated maps serve to isolate
problem areas and formulate relationships between items of information and
intelligence collected. Extensive research material is required, however,
to analyze these problem areas. in the early phase of an insurgency, the
insurgent leader is building an organization. The leader’s organizational
10-5
procedures and tactics, therefore, are unique, and familiarization
requires the intelligence officer to study personal ities and incident
analysis. Extensive working files, such as the insurgency analysis
worksheet, hot files, current propaganda and psychological operations
(PSYOP) file, personality and organization files, area study files,
civil-military operations file, and resource reference files are
established and maintained. Figure 10-1 shows an insurgency analysis
worksheet.
1. US objective (Immediate, short-term, long-term).
2. Nature of society.
a. Social, economic, political, and security conditions.
b. Causes of discontent.
c. Issues.
d. Groups (segments of the population) and forces (groups trying to influence the action of the others).
e. Variables Nkely to Influence the level of violence (coercive potential, Institutionalization, facilitation, legitimacy of
the regime).
3. Nature of insurgency.
a. Leadership,
b. Objectives.
c. Organization.
d. Target groups.
e. External support
f. Timing.
g. Mass support
h. Relationship to legitimate political process.
I. Use of violence.
j. Urban or rural base.
4. Nature of government
a. Objectives.
b. Description of counterinsurgency.
c. Evaluation of counterinsurgency.
(1) Balanced development neutralization, and mobilization programs.
(2) Preemptive and reinforcing aspects of counterinsurgency strategy.
(3) Adherence to operational guidelines.
(4) Evaluation of each counterinsurgency program In terms of likely Impact on each segment of the population.
5. US responae.
a. Possible courses of action.
b. Evaluation of each course of action.
c. Recommendation.
-_I
Figure 10-1. insurgency analysis worksheet.
10-6
Insurgency Analysis Worksheet . The insurgency analysis worksheet helps
identify information and intelligence needed to satisfy the PIR and IR. It
also provides a guide for analysis of a LIC environment.
Hot File . The hot file is the most important working file. It includes
all available material pertaining to an incident or groups of possibly
related incidents that are of current interest. This file contains
material on persons or places likely to be involved in insurgent activity,
together with material on agents or suspects who may be involved. A
reported sabotage plot, for example, could initiate a hot file. The hot
file remains active until the report is refuted, the incident occurs, the
attention of the insurgent is diverted elsewhere, or friendly interest
priorities change.
Current Propaganda and PSYOP File . If propaganda constitutes a major part
of the insurgent effort in the area, a current propaganda and PSYOP file
should contain all pertinent literature, background material, and analyses,
to include copies of propaganda speeches and analyses of local grievances
being exploited or subject to exploitation by the insurgents.
Personality and Organization Files . A local file is maintained on each
insurgent personality. If surveillance is carried out by the local police,
basic identifying and biographical information can be transferredfrom
police dossiers to a card file. This card file helps train friendly
surveillant to recognize key personal ities on siglht. The organization
section of this file includes information on the history and activities of
the insurgent organization’s fronts, other subversive or suspected groups,
and their officers, overlapping directorates, memberships, and liaison
among these organizations. Figure 10-2 shows the format for a personality
card file.
Area Study Files . Area study files contain up-to-date and pertinent data
in the geographic, political, sociological, economic, and cultural fields.
In low-intensity operations, even the lower echelon tactical commander,
particularly when operating in the same general operational
area over extended periods of time, has a definite requirement for such
information. The intelligence staff officer should, therefore, have ready
access to such data. The topical breakdown of such files concerns events
and activities of continuing significance. Thus, for example, if rice is
the basic staple in an economy, the topical breakdown includes files on
rice production, distribution and marketing, price levels, and black
marketeering and pilferage activities. Since this key economic indicator
has continuing influence on friendly military operations as well as on the
insurgent forces who depend on this staple for survival, careful analysis
of this data over a period of time provides patterns based on which
insurgent actions are anticipated and their capabilities predicted.
Resource File . A resource file includes all material which is of
importance but are not of immediate value. It includes inactive incident
files, inactive personality and organization files, and photography. The
latter material is particularly useful. Air or ground photographs of
places of interest are arranged chronologically by location and made
readily available for use with hot files, incident maps, and trap maps.
10-7
Figure 10-2. Personality card file format.
Reference Material . A library is maintained of reference publications,
such as manuals on doctrine, tactics, and methods; books on the area and
on the insurgent threat; files of newspaper and magazine clippings; and
any other material which is of use. This material is kept at a central
library serving the entire staff or located at an area coordination
center.
Coordinate Register . The coordinate register is a valuable analytical
tool , and method to store information during LIC situations. It
illustrates activity in a particular area over a period of time, and is
compact enough to be carried with ease. Each page represents a specific
geographic area or town that the S2 determined. The coordinate register
has two types of pages. One has written entries to record insurgent
activity with space for the S2 to add comments. Figure 10-3 shows a
sample written-entry coordinate register, applicable to a LIC.
ITEM
TIME
COORDINATE
ACTIVITY
NOTES
1.
150930
XK345678
MG harasses site
position patrol south
of site
2.
152230
XK348672
farmer reports 10
guerrillas moving
south
3.
200140
XK348678
individual with
binoculars seen
observing site
increase friendly
surveillance vie. of site
Figure 10-3. Wriften-eiftry' coordinate" regfsfer.
The second type of coordinate register is visual. Entries are plotted
on the overlay square as they appear on the incident map.
The coordinate register assists in trend and pattern analysis and is a
good way to store data, in an easily retrievable manner, for long periods
of time. The written register allows easy evaluation of enemy activity by
type action while the visual one allows rapid comparisons of activity
between several time periods.
Civil-Military Operations File . A civil-military operations file includes
all material and information concerning civil-military operations, their
results, effectiveness, and any countermeasures the insurgents take.
10-9
EVALUATION
Evaluation is the determination of the pertinence of information to
the operation, reliability of the source or agency, and accuracy of the
information. In evaluating information, the knowledge and judgment of the
intelligence analyst plays a major role. In determining the validity of a
fact or whether a reported activity is at all possible, it must be
realized that certain events are possible despite the fact that they did
not previously occur and have been deemed by past analysis as unlikely to
occur. Confirmation of information by other sources and agencies is
always desirable, but it is not always possible to obtain. Initially,
intelligence analysis commences with unconfirmed information which is
subsequently supported, confirmed, or denied by the collection of
additional and related information. As more information is obtained, the
insurgent situation, capabilities, and probable courses of action become
increasingly clear. As the body of intelligence expands, information that
is not compatible with the current insurgent situation and is not
consistent with the recent pattern of insurgent activity is suspect.
Chapter 2 describes evaluation in detail. Procedures governing the
assignment of evaluation ratings to sources and agencies have equal
application in the internal ‘defense environment.
INTEGRATION
Evaluated information becomes intelligence only after it has been
integrated with other information and interpreted to determine its
significance. Integration involves the combining of selected data to form
a pattern which will have meaning and establish a basis for
interpretation. It is important that the intelligence analyst is
sufficiently alert to recognize all the possible patterns that may be
formed. The following example illustrates the mental process of
integration: The intelligence section of the area coordination center
receives information that a prominent labor leader has been murdered. In
a search for related information, the intelligence analyst checks the
incident file, the friendly and suspect personality files, and the
organization file.
The incident file reveals a series of murders that have been linked
with the insurgent, with the primary victims being government officials,
prosperous merchants, and large landholders who opposed insurgent
objectives.
The suspect personality file reveals the labor leader’s controlling
position within a union that has recently intensified its criticism of the
government. The personality file also reveals the labor leader’s close
association with several government officials and recent extensive travel
throughout the nation.
The organization file indicates that the union has recently begun to
disseminate antigovernment leaflets and has threatened to call a strike
if demands for representation in the current government are not met. The
other primary contender for union leadership is a relatively unknown
newcomer.
lo-lo
Once all related items of information from the intelligence files are
obtained, the intelligence analyst begins to assemble the available
information to form as many logical pictures or hypotheses as possible.
Alternative methods of assembly are an essential prerequisite to any valid
interpretation.
Assembly of information to develop logical hypotheses requires good
judgment and considerable background knowledge. In formulating
hypotheses, the intelligence analyst avoids the limitations which result
from preconceived opinions. In the example of the murdered union leader,
the new information is integrated with existing intelligence in several
different ways. By combining the murder with one set of facts, the labor
leader is pictured as a loyal supporter of the government who became the
victim of a campaign of selective terror undertaken by the insurgents. On
the other hand, by combining the murder with another set of acts, the
labor leader is portrayed as a member of the insurgent organization who
was murdered for reasons not connected with the insurgency. As a third
possibility, the labor leader may have been a member of the insurgent
organization who was eliminated by the insurgents. Finally, there is a
fourth possibility that the labor leader and the murder are not connected
with the insurgency.
INTERPRETATION
Interpretation is the result of making deductions as to the probable
meaning of new information and determining its implications with respect
to future insurgent activity. The meaning of the information is
determined in relation to the insurgent situation and the insurgents’
probable courses of action.
For example, in the case mentioned above, if the labor leader was
loyal to the government and was murdered for opposing insurgent control of
the union, it reasonably is expected that further consolidation of
insurgent control over the union, increased antigovernment agitation by
the union, and possibly, an extension of insurgent terrorist activities
will take place.
However, if the labor leader was a member of the insurgent
organization and was murdered by the insurgents, it is conjectured that
the elimination was due to considerable unreliability or slow progression
toward the achievement of insurgent objectives. In this case, the prompt
emergence of another insurgent union leader who ensures more rapid
progress toward insurgent objectives is expected. It also is inferred,
however, that the labor leader was murdered as a result of a struggle for
power within the insurgent organization. In this case, weaker insurgent
control of the union is expected due to the dissension among the
insurgents.
Finally, if the labor leader had no connection with the insurgent
organization and was murdered for reasons unconnected with the insurgency,
this event has no significance from an intelligence standpoint.
10-11
DISSEMINATION
One of the more critical aspects of intelligence is the rapid
dissemination of the information to personnel and units that nead
information. Each information report is looked at immediately to see if
it is of immediate concern. If so, it needs to be disseminated to
affected units or personnel without delay. Successful intelligence
reporting communicates the results of analysis and combat information to
the right people, at the right time, and in the right format. It provides
the commander with tha information and intelligence needed to raduce risk
and uncertainty. The dissemination channel in a LIC varies little from
the conventional environment but often there are more agencies and
individuals to consider: police, potential terrorist targets, and other
civilian agencies operating in the AO. Also, intelligence is disseminated
to host nation military units.
Local SOP and guidance from higher headquarters dictate the amount and
type of information that is given to civilian agencies and host
national military forces. This question of releasability is resolved
before effective dissemination can exist.
ORDER OF BATTLE
Chapter 3 describes the production of OB intelligence. There are
certain OB considerations, however, which are unique to the insurgent
enemy. OB intelligence is equally as important in an insurgency as in
conventional combat operations. However, some differences in nomenclature
and approach must be recognized. The applicability of the various OB
factors differs in an insurgency from conventional operations, and there
also are differences in applicability between phase I and phase II
insurgency situations,
The elements of OB intelligence (OB factors) are not independent of
each other; they are closely related and are considered as a whole,
Information on one of the elements often leads to a reevaluation or
alteration of information previously received on another element.
Furthermore, the general rule, whereby OB intelligence is
developed and maintained down to and including two echelons below the
analyst's own level of command, does not apply to low-intensity
operations. Due to the nature of the insurgency and the phased
development of the insurgent forces, OB intelligence is produced in much
greater detail and pertains to much lower echelons (even down to squad)
than in conventional combat operations.
During phase I of an insurgency, subversive activities range from
being only a potential threat to frequently occurring activities along an
organized pattern. No major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled
insurgent activity exists. The insurgent is primarily concerned with
organizing infrastructure during this phase, along with conducting PSYOP
and terrorist attacks.
10-12
Phase II of an insurgency begins when the insurgent has gained
sufficient local or external support to initiate organized guerrilla
warfare against the government.
A phase III insurgency occurs when the insurgent has transitioned from
a guerrilla-oriented force to a primarily conventional-oriented force.
FM 100-20 describes, in detail, the goals and activities of insurgent
forces during all three phases. An important point to remember is that
the insurgent may be operating from areas outside the host country during
all three phases. Therefore, geographic boundaries cannot limit
intelligence collection and analysis.
A listing of the OB factors follows, together with a brief explanation
of their applicability and means in the context of insurgency situations.
COMPOSITION
In some insurgent movements, military force is only one of several
instruments through which the insurgent movement seeks power. Development
of a military force often has the lowest priority during the early stages
of an insurgency. As long as the party core and civil organizations are
establ ished and move effectively toward the goal of the insurgency, the
military arm either lies dormant or simply exists in cadre form until
needed as a supporting force. Even after military organizations are
fielded, the infrastructure never loses its importance. A
counterinsurgency operation is never over until the infrastructure is
neutralized.
Phase I Considerations
Rather than collecting information on the identification and
organization of specific enemy units, we are concerned with the internal
workings of insurgent activity groups. Knowledge of the composition of
insurgent groups is a key to the entire planned course of the insurgency
Details of composition include the appearance of new organizations, the
relative amount of enemy effort expended in rural and urban operations,
the internal chain of C 2 , and the manner in which insurgent groups are
organized for operations .
Phase II Considerations
The intelligence analyst is concerned here with determining the
composition of insurgent combat units, including their organization and
chain of command. The degree of sophistication encountered indicates
other factors, such as training, logistics, and strength. Armed platoons
or small terrorist cells indicate that the overt military portion of the
insurgents' plan is just beginning, and armed battalions and large urban
terrorist groups indicate that there is a serious menace to the current
government.
10-13
POLITICAL STRUCTURE
A tightly disciplined party organization, formally structured to
parallel the existing government hierarchy in the country, is found at the
center of some insurgent movements. In most instances, this
organizational structure consists of committed organizations at the
village, district, province, interprovincial, and national levels. Within
major divisions and sections of an insurgent military headquarters,
totally distinct, but parallel, command channels exist. These are the
military chain of command and the political channels of control. Whether
it is through a political division of an insurgent military headquarters,
a party cell or group in an insurgent military unit, or a unit political
officer, the party ensures complete domination over the military structure
by use of its own parallel organization. These party organizations fuel
mil itary action. Should the military arm be eliminated, and the party
left intact, only short-term security is achieved. The party begins
construction of a new military organization. The population only is safe
when the insurgent’s political structure is rendered ineffective.
COMBAT FORCES
The organization of insurgent combat forces is dependent upon the
need, the tactics to be employed, and the availability of personnel and
equipment. Frequently, subordinate elements of insurgent units are
employed independently. The intelligence analyst who receives a confirmed
report of a subordinate element of an insurgent unit operating in the area
cannot, therefore, assume that the parent unit is also present.
Identification of insurgent units are by--
"Number.
"Commander’s name.
"Nickname.
"Code designation.
"Name of the area in which it operates.
Unit designations are frequently changed and multiple designations are
often used to confuse friendly intelligence. It follows that the
intelligence analyst is not able to determine the size and strength of an
insurgent unit merely by obtaining a unit identification.
DISPOSITION
Determination of the disposition of the insurgent involves the
location of operational training and supply bases, LOC, and areas of
political control. The intelligence analyst arrives at potential
dispositions of the insurgent combat forces by developing patterns of
activity based upon map study and knowledge of insurgent tactics.
Insurgent base areas, for instance, normally are located near areas that
10-14
the insurgents politically control, thereby providing an early warning
system. By plotting insurgent sightings and combining this information
with weather conditions, time factors, detailed investigation of insurgent
incidents, and after action reports, the analyst best selects possible
enemy dispositions as well as possible areas of tactical deployment.
Consideration should also be given to areas where no insurgent activity is
reported. These areas, while appearing to be under the control of
internal defense forces, may be under the political control of the
insurgents.
Phase I Considerations
The location, deployment within this location, and any movements of
insurgent organizations or personnel are of concern here. The enemy’s
strength and tactics are revealed, to some extent, by discovering whether
this effort is concentrated in a few places or dispersed throughout the
target country and neighboring nations. If the enemy’s effort is
initially concentrated in one city or in one rural area, then the extent
and spread of the insurgent organizations are a key to how long the enemy
has been operational and how successful the enemy has been, and is an
indication of the enemy’s appraisal of friendly strength. In a nation
considered a relatively easy conquest, the enemy begins with many
operations, rather than a few. By studying the other available elements
of 06 intelligence, the intelligence analyst determines such things as
whether the movement of an enemy cadre or group is an advance toward new
goals or a retreat from an unprofitable operation.
Phase II Considerations
How the insurgent forces are deployed indicates whether the enemy is
making a widespread show of strength, with units scattered about the
country, or is concentrating forces around a few key targets. It also
shows whether the enemy is going to concentrate on such activities as
interdicting transportation or actively seeking battle with government
forces.
STRENGTH
The strength of the insurgent forces is thought of in terms of the
combat forces, political cadres, and popular support. Conventional
methods of strength computation are appl ied in determining insurgent
combat forces strength. The analyst should be aware, however, that the
insurgent will attempt to have strengths overestimated by low-intensity
operations forces. To give this false impression, the insurgent employs
rapid unit movement and uses multiple designations for a single element.
Reports from the populace concerning the strength of the insurgent forces
should be viewed with caution and the importance of actual counts of enemy
personnel stressed. Certain insurgent-initiated incidents provide useful
indicators of the strength of the insurgents in a particular area. An
example of these is an increase in raids with subsequent loss of weapons
by friendly forces. The determination of popular support for the
insurgents is a more difficult task and is stated best in terms of the
10-15
percentage of an area under government control, as opposed to the
percentage under insurgent control, with both viewed together in terms of
population density. A useful indicator of the extent of insurgent
political control is the willingness of the populace to report information
concerning the insurgents.
Phase I Considerations
The cadre who organize and activate the movement usually are highly
trained, aggressive professionals who exercise an influence
disproportionate to their actual numbers. The analyst also is concerned
with the number of enemy units in existence, which in phase I means
identifying and evaluating new groups and organizations which have either
appeared in the host nation or in neighboring countries and any changes in
the size of existent groups. Other types of equipment, besides weapons,
are of paramount interest. A printing press in phase I is a deadlier
weapon than a battalion of artillery in phase III.
Phase II Considerations
The actual number of personnel available to the insurgent now assumes
the importance it lacked, to some degree, in phase 1. By knowing also the
amount of weapons and equipment available, estimates of capabilities
against friendly forces are formulated. The degree of popular support for
the insurgent manifests itself in such areas as recruiting for forces, tax
or resource collection, and degree of population support for friendly
forces.
TACT ICS
Tactics include both enemy doctrine and the conduct of operations
according to that doctrine. Insurgent forces are more flexible in their
application |of doctrine than regular military organizations. The doctrine
which guides the insurgent must be known and understood by friendly forces
if they are to effectively counter insurgent efforts. The careful
examination of the tactics, or actual operational techniques, reveals
changes in doctrine as well as indications of the personality and
competence of the insurgent leader. Again, the choice and application of
tactics is a reflection of insurgent appraisal of friendly strength as
well as of personnel strength. A continuing estimate of relative
strengths is a very basic part of insurgent operational planning and has
an immediate effect on tactics. Tactics of the insurgent involve
political, military, psychological, and economic considerations, all
closely integrated. They vary with the phase of the insurgency. The
political goal of the insurgents is to undermine and discredit the
established government.
Phase I Considerations
Phase I insurgency is characterized by a relative absence of stri ctly
military operations and an emphasis on subversion and organizational
development. Although instances of terrorism begin to occur in the later
10-16
stages of phase 1, military activity is usually limited to recruiting and
establishment of military cadres.
Phase II Considerations
An increased emphasis on the study and evaluation of insurgent
military tactics is required. Tactics during phase II are generally
limited to ambushes, raids, sabotage, and terrorism. These activities
provide the insurgent with supplies, experience, and self-confidence,
while at the same time they erode friendly morale and reduce friendly
economic and military capabilities.
TRAINING
Insurgent training is closely related to the tactics being employed
and includes vigorous indoctrination in political affairs. Both the
combat forces and the people within an area under the political domination
of the insurgents receive training. Insurgents carefully plan and train
for individual operations and phases of movement. A careful analysis of
an area with respect to the type of training taking place provides a
useful indicator of the probable courses of action that are employed
against friendly forces.
Phase I Considerations
During phase I, the insurgent trains and indoctrinates existing cadre
as well as newly accepted or recruited indigenous personnel. Training
consists of a great deal of political indoctrination along with techniques
of propaganda, communications, and intelligence collection. Training and
effectiveness go hand in hand; the type, amount, and val idity of training
received by the insurgents is determined, to some degree, by any observed
increase in the effectiveness or size of the insurgent movement. Some
training normally is conducted in another country and is indicated by a
change in number and type of personnel travel ing to that country.
Phase II Considerations
Much attention now is devoted to locating training camps and areas,
identifying training cadres, and interdicting the movement of insurgents
to and from out-of-country training areas. Some insurgent units are
identifiable as having been trained for special missions, such as
reconnaissance, demolition, or even suicide attack missions.
LOGISTICS
In an insurgency, as in a conventional warfare situation, the
effectiveness of the insurgent is very much dependent on the logistical
support. In the early stages of an insurgency, the requirements for
military equipment and supplies are less than in the later stages.
Accurate intelligence on the insurgent’s sources and availab i lity of
supplies and equipment is essential to determine the capabil i ty to
maintain and expand the insurgency.
10-17
Phase I Considerations
Two particular items always are essential to the phase I
insurgent--money and a printing press. If highly successful in the
establishment and motivation of the power base, the insurgent never really
has a requirement for the usual items of military supply. Money is often
supplied from abroad, but such occurrences as bank robberies, unusual or
excessive fund drives, payroll deduction requests, or sudden affluence
among suspect government officials are cause for suspicion. Equipment for
the production and dissemination of propaganda, like printing presses and
radio sets, is of a special nature, and its acquisition by insurgent
forces indicates an increasing level of sophistication in propaganda
efforts.
Phase II Considerations
Logistics is now a larger and more elaborate requirement for the
insurgent, who must now procure, store, transport, and maintain weapons,
ammunition, explosives, signal equipment, and medical supplies. A much
larger number of people are required to operate the logistical system.
Insurgent supply caches or supply lines become items of critical concern
to friendly forces. Borders and coastlines are controlled and aerial
surveillance of remote areas or areas known to be used by the insurgents
must be instituted to detect or deter the movement of supplies.
EFFECTIVENESS
Effectiveness describes the qualitative ability of the insurgent to
achieve poI itical or military purposes.
Phase I Considerations
In phase I, the term “combat effectiveness’” is usually not
applicable. While the insurgent uses words like “struggle”’ and “front,”’
they do not connote the use of armed force. The overall effectiveness of
the insurgent effort is sometimes made very obvious by spectacular
successes (antigovernment victory in an important election) or failures
(collapse of a new factory-worker organization known to have been backed
by the insurgent), A continuing decline of governmental influence in a
certain area or among a certain group of people may well indicate a
corresponding increase in insurgent influence. The leaders forbid overt
or easily detectable actions until they feel that their movement is in
position to make a serious bid for power. In this case, the insurgent's
real effectiveness remains unknown until it is too late for anything but a
historical account of it. There usually is overt indication of the
effectiveness of the insurgent operation, and information on it is
gathered by careful observation of organizations, movements, and elections
at all levels. Penetration of these activities by government agents is
very desirable and makes a significant contribution to the OB picture.
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Phase II Considerations
The factor of effectiveness now expands to include combat efficiency
of insurgent military forces. By carefully evaluating the other OB
factors, and taking note of actual combat experience, we evaluate the
insurgent’s combat effectiveness or lack thereof. We determine the
insurgent’s strengths and weaknesses and, from this, calculate the
capability to follow various courses of action.
PERSONALITIES
Personalities are not listed as a separate OB factor in Chapter 3. In
an insurgency, personal ities often assume a greater importance than in
mid- and high-intensity conflicts.
Phase I Considerations
In phase I, personalities are an extremely important factor. During
this phase, when the insurgency is just beginning to organize, function,
and attempt to spread its influence, the loss of a comparatively small
number of personnel practically destroys it or at least sets back its
progress. Unfavorable publicity attached to the movement, as a result of
exposure, renders its success less likely. The apprehension, compromise,
or exposure of its leaders destroy the insurgency completely. Knowing who
the insurgent leaders are also furnishes a valuable indication of how
tactics and training are conducted and how effective the overall effort
is.
Phase II Considerations
As in phase I, personalities remain a critical concern. Many
insurgent units are cat led by their commander’s name, rather than having a
conventional designation.
ELECTRONIC TECHNICAL DATA
In the early stages, there is often a lack of uniform communications
procedures, preventing the development of an extensive enemy electronic
order of battle (EEOB) and electronic technical data base. There is very
little use of noncommunications equipment, such as radar. The insurgents
often use HF shortwave or ham radio sets to serve the initial “Committee
of Correspondence” function. VHF citizen band sets play a role in early
terrorist operations. Equipment available to the insurgent ranges from
the most primitive to the most modern. Even equipment not generally
available in the armed forces of major world powers, I ike spread spectrum
and frequency hoppers, is easily obtained.
Phase I Considerations
The propaganda requirements result in insurgent-sponsored medium
frequency or commercial radio AM broadcasts. Transmitters are located
outside the national boundaries or in remote, inaccessible areas. These
broadcasts frequently use code words to control and coordinate insurgent
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operations. Later, there is some increased use of VHF transmissions and
more organized communications procedures. The standardization of
communications practices reflects the level of communications training
expertise.
Phase II Considerations
Much more extensive use of communications equipment characterizes this
phase. Equipment is captured from government sources, purchased or stolen
from commercial sources, provided by external sponsors, or locally
manufactured. Communications procedures reflect doctrine and training
practices of an external sponsor. Insurgents use repeater transmitters,
set to receive and rebroadcast on the same frequency, to degrade VHF DF
efforts against them.
MISCELLANEOUS
Any other items which contribute to knowledge of the insurgent, such
as goals and methods, are considered here.
Phase I Considerations
This category includes such items as historical studies of people and
parties involved in the insurgency, code names or numbers, and any’ other
information which does not fit under the other eight categories. “This
type of information should not be siighted, as seem ngly superfluous items
may wel I become useful and important.
Phase II Considerations
Several miscellaneous items now become vital adjuncts to the other
factors. Weapons, insignia, code names and numbers, types and colors of
uniforms and flags--all these things aid in the identification of
insurgent units, the source of outside aid, the source of weapons and
equipment smuggled into or purchased in the target nations, and the morale
and effectiveness of the insurgent armed forces,
OB FACTORS SUMMARY
There are three points to remember in the application of OB factors to
an insurgency:
"The nine OB factors previously discussed are iclosely interrelated
and cannot be analyzed separately.
"When an insurgency escalates from a phase I to a phase II
situation, the OB effort is expanded considerably. The enemy combat
units must now be considered in addition to the various
phase I organizations and activities, which still are active.
“When ah insurgency escalates from a phase II to a phase III
situation, the application of the OB factors to the insurgent’s
combat units is the same as for other conventional forces.
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APPENDIX A
REPORT FORMATS
The report formats described are standard formats used to report
intelligence or information to task assets, or to receive information,
intelligence orders, or instructions. These formats are echelon-specific,
like the patrol report usually prepared at battalion level, or are general
reports used at all echelons, like spot reports.
This appendix provides a brief description of the most common
intelligence-related formats, including those formats used to pass
information of immediate potential intelligence value from one echelon to
another. It also identifies the echelon or echelons where each format is
most used and the element or individual responsible for preparing it. An
example of each format is also provided. Additional information about
report formats is in Chapter 8.
SPOT REPORT
The SALUTE mnemonic requires users to report enemy size, activity,
location, unit (or uniform), time, and equipment. Figure A-1 shows a spot
report using a SALUTE message format.
FROM: S5i b7TH INF-, 3D BDE
TO: GR 20TH INF DIV
COMBAT OUTPOST NO 2b:--A/a/b7 PATROL REPORTS SIGHTING FOUR ENEMY
TANKS MOVING WEST ALONG SECONDARY ROAD AT GRID COORD NBblBBIT AT
241730Z HR. TANKS TRAVELLING AT APPROX S KPH- HATCHES WERE
OPEN AND VISIBLE ENEMY PERSONNEL WERE WEARING PROTECTIVE MASKS-
UNIT MARKINGS WERE NOT VISIBLE BECAUSE THEY WERE COVERED WITH
MUD AND SANDBAGS.
Figure A-l. SALUTE messageformat.
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The intelligence estimate consists of five paragraphs. The first
paragraph is a restatement of the mission. The remaining paragraphs
outline an analysis of the battlefield area based on IPB; an estimate of
enemy strengths, capabilities, and limitations; and the intelligence
officer’s conclusions about the total effects of the AO on friendly
courses of action, the courses of action meet likely to be adopted by the
enemy, and the effects of exploitable enemy vulnerabil ities. The five
paragraphs are--
“Mission.
“Area of operations.
A-1
“Enemy situation.
“Enemy capabilities.
"Conclusions.
MISSION
Paragraph 1. Describe the mission in a short, clear, and concise
restatement of the assigned or assumed mission of the command.
AREA OF OPERATIONS
Paragraph 2. Discuss what influence the AO has on probable enemy
courses of action, based on facts and conclusions derived from IPB and an
analysis of the AO if one has been prepared. A previously prepared
analysis of the AO also is referenced. However, if previously prepared
or other reference material is not contained in this paragraph, it must
contain enough information to support the conclusions.
Weather and terrain analysis derived from IPB are always included in
the characteristics of the AO. Other characteristics are included if they
are important to either force in selecting courses of action to carry out
their assigned or assumed mission. These other characteristics are of
greater importance In AOs which have large civilian populations and to
commands with extensive territorial or CSS responsibilities. Detailed or
supporting terrain and weather information is included in an appendix to
the intelligence estimate.
Weather or terrain effects on the use of nuclear weapons and chemical
and biological agents are discussed when either combatant has the
capability to use them. Each description of enemy courses of action
includes the possible enemy or friendly use of these weapons, including
the impact that weather or terrain conditions has on weapons systems and
delivery means.
Weather
Weather conditions are those factors that impact on current and
planned operations. This includes appropriate light data and either a
weather forecast or climatic information. When operations cover a long
period or are programed for a future operation, climatic information
replaces weather data forecasts. Light data, in tabular form, includes
the beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT) and beginning of morning
civil twilight (BMCT), ending of evening civil twilight (EECT), and the
ending of evening nautical twilight (EENT), moonrise, moonset, phases of
the moon, and other information as required.
Terrain
The existing terrain situation includes the tactical aspects of the
area: observation and fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terra >n
features, and AAs. Each of these aspects is oriented based on its
A-2
influence on selected courses of action by either force. For example, in
a CSS unit, the discussion of concealment and cover is oriented toward
influence on CSS courses of action, including installation locations
required to accomplish the CSS mission and on enemy forces which
interfere with the accomplishment of the mission. In CSS unit
intelligence estimates, key terrain features are omitted unless the enemy
has the capability to seize or control terrain features which materially
affect the accomplishment of the mission.
Other Considerations
Other characteristics which are considered pertinent are sociology,
politics, economics, and psychology, science, materiel, transportation,
manpower, and hydrography.
The effects of each characteristic of the AO on possible enemy courses
of action normally include consideration of weather, terrain, and NBC
capabilities, the effects of these on other possible enemy courses of
action, and the possible use of particular weapons, methods, techniques,
or forces.
The extent of consideration for the factors is limited by the mission.
For example, when the mission is offensive, the discussion does not
include defensive courses of action. It does, however, include security
considerations.
ENEMY SITUATION
Paragraph 3. Provide information on the enemy which permits later
development of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. Establish the
basis for refining these capabilities into a specific course of action and
for determining the probability that the enemy will adopt this course of
action.
Paragraph 3 provides the following data on the enemy:
"Disposition,
"Composition.
"Strength.
"Recent and present s ignificant activities.
"Peculiarities and weaknesses.
Disposition
Enemy dispositions are the known or estimated locations and sizes of
enemy units. References are made to overlays, enemy SITMAPS, or
previously published documents when discussing enemy disposit i ens.
However, if these references are not readily available, they (or a copy of
them) are attached as appendixes to the intelligence estimate .
A-3
Composition
Composition is 06 data that is used to determine the strength the
enemy uses to prevent the accomplishment of the mission. List all the
units, including insurgent and guerrilla-type forces that contribute to
this. Include such supporting units as air, nuclear delivery, and REC
units that also affect the accomplishment of the mission. In determining
which enemy units affect mission accomplishment, time and space factors
are also considered.
Strength
Strength is all opposing enemy forces which are logically employed
against the command in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission.
The total forces listed cannot exceed, but is equal to or less than the
total forces listed under composition.
Enemy strength includes committed forces, reinforcements, air assets,
and NBC operations. Air or NBC operations units are omitted when the
enemy lacks such capabilities.
Committed Forces , Committed forces are those enemy ground maneuver units
currently in contact and those ground maneuver units with which imminent
contact is expected, regardless of the specific friendly course of action
implemented. Designation of enemy forces as committed forces depends on
disposition, location, controlling headquarters, and doctrine. For more
information on computing enemy strength, see Appendix D.
Reinforcements . Reinforcements are those enemy maneuver units that are
not committed in or out of the friendly sector, but react to the friendly
course of action in time to influence the accomplishment of the mission.
Contact with these units is not expected. Disposition, location, level of
control , or other factors are considered in determining which enemy forces
are reinforcements.
Enemy Air Capability . The enemy air capability is based upon numbers of
enemy aircraft within operational radius, maintenance facilities, expected
attrition, ground tactical situation, and other factors. The supporting
tactical air force furnishes intelligence on the number of sorties, by
type, which the enemy is expected to make within the field army or
comparable areas. The estimate is not usually prorated below the
field army level. Also, no attempt is made to calculate the number of
sorties the enemy can or may make against a subordinate command of the
field army or the communications zone (COMMZ). Corps, division, and COMMZ
command intelligence officers usually quote the estimate furnished by the
higher headquarters in stating enemy air capabilities. For example, a
corps or division G2 might state: “30th Army estimates that the enemy can
be expected to attack within the army area with as many as 150 fighter,
100 attack, and 75 bomber sorties daily. By massing all aircraft within
operational radius, the enemy can make a maximum of 250 fighter, 300
attack, and 250 bomber sorties daily.”
A-4
Nuclear Weapons and Chemical and Biological Agents . Estimates of enemy
NBC capabilities usually are prepared at field army and hlglner
headquarters. Units below field army level usually lack the means to
gather the information to make such estimates. They use the estimates of
the higher headquarters and modify them with available information.
The determination of enemy NBC operation capabilities is based
primarily on estimates of numbers and types of weapons and amount and
types of agents available, knowledge of enemy doctrine, past experience,
and estimates of enemy capabilities involving the employment of ground
troops. As with the enemy air capability, it is rarely feasible to
estimate what portion of the available enemy NBC effort is used against a
division or corps within a field army or a command in the COMMZ. It is
also rarely feasible to estimate the number of nuclear weapons the enemy
is capable of using within a period as short as one day. The period
selected is a month or other period depending on the available information
and past experience.
The statement of the enemy’s capability to use chemical and biological
agents includes the amount, typa, and delivery means of avai lab I e chemical
and biological agents.
Recent and Present Significant Activities
This is a summary of recent and current enemy activities which serve
as indicators of future enemy actions. Significant enemy failures to take
action also are listed. For example, if the enemy is apparently defending
behind a river obstacle but has failed to destroy certain bridges, the
omission is listed as a significant activity. Any basis for a belief that
the enemy has specific knowledge of the friendly situation or intentions
also is listed. For example, a capture by the enemy of an OPORD or a
compromise of current signal operating instructions would be noted. For
more information on enemy indicators, see Appendix C.
Peculiarities and Weaknesses
Briefly discuss each enemy peculiarity and weakness, indicating the
extent to which it is a vulnerability and how it affects the selection of
broad friendly courses of action. For example, if the enemy has an open
flank, the fact is stated under operations. Discuss the extent to which
the open flank constitutes an exploitable vulnerability. If enemy
reserves are small and poorly positioned to extend the flank, the
vulnerability may be great. If the enemy reserves are large and in
position to extend the flank or counterattack an enveloping force, the
vulnerability is probably insignificant. The G2 might state it as: “The
enemy north flank is open. Available reserves are adequate to extend this
flank a distance of only about 3,000 m. poSit ions to extend the flank
have not been prepared. The enemy is vulnerable to a flank attack,”
Conversely, it might be stated as: “The enemy north flank is open.
However, available reserves are adequate either to extend this flank
beyond our zone, or to counterattack an enveloping force. Positions
suitable to block an attempted envelopment have been prepared as shown on
‘the enemy situation map.” In the first statement, the enemy’s
A-5
vulnerability to a flank attack is carried forward to conclusions of the
intelligence estimate. In the second statement, the open flank apparently
is not a vulnerability and is not carried any further. Another example:
If the guerrilla forces are poorly equipped with antitank means of all
types, the fact is stated under logistics, and the extent ‘to which this is
an exploitable vulnerability is discussed briefly. The intelligence
officer might state: “The guerrilla forces in our area are poorly equipped
with antitank means. They cannot effectively defend against armored
vehicles” The inability to defend against armored vehicles is carried
forward as a vulnerability to conclusions of the intelligence estimate.
Figure A-2 shows some examples of enemy peculiarities and weaknesses.
PERSONNEL
-- Replacement situation (shortages or overages, particularly in
specialists)
-- Morale less than excellent, or exceptionally high.
— Disproportionate number of very young or very old men.
-- High rate of sickness.
-- Percentage of authorized strength, if less than 80 percent.
INTELLIGENCE
-- Susceptibility to deception or neutralization of certain enemy
information collection agencies.
— Overdependence on one or more categories of information sources.
-- Ineffectiveness of enemy intelligence.
OPERATIONS
-- Habitual repetition of certain schemes of maneuver, or
unconventional patterns of operations.
-- Faulty organization of the terrain.
-- Faulty disposition of reserves.
-- Susceptibility to electronic countermeasures.
-- Inadequate troop training, especially in defense against nuclear
weapons or chemical agents.
-- Lack of adequate mobility.
Figure A-2. Example sof typical enemy peculiarities and weaknesses.
A-6
-- Inadequate air or artillery support, or nuclear weapon del ivery
systems.
-- Pronounced failure to disperse and dig in.
-- Habitual failure to attack certain types of targets.
LOGISTICS
-- Shortages or inadequacies of particular supplies and materiel,
including nuclear weapons.
-- Status of equipment, if less than 80 percent.
-- Large concentrations of supplies.
-- Location of vulnerable points and bottlenecks in the logistics
system or lines of communications.
-- Inability to resupply during action.
-- Failure to equip troops with protective masks or protective
clothing.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS
-- Hostile attitude toward the civil populace, or of the civil
populace toward the enemy.
-- Inadequacies in the control of civil communications, to include
movement of civilians.
PERSONALITIES
— Peculiarities or weaknesses of the enemy commander, major
subordinate commanders, or principal staff officers as disclosed by
or deduced from their past performance, education, politics,
experience, or other basis.
Figure A-2. Examples of typical enemy peculiarities and weaknesses (continued).
ENEMY CAPABILITIES
Paragraph 4. List the enemy courses of action which tha enemy adopts
and which influences the accomplishment of the friendly mission, either
favorably or unfavorably. A properly stated enemy capability indicates
what the enemy can do, when and where the enemy can do it, and in what
strength. For example, “Attack (what) now (when) along our front (where)
with five motorized battalions supported by all available nuclear weapons,
artillery and air (strength). ” Another example: “Conduct harassing
operations (what) at any time (when) in our area (where) with about 200
guerrillas equipped only with small arms (strength).’”
A-7
The evidence considered in the analysis and discussion of enemy
capabilities includes characteristics of the AO and positive or negative
evidence of enemy activity, listed under recent and present significant
activities. A major obstacle across part of the friendly area is evidence
that attack elsewhere is more likely. Low ceilings and low visibility are
evidence that the enemy is not using all available aircraft. Open, flat
areas without any appreciable cover are evidence that the enemy does not
use guerrilla or infiltration forces.
In analyzing and discussing each enemy capability or appropriate
combination, the intelligence officer judges from the enemy point of view
the advantage or disadvantage of adopting the capability. In making this
judgment, the G2 or S2 also considers enemy doctrine and practices and the
ultimate results of adopting or rejecting the particular capability. For
example: “Employment of the unidentified tank division at TNOMYEH
deprives the enemy of the reserves needed to counterattack a penetration
by either of the two friendly divisions to our south. Commitment of this
tank division too early will result in the later defeat of the enemy.”
If there is no evidence of the enemy’s possible adoption of a
particular capability and the capability does not represent a major threat
to the accomplishment of the mission, the intelligence officer does not
judge it. For example, the enemy usually withdraws beyond our objective.
Ordinarily, such withdrawal is not a threat to the accomplishment of the
mission. If there is no evidence that the enemy withdraws, a statement
of conclusions is omitted. The intelligence officer states: “There is no
indication of withdrawal. ”
CONCLUSIONS
Paragraph 5. State the intelligence officer’s estimate of the--
"Total effects of the AO on friendly courses of action.
"Courses of action most likely to be adopted by the enemy,
including their relative probability of adoption.
"Effects of enemy vulnerabil ities that can be exploited.
For a defensive mission, conclusions identify the best defense areas
and the best AAs into the defense sector. For an offensive mission, the
conclusion describes the best AA to the objectives.
Determine the enemy probable courses of action by the previous
analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities. Consider how the enemy
views the vulnerabilities as indicated by doctrine, past experiences, and
the personality of the enemy commander. Consider previous enemy courses
of action selected under similar circumstances. The determination is
objective and not an unsubstantiated guess at what the enemy will do.
In determining the relative probability of adoption of enemy courses
of action, the intelligence officer avoids conclusions based on friendly
doctrine and practices. The officer considers the available evidence, to
A-8
include the enemy doctrine and practices, as well as positive or negative
enemy activity, If enemy activity is not definitive enough to justify
selection of the enemy’s most probable course of action, the officer
determines the most probable one based on the characteristics of the AO,
enemy doctrine, practices, and previous experiences.
In the statement of the courses of action most likely to be adopted by
the enemy, several capabilities are combined for brevity and clarity.
However, all of the enemy capabilities combined in one statement are
capable of being implemented at the same time. For example, the most
probable enemy course of action is to: “Attack to envelop our northern
flank, reinforced by corps reserve and using all available nuclear
weapons, artillery, and air support; and conduct harassing operations in
our rear areas with guerrillas and infiltrating forces. ”
If more than one enemy course of action is stated, they are listed in
the order of their probability of adoption.
An enemy vulnerability is any condition or circumstance of the enemy
situation or the AO which makes the enemy especially liable to damage,
deception, or defeat. Only those enemy weaknesses which are exploited are
considered. In studying the enemy peculiarities and weaknesses to
determine such vulnerabilities, the characteristics of the AO, all aspects
of the enemy situation, and the enemy’s doctrine and practices are
considered. Only actual vulnerabilities are presented. An open northern
flank which the enemy cannot, with available forces, extend or defend, is
a vulnerability. If, however, the enemy has reserves which readily extend
the flank to an impassable obstacle or counterattack to pin enveloping
troops against that obstacle, the open flank is mentioned as a possible
vulnerability, although the vulnerability may be eliminated by commitment
of the enemy reserves. However, the commitment of reserves creates
another vulnerability.
Each exploitable enemy vulnerability is listed as a brief statement of
the effect of the vulnerability rather than a repetition of the
peculiarity or weakness. For example: “Shortage of antitank means” is not
stated. Instead, the effect of that weakness is given by stating:
“Limited capability to oppose armored vehicles. ” If the enemy’s north
flank is vulnerable, it could be stated as: “’Enemy northern flank open to
envelopment subject to destruction of enemy reserves at . . .
In determining enemy vulnerabilities, the G2 or S2 considers the
feasibility of their exploitation and makes appropriate recommendations to
the G3 or S3. All enemy vulnerabilities are not exploited at the same
time. The exploitation of one vulnerability precludes the exploitation of
another vulnerability.
For example, the enemy is vulnerable to both a night penetration and a
daytime flank envelopment. The G3 or S3, in coordination with the G2 or
S2, recommends to the commander the priority of vulnerabilities to be
exploited. Based on the information in this appendix and in Chapter B,
Figures A-3 through A-5 show the formats for the annotated intelligence
estimate, sample intelligence estimate for a division, and an annotated
intelligence estimate for stability operations.
A-9
(Classification)
Headquarters
Place
Date, time, and zone
Msg Ref No
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO_
References: Maps, charts, or other documents.
Time Zone Used Throughout the Estimate:
(Short title identification)
1. MISSION. The restated mission determined by the commander.
2. AREA OF OPERATIONS. This paragraph discusses influence of the
battlefield environment in arriving at conclusions. It is based on the
facts and conclusions of IPB and the analysis of the battlefield area, if
one has been prepared. It may be a reference to an analysis of the
battlefield, if adequate coverage and discussion are contained therein.
a. Weather.
(1) Existing situation. Include light data and either a weather
forecast or climatic information, as appropriate. Use appendixes for
detailed information.
(2) Effect on enemy courses of action. Describe the effects of
weather on each broad course of action (such as attack or defend). Each
description concludes with a statement of whether the weather favors the
course of action. Among the courses of action, include use of chemical
agents, nuclear weapons, and special methods, techniques, equipment,
procedures, or forces.
(3) Effect on own courses of action. Describe in the same manner as
for (2) above, except that the estimate excludes the use of biological
agents.
b. Terrain.
(1) Existing situation. Use graphic representations, such as IPB
templates, where possible. Use annexes for detailed material. Include as
much information as necessary for an understanding of observation and fire,
concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain features, and AAs. Include
effects of nuclear fires, enemy biological and chemical agents, and any
other pertinent considerations on each of these factors as appropriate.
(Classification)
Figure A-3. Annotated intelligence estimate.
A-10
(Classification)
(Short title identification)
(2) Effect on enemy courses of action. Describe in the same manner
as for the effects of weather in a(2) above. For defensive courses of
action, state the best defense area and the best AAs leading to it. For
attack courses of action, state the best AAs.
(3) Effect on own courses of action. Describe in the same manner
as for effects of weather in a(3) above.
c. Other Characteristics. The following additional characteristics
considered pertinent are included in separate subparagraphs: sociology,
politics, economics, psychology, and other factors. Other factors may
include such items as science and technology, materiel, transportation,
manpower, and hydrography. These factors are analyzed using the same
subheadings as weather and terrain.
3. ENEMY SITUATION. This paragraph gives information on the enemy which
will permit later development of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities and
retire ment of these capabilities into a specific c urse of action and its
relat ve probability of adoption.
a Disposition. Reference may be made to over ays, enemy situation
maps, or previously publ ished documents.
b Composition. Summarize enemy OB that can influence accomplishment
of the mission. Reference may be made to previously published documents.
Special mention is made of units capable of EW, low-intensity operations,
and other special operations, as appropriate.
c. Strength. Enemy strength is listed as committed forces,
reinforcements, air assets, nuclear weapons, and chemical and biological
agents. The purpose of this listing is to assist in developing enemy
capabilities and vulnerabilities for use by the commander and staff in
selecting courses of action. The unit mission, location of the enemy,
enemy doctrine, and the level of command at which the estimate is being
prepared are factors to be considered.
(Classification)
Figure A-3. Annotated intelligence estimate (continued).
A-n
(Classification)
(Short title identification)
(1) Committed forces. List those enemy ground maneuver units
currently in contact and those ground maneuver units with which imminent
contact can be expected, regardless of the specific friendly course of
action implemented. Designation of enemy forces as committed forces
depends on disposition, location, controlling headquarters and doctrine.
The intelligence officer usually accounts for committed forces based on
the size unit doctrinally used to oppose the friendly unit. Generally,
enemy units are counted in terms of units two echelons below the friendly
unit's size (for example, a brigade S2 normally considers committed forces
in terms of companies; a division G2, in terms of battalions; and a corps
G2, in terms of regiments). If there is doubt whether a unit is a
committed force or a reinforcement, it is considered a reinforcement.
This attributes to the enemy the maximum capability to reinforce forces to
oppose a given friendly course of action.
(2) Reinforcements. Include designation and location.
Reinforcements are those enemy maneuver units that may or may not be
employed against us, depending on our choice of a specific course of
action and enemy plans. Reinforcements are enemy units not committed in
or out of the friendly sector, but which can react to the friendly course
of action, subject to time and distance considerations, in time to
influence the accomplishment of the mission. Imminent contact is not
expected. Disposition, location, level of control, or other factors at
the time of the estimate are considered in determining which enemy forces
are reinforcements.
(3) Air. List the number of enemy aircraft by type within
operational radius. Include the number of possible sorties per day by
type of aircraft, if known.
(4) Nuclear weapons and chemical and biological agents.
Estimate, as appropriate, the number, type, yield, and delivery means of
enemy nuclear weapons and chemical and biological munitions or agents
available to the enemy.
d. Recent and Present Significant Activities. List selected items of
information to provide bases for analyses to determine relative
probability of adoption of specific courses of action and enemy
vulnerabil ities. Enemy failures to take expected actions are listed, as
well as positive information.
(Classification)
Figure A-3. Annotated intelligence estimate (continued).
A-12
(Classification)
(Short title identification)
e. Peculiarities and Weaknesses. Based on knowledge of enemy
tactical doctrine, practices, the principles of war, the AO, and the enemy
situation previously described and discussed, list peculiarities and
weaknesses, and briefly describe each, indicating the extent to which they
may be vulnerable and how they influence possible friendly courses of
action. The items listed are grouped under the headings indicated below.
Only pertinent headings are used.
(1) Personnel. An estimate of strength usually is included if less
than 80 percent of authorized strength. Status of morale is included, if
known.
(2) Intelligence. An estimate of enemy intell igence success,
ineffectiveness, and susceptibility to deception and detection is usual ly
included.
(3) Operations. An estimate of combat effecti veness is usually
included if less than excellent.
(4) Logistics. An estimate of the enemy’s capability to support
their forces logistically is included if there are apparent weaknesses.
(5) Civil-military operations. An estimate of the attitudes of the
enemy and the civilian populace and the status of food supply, medical
facilities, communications, and other critical resources is usually
included.
(6) Personalities. An estimate of the capabilities and or
weaknesses of the enemy commander and principal staff officers usually is
included.
4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES. Based on all the previous information and
analyses, develop and list enemy capabilities. The listing provides a
basis for analyzing the available information to arrive at those
capabilities the enemy can adopt as specific courses of action and their
relative probability of adoption.
a. Enumeration. State what, when, where, and in what strength for
each capability.
(Classification)
Figure A-3. Annotated intelligence estimate (continued).
A-13
(Classification)
(Short title identification)
b. Analysis and Discussion. To provide a basis for conclusions of
enemy capabilities and their relative probability of adoption, each
capability, or appropriate combination thereof, is discussed in a separate
subparagraph. Consideration of enemy deception measures is included. All
the pertinent previous information and conclusions are tabulated as either
supporting or rejecting the adoption of the capability. After listing all
the evidence, each capability is judged from the enemy point of view of
whether the adoption of the capability is advantageous to the enemy. Such
judgments need not be made if the conclusion is obvious or if there is no
evidence that the enemy will adopt the capability, except when the
capability is one that will make the accomplishment of the friendly
mission highly doubtful or impossible. This exception is to focus
attention on dangerous threats.
5. CONCLUSIONS. Based on all the previous information and analyses,
conclusions are stated concerning the total effects of the AO on friendly
courses of action; the courses of action most likely to be adopted by the
enemy, including their relative probability of adoption; and the effects
of enemy vulnerabilities that can be exploited. These conditions assist
in the selection of a friendly course of action.
a. Effects of Intelligence Consideration on Operations. Indicate
whether the mission set forth in paragraph 1, above, can be supported from
the intelligence standpoint. Indicate which courses of action can best be
supported.
b. Effects of the AO on Own Courses of Action. For attack courses of
action, indicate the best AAs. For defensive courses of action, indicate
the best defense areas and the best AAs leading to and into the defense
areas. (This subparagraph is omitted if the discussion of the effects of
the area on own courses of action in paragraph 2 has been omitted because
of the availability of a current analysis of the AO.)
c. Probable Enemy Courses of Action. List courses of action in order
of relative probability of adoption. A listed course of action may
include several subordinate courses of action that can be executed
concurrently. Usually, no more than two or three courses of action, in
order of probability of adoption, can be justified by the available
evidence.
(Classification)
Figure A-3. Annotated intelligence estimate (continued).
A-14
(Classification)
(Short title identification)
d. Enemy Vulnerabil ities. List the effects of peculiarities and
weaknesses that result in vulnerabilities that are exploitable at own,
higher, or lower levels of command. The order in listing these
vulnerabil ities has no significance.
Isl (Designation of staff officer)
OFFICIAL:
G2’s Signature Block
Annexes (as required)
Distribution:
Figure A-3. Annotated intelligence estimate (continued).
A-15
(Classification)
Copy — of --- Copies
G2 Section, 52d Division (Mech)
GLENVILLE (NF3277), EASTLAND
2308302 June 19
Msg Ref No.
INTELLIGENCE EST MATE NO 20
Reference: Map, series East and, sheets Delta through Kilo, edition 2,
1:50,000 Time Zon e Used Throu ghout the Estimate: Zulu.
1. MISSION. 52d Div defends along Dry Creek and prepares to attack on
order.
2. AREA OF OPERATIONS.
a. Weather.
(1)
Existing
situation.
Weather
for the
period 23
to
28 June
#ill be rainy
and cool
1, gradually
warming and clearing
as a
high pressu
system moves through
the AO from
the south
Temperatures from
40 to
65°F . Visibility will
range from
16 to 25
kilometers,
except
during
precipitation
and in morning fog
in low drainage
areas
Surface winds
from the south at 8 to 10 knots.
BM-
BM-
EE-
EE-
Moon-
Moon-
Date
NT
CT
CT
NT
rise
set
23 June
0331
0419
2029
2130
1746
0125
25 June
0339
0422
2025
2124
1907
0214
27 June
0344
0425
2022
2118
2001
0518
28 June
0349
0428
2018
2112
2022
0820
(2) Effects on enemy courses of action:
(a) Precipitation will not hinder cross country movement
except in the low drainage areas of Minertown.
(b) Southerly winds will not affect enemy employment of NBC.
(c) Low visibility during precipitation and morning fog will
favor enemy attack.
(3) Effects on friendly courses of action:
(Classification)
Figure A-4. Sample division intelligence estimate.
A-16
(Classification)
(a) Precipitation will not hinder cross country movement
except in the low drainage areas of Minertown.
(b) Southerly wind direction will not affect friendly use of
chemical or nuclear weapons.
(c) Low visibility during precipitation and morning fog will
not favor friendly defense.
b. Terrain.
(1) Existing si tuation.
(a) Cover and concealment. Wooded areas around Midway offer
good concealment. Numer ous ravines in drainage areas of Minertown offer
limited cover and concealment.
(b) Observation and fire. There are good observation points
along bluffs above Gringo River. Fields of fire are excellent throughout
plains areas north of Mud Creek but limited moderately in populated and
vegetated areas near Glenville.
(c) Obstacles.
1
Swift
River (fordable
1 km
east
of Glenville).
2
Bluffs
above Gringo
River.
3
City
of Glenville.
Routes
around
city are passable;
routes through city impassable.
(d) Key terrain. Hill mass Jackson and Hill 333.
(e) AAs.
1 Available to the enemy into our sector:
a AA 1 is from Largo through gap around the
northeast end of HILL 702, 34 km southwest to Minertown and south to Dry
Creek.
b AA 2 is from Largo southeast through Midway to
river crossing east of Glenville.
(Classification)
Figure A-4. Sample division intelligence estimate (continued).
A-17
(Classification)
2 AA available for US movament into the enemy’s area is
generally the same as those I isted for enemy into our sector.
(2) Effect on enemy courses of action. Terrain favors the enemy
attack using AA 1.
(3) Effect on friendly courses of action. Terrain favors our
defense of the srea around Dry Creek.
c. Other Characteristics.
(1) Existing situation. Local nationals throughout the area
favor friendly military operations. Large numbers of refugees can be
expected to pass through friendly lines.
(2) Effect on enemy courses of action. The enemy can be
expected to insert infiltrators as refugees.
(3) Effect on friendly courses of action. Refugees can be
expected to provide valuable inteliigence.
3. ENEMY SITUATION.
a. Disposition. Annex A, Situation Overlay.
b. Composition. Enemy forces opposing 52d Div consist of elements of
the 4th Combined Arms Army.
(1) Identified units are--
(a) 10th MRD consisting of—
-27th MRR.
-30th MRR.
-31st MRR.
— 121st Tk Regt (unlocated).
(b) 19th Mech Div consisting of—
-23d MRR.
— 37th Tk Regt.
(2) Unidentified units are: 2 x U/l MRR of 19th MRD.
(Classification)
Figure A-4. Sample division intelligence estimate (Continued).
A-18
(Classification)
c. Strength.
(1) Committed forces. 52d Div (Mech) is opposed immediately by
four mechanized battalions and one tank battalion. These units are
supported by normal divisional and regimental artillery groups.
(2) Reinforcements. Reinforcements available to the enemy for
commitment in our zone are a total of five MRB and four tank battalions
from the 27th MRR, 121st Tk Regt, and the second-echelon battalions of the
30th and 31st MRRs and the 37th Tk Regt. Also, the 23d MRR can totally
reinforce within 8 hours from start of movement.
(3) Air. Enemy is supported by the 3d Air Army consisting of
unidentified numbers of fighter-bomber aircraft, ground attack aircraft,
and reconnaissance aircraft. Air parity currently exists with either
force capable of obtaining air superiority for limited periods of time.
Up to now enemy has used a maximum of 60 fighter-bomber sorties in a
12-hour period.
(4) Nuclear. No estimate of the enemy’s nuclear support for the
next 30 days is available. Enemy currently has 152mm Gun-Hows with
nuclear rounds and SSMS which can del iver rounds of 10-50 kt yield within
range of our division.
d. Recent and Present Significant Activities.
(1) Air reconnaissance and photo reports indicate increased enemy
movement along axis Bravo to Limo. Movement indicates reinforcement of
forward element of 4th CAA.
(2) Enemy’s aerial recon and tactical air flights have increased
in the last 36 hours, particularly along the I ine of contact.
(3) For the past 36 hours, volume of vehicular traffic has
increased in southerly direction.
(4) Artillery fire from the enemy has become more intensive in
the last 24 hours.
(5) Reliable source reports large tracked, amphibious vehicles
mov ng into area vicinity Hill 805.
(Classification)
Figure A-4. Sample division intelligence estimate (continued).
A-19
(Classification)
(6) Enemy has begun to employ smoke along the forward slope of
Hill 702.
e. Peculiarities and Weaknesses.
(1) Personnel. Enemy units are currently estimated to be at 85
to 90 percent authorized strength. Morale is high, although replacements
may not be highly trained.
(2) Intelligence. Enemy stresses communications security and
subordinate units of the 4th CAA have recently initiated intensive radio
security and procedures training.
(3) Operations.
(a) Enemy is susceptible to mine warfare and antitank
weapons.
(b) Enemy has trained heavily on attack formations and bas
been told offensive action is the only way to victory.
(c) Enemy is vulnerable to nuclear weapons due to massed
forces and canalization by further advancement.
(4) Logistics. Supplies are adequate for the enemy’s conduct of
either the offense or defense. The enemy had previously stockpiled
supplies wel I forward in division areas.
(5) Personal ities. GD Masonski, CG of the 10th MRD, is an
advocate of penetration type offense on a narrow front with subsequent
widening of the gaps to split enemy forces.
4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.
a. Enumeration:
(1) Attack at any time along AA 1 with four MRBs and one tank
battalion supported by normal d visional and regimental artillery groups.
(2) Attack at any time along AA 2 with four MRBs and one tank
battalion supported by normal divisional and regimental artillery groups.
(Classification)
Figure A-4. Sample division intelligence estimate (continued).
A-20
(Classification)
(3) Defend at any time with forces in contact supported by all
available divisional and regimental artillery groups.
(4) Reinforce the attack or defense with all or part of the
following units at the places and times indicated:
UNIT
PLACE
TIME
(a)
30th MRR(-)
AA2
immediately
(b)
31st MRR(-)
AA 1
immediately
(c)
37th Tk Regt
(-)
AA 1
immediately
(d)
27th MRR
AA 1
or 2
2 hr after
start of
movement
(e)
23d MRR
vie Little
8 hr after
start of
movement
(f)
121st Tk
Regt
Unlocated
Unknown
(g)
U/l MRR of
19th MRD
vie Bravo
9 hr after
start of
movement
(5) Delay in successive positions to the east of Little.
(6) Employ chemical agents within our sector at any time.
(7) Employ nuclear weapons of a 0.5-50 kt yield with delivery by
artillery or SSM.
(8) Employ guerrilla forces in our rear area either alone or in
communication with the capabilities enumerated below.
(9) The enemy can attack our area with an undetermined number of
fighter, ground attack, and bomb sorties daily. The maximum number of
daily sorties mounted in our area has been 60.
I _
(Classification)
Figure A-4. Sample division intelligence estimate (continued).
A-21
(Classification)
b. Analysis and Discussion.
(1) Attack along AA 1.
(a) The following indicate adoption of this capability:
1 Uses a good AA.
2 The enemy is massing mechanized elements, tanks,
artillery and logistic support along this avenue.
3 Forward elements disposed on a relatively narrow
front.
4 Extensive artillery preparation along approach.
(b) The scant cover presented along this AA is a limiting
factor but does not preclude adoption of this capability.
(2) Attack along AA 2.
(a) The following indicate adoption of this capability:
1 The enemy is massing mechanized elements, tanks,
artillery and logistic support along this avenue.
2 Forward elements disposed on a relatively narrow
front.
3 Extensive artillery preparation along this avenue.
(b) The following indicate rejection of this capability:
1 This AA accommodates only one deployed regiment and
offers limited cover and concealment.
2 The limited obstacle presented by Glenville.
(3) Defend. The following indicate rejection of this capability:
(a) The enemy is massing forces along the line of contact.
(b) Enemy has followed known doctrine for attack.
(Classification)
Figure A-4. Sampie division intelligence estimate (continued).
A-22
(Classification)
(c) Terrain favors attack.
(4) Reinforce. The following indicates adoption of this
capability:
(a) Movement of additional troops toward the front.
(b) New units identified in the combat zone.
(c) Forward logistical buildup.
(5) Delay. There are no indications of the enemy’s adoption of
this capability.
(6) Employ chemical agents. There is no indication the enemy
will employ chemical agents other than smoke.
(7) Employ nuclear weapons. There is no indication the enemy
will employ nuclear weapons.
(8) Employ guerrilla forces. The following indicates adoption of
this capability:
(a) Doctrine calls for use of guerrilla force.
(b) Use would enhance enemy advance by creating panic and
confusion.
(9) Air attack. Indications are that enemy will continue to
employ this capability as referenced in paragraph (9) above.
5. CONCLUSIONS.
a. Intelligence. Available intelligence indicates that the division
can accomplish its mission. Intelligence supports adoption of the
division course of action.
b. Weather and Terrain. The weather and terrain favors our defense.
The beat defensive area is the high ground east of Dry Creek. The best AA
into our defensive sector is AA 1.
c. Probable Enemy Courses of Action.
(Classification)
Figure A-4. Sample division intelligence estimate (continued).
A-23
(Classification)
(1) Attack with forces in contact supported by air and artillery
with the main attack of one mechanized regiment along AA 1. Will
reinforce w th elements as indicated in para 4a(4).
(2) Conduct secondary attack with forces in contact supported by
air and arti llery with one mechanized regiment along AA 2.
(3) Employ guerrilla or special forces in our rear areas in
conjunction with the above courses of action.
d. Enemy Vulnerabilities.
(1) The enemy is vulnerable to counterattack due to slowness to
exploit potential penetrations.
(2) Vulnerable to nuclear attack due to massing of troops and
concentrated logistics depots.
(3) Mine warfare will be effective against mechanized elements.
KROOK
BG
OFFICIAL:
Isl Bagger
BAGGER
GS
Annex: A--Situati on Overlay (omitted)
Distribution: A
(Classification)
Figure A-4. Sample division intelligence estimate (continued).
A-24
(Classification)
Copy --- of --- Copies
Preparing Staff Element
Organization
Location
Date-Time Group
Msg Ref No
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO
References: maps, charts, or other documents.
Time Zone Used Throughout the Estimate: Zulu
1. MISSION. (States the current or proposed mission of the force
designated for stability operations.)
2. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. (This paragraph discusses characteristics of
the host country, the area, and their probable effect upon both insurgent
and government courses of act ion.)
a. Geography. (Includes climate and topography.)
(1) Existing situation.
(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.
(3) Effect on government courses of action.
b. Politics. (Includes governmental organization, political parties,
and interest groups.)
(1) Existing situation.
(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.
(3) Effect on government courses of action.
c. Economy. (Includes private enterprise and publ ic facilities.)
(1) Existing situation.
(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.
(3) Effect on government courses of action.
(Classification)
Figure A-5. Annotated intelligence estimate for stability operations.
A-25
(Classification)
d. Sociology (Includes minority groups and social programs.)
(1) Existing situation.
(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.
(3) Effect on government courses of action.
e. Psychology. (Includes behavior patterns and motivating factors.)
(1) Existing situation.
(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.
(3) Effect on government courses of action.
3. THE INSURGENT SITUATION. (This paragraph discusses the insurgent
organization and its activities.)
a. Organization and Leadership. (Includes composition.)
(1) Nonmilitary. (Includes the underground.)
(2) Military. (Includes all insurgent armed elements.)
b. Strength and Disposition.
(1) Nonmilitary.
(2) Military.
c. Recent and Present Significant Activities.
(1) Nonviolent action. (Includes political, economic,
sociological, and psychological action.)
(2) Terrorist action. (Includes murder, torture, extortion,
kidnapp ing, and sabotage.)
(3) Guerrilla operations. (Includes harassment, destruction,
i nterdi ction, and dispersion.)
(Classification)
Figure A-5. Annotated Intelligence estimate for stability operations [continued).
A-26
(Classification)
(4) Conventional tactical operations. (Includes attack, defense,
clay, and withdrawal.)
d. Strengths and Weaknesses.
(1) Recruitment and retention.
(2) Intelligence and security.
(3) Organization and training.
(4) Finance and logistics.
(5) Communications.
4. INSURGENT CAPABILITIES. (This paragraph lists current insurgent
capabilities and discusses them in regard to probability of adoption.)
a. Enumeration. (Includes what, where, when, and how for each
capability.)
(1) Basic capabilities.
(a) Nonviolent action.
(b) Terrorist action.
(c) Guerrilla operations.
(d) Conventional tactical operations.
(e) Employment of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.
(2 Supporting capabilities.
(a) Intelligence and security.
(b) Recruitment and retention.
(c) Organization and training.
(d) Finance and logistics.
(Classification)
Figure A-5. Annotated intelligence estimate for stability operations (continued).
A-27
(Classification)
(e) Reinforcement capabilities.
b. Analysis and Discussion. (Includes all evidence supporting or
rejecting the adoption of each capability.)
5 . CONCLUSIONS. (This paragraph draws conclusions from the content of
:he preceding paragraphs and furnishes a basis for selection of courses of
action to accomplish the assigned miss ion.)
a. Effects of the Operational Environment. (States the total effect
of the AO upon courses of action.)
b. Probable Insurgent Courses of Action. (Lists probable insurgent
courses of action in order of relative probability of adoption.)
c. Insurgent Vulnerabilities, (Lists exploitable insurgent
vulnerabilities.)
/ s / _
G2 or S2
(Commander if distributed
outside headquarters)
ANNEXES:
Distribution: (If distributed only.)
Authentication: (G2 or S2 authenticates if commander signs estimate.)
(Classification)
Figure A-5. Annotated intelligence estimate for stability operations (continued).
A-28
INTELLIGENCE ANNEX TO THE OPORD OR OPLAN
The intelligence annex disseminates information about enemy forces
which is essential to the conduct of the operation and to give any other
necessary intelligence orders or guidance for the operation(s) in
question. It also serves as a medium for instructing subordinate
commanders to acquire information necessary for the conduct of the
operation but which can only be obtained immediately before or when the
operation itself has begun. The intelligence annex is not a substitute
for an intelligence collection plan; rather it is a way to communicate the
taskings and requests of the collection plan.
The intelligence annex is a formal intelligence tasking document that
accompanies an OPLAN or OPORD. It should be as brief as possible
consistent with clarity. Its first paragraph is a summary of the enemy
situation required to understand the OPLAN or OPORD and refers to
annotated maps, enemy situation overlays, or current intelligence reports.
Subsequent paragraphs contain specific collection requirements and
instructions. SOP information should not be repeated in the intelligence
annex. Figures A-6 and A-7 show a general intelligence annex format and
division intelligence annex example.
(Classification)
(Change from oral orders, if any)
Copy no _ of _Copies
Issuing headquarters
Place of issue (may be in code)
Date-time group of signature
Message reference number
ANNEX (INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION ORDER NO _.
References: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents.
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu
1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION. Information about enemy forces essential
in implementing the operation plan. When the amount of detail makes it
appropriate, a brief summary and reference to the appropriate intelligence
document, or appendix to the annex, may be used. Reference to documents
not included in the annex should not be made when they ara not available
to all recipients of the annex.
(Classification)
Figure A-6. Intelligence annex format.
A-29
(Classification)
2. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS. List each PIR in a separate subparagraph.
If a priority has been assigned to the PIR list in order, so state. In a
final subparagraph, list IRs, if any. If an intelligence annex is not
prepared or is distributed separately from the basic order, PIR should be
listed in the coordinating instructions subparagraph of the OPORD.
3. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS.
a. Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units. List, by unit, in
separate numbered subparagraph, detailed instructions for reports required
by the issuing headquarters. Units are listed in the same order as they
are I isted in the OPORD.
b. Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units. List in a
separate numbered subparagraph requests for information from units not
organic or attached.
4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL. This
paragraph contains instructions about the operation that are not contained
in SOP or that modify or amplify SOP for the current operation. Examples
include--
a. EPWs, Deserters, Repatriates, Inhabitants, and Other Persons,
Special handling and segregation instructions. Location of EPW collection
point as provided by the provost marshal.
b. Captured Documents. Instructions for handling and processing of
captured documents from time of capture to receipt by specified
intelligence personnel
c. Captured Materiel. Designation of items or categories of enemy
materiel for examination, and specific instructions for their processing
and disposition.
5. DOCUMENTS OR EQUIPMENT REQUIRED. This paragraph lists, in each
category, the conditions under which certain documents or equipment
required by or allocated to units can be obtained or requested. Items may
include air photographs and maps.
6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
a. This paragraph is covered largely by SOP. Many special
operational instructions having Cl aspects are I isted in the OPORD or in
other annexes.
(Classification)
Figure A-6. Intelligence annex format (continued).
A-30
(Classification)
b. Certain instructions and procedures on the conduct of special
personnel in the operation may require limited dissemination on a
need-to-know basis; therefore, a special Cl measures appendix may be
prepared for a limited and specified number of addresses.
7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION. This paragraph may be covered largely by
SOP . It stipulates the conditions (for example, dates, number of copies,
issue) regulating the issue of intelligence reports to the originating
command for the duration of the operation. Any or all of the following
items may be covered in this paragraph:
a. Period to be covered by routine reports and distribution.
b. Routine and special reports that differ from SOP required from
subordinate units.
c. Periodic or special conferences of inte lligence officers.
d. Distribution of special intelligence studies, such as defense
overprints, photointelligence reports, and OB overlays.
em Special intelligence liaison, when indicated.
8. MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS (if required). List here, under separate
subparagraphs, necessary items that are not covered above or in SOPS, or
which require action different from that detailed in SOPS.
Acknowledge
Last name of commander
Rank
Authentication:
Appendixes:
Distribution:
(Classification)
Figure A-6. Intelligence annex format (continued).
A-31
(Classification)
(Change from oral orders, if any)
Copy 4 of 5 Copies
20th Inf Div
Zelle (4671), Buttano
1019OOZ Sep 45
BQ 13
Annex A (Intelligence) to Operations Order 24
Reference: Map, Buttano, Edition 2, 1:50,000 sheets 204 (Zelle-Pagt).
Zulu Time
1 0 SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION. See INTSUM, this HQ, 1018OOZ
September, and Appendix 1, Situation Overlay.
2. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS.
a. PIR.
(1) Will enemy reinforce the forces along the Flood River before
the time of attack? If so, when, where, and with what forces? Special
attention to the mechanized regiment and the medium tank regiment in
vicinity of Burg.
(2) Will enemy employ nuclear weapons against us? If so, when,
where, how many, of what yields, and by what delivery means?
b. IR.
(1) Will enemy continue to defend in the present position? if
so, how will forces on the ground be organized, and with what troops?
Special attention to locations and activities of reserves and
vulnerability to nuclear attack.
(2) Will enemy attack prior to 1105OOZ September? If so, when,
where, and in what strength? Special attention to the axis Hill 536--HMI
524-CR9841.
(3) Will enemy use CB agents? If so, what agents, when, how, and
where?
(Classification)
Figure A-7. Sample of a division intelligence annex.
A-32
(CLASSIFICATION)
INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS.
a. Orders to Attached and Subordinate Units.
(1) 1st Bale.
(2) 2d Bale.
(a) Report as obtained.
1 Status of construction of defensive positions and
minef ields on and to the east of the Flood River.
2 Location and size of ammunition storage sites and
I ocat ion. size, and content of engineer equipment parks.
3 Clearing of lanes through obstacles within enemy
position n division zone.
4 Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols, and
time they were observed.
5 Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in
forward areas.
6 The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB
activity.
7 The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks
or wearing protective clothing.
(b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 1104OOZ
September.
1 Activity in medium tank regiment (-) and tank battalion
assembly area in vicinity of Burg.
2 Location and activity of mechanized regiment in
vicinity of Burg.
(3) 3d Bale.
(a) Report as obtained--
(Classif ication)
Figure A-7. Sample of a division intelligence annex (continued)
A-33
(Classification)
1 Activity of mechanized battalion north and east of
CR9847.
2 Activity of mechanized battalion on Hill 503.
3 Status of construction of defensive positions and
ninefields on and to the east of Flood River.
4 Location and size of ammunition storage sites and
location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.
5 Clearing of lanes through obstacles within enemy
position in division zone.
6 Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols and ime
they were observed or contacted.
7 Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling n
forward areas.
8 The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB
activity.
9 The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks
or wearing protective clothing.
(b) Report as obtained-Negative reports by 1104OOZ
September.
1 Activity in medium tank regiment (-) and tank battalion
assembly area in vicinity of Burg.
2 Location and activity of mechanized regiment in
vicinity of Burg.
(4) 1/21 Cav report as obtained—
(a) Activity of mechanized battalion on Hill 503.
(b) Status of construction of defensive positions and
minefield on and to the east of the Flood River.
(c) Location and size of ammunition storage sites and
location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.
(Classification)
Figure A-7. Sample of a division intelligence annex (continued).
A-34
(Classification)
(d) Clearing of lanes through obstacles within enemy
position in division zone.
(e) Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols, and time
they were observed.
(f) Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in
forward areas.
(g) The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB
activity.
(h) The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks or
wearing protective clothing.
(5) Div Arty.
(a) Report as obtained--
1 Status of construction of defensive positions and
minefield on and to the east of Flood River.
2 Clearing of lanes through obstacles within enemy
position in division zone.
3 Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols, and
time they were observed or contacted.
4 Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in
forward areas.
5 The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB
activity.
(b) Report as obtained--Negative reports by 110400Z
September. Locations of artillery positions, including number of weapons,
caliber, and state of preparation of position.
(6) 20 Avn.
(a) Report as obtained--
1 Activity of mechanized battalion north and east of
CR9847.
Classification
Figure A-7. Sample of a division Intelligence annex (continued).
A-35
(Classification)
2 Activity of mechanized battalion on Hill 503.
3 Location, size, and type of unit in vicinity of Hill
536 (north of Burg) .
4 Status of construction of defensive positions and
ninefieids on and to the east of Flood River.
5 Location and size of ammunition sites, location, size,
and content of engineer equipment parks.
6 Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence
of equipment appropriate to, atomic demolition munitions (ADM).
7 The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB
activity.
(b) Report as obtained--Negative reports by 1104OOZ
September.
1 Movement on the following roads:
a North on Highway 25.
b West on Highway 2.
c West on Highway 4.
2 Activity in medium tank regiment (-) and tank battalion
assembly area in vicinity of Burg.
3 Location and activity of mechanized regiment in
vicinity of Burg.
4 Location of artillery positions, including number of
weapons, ca i ber, and state of preparation of positions.
(7) 20 Engr report as obtained--
(a) Status of construction of defensive positions and
minefi elds on and to the east of Flood River.
(b) The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB
a c t i v ty .
(Classification)
Figure A-7. Sample of a division intelligence annex (continued).
A-36
(Classification)
b. Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units.
(1) 1st Corps is requested to provide:
(a) As obtained--
1 Location, size, and type of unit in vicinity of Hill
536 (north of Burg).
2 Number, types, direction of movement, and time of
movement of air or surface vehicular traffic within the division zone,
with special attention to Highway 2.
3 Troop concentrations, including types of vehicles, east
of Highway 25 within the divisional area of interest.
4 Evidence of field fortifications and troop
concentrations along the following lines:
a Hill 503-CR9847.
b Hill 518-Hill 536-Hill 499.
5 Location and size of ammunition storage sites and
locations, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.
6 Instances of heavily guarded vehicular movement.
Special attention to Highway 2 from Zilch to Burg.
7 Areas under unusual security restrictions in the
divisional area of interest.
8 Presence of special security troop units in any area
east of Highway 25.
9 Any location in the divisional area of interest from
which civilians have been evacuated.
1 0 Launcher sites for guided missiles or rockets within
divisional area of interest.
J_1 Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence
of equipment appropriate to, ADM.
(Classification)
Figure A-7. Sample of a division intelligence annex (continued).
A-37
(Classification)
12 The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB
activity.
JL3 All CB supply movement and dumping in zone.
JA The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks
or wearing protective clothing.
(b) As obtained—Negative reports by 1104OOZ September.
1 Movement on the following roads:
a North on Highway 25.
b West on Highway 2.
c West on Highway 4.
2 Activity in medium tank regiment (-) and tank battalion
assembly area in vicinity of Burg.
3 Location and activity of mechanized regiment in
vicinity of Burg.
4, Location and activity of mechanized regiment southwest
of CR9944.
5 Locations of artillery positions, including number of
weapons, caliber and state of preparation of positions.
6 Command posts, supply points, and medical facilities
east of Highway 25.
(2) 18 Inf Div is requested to provide—
(a) As obtained —
1 Troop concentrations, including types of vehicles, east
of Highway 25 within the divisional area of interest.
2 Instances of heavily guarded vehicular movement;
special attention to Highway 2 from Zilch to Burg.
(Classification)
Figure A-7. Sample of a division intelligence annex (continued).
A-38
(Classification)
3 Areas under unusual security restrictions in the
divisional area of interest.
4 Presence of special security troop units in any area
east of Highway 25.
5 Any location in the divisional area of interest from
which civilians have been evacuated.
6 Launcher sites for guided missiles or rockets within
divisional area of interest.
7 Locations of heavy artillery positions, including
number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.
8 Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence
of equipment appropriate to, atomic demolition munitions (ADM).
9 The interception of enemy patrols equipped for chemical
biological (CB) activity.
jLD All CB supply movement and dumping in zone.
1_LThe presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks
or wearing protective clothing.
(b) As obtained—Negative reports by 1104OOZ September.
1 Movement on the following roads:
a North on Highway 25.
b West on Highway 2.
c West on Highway 4.
2 Location and activity of mechanized regiment in
vicinity of Burg.
(3) 52 Mech Inf Div is requested to provide as obtained —
(a) Troop concentrations, including types of vehicles, east
of Highway 25 within the divisional area of interest.
(Classification)
Figure A-7. Sample of a division intelligence annex (continued).
A-39
(Classification)
(b) Instances of heavily guarded vehicular movement, special
attention to Highway 2 from Zilch to Burg.
(c) Areas under unusual security restrictions in the
divisional area of interest.
(d) Presence of special security troop units in any area east
of Highway 25.
(e) Any location in the divisional area of interest from
which civilians have been evacuated.
(f) Launcher sites for guided missiles or rockets within
divisional area of interest.
(g) Locations of heavy artillery positions, including number
of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.
(h) Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence of
equipment appropriate to, ADM.
(i) The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB
activity.
(j) All CB supply movement and dumping in zone.
(k) The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks or
wearing protective clothing.
(4) Supporting Ml units provide information obtainable from
SIGINT and ESM and will respond to specific tasking as described in
separate instructions.
4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL (see division
SOP) .
5. DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT REQUIRED.
a. Maps. SOP distribution of map, Buttano, 1:50,000, Zelle-Pagt.
b. Photographic. Following aerial photographs will be furnished:
(Classification)
Figure A-7. Sample of a division intelligence annex (continued).
A-40
(Classification)
(1) Basic cover of division zone (1:10,000 approximate), six
copies of each brigade and division artillery; one copy each tank
battalion, mechanized infantry battalion, 1/21 Cav, division engineer,
aviation battalion or group, and division signal officer.
(2) Annotated air photographs distributed automatically, as
available.
6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
a. Appendix 2, Cl.
b. All units coordinate use of Army aircraft through division
tactical operations center (DTOC) to minimize number of aircraft in air
over division zone prior to attack.
7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION. Effective 1108OOZ September units will
submit INTSUM at 0800, 1200, 1600, 2000, 2400, and 0400 hours daily in
lieu of times prescribed in division SOP.
8. MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS (as required),
None.
Acknowledge.
POWERS
MG
Append xes: 1 --S ituation Overlay
2--c
Distribution: Same as OPORD _
OFFICIAL:
/s/AUSTIN
AUSTIN
G2
NOTE: This format may also be used in Joint Service Operations.
(Classification)
Figure A-7. Sample of a division intelligence annex (continued).
A-4 1
SITUATION REPORT
Preparation and submission of the SITREP is a staff responsibility of
the S3; however, the S2 prepares paragraph 1, Enemy, of the SITREP and
furnishes it to the S3 in usable form. Figure A-8 shows the prescribed
format for preparing a SITREP.
ENEMY .
Committed forces (overlay).
Forces committed against TF 2-80 are—
(1) Four mechanized platoons.
(2) Two medium tank platoons.
(3) Normal regimental artillery.
(4) Six 160mm mortars.
(5) Ten 122mm howitzers.
(6) Four 100mm artillery guns self-propelled (SP).
(7) Two 122mm multiple rocket launchers.
(8) One 152mm gun SP.
(9) Air and nuclear weapons.
Reinforcements (overlay). Reinforcements currently capable of being”
employed in sector now total: U/l Medium tk pit vie BD4156, MRC of 281st
MRR vie BD4867, MRC of 282d MRR vie BD4873, MRC of 281st MRR vie AB4673,
MRB (-) of 281st MRR vie AB4650, MRB of 282d MRR vie CD5060, U/l tk co vie
DE5265 .
Enemy Activity During Period I00600Z-101800Z.
(1) Occupation of previously unoccupied positions vie BG3531, NT3633,
MT3734, DT4239 .
(2) Movement of combat units fwd vie MN4036.
(3) Dispersal of tanks to fwd units vie CG3136.
(4) Movement of assault boats into vie GM3338.
(5) Two 100mm AT guns (SP) vie MT3737, two 120mm AT guns (SP) vie
ER3833 .
(6) Six additional 122mm how vie DT3731.
(7) Increased enemy counterbattery fire in bde sector.
(8) Clearing lanes through minefield BC2937.
(9) Mech regimental aid station vie CD3339.
( o) Increased enemy air activity vie FN2836, RB2437.
(11) Suspected jamming of VHF communications (intel net) at 100745Z
and 013252.
Concl usions. Enemy’s most probable courses of action-
(1) Continue defense now.
(2) Attack along our front within 8 hours.
Figure A-8. Sample situation report.
A-42
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
The INTREP is a standardized report which, based on its importance, is
disseminated without regard to a specific schedule. It is prepared at all
echelons when facts influencing the enemy capabilities have been observed,
or when a change in enemy capabilities has taken place. It is passed to
higher, lower, and adjacent units at the discretion of the commander
producing the report. It is sent as quickly as possible following receipt
of the information. Whenever time permits, the INTREP includes the
originating office’s interpretation of the information or intelligence
being reported. The first word of the report is INTREP. Otherwise, there
is no prescribed format for this report. It is not used in lieu of the
critical INTREP. Figure A-9 shows a message format for INTREPs that has
been developed for joint operations.
C110: Message Identification Number.
INTREP: The first word of the report must be “INTREP.’
HEADING: Addressee information and meg ctr data.
TEXT: Intelligence or information to be reported. Should answer
Who, What, Where, When and How Questions.
CONCLUSIONS: Whenever possible the INTREP should include the
originating office’s interpretation of the information
intelligence being reported.
Figure A-9. Sample INTREP message format.
Figure A-10 shows the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) INTREP format.
MESSAGE HEADING
ORIGINATING AGENCY
ACTION ADDRESSEES
INFORMATION ADDRESSEES
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND CODE WORD OR NICKNAME
INTREP (number) AS OF DATE-TIME GROUP (GMT)/MO/YR
BODY Installation, Event, and Sighting Format
Reference to previous message, if any.
Source reliability evaluation.
Concise narrative description.
REMARKS: Any other information not covered in
the body of the report.
Figure A-10. Sample JCS INTREP message format.
A-43
INTELLIGENCE SUMMRY
The INTSUM provides a summary of the intelligence situation covering a
specific period of time dictated by the commander. Figures A-ll and A-12
show INTSUM formats. There is no specified format for the INTSUM, except
for joint service operations (see the format in Figure A-12).
Format of an INTSUM
NOTE: Omit items not applicable
unless otherwise indicated.
1. Issuing unit (always
incIuded).
2. Time and date of issue
(always Included).
3. Summary of enemy activity
for period.
a. Ground activity.
b. Trace of forward elements.
c. Potential targets for
clear weapons.
d. Nuclear activity.
e. CB activity.
f. Air activity.
g. Other (new tactics,
counterinteiIigence).
4. Enemy personnel and
equipment losses.
a. Personnel Killed in
Act ion (KIA).
b. EPW.
c. Equipment destroyed or
captured.
5. New obstacles and barriers.
6. Administrative activities.
7. New identifications.
a. Units.
b. Personalities.
8. Enemy movements.
9. Estimates number and types
of vehicles.
10. Weather and terrain
conditions.
11. Brief discussion of
capabiIities and
vuInerabiIities
(always included).
NOTE: In joint service operations,
IMMEDIATE
TO CG ED CORPS
INTSUM NUMBER 144 ENDING 040bQ0Z
PARA 3 ALFA ENEMY CONTINUED DEFENSE
IN ZONE EXCEPT FOR LOCAL ATTACK AT
0415 VICINITY RS37b751 WITH
ESTIMATED 10 MEN CMM 3 MEDIUM TANKS
CMM AND LIGHT ARTILLERY SUPPORT PD
ATTACK REPULSED PD PARA 3 DELTA
ATTACK PRECEDED AT 0410 BY VERY HIGH
AIR BURST NUCLEAR WEAPON CMM GROUND
ZERO RS3747bl CMM DELIVERY MEANS
UNDETERMINED CMM YIELD ESTIMATED AT
0 PD 5 KT PD PARA 3 FOXTROT ATTACK
SUPPORTED BY 2 JET ATTACK AIRPLANES
BOMBING AND STRAFING VICINITY
RS3%75b FOR 5 MINUTES STARTING AT
0425 PD PARA 4 ALFA CONFIRMED 20 KIA
CMM ESTIMATED 5 KIA PD PARA 4 BRAVO
10 INCLUDING 2 WIA PD PARA 4 CHARLIE
2 MEDIUM TANKS DESTROYED CMM 1
DAMAGED CMM 1 JET
ATTACK AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN PD PARA b
PRISONER STATES AMMUNITION SUPPLY IN
FORWARD UNITS RUNNING LOW PAREN
CHARLIE DASH 3 PAREN PD PARA 7 ALFA
PATROL REPORTS BATTERY 152MM GUN
HOWITZERS AT RS303212 PD PRISONERS
CONFIRM LOCATION 2D BATTALION CMM
17F MRR VICINITY RS37575A PAREN
BRAVO DASH 1 PAREN PARA & AIRBORNE
RADAR RECONNAISSANCE DETECTED 10
TRUCKS MOVING SOUTH ON ROAD AT
RS3302A0 AT 0345 PD PARA 1 PROBABLY
ROUTINE SUPPLY VEHICLES PD PARA 10
SNOW STARTED AT 040545Z AND
CONTINUING PD GROUND FROZEN HARD AND
SUPPORTS ALL TYPES OF VEHICLES PD
use the format in Figure A-12.
Figure A-11. Format" and' sampfe of an "irfteTTigence summary.
A-44
12. Conclusions (always
included).
PARA 11 LOCAL ATTACK REPORTED
PROBABLY WAS TO SEIZE HILL 405 PD
ENEMY IS CAPABLE OF CONTINUING
DEFENSE IN PRESENT POSITION CMM
Examples of a Division INTSUM MAKING LOCAL ATTACKS TO IMPROVE
(full distribution not HIS DEFENSIVE POSITION CMM DELAYING
indicated) FM CG 520 Inf Div TO STRONGER POSITION ALONG LAURIEX
(Mech) RIVER PD PARA IE CONTINUED DEFENSE
IN PRESENT POSITION MOST PROBABLE-
NOTE: In joint service operations, use the format in Figure A-12.
Figure A-ll. Format and sample of an intelligence summary (continued).
HEAD ING
PRECEDENCE
ORIGINATING AGENCY
ACTION ADDRESSEES
INFORMATION ADDRESSEES
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, CODE WORD, OR NICKNAME
INTSUM ( Number) FOR PERIOD ENDING DATE-TIME GROUP-MONTH-YEAR
BODY
1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY FOR THE PERIOD . Is a summary of those that
occurred during the period of the report. It contains but not be limited
to the following:
a. GROUND ACTIVITY . Summarize major movements and activities of
enemy ground forces. Indicate estimated strength, composition,
disposition, and any other items of significance.
b. TRACE OF FORWARD ELEMENTS . The most forward location or main
location of the enemy force will be shown as a pinpoint position, area
boundary, or a series of connected points, as applicable. The following
methods for reporting locations is used and stated in the intelligence
annex.
Figure A-12. Intelligence summary for joint service operations.
A-45
(1) Operations Involving Ground Forces. For unified or joint
operations in which ground forces are directly participating, not
specifically provided for in the subparagraph below, the UTM system
prescribed for the area concerned is used to the maximum extent
practicable in communications between ground forces and other forces
jointly engaged. When the use of the UTM system is impractical, latitude
and longitude is used.
(2) Operations Not Involving Ground Forces, The World Geographic
Reference System (GEOREF) is used in joint operations which do not
directly involve ground forces.
(3) For Close Air Support of Ground Forces. When air forces
(including naval aviation) are acting in close air support of ground
forces, the UTM system prescribed for use by ground forces in the area
concerned is used.
(4) For Joint Amphibious Operations. The UTM system prescribed
for use by landing forces within the amphibious objective area is used for
support of landing force operations by all supporting forces.
(5) For Joint Air Defense Operations. GEOREF is used in joint
air defense operations. When there is a possibility of confusing which
system to use in reporting positions, the reference system should be
indicated in the report. GEOREF is not used by air forces (including
naval aviation) when reporting positions to ground forces, except in air
defense operations. GEOREF is used by ground forces when reporting
positions to air forces in air defense operations.
(6) in joint operations not using procedures specified in the
above paragraphs, latitude and longitude is used.
c. POTENTIAL TARGETS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS . List all potential nuclear
targets, such as concentrations of troops or equipment observed during
period. Include location, date, and time (Zulu) of observation.
d. NUCLEAR ACTIVITY . Enemy nuclear capability observed during the
period is reported. Include any changes to previously reported
capabilities. Indicate location, date, and time (Zulu) of observation of
artillery, missile, or air nuclear capability.
e. NUCLEAR. BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL ACTIVITY . Indicate NBC weapons
(agents) employed or capability by type, location, date, and time (Zulu)
of occurrence.
f. AIR ACTIVITY . All enemy air activity that has occurred during the
period (CAS, air interdiction, AD, and reconnaissance affecting the
Figure A-12. Intelligence summary for joint service operations (continued).
A-46
operation is summarized, including location, date and time (Zulu), and
type of aircraft involved.
g. NAVAL ACTIVITY . Summarize all enemy naval activity that has
occurred during the period. include location, date and time (Zulu), and
types of ships and craft.
h. OTHER . New tactics observed are summarized. Cl measures of
significance, including active and passive measures, are listed. Any item
not properly reported in any other paragraph also may be included.
2. ENEMY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT LOSSES .
a. PERSONNEL . List in separate categories confirmed Kl A (body
count) , estimated KIA, estimated wounded in act on (WIA), and captured.
b. EQUIPMENT AND MATERIEL . List by number and type the enemy
equipment and materiel losses during the period. Include damaged enemy
equipment separately.
3. NEW OBSTACLES AND BARRIERS . List those identified during the period
by type and location.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES . Summarize enemy activities pertaining to
personnel replacements, supply buildup, or other unusual logistic activity
but not information or intelligence reported elsewhere in the INTSUM.
5. NEW IDENTIFICATIONS .
a. UNITS . List new units identified during the period. Include
location, date and time (Zulu), and unit making the identification.
b. PERSONALITIES . List significant individuals identified during the
period by name, rank or title, and organization.
6. ENEMY MOVEMENTS . Summarize significant enemy movements by type,
activity, location, and unit designation, if known.
7. ESTIMATED NUMBER AND TYPES OF VEHICLES. SHIPS, AIRCRA FT. Summarize by
type the estimated number of vehicles, ships, and aircraft available to
the enemy.
8. WEATHER AND TERRAIN CONDITIONS . A summary of the weather and terrain
conditions during the period that would have an effect on subsequent
operations.
Figure A-12. Intelligence summary for joint service operations (continued).
A-47
9. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES . (Always
included.) State courses of action which the enemy most probably will
adopt.
NOTE: Paragraphs and subparagraphs for which no information has been
obtained are omitted in the preparation of the INTSUM. Each topic
reported upon retains the numerical (and letter) designation outl ined
above.
Figure A-12. Intelligence summary for joint service operations (continued).
PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
The PERINTREP is a summary of the intelligence situation covering a
longer period than the INTSUM. It is a means of disseminating detailed
information and intelligence. Other intelligence documents like technical
intelligence summaries, EPW interrogation reports, translations of captured
documents, and weather and climate summaries are disseminated as appendixes
to the PERINTREP. The PERINTREP is concise--but complete--and makes
maximum use of sketches, overlays, marked maps, and annexes.
Although not normally prepared by intelligence officers at division
and lower levels, PERINTREPs provide detailed information and intelligence.
Therefore, intelligence officers at these levels should be familiar with
the format and content of PERINTREPs.
The PERINTREP is normally published every 24 hours. The beginning and
end of the period is selected to permit dissemination of the PERINTREP in
time for its use in daily planning. It is disseminated by the most
suitable means consistent with its volume and urgency. Figure A-13 shows
the PERINTREP format.
The Supplementary Intelligence Report (SUPINTREP) is a comprehensive
analysis of one or more specific subjects. This report is formatted like a
PERINTREP and usually contains selected intelligence data collected over an
extended period of time. It includes additional details on items contained
in other reports. The report is disseminated based on the intell igence
contained in the report and the desires of the commander. It
is normally produced as the result of a request or in support of a
particular operation.
A-48
(Classification)
copy No _
Unit
Location
Date-time group
Message reference number
PERINTREP NO _
Period Covered: (date and time to date and time).
References: Maps or charts.
Disposal instructions: (if any).
1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. This paragraph contains a brief summary of
enemy operations during the period. Amplifying details are furnished in
the paragraphs that follow and in appropriate annexes, or both. This
paragraph provides brief highlights of the anemy situation and the
significance of the enemy’s major activities, to include marked changes in
morale, strengths, dispositions, tactics, combat effectiveness, and
equipment. Data that is langthy or can conveniently be shown graphically
are presented in annexes.
2. ENEMY ACTIVITIES. This paragraph, in conjunction with those following,
providas the details of the situation summarized in paragraph 1. Detailed
intelligence provided in this paragraph covers all operational activities.
Information may be presented graphically by overlays, printed maps, sketch
maps, and annexes. Subparagraphs are omitted when appropriate intelligences
is not available or is adequately covered by othar portions of this report,,
a. Ground. (Primarily includes activities of combat arms, raserves,
and reinforcements; also includes enemy defensas, minefield,
fortifications, barriers, obstacles, and other defensive works.)
b. Air. (Includes Air Force activities, such as bombing, close air
support, tactical aerial reconnaissance, air surveillance, and
air-supported operations.)
c. Airborne.
d. Irregular.
e. NBC operations.
f. EW.
_ (Classification) _
Figure A-13. Sample format for a periodic intelligence report.
A-49
g. Other. (Normally includes other than combat arms; includes
appropriate comments not covered in other subparagraphs on reserves,
reinforcements, new tactics, weapons and equipment, administrative
installations, combat service support, and technical intelligence.)
3. ORDER OF BATTLE, Frequently, this paragraph will consist only of
references to the enemy SITMAP (or overlay) and to the OB annex, which is
developed using the format shown below. When desired by the commander,
particularly significant 06 changes may be summarized in addition to being
discussed in detail in the 06 annex.
a. Composition and Disposition.
b. Strength. (Personnel and major weapons and items of equipment.)
(1) Losses.
(2) Current strength.
c. Tactics,
d. Training.
e. Css .
f. Combat Effectiveness.
g. Miscellaneous Data.
4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. This paragraph, or parts thereof, should be
issued as an annex if a limited distribution is required.
a. General. (A short summary of the Cl situation during the period.)
b. Espionage.
c. Sabotage.
d. Subversion.
e. Communication and Noncommunication Security.
f. Miscellaneous.
5. WEATHER. This paragraph gives a summary of the effect of weather on
operations during the period.
(Classification)
Figure A-13. Sample format for a period intelligence report (continued).
A-50
(Classification)
6. TERRAIN. Use an annex, special maps, and overlays, when possible,
include impact on future operations, if appropriate.
7. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION. This paragraph lists and discusses briefly
enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. The conclusions present the
commander’s assessment of the most probable courses of action available to
the enemy, probability of their adoption, and vulnerabilities that are
exploitable by own, higher, or lower levels of command.
a. Enemy Capabilities.
b. Enemy Vulnerabilities.
c. Conclusions.
Authentication:
Annexes: (Any intelligence document may be distributed as an annex to a
PERINTREP. Although annexes are a means of distributing detailed
intelligence and information, care is exercised to avoid unnecessary bulk
and duplication.)
DISTRIBUTION:
(Classification)
Figure A-13. Sample format for a periodic intelligence report (continued).
PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
The periodic intelligence summary (PERINTSUM) is a detailed hard copy
summary of the intelligence situation covering a period of time specified
by the force commander (normally 24 hours or more). The PERINTSUM is a
means of disseminating concise and complete detailed information and
intelligence and makes maximum use of sketches, overlays, annotated maps,
and annexes. Normally, this report is prepared at corps level and higher.
It is disseminated two echelons higher, two echelons lower, and to
adjacent units; however, subordinate units also may be tasked to prepare a
PERINTSUM. Figure A-14 shows a JCS message format for the PERINTSUM,
structured to facilitate updating the intelligence estimate.
A-51
HEAD ING
PRECEDENCE
ORIGINATING AGENCY
ACTION ADDRESSEES
INFORMATION ADDRESSEES
SECURI TY CLASSIFICATION, CODE WORD, OR NICKNAME
PERINT SUM (Number ) FOR PERIOD ENDING DATE-TIME GROUP-MONTH-YEAR
BODY
1. AREA OF OPERATIONS . State conditions which exist and indicate the
effect of these conditions on enemy capabilities and the assigned
mission. The characteristics of the area are based on the facts and
conclusions of an analysis of the AO, as follows:
a. TOPOGRAPHY . Include information available on observation and
fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain features,
AAs, nuclear fires, biological and chemical agents, and so forth. Graphic
representation may be included, if necessary.
b. HYDROGRAPHY . Include general relief of beaches and beach
approaches, surf conditions, tides and currents, navigational aids,
identifying features, channels, water depths, rocks and shoals, obstacles,
anchorages, beach trafficability, coastline, contiguous islands, and
compartmentation, as each affects operations.
c. CLIMATE AND WEATHER . Discuss weather during the period which will
affect operations.
d. TRANSPORTATION . Include status of beaches, beach airways,
pipelines, and inland waterways. The following should be included:
capacities, surface conditions, bridges, amount and condition of rolling
stock, motor and air transport, barges, freighters, and other inland
waterways craft. Vulnerabilities are reported in as much detail as
possible.
e. ELECTRONICS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS , Report existing electronic
telecommunications systems and equipment, both military and civil.
f. POLITICS, The extent of civil control of the region, the
amenability of the civilian population to political control, the political
organizations, and the key political figures.
Figure A-14. Sample periodic intelligence summary.
A-52
Figure A-14. Sample periodic intelligence summary (continued).
A-53
(3) N ew Tactics. Weapons, and Equipme nt. List new tactics,
weapons, and equipment which may affect the mission and enemy
capabilities.
c. NAVAL FORC ES (Including amphibious forces).
(1) Strength and Dispositions . Summary of enemy units and
locations.
(2) Order of Battle . Summary of opposing forces and other enemy
forces that can affect accomplishment of mission.
(3) N ew Tactics. Weapons, and Equipmen t. List new tactics,
weapons, and equipment which may affect the mission and enemy
capabilities.
d. MISSILE FORCES (Excluding SAMs).
(1) Strength and Dispositions . Summary of enemy units and
locations.
(2) Order of Battle . Summary of opposing forces and other enemy
forces that can affect accomplishment of mission.
(3) N ew Tactics. Weapons, and Equipme nt. List new tactics,
weapons, and equipment which may affect the mission and enemy
capabilities.
e. ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE S (including SAM).
(1) Strength and Dispositions . Summary of enemy units and
locations.
(2) Order of Battle . Summary of opposing forces and other enemy
forces that can affect accomplishment of mission.
(3) N ew Tactics. Weapons, and Equipme nt. List new tactics,
weapons, and equipment which may affect the mission and enemy
capabilities.
f. AIRBORNE UNITS .
(1) Strength and Dispositions . Summary of enemy units and
locations.
(2) Order of Battle . Summary of opposing forces and other enemy
forces that can affect accomplishment of mission.
Figure A-14. Sample periodic intelligence summary (continued).
A-54
(3) New Tactics Weapons, and Equipmen t. List new tactics,
weapons, and equipment which may affect the mission and enemy
capabilities.
3 .. ENEMY MILITARY SITUATION .
a. IDENTIFICATION OF COMMITTED GROUND FORCES .
(1) Movement and Locations . Report disposition, location, and
echelon of control of enemy ground forces.
(2) Reinforcements . Report disposition, location, and echelon of
control of enemy ground force reinforcements.
(3) Logistics . Report the following elements of the enemy’s
logistic system: transportation, storage distribution, levels of supply,
critical shortages.
(4) Equipment . Report weapons systems and equipment used by
committed enemy ground forces.
(5) Personalities . Report significant individuals operating for
the enemy ground forces.
(6) Morale . Report any significant breakdown or buildup of enemy
norale.
(7) P ersonnel and Materiel Losses .
(a) KIA.
1 Body count.
2 Estimates.
(b) WIA (estimated).
(c) Captured.
(d) Materiel losses.
(8) Analysis of Capabilities . Analyze each capability of
enemy-committed ground forces, considering all applicable factors in item
3a above.
Figure A-14. Sample periodic intelligence summary (continued).
A-55
b. IDENTIFICATION OF AIR FORCES .
(1) Operational Capability (aircraft and airfields). Report
observed aircraft operational capability, including numbers of aircraft,
fuel status, weapons, and status of the airfield.
(2) Movements and Locations . Report movements and locations of
al I observed aircraft and airfields,
(3) Materiel and Personnel Losses .
(a) Aircraft.
1 Confirmed destroyed in the air.
2 Confirmed destroyed on the ground,
3 Confirmed damaged in the air.
4 Confirmed damaged on the ground.
5 Probable destroyed.
6 Probable damaged.
(b) Ground equipment.
1 Destroyed.
2 Damaged.
(c) Personnel.
1 KIA.
a Confirmed,
b Estimated.
2 WIA (estimated).
3 Captured.
(4) Morale . Report any significant breakdown or buildup of enemy
morale.
(5) Electronic Warfare Capability . Report enemy ECM, ECCM, and
ESM capabilities and activities.
Figure A-14. Sample periodic intelligence summary (continued).
A-56
(6) Nuclear Capability . Report nuclear weapons observed,
including type, yield, numbers, method of del ivery, and enemy doctrine
concerning their use.
(7) Analysis of Capabilities . Analyze each capability of enemy
air forces, considering all applicable factors in item 3b above.
c. IDENTIFICATION OF NAVAL FORCES .
(1) Operational Capability . Report observed naval forces’
operational capability, including numbers of ships, operational weapons,
and problems which could affect their successful employment.
(2) Movements and Locations . Report movement and location of all
observed naval forces.
(3) Ships. Materiel, and Personnel Losses .
(a) Ships (identification by name, class, type).
1 Confirmed sunk.
2 Probable sunk.
3 Damaged.
(b) Shore-based equipment and facilities.
1 Destroyed.
2 Damaged.
(c) Personnel .
1 KIA.
a Confirmed,
b Estimated.
2 WIA (estimated).
3 Captured.
(4) Morale . Report any significant breakdown or buildup of enemy
morale.
(5) Electronic Warfare Capability . Report enemy ECM, ECCM, and
ESM capabilities and activities.
Figure A-14. Sample periodic intelligence summary (continued).
A-57
(6) Analysis of Capabilities . Analyze each capability of enemy
naval forces, considering all applicable factors in item 3c above,
4. ENEMY UNCONVENTIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE .
a. IDENTIFICATION OF GUERRILLA FORCES . Identify guerrilla forces
being used in friendly areas or areas newly seized from the enemy.
b. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE . Discuss psychological warfare, including
enemy methods and facilities observed for the conduct of propaganda, the
susceptibility of the population of the target area, and the major or main
focus of the enemy’s psychological warfare efforts.
5. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE .
a. SABOTAGE . Report enemy sabotage effects observed, including
information concerning his methods, targets, sensitive targets in the AO,
and successes or fai lures.
b. ESPIONAGE . Report enemy efforts to collect information by types
of espionage: designation (trained agents) or saturation (mass use of
citizenry) and include methods of pressure, coercion, and enforcing the
saturation-type espionage.
6. CONCLUSIONS . State conclusions derived from item 3 above, and
include, when possible, a concise statement of the effects of each enemy
capability on the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Cite enemy
vulnerabilities, where possible.
Figure A-14. sample periodic intelligence summary (continued).
RECONNAISSANCE EXPLOITATION REPORT
The RECCEXREP disseminates results obtained from the first rapid
interpretation of imagery and debriefing of the aircrew. The report
addresses those targets requested in the original tasking with each target
addressed separately. The RECCEXREP is submitted as rapidly as possible,
but not later than 45 minutes after engine shutdown. If review of the
imagery results in information contradictory to that in an earl ier
RECCEXREP, the new information is to be reported promptly in another
RECCEXREP. Table A-1 shows an annotated format for the RECCEXREP.
A-58
Table A-1. Sample reconnassance exploitation report annotated format.
Standard Message Heading
RECCEXREP
Air Reconnaissance Mission
Number:
A. Location identifier:
B. Time on target; time
of sighting.
C. Results:
D. Other information
1. TARWI:
2. Imagery confirmed:
E. *Type sensor, exposures:
F. ‘Percentage of coverage:
Standard Message Heading
RECCEXREP
2/R/501
A. PB088195
B. 241610Z
C. CAT 06
1. Type: Motor rifle
and tank.
2. Status: Moving northwest
on road from Rotterode to
Asbach.
3. Activity: 24xT-62, 9xBMP.
4. Defenses: 2xZSU-23-4 moving
with and defending target.
D. None.
1. TARWI 1234X
2. Yes
E. Good, large
F. 100 percent.
* To be completed if significant or requested.
NOTE: Target category codes are found in STANAG 3596. Standard
message headings are noted in AR 105-31. The RECCEXREP replaces
the hot (high priority) photographic report (HOTPHOTOREP) and
mission report (MISREP) (except that the MISREP is used for
negative mission results) in USAREUR. It may soon be accepted
for use by US forces worldwide.
INITIAL AND SUPPLEMENTAL PROGRAMMED INTERPRETATION REPORT
The initial programed interpretation report (IPIR) and the
supplemental programmed interpretation report (SUPIR) are used to report
intelligence obtained from imagery which has not been reported through
previous reports. The format for both reports is the same and should be
used to report data acquired from a systematic review of imagery or to
report more detailed information than is provided in other reports. These
reports are prepared in either manual or ADP formats.
The IPIR is no t completed on all missions and must be requested. It
is disseminated w thin four hours of engine shut-down. The IPIR reports
on programed miss on objectives or other vital intelligence information
which is readily dentified in reasonable proximity to these objectives
and which has not been reported in earlier reports.
A-59
The SUPIR reports on all significant targets covered by the mission
and not included in other reports or when supplemental information is
required. The SUPIR is completed at higher headquarters only if they
decide it is necessary.
Table A-2 shows the format used for both the I PI R and the SUPIR. This
format also is used for joint service operations.
Table A-2. Initial and supplemental programmed interpretation reports.
Standard Message Heading
I PI R (or SUPIR)
Air Task or Mission Number:
PART I: Mission highlights:
PART II: Significant results:
A. Perishable items:
B. Change and OB items:
Target 3: CAT 01/PB4056
241644Z/P0027.
3. Update: AOB: 6 Flagons
21 Fishbed
4 Hook
C. Bonus items:
D. Damage assessment:
PART III: Other results:
A. Additional items:
B. Identification only items:
PART IV: Mission collection
results:
A. Collector’s objectives
satisfied:
B. Collector’s objectives
not satisfied:
Standard Message Heading
I PI R
2/R/501
PART I: One new SA-2 site observed
PART II:
A. Target 1: CAT 06/PB088195/
241610Z/LOOII-0113
1. Motorized rifle and tanks
2. Moving northwest on
Road Rotterrode-Asbach.
3. 24xT-62, 9xn intelligence annex.
4. Two occupied air warning
(AW) positions approx 200m
west of site.
5. One FAN SONG E radar in
center of site.
6. Six transporters; two van
trucks, four cargo trucks.
B. Air order of battle (AOB)
D. (Not used.)
E. (Not used.)
PART III: (Not used.)
A. NTR (nothing to report.)
B. NTR
PART IV:
A. NTR
B. CAT 4/PB1437/241653Z/
camera malfunction.
(When issued separately from an OPORD)
A-60
INTERROGATION AND TRANSLATION REPORTS
Interrogation reports summarize the results of interrogations of EPW,
civil ian detainees, or refugees, and the translations of summaries of
enemy documents. Information of immediate value is disseminated in spot
reports.
The initial interrogation report serves as a written summary of the
initial interrogation of each prisoner. Figure A-15 shows the format of
this report. Emphasis is placed on completing as much of the tactical
interrogation as possible at the lowest level and supplementing this with
further interrogation at higher echelons. The primary purpose of this
report is to preclude duplication of effort in subsequent interrogations.
The detailed interrogation report is used to record information
obtained in the course of subsequent interrogations of selected
interrogees. Figure A-16 shows its format. A more detailed interrogation
and screening report format is available in FM 34-52.
During joint service operations, interrogation information of
immediate tactical interest (obtained at the brigade or regimental level)
is generally reported in the INTREP. Follow-on interrogation reports, the
initial interrogation report, and the detailed interrogation report
disseminate more complete and comprehensive information. It is essential
that these follow-on reports reference the INTREP where the information
first appeared to ensure that the information contained in these reports
is not used to confirm the preliminary information contained in the
INTREP.
Joint services use the document translation report to report
information gained through the translation of documents which contain
information of tactical value. Figures A-17 and A-18 show the format and
sampLe of a translation report. Full or extract translations are
accomplished as the intelligence officer directs. All translations are
prepared in triplicate, unless otherwise directed, and each translation is
conspicuously annotated with the word “Draft.”’
The original of the translation is appended to the document when it is
forwarded to the next higher headquarters. Copies of the original
document are provided to the intelligence officers at echelons which
contain translation sections to support their journal entries. The
document translation report format also is used for joint service
operations. Figures A-19 and A-20 show sample screening reports. Figures
A-21 and A-22 show sample tactical interrogation reports. These reports
are used to record information on interrogees.
A-61
(Classification)
REPORT NO
CY NO _ DATE-TIME(Zulu)
SOURCE
(Numbered sequentially)
I NTG UNIT
(last name only)
CATEGORY A B C D
(see detailed report)
(attached to interrogator)
MAPS USED _
(1 ist sheet name, number, and scale of maps)
LANGUAGE USED
PART I INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL OF ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR
(rank) (last name, first name)
(Ml) (service or serial number)
DOB
(day, mo, yr)
NATIONALITY _
LANGUAGES
BIRTHPLACE
RACE _
UNIT
(city, county, or country)
(list and include
proficiency)
(interrogees’ parent unit listed
completely to highest headquarters)
CIVILIAN CAREER
(summarize prisoner’s premilitary career)
MILITARY CAREER _
(summarize)
ASSESSMENT _
(intelligence, experience, cooperation, and reliability of the
interrogee, NOT the information)
SPECIALIST KNOWLEDGE _
(knowledge of technical subjects or equipment)
DOCUMENTS _
(carried at time of capture; include money or valuables)
EQUIPMENT _
(of intelligence interest) (personal equipment or weapons)
PART II - INFORMATION OBTAINED_
(summarize)
(Classification)
Figure A-15. Initial interrogation report.
A-62
(CLASSIFICATION)
_INTG TEAM
UNIT _
(place and coordinates)
DATE AND TIME _
(Zulu)
Detailed Interrogation Report No _
(number reports sequentially)
Maps _
(list all maps used and indicate sheet name, number, and scale)
PART I
1. RANK _ NAME _ SER NO _
(last name, first name, Ml)
(interrogees’ parent unit listed completely; for example, 1st
Pit, A company, 103 Recon Bn, 3d Rifle Div)
CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE _
(summary of details of capture, including
date and time, location or coordinates, and
capturing unit)
ASSESSMENT _
(intelligence, experience, reliability) (Concise statement
of the interrogator’s assessment of the prisoner--not of
the information acquired)
CATEGORY: A B C D
(circle one to describe prisoner’s intelligence potential, as
indicated) :
A High-level prisoner whose broad and specific knowledge of the war
effort makes interrogation necessary without delay by specially
qualified interrogators at the highest level; that is general
officers, scientists, political and intelligence officers, and so
forth.
(CLASSIFICATION)
Figure A-16. Detailed interrgation report.
A-63
(CLASSIFICATION)
B Prisoner who has enough information about the enemy or any subject of
value to intelligence, in addition to information of tactical value,
to warrant a second interrogation.
c Prisoner with information of immediate tactical value who will not
warrant further interrogation.
D Prisoner of no intelligence value.
DOCU MENTS _
(list documents of intelligence value taken from the prisoner)
EQUI PMENT _
(list equipment of intelligence value taken from the prisoner)
PART II
2. ORGANIZATI ON, STRENGTH, AND DISPOSITION.
a. Organ ization _
(summarize the enemy organization as stated by the
prisoner, including equipment authorized and on hand)
i). Strength _
(personnel strength, officer and enlisted, authorized and
assigned!
c. Disposition _
(location of enemy units known to the prisoner)
3. MISSION _
(statement of enemy missions, beginning with the lowest unit)
4. OTHER ENEMY FORCES _
(information of enemy forces other than the
prisoner’s own immediate organization; include and
annotate fact and rumor)
5. SUPPLY, LOSSES, REPLACEMENT.
a. supply _
(information concerning status of SUPPI ies, known shortages
and deficiencies)
_ (CLASSIFICATION) _
Figure A-16. Detailed interrogation report (continued).
A-64
b. Losses
(CLASSIFICATION)
(statement of personnel and equipment losses known to
prisoner)
c. Replacements _
(number and date received, sufficiency, and so forth)
6. PERSONALITIES _
(list by name, rank, organization, duties, and
characteristics)
7. MISCELLANEOUS.
a. Morale _
b. Tact i cs _
(new or unusual tactics)
c. Obstacles _
(location, coordinates, type)
d. Other Information _
(other information of intelligence value not
covered above)
8. REMARKS
NAME _
(of Interrogator)
GRADE _
TRANSLATOR _
(if used)
Figure A-16 Detailed interrogation report (continued).
A-65
(CLASSIFICATION)
DATE:
- 0 :
ROM: REPORT NUMBER:
1. CONTROL DATA.
1. DOCUMENT NUMBER,
2. DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: (type of document, originating headquarters,
language, and number of pages),
3. DOCUMENTS ORIGINAL LANGUAGE.
4. DATE AND TIME RECEIVED.
5. DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE: (date and time (Zulu) and place,
including coordinates; if obtained from an individual, identify) .
6. PLACE OF CAPTURE.
7. CAPTURING UNIT: (unit initially obtaining document).
8. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE.
9. TRANSLATOR.
10. TYPE OF TRANSLATION: (state whether extract or complete
translation)
TEXT OF TRANSLATION (Translation typed in here, using the format of
the document. Use continuation sheets as needed).
(CLASSIFICATION)
Figure A-17. Documen translation report.
A-66
(CLASSIFICATION)
DATE : 231500ZAug88
TO: G2, X Corps
FROM: Team 1, IPW Section REPORT NUMBER: 08-0356
441st Ml Bn, 23 Div (Armd)
X Corps
PART 1: CONTROL DATA
1. DOCUMENT NUMBER: US-WAIBVC-03093
2. DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: Personal letter, 1 page, handwritten,
mentions a tank factory disguised as a sugar processing plant, and school
teachers and elderly people working in factories.
3. DOCUMENT’S ORIGINAL LANGUAGE: Russian
4. DATE AND TIME RECEIVED: 240847ZAug88
5. DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE: 230923ZAug88
6. PLACE OF CAPTURE: NB640320
7. CAPTURING UNIT: A/1-41/23 AD
8. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: Found in an abandoned enemy CP,
9. TRANSLATOR: SSG Bennett
10. TYPE OF TRANSLATION: Full
PART 2. TEXT OF TRANSLATION
My dear Serzhen’ka:
It has been a long time since I received a letter from you. How are
and where are you? The last time you wrote that fighting was going on
around you all the time, and this worries me a lot. Take care of
yourself. There have been many changes at home. Your mother, despite her
age, had to go to work in the factory. They make tanks there, but the
sign over the entrance says this is a sugar plant. I don’t know why they
do this. At the school where I work, we were also told to go and work at
the same plant. They are going to close the school. Everyone has either
to go to the front or work in the war industry. This is necessary in
order to speed up the victory over the enemy of our country. I would be
more at ease if I knew that you are alive and well. Please write as soon
as you can.
Your KATHY.
(CLASSIFICATION)
Figure A-18. Sample translation report.
A-67
(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
1st Brigade IPW Team, 123d Ml
APO New York, New York 09166
IPW TEAM REPORT NUMBER:
DATE-TI ME:
SCREENING REPORT
PART I . INFORMATION CONCERNING CAPTIVE :
A. PREVIOUS SCREENING OR INTERROGATION REPORTS (Unit or Report No!
B. CAPTURE INFORMATION:
1. CAPTIVE TAG NUMBER:
2. CAPTURING UNIT:
3. DATE-TIME OF CAPTURE:
4. PLACE OF CAPTURE:
5. Documents Captured (Disposition):
6. Equipment Captured (Disposition):
7. Circumstances of Capture:
c. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:
1. Full Name, Rank, Service Number:
2. Date, Place of Birth:
3. Sex, Marital Status, Religion: _
4. Full Unit Designation or Unit Code: _
(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS
Figure A-19. Sample blank screening report.
A-68
(CLASSIFICATION;
WORKING PAPERS
5. Duty Position: _
6. Military Education
and Experience:
7. Civilian Education and Experience: _
8. Languages Spoken (Proficiency) : _
D. OBSERVATIONS
l. Physical Condition of Captive: _
Uniform, insignia (type and condition):
3. Assessment of Attitude and Behavior:
4. Assessment of Knowledgeability: _
PARTII. SCREENING RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SCREENER’S RECOMMENDATIONS :
' Screener’s and Interpreter’s Names: _
2 Place of Screening:
3. Screening Code: _
9. SENIOR INTERROGATOR’S RECOMMENDATIONS:
Senior interrogator’s Name:
A-69
(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
1st Brigade IPW Team, 123d Ml
APO New York, New York 09166
IPW TEAM REPORT NUMBER: 007 DATE-TIME: 181530 AUG 99
SCREENING REPORT
(PART I . INFORMATION CONCERNING CAPTIVE:
>A. PREVIOUS SCREENING OR INTERROGATION REPORTS (Unit or Report No)
13. CAPTURE INFORMATION:
1. CAPTIVE TAG NUMBER: P-4A
2. CAPTURING UNIT: C Trp, 1st Sqdn, 8 ACR
3. DATE-TIME OF CAPTURE: 181300 AUG 99
4. PLACE OF CAPTURE: NB621108
5. Documents Captured (Disposition): lx ID card no 1350412 (retained
by EPW); lx personal letter (evac with EPW); lx map section (evac
with EPW).
6. Equipment Captured (Disposition): lx ShM protective mask (retained
by EPW); lx standard web gear, lx individual first aid kit (both
destroyed in place). lx 5.45rnn AK-74 w/4x mag (129x rds)
(evacuated through supply channels).
7. Circumstances of Capture: Surrendered to US Patrol
C. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION :
1. Full Name, Rank, Service Number: Boris Petrovich BARONOV, JrSGT,
No 0951046
2. Date, Place of Birth: 16 JAN 78, BRYANSK, BySSR, USSR
3. Sex, Marital Status, Religion: Male, Single, None
(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS
Figure A-20. Sample completed screening report.
A-70
(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS
4. Full Unit Designation or Unit Code: Would Not Answer (WNA);
QKN-854
5. Duty Position: WNA
6. Military Education and Experience: WNA
7. Civil ian Education and Experience: 10 yrs compulsory civil an
education
8. Languages Spoken (Proficiency): Ukrainian (N) , Russian (FL
D. OBSERVATIONS
1. Physical Condition of Captive: Good
2. Uniform, Insignia (type and condition): Standard Soviet uniform,
with JrSgt rank tabs and MR insignia, dirty and torn.
3. Assessment of Attitude and Behavior: Calm, cooperative.
4. Assessment of Knowledgeability: UNK
PART II. SCREENING RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SCREENER’S RECOMMENDATIONS :
1. Screener’s and Interpreter’s Names: SSG BROWN, None
2. Place of Screening: IPW See, 123d Ml Bn Ml, 23d Inf Div (Mech
3. Screening Code: A-2
B. SENIOR INTERROGATOR S RECOMMENDATIONS :
1. Senior Interrogator’s Name: MSG MOSCHETTI
2. Interrogate: YES
3. Action: None
(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS
Figure A-20. Sample completed screening report (continued).
A-71
(CLASS:F:CATiON)
Working Papers
Date
TACTICAL
INTERROGATION REPORT
'0AME OF PRISONER: LAST NAME SOURCE INTERROGATOR: RANK and LAST NAME
CATEGORY: A B C D UNIT OR FORMATION TO WHICH I NT G_
ATTACHED: _
INTG SERIAL NO: _ MAPS USED: _
DTG OF I NTG: __ LANGUAGE USED:
I NTG REPORT NO: _ INTERPRETER: _
PART i - INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL OF ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR (EPW)
A. PERSONAL PARTICULARS :
1. Rank, full name, service number, and position:
2. Date and place of birth:
3. Nationality: Ethnic: Religion:
4. Knowledge of languages and proficiency:
5. Unit, formation or organization:
6. Date-time, place or grid references, capturing unit, and
circumstances of capture:
3. CAREER :
1. Pre-mi I itary:
ParamiI itary Tng:
2. Mii i tary:
C. ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE VALUE :
1. intelligence, experience, cooperation, reliability:
2. Specialist knowledge:
3. Discussion of approach techniques:
(CLASSIFICATION)
Figure A-21. Sample blank tactical interrogation report.
A-72
(CLASSIFICATION)
Working Papers
Date
D. DOCUMENTS CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTUJRE :
List of documents:
L 1 Details of money and valuables:
E. EQUIPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE :
1. Personal Equipment:
2. Weapons:
PART II - INFORMATION OBTAINED
A. SUMMARY :
DOI is Time of Capture (TOC) unless otherwise indicated in the
body of this report.
B. TEXT:
i. MISSIONS
a EPW (or) EPW and
(1) TOC:
(2) Fut:
(3) Past:
b. Unit:
(1) Pres:
(2) Fut:
(3) Past:
(CLASSIFICATION)
Working Papers
Figure A-21. Sample blank tactical interrogation report (continued).
A-73
(CLASSIFICATION)
Working Papers Date
c. Unit:
(1) Pres:
(2) Fut:
(3) Past:
2. COMPOSITION:
3. STRENGTH:
a. Personnel :
( 1 )
( 2 )
(3)
b. Weapons and Equipment:
( 1 ) individual Weapons:
(a)
(b)
(2) Crew-served Weapons:
(a)
(b)
(CLASSIFICATION)
Working Papers
Figure A-21. Sample blank tactical interrogation report (continued).
A-74
(CLASSIFICATION)
Working Papers
Date
(3) Other Weapons:
(a)
(b)
(4) Armored Vehicles:
(a)
(b)
(5) Other Vehicles:
(a)
(b)
(6) Communications Equipment:
(a)
(b ;
(7) NBC Equipment:
(a) IndividuaI:
((D)
( ( 2 ) )
(b) Vehicular:
((D)
(( 2 ))
(8) Specialized Equipment:
(a)
(b)
(CLASSIFICATION)
Working Papers
Figure A-21. Sample blank tactical interrogation report (continued).
A-75
(CLASSIFICATION)
Working Papers
Date
4 . DISPOSITIONS
a, Activity, FUD, 6 digit grid coordinate, physical description,
collocated units: _, sc *y measures: -■
b.
5. TACTICS:
a. Offensive:
b. Defensive:
c. Special Operations:
6 TRAINING:
a. Individual:
b. Unit:
c. Specialized:
7 COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS:
a. Losses:
(1) Personnel :
(2) Equipment:
b) Replacements:
(1) Personnel:
(2) Equipment:
c Reinforcements:
(1) Personnel:
(2) Equipment:
(CLASSIFICATION)
Working Papers
Figure A-21. Sample blank tactical interrogation report (continued).
A-76
(CLASSIFICATION)
Working Papers
Date
d. Combat Experience:
e. Morale:
8. LOGISTICS:
a. Weapons and Ammunition:
(1) Weapons:
(2) Ammunition:
b. Vehicles and POL:
(1) Vehicles:
(2) POL:
c. Food and Water:
(1) Food:
(2) Water :
d. Communications Equipment:
e. Medical:
(1) Individual Equipment:
(2) Vehicular Equipment:
(3) Personnel:
(4) Facilities:
(5) Evacuation Procedures:
f. NBC Equipment:
( 1 ) Individual:
(2) Vehicular:
(CLASSIFICATION)
Working Papers
Figure A-21. Sample blank tactical interrogation report (continued).
A-77
(CLASSIFICATION)
Working Papers
Date
g. Specialized Equipment: (NOTE: If para 3.b. (8) was Unk or None,
DO NOT write this sub-para at all)
3 MISCELLANEOUS:
a. Personal ities:
Last name First name MN/I Rank P3N FUD
b. Code Names and Numbers:
(1) Code Names:
(2) Code Numbers:
c. Radio Frequencies and Call Signs:
(1) Radio Frequencies:
Radio Primary Alternate
(2) Call Signs:
Unit Primary Alternate
d. Passwords:
Challenge: Countersign:
(NOTE: If more than one password is known, use the following chart.!
Unit Challenge Countersign
e. Obstacles:
(1) Enemy:
(2) NATO:
f. PSYOPS :
(1) Enemy:
(2) NATO:
(CLASSIFICATION)’
Working Papers
Figure A-21. Sample blank tactical interrogation report (continued).
A-78
(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS
TACTICAL
INTERROGATION REPORT
NAME OF PRISONER:
BARANOV
INTERROGATOR:
CATEGORY: A
(B) C D
UNIT OR FORMATION TO WHICH INTG
ATTACHED: IPW See, 123d Ml Bn
23d Inf Div (Mech)
INTG SERIAL NO:
US-AR-2235-4A
MAPS USED: GERMANY, 1:50,000,
EISENACH-HUNFELD, USACGSC 50-242
DTG OF INTG: 181500 AUG 99
LANGUAGE USED: RUSSIAN
INTG REPORT NO:
104
INTERPRETER: NONE
PART I - INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL OF ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR (EPW)
A. PERSONAL PARTICULARS:
1. Rank, full name, service number, and position:
JrSGT Boris Petrovich BARONOV, No, 0951046, driver
2. Date and place of birth: 16 JAN 78, BRYANSK, BySSR, USSR
3. Nationality: Soviet Ethnic: Ukrainian Religion: None
4. Knowledge of languages and proficiency: Ukrainian (N), Russian
(FL) .
5. Unit, formation or organization: Regt HQ, 61MRR, 56MRD
(HQ, 61MRR, 56MRD)
6. Date-time, place or grid references, capturing unit, and
circumstances of capture: 181300 AUG 99; NB621108; C Trp,
1st Sqdn, 8 ACR; surrendered to US Border Patrol .
B. CAREER :
1, Pre-military: Civilian Education: 10 yrs compulsory. No
vocational training. No civilian job. Paramilitary training:
Standard preinduction training.
(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS
Figure A-22. Sample completed tactical interrogation report.
A-79
(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS
2. Military: 21 months conscripted service. Military schools:
None. Previous job: None. Previous unit: None.
c. ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE VALUE :
1. Intelligence, experience, cooperation, reliability: Average, 3
years experience, cooperative, information checked against OB
holdings.
2. Specialist knowledge: None.
3. Discussion of approach techniques: Direction approach failed but
incentive approach was successful .
D. DOCUMENTS CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE :
1„ List of documents: lx ID card no 0951046 (retained by EPW), lx
personal letter (returned to EPW), lx map section (evac to G-2)
2. Details of money and valuables: None
E. EQUIPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE :
1. Personal Equipment: lx standard web gear, lx indiv first aid kit
(both destroyed in.place), lx SHM protective mask (retained by
EPW)
2. Weapons: lx 5.45rnn AK-74 assault rifle with 4x full mags
(120xrds) (all evac thru supply channels)
PART II - INFORMATION OBTAINED
A. SUMMARY :
DOI is 181300 AUG 99 unless otherwise indicated in the body of this
report.
B. TEXT :
1. MISSIONS
a. EPW
(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS
Figure A-22. Sample completed tactical interrogation report (continued).
A-80
(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS
("*) TOC: Waiting outside of gasthaus S of Spahl (NB6412) for PO,
61MRR, 56MRD and PO, 1MRB, 61MRR, 56MRD (IMRB, 61MRR, 56MRD)
for over an hour.
( 2 ) FUT: At 181330 AUG 99, was to drive PO, 61MRR, 56MRD and
PO, IMRB, 61MRR, 56MRD to a U/l unit 61MRR, 56MRD.
(Hearsay: PO, 61MRR, 56MRD. DOI: 181130 AUG 99).
(3) PA ST : Left CDP, 61MRR, 56MRD, located SE of Geismar (NB6515)
180800) AUG 99 and drove PO, 61MRR. 56MRD to CP, IMRB, 61MRR,
56MRD. Waited for PO, 61MRR, 56MRD about 3 hrs and at 181130
AUG 99 drove PO, 61MRR, 56MRD and PO, IMRB, 61, 56MRD to
gasthaus S of Spahl (NB6412). At 172330 AUG 99, left
assembly area, 61MRR, 56MRD and drove CO, 61MRR, 56MRD to CP,
61MRR, 56MRD arriving at 172345 AUG 99.
b. Unit: 61MRR, 56MRD
(1) PRES : Preparing men and equipment to advance W to Nusttal
(NB6010).
(2) FUT: Cross international Border and attack Nusttal (NB6010)
Nlt 190530 AUG 99. (Hearsay: PO 61MRR to PO IMRB, 61MRR;
DOI: 181130 AUG 99).
(3) - PAST: Moved into assembly area (exact location unk). 61MRR,
16 AUG 99.
c. Unit: IMRB, 61MRR, 56MRD
(1) ?RES : UNK
(2) FUT: u/l element MRB to secure road junction somewhere N of
Nusttal (NB601O) (exac loc unk). Road junction to be secured
NLT 190430 AUG 99. (Hearsay: PO IMRB to PO 61MRR; DOI
181130 AUG 99).
(3) PAST : UNK
2. COMPOSITION: (61MRR, 56MRD)
a. 61MRR had one HQ; three MRBs, dsg 1,2,3; one tk bn; one 122mm how
bn; one engr co; one recon co; one supply and svc pit; one med co;
one signal co
(Classification)
WORKING PAPERS
Figure A-22. Sample completed tactical interrogation report (continued).
A-81
(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS
b. Each MRB, 61MRR had one HQ; three MRC dsg 1,2,3; one mortar btry;
one commo pit
3. STRENGTH: (HQ, 61MRR, 56MRD)
a. Personnel : (HQ, 61MRR) - HQ, 61MRR had approx 65 pers
(UNK no off and EM)
b. Weapons and Equipment: (HQ, 61MRR)
(1) Individual Weapons: (HQ, 61MRR)
(a) UNK No x 9mm PM pistols (at least one ea off, HQ, 61MRR)
(b) UNK No X 5.45rrrn AK-74 assault rifles (at least one ea
UAZ-469 driver, HQ, 61MRR)
(2) Crew-Served Weapons: LINK
(3) Other Weapons: UNK
(4 Armored Vehicles: (HQ, 61MRR) - 2xBTR-70, armament UNK
(HQ, 61MRR)
(5 Other Vehicles: (HQ, 61MRR) - 3xUAZ-469 trk (one ea Regt
driver, HQ, 61MRR)
(6 Communications Equipment: (HQ, 61MRR)
(a) 3xR-130 transceiver (trans) (one ea UAZ-469 > HQ ’ 61MRR )
(b) 2xR-123 VHF trans (one ea BTR-70, HQ, 61MRR)
(7) NBC Equipment: (HQ, 61MRR)
(a) Individual: (HQ, 61MRR)
((I)) UNK no.xShM prot masks (ix ea lower EM, HQ,
61MRR)
. ((2) UNK no.xShMK prot masks (Ix ea off, Ix ea NCO,
HQ, 61MRR)
(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS
Figure A-22. Sample completed tactical interrogation report (continued).
A-82
(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS
((3)) UNK no.xOP-l prot clothing (one ea member, HQ,
61MRR)
(( 4 )) UNK no.xIPP indiv decon kits (one ea member, HQ,
61MRR)
(b) Vehicular: (HQ, 61MRR) - 3xDK-4K portable
decontamination sets (one ea UAZ-469 Trk, HQ, 61MRR)
(8) Specialized Equipment: UNK
4. DISPOSITIONS
a. CP, 61MRR, 56MRD loc vie NB665139 at intersection of 2xfarm roads
in forest SE of Geismar (NB6515). Collocated units: UNK.
Security measures: UNK no.x perimeter guards (FUD UNK). DOI:
180800 AUG 99.
b. Assembly area, 61MRR, 56MRD loc vie NB696163 (center of mass, and
measures Ikm N to S and E to W) SW of Kranlucken (NB7017).
Collocated units: None. Scty measures: UNK No x perimeter
guards (FUD UNK). DOI: 172330 AUG 99.
c. CP, 1MRB, 61MRR, F6MRD loc vie NB666156 at intersection of 2x farm
roads E of Geismar (NB6515). Collocated units: None. Security
measures: UNK. DOI: 181130 AUG 99.
d. DEPL, tk co (FUD UNK) loc vie from NB631104 to NB626104, along
farm road S of Reinhards (NB6210). Tanks engines were running
and were facing S. Collocate units and security measures: UNK.
cot: 181245 AUG 99
5. TACTICS: UNK
6. TRAINING: (61MRR, 56MRD)
a. Individual: (HQ, 61MRR) - The 3x regt drivers have been practicing
OPSEC (silence and no lights) while driving.
b. Unit: (61 MRR) - Extensive political training in the 61MRR for
the last month. (Hearsay: PO, 61MRR to PO, 1MRB, 61MRR. DOI:
181130 AUG 99.)
c. Specialized: UNK
(CLASSIFICATION)
_ WORKING PAPERS _
Figure A-22 Sample completed tactical interrogation report (continued).
A-83
(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS
7. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: (61MRR, 56MRD)
a. Losses : (61MRR)
(1) Personnel: (61MRR) - Since arriving in the border area
on 16 AUG 99, approx 20 training casualties have been evac to
the rear, (Hearsay: PO, 61MRR to PO, 1MRB, 61MRR. Dot:
181130 AUG 99).
(2) Equipment: (61MRR) - None
b. Replacements: (61MRR) None, but there was a replacement center
(FUD UNK) in “some large city”. (Hearsay: PO, 61MRR to PO, 1MRB,
61MRR. DOI: 181130 AUG 99).
c. Reinforcements: UNK
d. Combat Experience: (HQ, 61MRR) - Most of the officers in HQ,
61MRR have had experience in Afghanistan, but it is always
stressed that they were advisors and not fighters.
e. Morale: (HQ, 61MRR) - Officer morale is relatively high as they
enjoy field duty and are anxious to show CO, 61MRR that they are
proficient. Officers sometimes take their frustrations out on
lower EM, causing them to become angry and despondent.
8. LOGISTICS: (HQ, 61MRR, 56MRD)
a. ‘Weapons and Ammunit ion: (HQ, 61MRR)
(1) Weapons: (HQ, 61MRR) - All weapons are in good condition
due to recondit ioning in JUL 99 by maint unit (FUD UNK).
There are miscellaneous spare parts stored in each BTR-70.
Hearsay: BTR-70 driver, HQ, 61MRR. DOI: 171400 AUG 99.)
(2 Ammunition: (HQ, 61MRR) - No problems with any ammo. 300xrds
were issued for each AK-74 and 2 full mags (16xrds) for PM
pistol on 171400 AUG 99 at assembly area, 61 MRR U/l officer,
HQ, 61MRR.
b. Vehicles and POL: (HQ, 61MRR)
(CLASSIFICATION)
_ WORKING PAPERS _
Figure A-22. Sample completed tactical Interrogation report (continued).
A-84
(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS
(1) Vehicles: (HQ, 61MRR) - All vehicles are in good condition,
Drivers are constantly working on vehicles. Spare parts are
available from chief of Motor Transport, HQ, 61MRR on an as
needed basis, but all drivers steal parts from each other
occasionally. Tool kits are stored in each vehicle.
(2 POL: (HQ, 61MRR) - All vehicles were refueled at assembly
area, 61MRR 17 AUG 99, Additional fuel will be obtained ‘
from U/l tanker trucks, 61MRR after reaching Nusttal
(NB601O) (Hearsay: chief of Motor Transport, HQ, 61MRR.
DOI: 171800 AUG 99.)
c. Food and Water: (HQ, 61MRR)
(1) Food: (HQ, 61MRR) - 9 canned rations were issued to each
member, HQ, 61MRR at assembly area, 61MRR 171700 by chief of
Food Supply, HQ, 61MRR. After reaching NUSTTAL (NB601O),
members will be receiving more canned rations. CO and PO,
61MRR keep their canned rations and eat at gasthauses in
Spahl (NB6412).
(2) Water-: (hq, 61MRR) - U/l Water trailer (FUD UNK) at HQ,
61MRR supplies water as needed.
d. Communications Equipment: (HQ, 61MRR) - All commo equip was in
good condition as it was inspected by technical officer, 61MRR
171600 AUG 99 at assembly area, 61MRR.
e. Medical: (HQ, 61MRR)
(1) Individual Equipment: (HQ, 61MRR) - Each member was issued
lx U/l indiv first aid kit around the first week of AUG
(still sealed).
(2) Vehicular Equipment: (HQ, 61MRR) - Each vehicle had lx U/l
first aid kit.
(3) Personnel: UNK
(4) Facilities: UNK
(5) Evacuation Procedures: UNK
f. NBC Equipment: (HQ, 61MRR) - All NBC equip was in good condition
due to inspection by technical officer, 61MRR first week of
Aug 99.
(CLASSIFICATION)
_ WORKING PAPERS _
Figure A-22. Sample completed tactical Interrogation report (continued).
A-85
3. MISCELLANEOUS: (61MRR, 56MRD)
a. Personalities: (61MRR)
LAST NAME
FIRST NAME
MNI
RANK
PSN
FUD
OREKHOV
Nikolai
MNU
COL
CO
61MRR
MILENOVICH
Svetoslav
MNU
LTC
P0
61 MRR
GABOVICH
Vladimir
MNU
MAJ
TO
61 MRR
b. Code Names and Numbers: (61MRR)
(1) Code Name: (61MRR) - NOVY GOD
(2) Code Number: (61MRR) - QKN-854
cm Radio Frequencies and Call Signs: (61MRR)
(1) Radio Frequencies: (61MRR)
RAD 10 _ PR I MARY _ ALTERNATE
R-130 1.84 MHz 9.01 MHz
Radio frequencies are in effect 18 AUG 99 and are changed
daily at 2400 hrs IAW 56MRD CEOI.
(2) Call Signs:
(61 MRR)
UNIT
PR 1 MARY
ALTERNATE
Regt HQ, 61 MRR
ZHOLTAYA GORA
UNK
PO. 61 MRR
ZHOLTAYA GORA-2
UNK
Call signs are in effect 18 AUG 99 and are changed daily at
2400 hrs AW 56MRD CEOI.
d. Passwords (61MRR) - Challenge: ZNAMYA Countersign: VPERYOD
Passwords are in effect 18 AUG 99 and are changed daily at
2400 hrs AW 56MRD CEOI.
e. Obstacles UNK
f. PSYOPS: UNK
(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS
Figure A-22. Sample completed tactical interrogation report (continued).
A-86
BOMBING. SHELLING. AND MORTARING REPORTS
Bombing reports (BOMREPS), shell reports (SHELREPs), and mortar
bombing reports (MORTREPs) supply information on enemy bombing, shelling,
or mortaring activity. Submission is the responsibility of the affected
unit. Reports are handled as normal messages and are transmitted by the
fastest means available. Each transmission is preceded by the code word
“SHELREP” in the case of enemy artillery, by the code word “MORTREP” in
the case of enemy mortar or rocket fire, and by the code word “BOMREP” in
the case of an enemy air attack. The text of the message is transmitted
in the clear except for the unit identification and position of the
observer. A call sign is used in place of unit identification. The
observer’s position is encoded if it discloses the location of a
headquarters or an important OP. Figure A-23 shows the bombing, shell ing,
and mortaring report format.
A-87
(CLASSIFICATION)
A. UNIT OF ORIGIN, (use current call sign, address group or code name) .
B. POSITION OF OBSERVER (grid reference preferred--encode if this
discloses the location of a headquarters or important OP, or if
subparagraph F2, below, is used to give information on location).
c. DIRECTION AND ANGLE OF FALL OR DESCENT, (direction and bearing of
flash, sound, or groove of shell (state which) is measured clockwise from
grid north in mils, unless otherwise specified, The angle of fall or
descent may be determined by placing a stick or rod in the fuze tunnel and
measuring in roils, Unless otherwise specified, the angle formed by the
stick or rod in relation to the horizontal plane).
D. TIME FROM.
E. TIME TO.
F. AREA BOMBED, SHELLED, ROCKETED, OR MORTARED, (may be sent either as«
L Grid reference (clear reference is to be used).
OR
2. Direction measures clockwise from grid north to impact points
(degrees or rnils--state which) and distance in yards or meters (state
which) from observer. This information must be encoded. When this method
is used, maximum possible accuracy is essential) .
G. NUMBER AND NATURE OF GUNS, MORTARS, ROCKET LAUNCHERS, AIRCRAFT, OR
OTHER METHODS OF DELIVERY.
H. NATURE OF FIRE, (adjustment, bombardment, harassing) (may be omitted
for aircraft) .
I. NUMBER, TYPE AND CALIBER, (state whether measured or assumed) of
shells, rockets (or missiles) , and bombs.
J. TIME FROM FLASH TO BANG, (omit for aircraft).
F. DAMAGE, (encode if required).
NOTE: JCS Publication 12, page 14, requires an additional message
indicator item. This item identifies the report being sent as a shell,
bomb, or mortar report. It generally follows the unit of origin item in
the message format.
(CLASSIFICATION)
Figure A-23. Format for BOMREP, SHELREP, or MORTREP reports.
A-88
NBC ATTACK REPORTS
NBC attack report formats are used according to the provisions of
STANAGS 2103 and 2104 and FM 3-3 to report NBC attacks and the resulting
NBC hazardous areas. Chemical and radiological hazardous areas resulting
from nuclear and chemical attack by friendly forces are also reported
using these formats. These reports are—
0 NBC-1. Report used by the observing unit to give initial and
subsequent data of an enemy chemical, biological, or nuclear
attack.
0 NBC-2. Report used for passing evaluated data of a chemical,
biological, or nuclear attack.
® NBC-3. Report used for immediate warning of expected NBC
contamination or hazardous area.
0 NBC-4. Report used for radiation dose-rate measurements and
detection of chemical or biological contamination.
0 NBC-5. Report used to locate the area of NBC contamination or
hazard .
0 NBC-6. Report used to detail information on chemical or biological
attacks.
NBC-1 and -4 reports are prepared by the unit under attack or a unit
observing an attack. These reports are submitted through cormmand,
intelligence, or FA communications channels to the designated headquarters
TOC by the fastest means available. Initial enemy use of NBC weapons is
always reported to the theater commander, through the chain of command, by
the fastest means with a FLASH message precedence.
The information source for nuclear attack reports is normally the
headquarters of an FA or AD unit (other units may also be designated as
collection and reporting agencies). These units submit—
'An initial NBC-1 nuclear report to the unit’s next higher
headquarters with a FLASH message precedence.
"Subsequent NBC-1 nuclear reports, which are transmitted to the
unit's next higher headquarters, with an IMMEDIATE message
precedence, giving follow-up data.
The information source for chemical and biological attack reports is
normally the headquarters of a company or independent platoon. It
submits—
A-89
'An initial NBC-1 chemical or biological report, to its next higher
headquarters, with a FLASH message precedence. The next higher
headquarters forwards the initial NBC-1 chemical or biological
report through command channels, to the NBC collection center, with
the same message precedence.
"Subsequent NBC-1 chemical or biological reports, to the unit’s
next higher headquarters, with an IMMEDIATE message precedence,
giving follow-up data. The next higher headquarters forwards
subsequent NBC-1 chemical or biological reports through command
channels, to the NBC collection center, with the same message
precedence.
NBC COLLECTION CENTER
The NBC collection center is normally the nuclear, biological, and
chemical element (NBCE) of the TOC at division. It consolidates NBC-1
nuclear, biological, or chemical reports of the same attack received from
its various information sources and transmits an NBC-1 report to the NBC
control center, normally the TOC at field army headquarters. It transmits
appropriate NBC-2, -3, and -5 reports to subordinate, adjacent, and higher
commands. If there is no NBCE, the G3 assumes these responsibilities.
NBC CONTROL CENTER
The NBC control center is normally the NBCE of the tactical operations
center at field army. It consolidates and evaluates NBC reports received
from subordinate commands and USAF, Marine Corps, and civilian
installations and agencies. It directs reconnaissance and survey efforts;
transmits evaluated NBC data to subordinate commands and adjacent area
commands; and submits appropriate reports to higher headquarters, adjacent
commands, and national agencies. If there is no NBCE, the G3 assumes
these responsibilities.
NBC-1 REPORTS
NBC-1 reports follow the same format as SHELLREPs, MORTREPS, and
BOMBREPs. The words “Type of Report,” and the letters “B,” “ D,” “ H,” or
either “C or “F" always are reported. Other items are optional. Table
A-3 shows the letter explanation for NBC-1 reports. Table A-21 shows the
master list of available letters.
Table A-3. Letter explanation for NBC-1 report.
EXAMPLE
EXAMPLE
EXAMPLE
LETTER
MEANING
NUCLEAR
CHEMICAL
BIOLOGICAL
Precedence data and Uma (local or Zulu
Uma, stata which)
Security classification
From
To
Type of Report
NBC 1 (NUCLEAR)
NBC 1 (CHEMICAL)
NBC (BIOLOGICAL)
■
Strike serial number (If known—at assigned by
the NBCE at the operations canter responsible
for the areas In which the strike occurs).
A. 04
A. 02
l_!_l
Position of observer (UTM or place).
LB 196400
B. Manila
A-90
Table A.-& Letter explanation tor NBC-1 report (continued).
Direction moasurod clockwise from or magnetic C. Grid 060
north (state which) of the attack from Degrees
observer (degrees or mils, state which).
Date and time of denation or date and time
attack started (local or Zulu time, state which).
Illumination time (seconds) or time attack
ended (local or Zulu, state which).
Location of attack (UTM or place) or area
attacked (actual or estimated, state which).
Means of delivery. If known.
Type of burst—air, surface or unknown (state
which)—Including height, if known; type of
agent. If known (chemical or biological);
or type of attack (chemical or biological).
Type and number of munitions or aircraft
(state which).
Flash-to-bang time (seconds).
Crater present or absent and diameter If known
(meters).
Nuclear burst angular cloud width measured at L. 280 mils
5 minutes after the detonation (degrees
or mils, state which).
(Do not report If date Is obtained more than
5 minutes after the detonation).
StabSized cloud-top angle and cloud-bottom
angle (state which) or cloud-up and
cloud-bottom height (slate which)
measured at H+10 minutes (degrees,
mils, meters, or feet—state which).
Date-time of reading or date-time
contamination Initially detected (chemic a l
or biological). State whether local
or Zulu time.
Located area of contamination (UTM).
NOTE:
When the contaminated area is a
complete circle, the first coordinate
w6l be repeated as a last coordinate
A-91
Table A-4. Initial nuclear report example.
(CLASSIFICATION)
FLASH Mima ROMEO
UNCLASSIFIED
FROM REDDOG TO AMIGO
NBC-1 NUCLEAR
BRAVO SHACKLE DELTA HOTEL BRAVO
UNSHACKLE
CHARLIE GRID 162 MILS
DELTA CHM07 ROMEO
HOTEL SUR r ACE
JULIET bC
END OF MESSAGE
(CLASSIFICATION)
Table A-5. Initial chemical report example.
(CLASSIFICATION)
FLASH
20140& HOTEL
FROM (27ROb
TO EHZ03
NBC-1 CHEMICAL
BRAVO MARVILLE
DELTA 2I314CS HOTEL
FOXTROT LIMA BRAVO 2DS3GS
ESTIMATED
GOLF ARTILLERY
HOTEL AIR
(CLASS IF I CAT!ONj
A-92
Table A-6. Subsequent NBC-1 nuclear report example.
(CLASSIFICATION)
IMMEDIATE 0^0R13 ROMEO
UNCLASSIFIED
FROM REDDOG TO AMIGO
NBC-1 NUCLEAR
BRAVO SHACKLE DELTA HOTEL BRAVO
UNSHACKLE
CHARLIE GRID 162 MILS
DELTA mmC7 ROMEO
HOTEL SURFACE
LIMA 26C MILS
END OF MESSAGE
(CLASSIFICATION)
Table A-7. Subsequent NBC-I chemical report example.
(CLASSIFICATION)
IMMEDIATE
201436 HOTEL
FROM c3?R0b
TO E4203
NBC-1 CHEMICAL
ALPHA 02
ECHO 2G14G5 HOTEL
HOTEL NERVE
(CLASSIFICATION)
A-93
NBC-2 REPORTS
NBC-2 reports are used for passing evaluated data of an NBC attack.
They are normally based on two or more NBC-1 reports and include an attack
location and in the case of a nuclear detonation, an evaluated yield.
Tables A-8 and A-9 show examples of NBC-2 (nuclear) and NBC-2 (chemical)
report messages.
Table A-8. NBC-2 nuclear report example.
(CLASSIFICATION)
E4Z03E4Z03
IMMEDIATE NBC-2
FROM (37J04
ALFA/NQ01
201405 ZULU
FOXTROT LIMA BRAVO lfl74flb
HOTEL SURFACE
NOVEMBER 50
YANKEE/050/01Z KPH
(CLASSIFICATION)
Table A-9. NBC-2 chemical report example.
(CLASSIFICATION)
E4Z03E4Z03
IMMEDIATE NBC-2
FROM (37J04
2D0T45Z
FOXTROT LIMA BRAVO 12b45bZ
HOTEL NERVE
(CLASSIFICATION)
NBC-2 reports include the attack time, location, and, in the case of a
nuclear detonation, an evaluated yield. Letters “A,”’ “D,”’ “F,” “H,” and
“N”” are repeated as often as necessary to produce a summary report. Other
letters may be added; however, the letters mentioned must be included in
the report. Table A-10 shows the letter explanation for NBC-2 reports.
A-94
Table A-10. Letter explanation for NBC-2 report.
LETTER MEAN ING EXAMPLE
NUCLEAR
EXAMPLE
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
Precedence
Date-time (local or Zulu
time, state which)
Security Classification
From
To
Type of Report NBC-2 (NUCLEAR) NBC-2 (CHEMICAL)
A. Strike serial number
24
D. Date-time of detonation 201405 Zulu 200945 (local)
or date-time attack
started (local or Zulu
time, state which).
F. Location of attack (UTM LB 187486 LB 126456 actual
or place) or area actual
attacked (actual or
estimated, state which) .
G, Means of delivery, if known.
H. Type of burst--air, surface, Surface Nerve
or unknown (state which)—
including height, if known;
type of agent, if known;
(chemical or biological);
or type of attack (chemical
or biological).
N. Estimated yield (kt). 50
A-95
NBC-3 REPORTS
NBC-3 reports provide irrmediate warning of expected NBC contamination
or hazardous areas. Tables A-11 and A-12 show examples of NBC-3
(chemical) and NBC-3 (nuclear) messages.
TableA-ll. NBC-3 nuclear report example.
(CLASSIFICATION)
ASZOIE3Z05
intlEDIATE NBC-3
FROM R4t30b
DELTA EQ140Z
FOXTROT LIMA BRAVO l&74fib
HOTEL SURFACE
PAPA ALPHA-
LIMA BRAVO I'mEO
LINA BRAVO ED044D
LINA BRAVO E55410
LINA BRAVO E574S7
YANKEE DE7E-D31E DEGREES
ZULU Dn-QES-DS
(CLASSIFICATION)
Table A-12. NBC-3 chemical report example.
(CLASSIFICATION)
ASZOIEEZOE
INNEDIATE NBC-3
FRON R4(20b
DELTA ED141SZ
FOXTROT LINA BRAVO EDb3DQZ
HOTEL BC GB
PAPA ALPHA LINA BRAVO EDfl3E0n LINA BRAVO
E103E0i LINA BRAVO EQbl3Di LINA
BRAVO SD431D
(CLASSIFICATION)
A-96
Table A-13 explains the letters in the NBC-3 nuclear and chemical
report examples, Other letters from the master list, are added at the
users’ discretion.
NOTE: When the effective windspeed is less than 8 kph, the NBC-3 report
consists of the letters “D,”’ “F,’ and “Z.” “Z” contains three digits
only, (the radial distance of zone I).
Table A-13. Letter explanation for NBC-3 reports.
LETTER
MEANING
EXAMPLE
NUCLEAR
EXAMPLE CHEMICAL
AND BtOLOGICAL
Precedence
Date-lime (local or
Zulu time, state which)
Security Classification
From
To
Type of Report
NBC 3 (NUCLEAR)
NBC (CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL)
A.
Strike serial number.
A. 24
A. 3
D.
Date-time of detonation or
date-time attack started (local
or Zulu time, state which).
D. LB 201405 Zulu
D. 201405 (local)
F.
Location of attack (UTM or place)
or area attacked (actual or
estimated, state which).
F. LB 187486 actual
F. LB 206300 actual
P.
Areas of expected contamination
(UTM).
P. LB 208320 LB 206310
LB 210320 LB 204310
Y.
Direction measured clockwise, from
grid north, to the left and then to
the right radial lines (degrees or
mils, state which) (4 digits each).
Y. 0272-0312 degrees
Z.
Effective windspeed (kph), 3 digits;
downwind distance of zone 1 (km);
3 digits; cloud radius (km), 2 digits.
(When effective windspeed is less
than 8 kph, use 3 digits only for
radial distance zone 1).
Z. 019-025-05
A-97
NBC-4 REPORTS
NBC-4 reports are used to transmit radiation dose-rate measurements.
Tables A-14 and A-15 show examples of NBC-4 radiation dose-rate messages.
Table A-14. NBC-4 report example 1.
(CLASSIFICATION)
E4Z03 E4Z03
IMMEDIATE NBC-4
FROM (37ROb
201745 HOTEL
flUEBEC LIMA BRAVO 123^67
ROMEO 35 INITIAL
SIERRA 201735 HOTEL
(CLASSIFICATION)
Table A-15. NBC-4 report example 2.
(CLASSIFICATION)
REDDOG 3 REDDOG 3
IMMEDIATE NBC-4
FROM ALFA
201745 HOTEL
QUEBEC LIMA BRAVO 123^7
ROMEO 1 INITIAL
SIERRA 201735 HOTEL
(CLASSIFICATION)
A-98
Table A-16 explains the items in the examples for NBC-4 nuclear and
chemical report formats. The letters “Q,”’ “R,” and “S” are repeated as
often as necessary. Users of NBC-4 reports are not confined solely to the
use of the letters shown in the examples; other letters from the master
list, (see table A-21), are added at the users’ discretion.
NOTE: Radiation dose-rates are measured in the open, one meter above the
ground. Other conditions are specified in the message as part of line
ROMEO .
Table A-16. Explanation of letters for NBC reports.
LETTER MEANING EXAMPLE
Precedence
Date-time (local or Zulu time, state
which)
Security Classification
From
To
Type of Report NBC-4 (NUCLEAR)
Q. Location of reading (UTM) Q. LB 123987
R. Dose-rate (cGy/hr)
(this is NOT normalized
to H + 1 hour). The words
“initial,”’ ‘ increasing, ”
“peak,”’ or “decreasing,”
may be added (correlation
factor information is
included if shielded dose-
rate readings are reported).
s. Date-time of reading
(local or Zulu, state which)
S. 201735 (local)
Q. LB 129965
R. 60
S. 201650 (local)
Q. LB 146808
R. 27 INCREASING
S. 201710 (local)
A-99
NBC-5 REPORTS
NBC-5 reports identify the area of contamination or hazard. Tables
A-17 and A-18 show examples of an NBC-5 report messages.
Table A-17. NBC-5 nuclear report example.
(CLASSIFICATION)
ASZ0IE3Z0E
IMMEDIATE NBC-5
01M13 GOLF
FROM REDDOG
TO AMIGO
NBC-5 NUCLEAR
TANGO E01505Z
VICTOR NOVEMBER DELTA b51455
510510
asms 1 )
bS145S
WHISKEY NOVEMBER DELTA bQ471fl
'mbfib
11M MED
5T5007
(CLASSIFICATION)
Table A-18. NBC-5 chGmical report example.
(CLASSIFICATION)
ASZOIEEZOE
IMMEDLATE NBC-5
SIERRA EQOflOOOZ
TANGO EQ104SZ
EXRAY CHEM NOVEMBER
DELTA EQbTO
E01575
ED07&7
EQbTIl
(CLASSIFICATION)
A-100
The NBC-5 report is most useful when sent as a map trace or overlay
(if time and distance permit). When the contamination arises from a
single threat or unidentified nuclear burst, the dose-rate always refers
to H+1 hour, and the letter “’T” is used. When there have been several
nuclear detonations at different times or on different days and no single
H + 1 hour is possible, the dose rates are reported as a specified item
using the letter “’O.” Letters “O” and “T” are, therefore, alternatives;
both cannot be used in the same report. Table A-19 explains the letter
designations used in NBC-5 reports.
NOTE: When requested decay rates are to be transmitted, use the letter
“R. “
Table A-19. Letter explanation for NBC-5 reports.
LETTER
EXAMPLE
NUCLEAR
EXAMPLE
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
Precedence
Date-time (local or
Zulu time, state
which)
Security Classification
From
To
Type of Report
NBC-5 (NUCLEAR)
NBC-5 (CHEMICAL and
BIOLOGICAL)
A. Strike serial
numbers causing
contamination
(if known)
A. 24
A. 1
o. Reference date-time
for estimated contours
(see note ( 2) above)
when not H+1 hour
s. Date-time contamination
initially detected
(chemical or biological
(local or Zulu time,
state which)
S. 200800 (local)
A-101
Table A-19. Letter explanation for NBC-5 reports (continued).
T. H + 1 date-time or T. 201505 ZULU T. 201045 (local)
date-time of latest
reconnaissance of
contamination in the
area (chemical or
biological). State
whether local or Zulu time.
u.
1,000 cGy/hr
contour 1 ine coordinates
V.
300 cGy/hr contour
V. ND
651455
line coordinates
ND
810510
ND
821459
ND
651455
w. 100
cGy/hr contour
W. ND
604718
line
coordinates
ND
991686
ND
114420
ND
595007
x. 20 cGy/hr contour
line coordinates,
or located area of
contaminant ion
(chemical or biological)
X. CHEMICAL
ND 206991
ND 201575
ND 200787
ND 206991
Figure A-24 shows a current example of the estimated radiological
contamination trace (dose-rate type) format. It is not necessary, or even
desirable, to report all four of the contours for different dose rates.
Four are given to provide flexibility. (In the example, only two are
reported.) When a contour closes to form a complete ring, the first
coordinate is reported at the end. The following are colors used for
plotting and sending the report as a trace:
“Red for 1 ,000 cGy/hr.
“Green for 300 cGy/hr.
“Blue for 100 cGy/hr.
“Black for 20 cGy/hr,
A-102
Yellow is used for chemical and biological contamination or hazardous
areas. Additional letters, including those shown in the examples in Table
A-19, are used. Letters from the master list in Table A-21 are added at
the users’ discretion.
MAP .
SCALE.
B
GZ
»
X
HO—Inf Dlv
Nuclear Bunt (30 KT)
GZ MN 671355
H-hour 170500Z
Standard Decay (R + 12)
Prepared 171130Z
Do not use after 171600Z
10 cGy/hr at H + 1
A. 10 cGy/hr at H + 7
10 cGy/hr at H +11
B. 30 cGy/hr at H + 7
30 cGy/hr H+11
C. lOOcGy/hratH + 7
A-103
NBC-6 REPORT
NBC-6 reports are used to summarize information concerning a chemical
or biolog ical attack. Table A-20 shows an NBC-6 biological report.
Table A-20. NBC-6 biological report.
ALFA
coo 1
DELTA
200430Z
ECHO
200435Z
FOXTROT
LBZ00300 to LB208304 Actual
GOLF
Aerial spray
HOTEL
Toxin
INDIA
2 Aircraft
KILO
Rolling hills, mostly open
MIKE
Enemy broke contact just before
attack, then bypassed on right
f 1 ank
the
QUEBEC
Soil sample taken at LB200300
YANKEE
Downwind direction 270 degrees,
speed 015 kph
wind
ZULU BRAVO
This is the only biological attack
in our area
The NBC-6 report is a narrative description of chemical and
biological attacks that have occurred in a unit's AO. It is designed to
be developed at battalion level and above. It contains as much
information as is known about the attacks. It is submitted only when
requested and is usually sent in hard copy.
A-104
MASTER LIST
Table A-21 shows the master list of letters that is applicable to
all types of NBC reports. Each letter is annotated. Care should be taken
to ensure that letters mandatory for each NBC report are incorporated
before adding letters to the reports, overlays, or traces.
Table A-21. Master list of letters.
LETTER MEANING MEANING
NUCLEAR REPORTS
A. Strike serial number(s).
B. Position of observer (UTM or
place) .
c. Direction measured clockwise
from grid or magnetic north
(state which) of the attack
from observer (degrees or
roils, state which).
D. Date-time of detonation (local
or Zulu time, state which) .
If local time is used, give
the letter of the local time
zone, i f -known. See
FM 101-10-1 for time-zone charts.
If the local time is used and
the time-zone letter is not
known, the word “local” will
be transmitted with this
itern.
E. Illumination time. (Report
only when other data are not
available. Report in
seconds.)
F. Location of attack (UTM or
place) (actual or estimated,
state which).
G. Means of delivery, if known.
H. Type of burst--air, surface,
or unknown, state which--
including height, if known.
I. (This letter item is not used
for nuclear report.)
J. Flash-to-bang time (seconds).
K. Crater present or absent and
diameter, if known (meters) .
CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL REPORTS
Strike serial number(s).
position of observer (UTM) or
place) .
Direction measured clockwise from
grid or magnetic north (state
which) of the attack from
observer (degrees or roils, state
which) .
Date-time attack started (local
or Zulu time, state which). If
local time is used, give the
letter of the local time zone,
if known. See FM 101-10-1 for
time-zone charts. If the
local time is used and the
time-zone letter is not known,
the word ‘“local, ” will be
transmitted with this item.
Time attack ended (local or Zulu,
state which).
Area attacked (actual or
estimated, state which).
Means of delivery, if known.
Type of agent, if known (chemical
or biological). Type of attack
(chemical or biological).
Type and number of munitions or
aircraft (state which).
A-105
Table A-21. Master list of letters (continued).
LETTER MEAN ING
NUCLEAR REPORTS
L. Nuclear burst angular cloud
width measured at 5 minutes
after the detonation
(degrees or roils, state which).
(Do not report if data is
obtained more than 5 minutes
after the detonation.)
M. Stabilized cloud-top angle
and cloud-bottom angle
(state which) or cloud-top
height and cloud-bottom
height (state which)
measured at H+10 minutes
(degrees, roils, meters, or
feet--state which).
N. Estimated yield (kt).
O. Reference date-time for
estimated contours when
not H + l hour.
P. For radar purposes only:
P.A. UTM coordinates of points
to outline external
contours of radioactive
clouds.
P.B. Effective wind direction
(direction from which the
wind is blowing) in
degrees or roils (state
which) .
Q. Location of reading (UTM).
R. Dose-rate (cGy/hr). The
words “initial, ”
“ increasing,’” “peak.”
or “decreasing” may
be added.
s. Date-time of reading (local or
Zulu time, state which).
T. H + l date-time (local or Zulu
time, state which).
u. 1,000 cGy/hr contour line
coordinates (UTM) (red).
v. 300 cGy/hr contour line
coordinates (UTM) (green).
MEAN ING
CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL REPORTS
Area of expected contamination
(UTM).
Date-time contamination initially
detected (local or Zulu time,
state which).
Date-time of latest reconnaissance
of contamination in the area
(local or Zulu time, state which).
A-106
Table A-21. Master list of letters (continued).
LETTER MEAN ING
NUCLEAR REPORTS
W. 100 cGy/hr contour line
coordinates (UTM) (blue),
x. 20 cGy/hr contour line
coordinates (UTM) (black).
Y. Direction measured clockwise
from grid north to the left
and then to the right radial
lines (degrees or roils, state
which--4 digits each),
z. Effective windspeed (kph), 3
digits; downwind distance of
zone I (km), 3 digits; cloud
radius (km), 2 digits. (When
effective windspeed is less
than 8 kph, the NBC-3 report
will contain only three
significant digits, that is,
the radial distance of zone I.)
MEAN ING
CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL REPORTS
Located area of contamination (UTM)
(yellow).
A-107
ANALYSIS OF AREA OF OPERATIONS
Figure A-25 shows a completed sample and explanation of analysis of
the area of operations. The following paragraphs are keyed to paragraphs
in the sample.
1. PURPOSE AND LIMITING CONSIDERATIONS. State the purpose of the
analysis and define the area that is being analyzed. Include a statement
of the mission of the command and other considerations that limit the
applicability of the analysis. Include the commander’s plan of action and
enemy capabilities.
2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA.
a. Climatic or Weather Conditions. This paragraph lists items of
weather information that have military significance. Throughout the
remainder of the analysis, weather information is interpreted as to its
operational effects. For example, winds at low temperatures are
interpreted in terms of the wind chill factor and the resulting effects on
operations, such as attack or defense which must face the prevailing
winds, or the use of open or closed storage facilities.
Light data is always reported to assist in selecting courses of action
and the conduct of mil itary activities.
The BMNT and the EENT are the beginning and end, respectively, of
enough light for limited visibility. The BMCT and the EECT are the
beginning and end, respectively, of adequate light for large-scale
operations.
Moon phases and other phenomena, like atmospheric conditions and star
brilliance, also influence night operations. During full moonlight,
conditions of visibility sometimes approach those of daylight. Such
conditions need to be anticipated as they influence friendly and enemy
courses of action such as attacks, patrolling, and changes in
dispositions.
b. Terrain.
(1) Relief and Drainage System, Drainage and ridge lines are
basic elements in studying terrain, as they clearly indicate the general
shape of the ground. A complete study of relief and drainage includes
detailed information about slope, configuration, elevation of ground
forms; and depth, width, tide data, and conditions of banks and bottoms of
streams and rivers. These items are portrayed graphically on maps.
(2) Vegetation. Vegetation studies are best presented in the
form of tinted, or otherwise marked, overlays. Considerations include
locations of trees, diameters of trunks, density, ground cover or canopy,
undergrowth, and types of natural and cultivated vegetation in nonwooded
areas.
A-108
(3) Surface Materials. Surface materials are best presented on
colored or marked overlays. Soil maps made by the agricultural services
of various countries are particularly valuable. The information contained
in soil maps frequently is translated into a trafficability map and a map
of areas susceptible to high levels of induced radioactivity. A
trafficability map based on weather forecasts are colored or marked to
indicate degrees of trafficability effectively shows areas suitable for
cross-country movement.
(4) Artificial Features, Artificial features of potential
military significance include roads, railroads, bridges, tunnels, mines,
towns, industrial areas, and fortifications. The features are best
represented on maps or marked overlays.
c. Additional Characteristics. Only those characteristics--
sociology, politics, economics, transportation, manpower--which influence
the choice of a course of action by either force are included. Lengthy
data is presented in an annex, preferably in tabular form.
3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE AREA. The facts listed in paragraph 2 are
analyzed and their influence on tactical and CSS factors that are
considered in the selection of a course of action by either force are
determined. In the analysis of these factors, the effects of and on
nuclear fires, chemical and biological agents, and important devices and
equipment used in implementing courses of action are integrated, as
appropriate. The tactical aspects of observation and fire, concealment
and cover, obstacles, key terrain features, AAs, and the CSS aspects are
discussed in the following paragraphs.
a. Tactical Aspects.
(1) Observation and Fire.
(a) Observation depends on condit ions of terrain which
permit a force to locate the enemy, either visua I ly or through the use of
surveillance devices. The highest terrain in an area usually provides the
best observation. The increased use of equipment with LOS characteristics
requires the availability of suitable terrain features for sighting
purposes; while at same time, the capability of employing organic aerial
platforms reduces the requirement to use such terrain. Dust clouds caused
by nuclear blast reduce electronic LOS. Other limits to observation
include darkness and tall vegetation (woods and jungle canopy). The
effects of visibility on observation are analyzed along with weather
conditions.
A-109
(b) Fire, as used in the analysis of the battlefield area,
includes the FofFs of all weapons and characteristics of weapons del ivery
systems affected by weather and terrain. For example, gusty surface winds
affect the use of projectiles. High, irregular terrain features or the
absence of overhead mass clearance limit FofFs. A FofF is an area that
weapons can cover effectively with fire from given positions. Although
observation is essential to effective control of fire, the best
observation does not always guarantee the best FofF. An ideal FofF for
flat-trajectory weapons is an open area in which the enemy can both be
seen and has no protection weapons fire.
(2) Concealment and Cover.
(a) Concealment is protection from observation. It is
provided by woods, underbrush, snowdrifts, tall grass, cultivated
vegetation, darkness, smoke, dust, fog, ground haze, rain, or falling
snow.
(b) Cover is protection from the effects of direct and
indirect fires. It is provided by ditches, quarries, caves, riverbanks,
folds in the ground, shell craters, buildings, walls, railroad embankments
and cuts, sunken roads, and highway fills. Defiladed areas which provide
protection against some types of weapons do not necessarily protect
against effects of nuclear fires. Unless the forward slopes of a terrain
mass are very steep, nuclear blast will affect personnel and material on
the reverse slope because the blast wave follows the configuration of all
but the most rugged terrain. When a nuclear weapon is fired over a deep
val ley, or the valley axis points toward ground zero, the blast effects
are canal ized, increasing the damage. Irregular terrain provides some
cover from thermal radiation of nuclear fires. Few buildings are
sufficiently strong to withstand all effects of blast or, if not damaged
or destroyed by blast, to be unaffected by thermal radiation. Foxholes,
bunkers, and tunnel-type shelters offer the simplest forms of effective
cover.
(c) Concealment and cover are desirable for both the attack
and the defense. If troops move forward under the concealment of woods,
fog, or a moonless night, the chances of achieving surprise are greater.
If troops move protected from the enemy’s fire by ditches, embankments, or
walls, the attack is more effective. In a defensive situation, friendly
forces seek to defend in an area which offers both concealment and cover
but does not provide covered approaches for the enemy.
(d) The mobility of the command is considered in determining
avai lable concealment and cover. Concealment and cover are desirable
during troop movements by any means. Routes which afford good concealment
and cover reduce the vulnerability of a moving force to detection and to
destruction by fire.
A-110
(3) Obstacles.
(a) An obstacle is any natural or artificial terrain feature
which stops, impedes, or diverts military movement. Natural obstacles
include rivers, streams, canals, lakes, swamps, cliffs, steep slopes,
dense woods, jungles, deserts, mountains, cities, and certain types of
unstable soil . Artificial obstacles are works of construction and
destruction executed to stop or impede military movement. They include
minefield, craters, antitank ditches, trenches, abatises, roadblocks,
deliberately flooded areas, areas contaminated with chemical and
biological agents, extensive rubble, forest fires, trees blown down, and
areas contaminated with residual nuclear radiation.
(b) To be fully effective, obstacles are covered by
observation and fire. However, even undefended obstacles may canal ize an
attacker into concentrations which are easier to detect and which are
suitable for nuclear attack. Obstacles perpendicular to a direction of
attack favor the defender by slowing the enemy, forcing the enemy into
concentrations that tend to occur while crossing obstacles, and holding
the attacker for a longer time under the effective fires of the defense.
Obstacles parallel to an axis of advance give the attacker flank
protection. However, parallel obstacles interfere with lateral movement
and coordination.
(c) The mission of the command influences consideration of
obstacles. In the defense, the intelligence officer identifies as
obstacles those features of the terrain which stop, impede, or divert
military movement into, out of, or within the area encompassed by the
FEBA, lateral boundaries, and the rear boundary (prescribed or assumed).
In the attack, the intelligence officer considers the obstacles from the
line of departure to the objective (both inclusive) , bounded laterally by
the assigned or assumed operational zone.
(4) Key Terrain Features.
(a) A key terrain feature is any loca I ity or area whose
seizure or control affords a marked advantage to ei ther opposing force.
Key terrain features are selected to indicate areas and local ities whose
seizure or control are considered in formulating and selecting courses of
action. The selection is based on the level of command, type of unit, and
mission of the command. Key terrain which would give us a marked
advantage in the accomplishment of our mission is selected. If it is
seized or control led by the enemy, it would delay the accomplishment of
our mission. For example, a bridge over an unfoldable river gives access
to the opposite shore without requiring an assault crossing, Control of a
road or rail center reduces the enemy’s ability to resist our advance. A
level clearing in rough terrain is the only accessible landing field for
airmobile operations.
A -111
(b) Key terrain varies with the level of command. For
example, to an army commander, a large city affords marked advantages as a
communications center. To a division commander, the high ground which
dominates the city is more important, and the city itself is an obstacle,
(c) Obstacles are rarely key terrain features. The high
ground dominating a river, rather than the river itself, is usually the
key terrain feature for the lower unit commander. An exception is an
obstacle like a built-up area, which is assigned as an objective to a
force; the obstacle then becomes key terrain to the force ordered to
capture it.
(d) Key terrain, in addition to influencing mission
accomplishment, is also highly significant in applying combat power.
Control is not ensured only by seizure and occupation. Seizure and
physical occupancy of key terrain features by relatively large forces may
not be desirable, Destructive fires delivered by long-range means can
destroy forces physically occupying key terrain. The commander controls
key terrain to avoid destruction of force while keeping the enemy from
gaining control. Control includes maneuver, surveillance, security, and
use of fires. Terrain which permits or denies maneuver is key terrain.
Tactical use of terrain often is directed at increasing the capability for
applying combat power and, at the same time, forcing the enemy into areas
which result in reduction of the enemy's abil ity to apply combat power.
Terrain which permits this also is key terrain. The effects of terrain on
maneuver, appl ication of combat power, and preservation of force integrity
are considerations in selecting and controlling key terrain and its
tactical use.
(e) In the offense, key terrain features are usually forward
of the friendly dispositions and are often assigned as objectives.
However, terrain features in adjacent sectors are key terrain if their
control is necessary for the continuation of the attack or the
accomplishment of the mission. If the mission is to destroy enemy forces,
terrain is selected whose seizure helps ensure the required destruction.
Terrain which gives the enemy effective observation along an axis of
advance to be used by the friendly forces is key terrain if the enemy must
be denied its possession or control. Key terrain is within friendly
territory when its control is essential to the success of an offensive
operation. For example, if the enemy attacks before friendly forces
attack, the control of this terrain is essential because it affords a
marked advantage. Thus, it is a key terrain feature.
In the defense, key terrain is usually within the assigned sector and
within or behind the selected defensive area. Some examples of key
terrain are--
"Terrain which gives good observation over AAs to and into the
defensive position.
"Terrain which permits the defender to cover an obstacle by fire.
A-112
“Important communication centers which affect command
communications and the use of reserves.
Key terrain also is forward of the defensive area or in adjacent
sectors. For example, a terrain feature along the FLOT or in an adjacent
sector which gives the enemy good observation over defended localities,
corrrnunication routes, or enemy AAs is key terrain when active measures are
taken to reduce the enemy advantage. The defender moves positions forward
to include the feature or take action to minimize the enemy advantage by
the use of fire, chemicals, smoke, concealment, and cover.
(5) Avenues of Approach. An AA is a route for a force of a
particular size to reach an objective or key terrain. To be considered an
AA, a route provides some ease of movement and enough width for dispersion
of a force of a sufficient size to significantly affect the outcome of the
operation. The division G2 usually considers AAs adequate for the type
brigade of the particular division. The corps and higher G2s usually
consider AAs adequate for at least a division. In determining the width
of dispersion, consideration is given to the deployment patterns, mobi I ity
means, and area required for maneuver to prevent presenting lucrative
targets for nuclear fires.
(a) Ground Avenues of Approach. A valley approach gives the
advancing force some cover from enemy direct fire and some concealment
from enemy observation. A valley approach includes the floor of the
valley, the slopes of the ridges, and the military crests. Control of the
military crests on each side of the valley is essential. In a valley
approach, the best AA is that which offers the best observation,
cross-country trafficability, road net, FofF, concealment and cover, and
dispersion, In evaluating the use of deep valley approach, the possible
intensification of nuclear effects and resulting greater casualties on the
valley floor are considered. At times, the best avenue is along the
slopes of a ridge below the military crests, rather than along the valley
floor.
The use of a ridge approach depends upon the width and shape of the
ridge, the size and deployment of the units involved, and the distance to
the elevation of adjacent ridges. A ridge approach usually has the
advantage of good observation; however, there is little protection from
enemy fire on the ridge. The best AA on a ridge is often slightly below
the topographical crest, with sufficient force on the crest to control it.
(b) Air Avenues of Approach. An AAA is a route which
provides a suitable path for a particular number of aircraft to reach a
LZ. The aviation officer or the aviation mission commander assists in
evaluating the effect of density altitude, wind, turbulence, and
visibility on selected AAAs. In selecting AAAs, the following factors are
considered:
"Sufficient air space.
"Concealment from ground observation.
A-113
° Eaaily recognized terrain features.
"Length of flight paths.
1 Sufficient air space is required for rapid movement of
the aircraft to the LZS. FS requirements involving art i llery and tactical
air support may restrict the availability of air space. Consideration is
given to gun-target lines and to restrictive fire plans that are in effect
during the air movement phase. The size of the air assault force involved
in the operation also is considered; however, no paramsters are given as
to width concerning AAA. Depending on the flight formation, a large
number of helicopters are flown over a relatively narrow AAA. Another
consideration in relation to adequate air space is the desirability of
having multiple flight routes available. Generally, in situations with
concentrated enemy forces along the LOC, multiple flight routes from the
pickup zone to the objective area and back are desirable.
2 Heavily forested and swamp areas provide good routes and
concealment from ground level because ground troops have little
opportunity to see and fire on helicopters passing overhead at tree-top
level. Low-altitude operations over heavy foliage distort the acoustic
wave from aircraft and decrease the distance at which the sound is
detected. They also hamper determination of the direction of the noise
source by ground observers. AAAs are in defi lade with respect to enemy AD
radar and weapon locations. Ridge lines are crossed as infrequently as
possible to reduce exposure time to radar detection. Steep defiles or
canyons are avoided, especially when there ie an appreciable amount of
surface wind that can cause momentary loss of aircraft control because of
downdrafts.
3 Navigation at low altitudes is extremely difficult.
The presence of easily recognized terrain features, such as rivers or
roads, significantly improves the pilot’s abil ity to navigate by reference
to ground features. Terrain corridors are usually desirable because they
afford both ease of navigation and defilade. Linear features that
parallel the direction of flight are the most valuable in assisting
navigation.
4 In the interest of minimizing the exposure of aircraft
enroute to the objective area, the shortest possible flight paths that
afford sufficient air space, concealment from ground observation, and
easily recognized terrain features are usually preferred. However, longer
flight paths are selected for purposes of deception.
(6) Combat Service Support Aspects. The analyses of the facts
and subconclusions developed in the preceding parts of the analysis are
used as a basis for further studies of the effects of CSS activities on
friendly and enemy units. This paragraph determines the effects of the
characteristics of the battlefield area on CSS that influence the
selection of a course of action by either force.
A-114
In studying the influence of the area, consideration is given to
effects cm matters such as availability of adequate routes for LOC,
facilities for maintenance and storage, construction resources, public
health situation, required shelter for administrative facilities,
availability of labor, maintenance of discipline, law and order, and
control of refugees.
4. EFFECTS OF CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA. This paragraph contains the
conclusions reached on the basis of the facts and subconclusions
previously developed. The effects of the characteristics of the AO on
each significant course of action which the enemy is physically oapable of
adopting and which, if adopted, could adversely affect the accomplishment
of our mission are discussed. Usually, the discussion includes effects on
the enemy’s ability to defend or attack. It also includes, a s
appropriate, the effects on the enemy’s ability to delay; to use reserves,
amphibious or airborne forces, nuclear fires, guerrilla forces, chemical
and biological agents, cover and deception, sensor devices; or to conduct
special operations and support the enemy’s forces administratively. The
discussion of the effects on our courses of action is limited to those
required for the accomplishment of the mission.
A-115
(CLASSIFICATION)
opy no 2 of copies
2d Itech Div
ELLY (8831)
2I503S July 19
SB2
ANALYSIS OF AREA OF OPERATIONS NO 6
eference: Map, series CSN 01, iestland, sheet 1 (Ebel), edition 1974, 1:50,000
. PURPOSE AND UNITING CONSIDERATIONS
a. Purpose. To analyze and evaluate the area east of Cartersberg (9297) from the general area of
verlook Ridge (9406) south to the Erie Canal euithin the division zone.
b. Mission. Division attacks 140900 July, secures high ground from Hill 322 (1394) to Hill 305 (0490)
o deny the enemy a bridgehead, and prepares to cross the Erie Canal and continue the attack to the south.
!. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA
a. Climate or Heather Conditions.
(1) Climate, Annex A (climatic summary).
(2) Heather, Heather forecast, 12-16 July.
(a) Precipitation. None predicted.
(b) Fog. None predicted.
(c) Temperature. Range from 70* to 86’F.
(d) Hind. Surface winds from north, 9 to 17 knots per hour.
(e) Cloudiness. None predicted.
(f) Atmospheric pressure. Average about 980 millibars.
(g) Moon. New moon, 25 July.
(h) Light data.
13 July 0232 0440 1933 2138 2024 0608
14 July 0233 0442 1932 2138 2050 0714
15 July 0234 0444 1931 2137 2114 0806
16 July 0235 0446 1930 2137 2137 0901
b. Terrain.
(1) Relief and drainage systems. Annex B (Relief Overlay), Annex C (Drainage Overlay), and Annex 0
(Slope Overlay). Area is drained by the Maine River on the west and southwest and the South River on the
northeast. The northwest to southeast ridge running from Hill 351 (9807) to Albany (3960) generally bisects
the area. The major spurs of this ridge run generally east and west. The terrain is generally rolling with
a series of sharply, rising table lands. The Maine and South Rivers and the Erie Canal are unfordable. The
Maine River south of Cartersberg averages about 30 meters in width and 2 meters in depth. The South River
averages about 15 meters in width and about 2 meters in depth. The Erie Canal has steep banks and averages
about 3 meters in depth and is about 17 to 21 meters in width at the top of the banks. All other rivers and
streams are fordable, varying in width from about 1 to 7 meters, with an average depth of 40 centimeters.
(2) Vegetation. Annex E (Vegetation Overlay) and Annex F (Vegetation Impeding Movement Overlay).
Vegetation consists of growing crops, vineyards, pasturelands, orchards, and wooded areas. Hay, wheat, and
vegetables are the main crops. Most crops are completely cut by the end of September. Hheat is grown mostly
on open-topped tablelands. Vineyards are generally terraced and on the slopes of hills. Most woods in the
(CLASSIFICATION)
Figure A-25. Example and explanation of analysis of the AO.
BMNT
BMCT
EECT
EENT
Moonrise
Moonset
0232
0440
1933
2138
2024
0608
0233
0442
1932
2138
2050
0714
0234
0444
1931
2137
2114
0806
0235
0446
1930
2137
2137
0901
A-116
CI ass if i cat ion is centered at the top and bottom of each page,
Copy number assignad by issuing headquarters. Official designation of unit. Physical
I ocat ion of command post by coordinates, state or county.
Date-time roup when the analysis is signed followed by the message reference number
(example: SB2) used when the analy sis is distributed outside the adquarters for the purpose
of acknowledgment in the clear. All appended material analysis having the suns
distribution bears the sane reference number.
The title line identifies the analyses by number (consecutive throughout the calendar year).
Reference I ist maps, charts, or other documents requ i red to understand the analy s is.
References to maps inc I ude the map series number (country or geograph ic area, ifrequired),
sheet number (and name, if required, edition and scale (if required).
Paragraph l a states the exact I imi ts of the area being studied.
Paragraph 1b states the mission and any other I imi t ing considerat ions such as t ime
limitations, the commander’s plan of action, and enemy capabilities.
Paragraph 2 is listing of pertinent facts for use as a basis for the succeeding paragraphs.
Paragraph 2a lists or.re.fers b other docunraepts .containing (for the period under study)
meteorlogical conditions to, Include precipitation, fog, croud conditions, temperature,
relative humidity, surface winds, effective winds (or winds aloft), atmospheric pressure,
I ight data to inc lude moon phases, moonrise and moonset, and other geodetic data as
appropriate. When appropriate, include magnetic phenomena.
Paragraph 2a(2) I ists data to be considered by aviation units. It is used in calculating
aircraft performance and altimeter setting. Light data are always given, as they are
necessary for the set ect ion of courses of action. The BMNT and the EENT are the be inning
and end, respectively, of enough I ight for limited visibi I ity. The BMCT and the EftCT are the
beginning and end, respectively of adequate light for large scale operat ions.
Paragraph 2b(l) describes conf igurat ion of the ground, including slopes, for personnel and
vehicles and critical relief for equipmnt dependent on configuration and conditions of
streams, including depth, slope, and condition of banks and bottom, and location of crossing
sites. Named localities are located by grid coordinates the first time they appear in the
anal ysis. Grid coordinates are repeated only if requ i red for ease of reference.
Paragraph 2b(l) also makes maximum use of special colored maps or overlays. Under each
characteristic include facts to assist in subsequent determination of the effects of the
character ist i c on the use of nuc I ear weapons, chemical agents, and important devices and
equipment used implement ing courses of action (do not include here the interpretation of
these effect on friendly or enemy possible courses of action).
Paragraph 2b(2) indicates wooded areas, including type, location, size, and shape of trees,
diameter of trunks, density, crown cover, and undergrowth include types of natural and
cultivated vegatation of norwooded areas.
A-117
(CIASS1RCAT10N)' '
area are oecicuous trees aoout 25 centimeters in diameter and approximately 10 to 12 meters apart.
Underbrush has been cleared throughout the area. Logging operations throughout the forest in vicinity of
9306 have thinned the tree stand to an average density or 90 trees per hectare. Roads and streambanks are
genera,iy borderec with trees. Small, scattered patches of trees are found in the lowland plains. Wooded
areas restrict, but do not preclude, the employment of armor..
(3) Surface materials. Annex G (Soils Overlays). 'Surface in most of the area'consists of thick
ciay-1 1 Ice soil on a hard limestone or limey shale base. .Above 200 meters elevation, with but few exceptions,
the soil is firm and capable of supporting heavy wheeled and tracked vehicles even where under cultivation.
The rains do not seriously affect trafficability at this time of year. The soil is generally wet in stream
bottoms and in thelowlands beiow 200 meters elevation. Whiie.capable of supporting light tracked or wheeled
vehicles, the soil becomes spongy and boggy where the turf has been destroyed.
(4) Artificial features. Annex H (Built-up Areas and L0C Overlay). A double-track,, railroad
crosses the area from Cartersberg to the east. A single-track railroad runs from Home {9619) to Cartersberg,
crossing the Macon saddle (9608). A double-track raitroad from the west parallels the south bank of the Erie
Canal as far as Dawson (0489). The area is covered witn an extensive network of principal and secondary
roads. Principal roafls raoiate from Cartersberg. Roads across Overlook Ridge (9406) from north to south
have been improved. National highways are at least 6 meters wide. All bridges on regularly maintained roads
are two-way class 50. Villages consist of closely grouped bui icings of brick or stone.' The enemy-has
constructeo extensive field fortifications and artificial obstacies throughout the area north of Erie Canal.
The artificial obstacles consist primarily of minefields and wire and ar,e most extensive in the South River
vat ley ana in tne general area of Athens (0194) and Auburn (049S). c
c. Other Characteristics.
(1) Sociology. The area is generally rural. The farm villages have a present population of from
50 to 100 each. Current population of Cartersberg is estimated at 50,000 and population of Harlow is
estimated at !5 r 000. The population is primarily Caucasian; farming is the principal .occupation. Principal
crops are wheat, corn,.-cotton, and grapes. . . -
(2) Economics. Little food and few-suppiies are available because the enemy has taken food and
materials to support the forces. However, some grain crops.remain fn fields and can be harvested at a later
date if protected.
(3) Government. There are civil agencies that are prepared to take over functions of civil
government as the country is recaptured. '
(4) Psychology. Thejconfiscation of food and supplies and the impressing of civilian Iabor have
made the people extremely hostile,, toward the enemy. Acts of sabotage occur frequently in'the Army’s rear
3. MILIARY ASPECTS OF THE AREA,
a. Tactical Aspects.
(1) Observation and fire. Annex I (Horizontal Visibility Overlay).
(a) Weather conditions. Annex J (Fog Overlay). Weather permits good air and ground
observation. Continued dry weather will increase dust c-louds caused.by nuclear.weapons. Observation will be
reduced for a longer period of time in nuclear, target,areas. Weather favors our, but not enemy’s,-use of
smoke. .. ' ..." [ • T.-I
(b) Relief. The high ground now he id by the enemy affords the enemy.excel lent observation
over approaches into the position. The enemy-held hills west of the Maine River dominate the western part of
the area. High ground vicinity Baida’s Peak (0004) provides the enemy with excellent observation to the
northeast, east, and south. The division objective, with the spur extending north from 1395 to 1004*
provides the enemy with exceilent, observation over ail approaches leading directly to it. FofFs within the
area for flat-trajectory weapons are generally good but short, except in valley bottoms and from the military
crests of open hilltops where they are generally excellent. FofFs on the northern slopes of Overlook Ridge
and Hill 351 are excellent and favor enemy defense. FofFs from the northern slopes of the division objective
are excellent, long-range FofFs to the south from Overlook Ridge are good and favor our attack. FofFs for
high-angle weapons are gooo tnroughout the area.
(CLASSIFICATION)
Figure A-25. Example and explanation of analysis of the AO (continued).
A-1 1 6
Paragraph 2b(3) indicates the type and distribution of soilsand subsoils in the area and
soil trafficability. Include soil content as it affects induced radiation, Use overlay if
material is extensive.
Paragraph 2b(4 ) indicates roads, railroads, bridges, tunnels, mines, towns, industial areas,
fortifications, and other features of military significance; include type of construction.
Paragraph 2c (1). (2) consider as pert inent in separate subparagraphs sociology,
pol i t ics, economics, psychology, and other character i st ics. Other character i st ics may
i nc I ude such items as sc ience, mater iel, transportat i on, manpower, hydrography, etc. Under
each of these characteristics considered, list all facts as the pertain to the area of study
and which may influence friendlyand enemy courses of action. The degree of coverage
required of these characteristics varied with the mission and other aspects of the
operat ional env iroment. These characteristics influence, to some extent, the decisions of
all commanders and become increasingly important as the area of interest of a command
increases.
Paragraph 3 anal yzea the facts in the previous paragraph to determine their influence on
factors affecting tactical and activities that are considered in the development of specific
courses of action. The axtent of the analysis depends on the mission, the means available to
accomplish the mission, and the possible means the enemy can use to prevent the
accomplishment of the mission, {n considering the factors under each aspect, include the
affects, as appropriate, of and on nuclear fires, chemical and enemy biological agents, and
important devices and equipment used in implement ing courses of action.
Paragraph 3a considers the effect that the .aerea will have on observation, fire, concealment
and obstacles; and deterimines key tarrain features and AAs.
Paragraph 3a(l) indicates graphically or describes the influence of weather, relief,
vegetation, surface materials, artificai features, and other pertinent characteristics.
Effects of and on nuclear fires, chemical agents, and so forth are included as are any marked
effects on surveillance devices equipment based on LOS and fire delivery means. Effects on
fire include effects on delivery means, FofFs and effectiveness of fires. Observation and
fire are of concern to CSS units as they influence rear area security.
A-119
■ ■ tClASSlfiCAtiOW -v *■ "
!" --J:. ■ iltvt'.-i - ■ 'i ■ : :.i. • - : :f).:
(c) Vegetation. The National Fores: from 0306 to 0597 severely'restricts observation and
FofFs in the eastern part of the area. Within ail wooded areas FofFs for flat-traiectory weapons are
restricted io forest trails and roads. Fields and tree blowdown in woods, caused by nuclear weapons. may
restrict Fofrs within woods. Wheat fields severely restrict ground level observation at this time of the
year. Forest fire smoke clouds may reduce observation throughout the area.
(d) Artificial features.- • Cnurch'steeples Iff tne numerous villages afford excellent
observation points. Villages and farm buildings wi:I limit FofFs for flat-trajectory weaoons.
(2) Concealment and cover.
la) Relief. The rolling nature of the terrain affords some degree of concealment ano cover
from ground observation. Concealment and cover are poor on the northern slopes of Overlook Ridge and HI!
351. On the southern slopes of Overlook Ridge, concealment and cover are gooc. The roiling nature of tne
terrain ano numerous .folds in the ground wi IT reduce thermal affects of- nuclear bursts 1 .
' - {$) Vegetation. Annex K (Canopy Closure Overlay). National'Forest*offers excellent conceal¬
ment and cover'for-large units.' Hoods-throughout ther area afford" excellent conceaf inenf-and-protect ion from
thermo! effects because of the thick deciduous trees befog in fu-li leaf. Wheat-f letcsfa I so' afford some ceare
of concealment. - , '<■ tv- e.
(c) 'Artrf-iciai features. Buildings i ; n the area offer cover from small arms fire and shell
fragments, but do not protect from Diast by any significant degree. > .-■ "
(3) Obstacles. Annex l (Combined Obstacles Overlay).
(a) Relief. Terrain favors enemy use of persistent chemicals in the vaOev forward of the
present position. Drainage system consists of the Maine ano South Rivers.
- " : (b) ''Vegetation. Woods', espec-ia! iy-tne National Forest, witi restrict thesross-eountry
modi I Tty ! of a: I’vehicies?- including trackiayi-ng vehicles. Tney will become severe obstacles'is the event of
biowdown by blast or it’set afire'. Cultivated areas wifi limit wheeled vehicles, terraced vineyards on the
south sidpes-of Overlook-Rfdge; Bard's Peak, and tne r plateau at 9400 northeast'of -Canter-sbecg-wi:i restrict
the movements'bf tanks and heavy vehicles to road and trails in-those areas.
!c) Surface materials. Annex M (Weather Effects on Cross Country Movement Overlay). The soi
is generally wet in areas below 299 meters elevation. This wiii magnify the cratering effects ot subsurface
nuclear bursts in these locations. While capable of suoporting iigr.t tracked or wheeled vehicles, the soil
becomes spongy and boggy where the turf has been destroyed. Soil composition coes not favor tne production
of high intensities or radio activity. .. . i- ,
id) Artificial features. Tne enemy has constructed extensive artificial obstacles consisting
of minefields and wire, particularly on the east flank ano north of Hu I 3C5 (0490. Tnis win n inoar
movements ano limit use of certain AAs in these areas. Buildings and villages do not present significant
obstacles even if destroyeo by blast, except for the suburbs of Cartersberg or the east bank of the Maine
River. " : " ' i.
(4) - ; <ey Terrain Features,
- (a) Hill 351 (9807) and Overlook Ridgewest therec*. These terra features control the AAs
in the western arc central parts of our zone. The:mission wil> oe seriously jeopardized if these areas are
not secured.
(b! Hill 359 (0004). This h<li mass dominates the central and eastern AAs. its seizure is
essential to tne integrity and security of our forces, ano will facilitate fire ano maneuver to the south.
(c) Hill 334 (9400). This plateau controls the AAs in the western part of tne division zone,
it is key terrain if cur tactica: plans call for either a main attack or a supporting attack in the area.
(d) Hill 306 (9997). This hill provides dominant observation over a wide area in this part o
the division zone, its seizure and control will greatly-'enhance the security, fire, and maneuver of any our
forces attacking in this area.
_ (CLASSIFlCATiON) _
Figure A-25. Example and explanation of analysis of the AO (continued).
A- 120
Paragraph 3a(2) on concealment and cover, indicates or describes the influence of weather,
relief, vegetation, and artifical features. Effects of and on nuclear fires, surveillance
devices, chemical and enemy biological agents, and so forth are included as appropriate. The
discussion is oriented not only on protection of own and enemy forces, but also on other
operations to include use of guerrillas, infiltration and counter infiltration, deception,
Cl, armor, and artillery. It is also oriented on site requirement for CSS and tactical
installations. Include only marked effects that help in selection of friendly and enemy
courses of action.
Paragraph 3a(3) on obstacles indicates graphically or describes all natural and artificial
obstacles and the influence of relief, weather, vegetation, surface materials, and artifical
features. Effects, as appropriate, of and on nuclear fires, chemical and enemy biological
agents, and effects on trafficabiIitv and accessibility are included. If of significant
influence, the effect of each obstacle on possible friendly and enemy courses of action is
indicated. Obstacles and trafficabiIity influence site locations for CSS units.
Paragraph 3a(4) describes key terrain features based on the analysis of observations and
tire! concealment and cover, obstacles, and mission. Any locality or area the seizure,
retention, or control of which affords a marked advantage of either force is considered. The
influence of each key terrain feature listed is discussed briefly. The discussion is
oriented toward subsequent development of friendly and enemy courses of action. Key terrain,
features selected are revised as required by the coonander's decision and current situation.
Key terrain features may be omitted when the enemy has no capability to secure or control
terrain features that will materially affect the accomplishment of the mission.
A-121
(CLASSIFICATION)
(e) Hill 326 (1199), This hill dominates favorable terrain leading directly to tha eastarn
part of the division object ive.
(f) Hi I Is 305 (0490) and 322 (1394). This terrain system constitutes the division objective,
‘he mission cannot beaccompl ishad without securing it. Control of this ridge is also necessary to
ontinuat ion of the attack to the south,
(5) Avenues of Approach. Annax N (Avenues of Approach Overlay).
(a) Avai I able to enemy into our position.
t. Axis Hill 351 (9607)-Hill 361 (9709),
2. Axis Hill 339 (9206)-Hill 356 (9310).
3. Axis Hill 230 (OOIO)-Paris (9811)-Hill 364 (9613).
(b) Available to us into the enemy's position.
1. Axis Hill 3 5 6 (9310)-Hill 339 (9206)-Hill 334 (9400)-Hill 306 (9997)-Hill 305
[0490)-r idgs east thereof (Avenue A).
2. Axis Hi 11 361 (9709)-Hi 11 351 (9607)-Hi 11 359 (0004)-Auburn (0495)-ridge Hi 11 305
10490) to Hi 11 322 (1394) (Avenue B).
3. Axis Hi 11 361 (9709)-Hill 351 (9807)-Hill 359 (0004)-Hili 271 (0702)-Hi 11 326
[1199)- Hill322 (1394)-ridge west thereof (Avenue C).
4. Axis Hill 280 (OOIO)-Hill 262 (0803)-Hill 326 (1199)-Hill 322 (1394)-ridge west
[hereof (Avenue 9).
b. Combat services Support Aspects.
(1) Personnel. Character istics of the society are such that only unskilled civil Ian labor will be
available at any time. Employment of civilian labor to meet short-term objectives must be balanced careful ly
iga inat the long-term needs of harvesting rams in ing crops.
(2) Logistics. Lack of civilian food and SUPPI ias may impose added logistic burdens on our forces.
Some pi I ferage can be axpected. Few resources beyond basic natural resources ara avai I able formi I i tary use.
(3) Civi l-military operationa. Displacement of civil ians through the impressing of civil ian labor
>y the enemy and lack of food and supplies mi 11 create problems which, if not control lad, can impact on
mi i tarwperations. The existence of civil agencies capable of assuming the functions of governmentwi 11
help al aviate the problem. Homever, these agencies will require guidance.
4. EFFECTS OF CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA.
a. Ef feet on Enemy Courses of Action.
(1) Effect on enemy defense.
(a) Tarrain now held by the enemy favors defense in depth from present positions to the
division objective. The anemy has excel lent observation over al I Ms, and tha enemy's f tanks ara protected
by the rivers and canal on the west and artificial obstacles on the asst. The enemy’s beet defense areas are
the enemy-occupied forward pcs i t ions.
(b) The excel lent weather cond it ions favor enemy defense and perm! t tha enemy to use
supporting firea with maximum effectiveness.
(2) Effects on enemy attack.
(a) The enemy’s beat Mis the axis Hill 260 (0100) -Paris(9811)-Hi11 364 (9613),
(b) ‘feather cond it ions are such that the enemy wi 11 not be able to maneuver toward our
poe it ions without being observed except during tha hours of darkness. Tha lack of precipitat ion favors
cross-country mobility. _ (CLASSIFICATION) _
Figure A-25. Example and explanation of analysis of the AO (continued).
A-122
Paragraph 3a(5) describes the AAs that are developed from all the previous analyses of the
tactical aspects. Such development does not consider the disposition of the enemy forces.
An AA must afford some facility of movement and room for adequate dispersion for a force
large enough to have significant effect on the outcome of the operation. When either
opposing force has available and adequate number of aircraft that can be used to deploy
troops and equipment forward to the battle area and significantly affect the accomplishment
of the mission, AAAs are listed. If terrain and weather conditions do not significantly
influence choice of flight paths, then AAAs are not listed. Enemy AAs are listed first,
followed by a list of AAs into the enemy battle area. When the opposing forces are not in
contact, or when only security forces are in contact, AAs to the battle area for both forces
are listed. Each listing of an AA is accomplished by a brief discussion to provide a basis
for subsequent development of possible courses of action by either force. For CSS units, the
discussion of AAs is based on rear area security requirements.
Paragraph 3b analyzes the facts listed in paragraph 2, and the subconclusions developed under
tactical aspects. Indicate those facts and subconclusions that significantly affect CSS
activities influencing choices of possible courses of action by either force or by requiring
special activities to ensure adequate support. Omit any activity that is not significantly
influenced.
Paragraph 3b(I) addresses personnel. Personnel management is of particular importance when
weather and~ferrain conditions are severe, when the AO has a significant population and
potential labor forces, and when political and economic conditions are unsettled.
Paragraph 3b(2) covers logistics. Logistics is of particular importance when weather and
terrain conditions are severe, when the AO imposes additional logistic requirements and has
significant resources of military value, and when political and economic conditions are
unsettled. Coverage is particularly detailed for those camnands accomplishing their mission
by logistic support of other units.
Paragraph 3b(3) discusses civil-military operations. Civil-military operations are of
particular importance in cold war, limited war, occupation operations, and when extensive
civil affairs responsibilities have been assigned to the command, it is particularly
important to tactical units when the numbers of civilians in the area present control
problems and restrict use of fire power. Coverage is detailed for those camnands with
extensive civil affairs responsibilities.
Paragraph 4 contains the conclusions developed in the previous paragraphs. The conclusions
are stated in terms of effects on the general courses of action available to both forces.
Paragraph 4a(I)(a) lists in turn, each significant possible enemy course of action, such as
attack; defense; withdrawal; use of air, armor, nuclear fires, chemical agents, guerrillas,
etc. Each listed course of action (using separate subparagraphs) is accomplished by a
discussion, to indicate the characteristics of the area favoring the courses of action. For
attack courses of action, indicate the best AA . For defense courses of action, indicate the
best defense areas and, if appropriate, the best AA leading to the defense areas.
A-123
(CLASSIFICATION)
(3) Effect on enemy air,
(a) Weather and terrain favor enemy employment of air in the division AO.
(b) Terrain favors enemy delivery of nuclear weapons by low-level air attack.
(4) Effect on enemy use of nuclear weapons. Weather cond i t ions are favorable for enemy use of
nuclear weapons. Ef feet ive winds do not favor use of fallout. Rol I ing terrain, numerous folds in the
ground, and foliage will reduce thermal effects. Obstacles will be created by forest and tree blowdown.
(5) Effect on enemy chemical operations. Weather does not favor enemy use of chemicals. Terrain
favors use of persistent chemicals in the valley forward of the enemy’s present defensive positions.
b. Effect on Own Courses of Action.
(1) The best natural AA into the enemy area is axis Hill 280 (OOIO)-Hill 232 (0803)-Hill 326
(1199)-Hill 322 (1394)-ridge west thereof (Avenue D). It is blocked by extensive minefields.
(2) The second best AA is axis Hill 361 (97091-Hill 351 (9607)-Hill 359 (0004)-Hill 271
(0702)- Hi 11 326 (1199)-Hi 11 322 (1394)-ridge west thereof (Avenue A).
(3) Weather and terrain do not favor our attack. We will not be able to maneuver toward enemy
posit i one without being observed except during the hours of darkness. The lack of precipitation will favor
cross-country mobi I ity except below 200 meters elevation. Forest f ires end tree blowdown caused by use of
nuclear weapons in Nationel Forest will restrict mobility, observation, and FofFs.
(4) Effect on nuclear weapons. Weather conditions are favorable for the employment of nuclear
weapon. The rolling nature of the terrain, numerous folds in the round, and foliage will reduce effects on
nuclear bursts. The wooded areas are dry and subject to extensive burning. Soil composition does not favor
the production of high intensities of radioactivity. Winds generally favor employment by our forces of
radiation effects of fallout from nuclear weapons.
(5) Effect of chemical agents. Weather conditions are favorable for our use of chemicals.
Acknowledge.
MANN
OFFICIAL:
Isl Foster
FOSTER
G2
Annex: A-Climatic Sumer y (omitted)
B-Relief Overlay (omitted)
C-Orainage Overlay (omitted)
0-Slope Overlay (omitted)
E-Vegetation Overlay (omitted)
F-Vegetation Impeding Movement Overlay (omitted)
G-SoiIs Overlay (omitted
H-Built-up Areas and LQC Overlay (omitted)
1-Horizontal Visibility Overlay (omitted)
J-Fog Overlay (omitted)
K-Canopy Closure Overlay (omitted)
L-Combined Obstacles Overlay (omitted)
M-feather Effects on Cross Country Movement Overlay (omitted)
N-Avenues of Approach Overlay (omitted)
Distribution: A
(CLASSIFICATION)
Figure A-25. Example and explanation of analysis of the AO (continued).
A-124
Paragraph 4b lists, in turn, broad courses of action that mill accomplish or facilitate the
accompi ismant of the mission, such as attack; defense; withdrawal; or use of air, armor,
nuclear fires, chemical agents, and guerrillas. Each listed course of action is discussed in
the same manner as enemy courses of action.
Acknowledgement instructions included if distributed outside the headquarters. Normally, the
word 'acknowledge* is sufficient.
The signature block contains the name and rank of the commander and appears on all copies of
the analysis if distributed outside the headquarters. If not distributed outside the
headquarters, it is signed by the intelligence officer.
Authentication is required only if the analysis has not been signed by the coemander and is
to be distibuted outside the headquarters.
Annexes are listed by letter and title.
Distribution may refer to a standard distribution list.
A-125
PATROL REPORT
A patrol report is a written copy of verbal information reported
following a reconnaissance or combat patrol mission. The battalion S2
generally prepares this report. Figure A-26 showa the patrol report
format,
(DESIGNATION OF PATROL)
TO: _
MAPS :_
A. Size and composition of patrol.
B. Mission.
c. Time of departure.
D. Time of return.
E. Routes out and back.
F. Terrain. (description of the terrain--dry, swampy, jungle, thickly
wooded, high brush, rocky, deepness of ravines and draws: condition of
bridges as to type, size, and strength; effect on armor and wheeled
vehicles).
G. Enemy. (strength, disposition, condition of defense, equipment,
weapons, attitude, morale, exact location, movements, and any shift in
disposition; time activity was observed, coordinates where activity
occurred) .
H. Any map corrections.
I. (Not used.)
J. Miscellaneous information (include aspects of NBC warfare).
K. Results of encounters with enemy (enemy prisoners and disposition;
identifications, enemy casualties, captured documents and equipment).
L. Condition of patrol (including disposition of any dead or wounded).
M. Conclusions and recommendations (include to what extent the task was
accomplished and recommendations as to patrol equipment and tactics).
Signature Grade or Rank Org Unit of Patrol Leader
Figure A-26. Patrol report format.
A-126
N. Additional remarks
by interrogator.
Signature
Grade or Rank
Org Unit of Patrol Leader
Time
o. Distribution.
Figure A-26. Patrol report format (continued).
FRAGMENTARY ORDER
FRAGOs are extracts from more detailed orders or are issued to change
previous orders. Like warning orders, these are usually brief oral or
written messages. Mission orders are a form of FRAGOs which provide
experienced commanders with the essentials of an order (such as a new
mission or change to a peavious mission).
FRAGOs do not have a specified format; howaver, to ansure
understanding, the OPORD format is useful. A FRAGO is issued orally or in
writing. Those elements found in a complete order are omitted when they
have not changed, are not essential, or are incomplete at the time of
issue. As a general rule, a FRAGO--
0 Is addressed to each commandar required to take action.
0 Is addressed to higher and adjacent headquarters for information.
0 Refers to a previous order. Indicates task organization changes.
0 When necessary for clarity, includes a brief outline of the
situation that generated the requirement for a FRAGO, to include a
statement of the mission, if changed.
0 Provides brief and specific instructions without loss of clarity.
0 Requests acknowledgment.
0 Contains proper classification.
With command approval, FRAGOs are prepared and issued by either
coordinating or special staff officers with command approval. Figure A-27
shows an example of a FRAGO.
A-127
(CLASS IF I CAT ION)
COPY NO OF COP I ES
5 2 d Mech Div
Xrayville (6271), Missouri
141300 5 January 1980
Frag Order YZ55
Reference. OPORD 7
Map, Series V661, Sheet 7061,
Edition 1, Scale 1:50,000
TASK ORGANIZATION. C/52 Avn OPCON 3d Bde
Eff 141400 5 Jan
1. SITUATION. Estimated enemy tank regt
delaying advance of 1st Ode
2. MISSION. No change.
3. EXECUTION:
a. Div continues attack, 3d Bde bypasses
1st Bde in north and attacks in zone to
secure division objective. tst Bde becomes
reserve, follows 3d Bale. Priority of fires
to 3d Bale.
b. 1-42 FA OS 3d Bale.
c. 1-40 FA GSR 1-42 FA.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. No change.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
Tac CP currently at 3067.
ACKNOWLEDGE.
VON STEUBEN
MG
OFFICIAL:
YOUNG
G3
DISTRIBUTION: C
(Classification)
DC0M7308D/FEB83
Figure A-27. Example of a fragmentary order.
A-128
MISSION REPORT
The MISREP is used by all air units--strike or attack, reconnaissance
or surveillance, airlift, observation, and helicopter--to report the
results of all missions and significant sightings along the route of the
flight. The MISREP amplifies the inflight report and is normally
submitted within 30 minutes after aircraft landing to the tasking agency,
the requesting unit or agency, and to other interested organizations.
Upon completion of a tactical EW air task or mission, a debriefing is
conducted by intelligence personnel, and a MISREP is submitted.
Figure A-28 shows the MISREP format.
HEAD ING
PRECEDENCE
ORIGINATING AGENCY
ACTION ADDRESSEES
INFORMATION ADDRESSEES
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, CODE WORD, OR NICKNAME
MISREP ( Number) DATE-TIME GROUP (GMT)-MONTH-YEAR
BODY
1. AIR TASK OR MISSION NUMBER OR NICKNAME . Reference the request number,
FRAGO number, or directive causing initiation of the mission.
2. LOCATION IDENTIFIER . Target number, line number, approved target
designator or identifier, or coordinates of the target or sighting being
reported.
3. TIME ON TARGET OR TIME OF SIGHTING . Report all times by date-time
group, using Zulu time unless otherwise directed.
4. RESULTS AND SIGHTING INFORMATION . This item should contain the pilot
or aircrew evaluation of expected results (for example, percent destroyed,
number and type destroyed, or percent of coverage) and concise narrative
information on significant sightings (for example. unusual or new enemy
equipment or concentrations of enemy forces observed to include number,
spead, and direction (if applicable)).
5. REMARKS. Includes information not specifically mentioned in above
items (for example, enemy defenses encountered, weather data, hostile MIJI
attempts, and so forth).
Figure A-28. Mission report format.
A-129
ORDER OF BATTLE ANNEX TO THE PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Figure A-29 showa the format for an OB annex to the PERINTREP. Omit
items not applicable and renumber the remaining paragraphs.
All remaining entries are completed, and each entry contains an
evaluation of the source and information, to include the type of source.
Figure A-30 shows a completed sample of the OB annex.
(CLASSIFICATION)
ORDER OF BATTLE
Annex _ (OB) to PERINTREP NO _ Corp s, _
1. COMPOSITION AND DISPOSITION (see appendix 1, overlay). An overlay is
usually attached to present the graphic display of enemy units. The
initial subparagraphs always contain information pertaining to
organization. Information concerning identification and disposition is
listed by mentioning the highest echelons first, followed by subordinate
units from left to right or top to bottom, as displayed on the overlay.
Related items may be combined and presented in a single entry.
2. STRENGTH. Report information pertaining to enemy personnel, weapons,
and equipment losses during the period. Replacement rates and strength
figures of individual units may be listed.
3. TACTICS. Report only new tactics and deviations from prescribed
tactical doctrine.
4. TRAINING. Report new developments and recent changes in training
programs or methods of special training undertaken by the enemy since the
initiation of hostilities.
5. LOGISTICS. Report those items which will affect current enemy
operations, such as supply status, supply systems, and locations of supply
facilities.
6. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS. Report data on the combat effectiveness of
enemy units, either of the entire force or of a major tactical unit., List
items indicating morale, esprit, and quality of troops and commanders.
Describe the ability of the enemy unit to accomplish its expected mission.
(CLASSIFICATION)
Figure A-29. OB annex to PERINTREP format
(CLASSIFICATION)
7. MISCELLANEOUS DATA. List personalities, unit history, FPO, code
numbers and names, 06 changes, and any other item of 06 intelligence that
cannot be properly inserted in preceding paragraphs.
Acknowledge.
(SIGNATURE)
Appendixes:
Distribution:
OFFICIAL
(NAME OF G2)
Figure A-29. OB annex to PERINTREP format (continued).
A-131
Annex B (OB) to PERINTREP 29, 3 Corps, 201800 August 1985
ORDER OF BATTLE
1. COMPOSITION AND DISPOSITION (see appendix 1 overlay).
a. All EPW captured during period are from the enemy 2d Combined Arms
Army. Unit identification include--(C-l)
17 MRP _ 30 MRP _ 32 MRP _
283 MRR 141 MRR 132d Med Tk Regt
290 MRR 142 MRR
130 Tk Regt
130 Recon Bn
COMMENT. 32 MRD accepted as being organic to 2d CAA. 52 Tk Div
previously accepted, completing organization of 2d CAA.
b. Two large missile-type weapons mounted on large amphibious armored
carriers and several smaller vehicles identified in position vicinity MP
420513. (8-2) .
COMMENT. Probably elements of Free Rocket Regt, 2d CAA, previously
uniocated.
c. Captured enemy field order reveals plan to attach 40 Tk Div to 2d
CAA effective 22 Aug. (B-l).
COMMENT. EPW previously reported 40th Tk Div moving to reinforce 2d
CAA . Enemy main effort probably planned for this area.
2. STRENGTH.
Enemy losses reported during period:
EPW
KIA
ARTY ARMOR
AIR
VEH
16 MRD 37
302
2
4
1
21
30 MRD 16
52
8
1
...
16
32 MRD 8
12
—
—
—
4
Total 111 US Corps Sector 61
366
10
5
1
41
COMMENT. The marked increase in personnel losses during the period
have been sustained primarily by enemy combat patrols. Aircraft loss was
HI, observation helicopter, equipped with aeronautics radar. Overall
strength of 2d CAA is generally not affected.
(CLASSIFICATION)
Figure A-30. Sample OB annex.
A-132
(CLASSIFICATION)
3. TACTICS.
a. EPW from 16 MRD and 30 MRD state they have been instructed, in the
event their units are cut off, to continue fighting as guerilla units or
in small groups, live off the land, and destroy as much US Army property
as possible before gradually infiltrating back to friendly lines. (C-6) .
COMMENT. Intensive guerrilla activity in our rear aress can be
expected if elements of these units are cut off.
b. Enemy documents captured 07 Aug included a training pamphlet for
battalion, company, and platoon commanders, written by GD Griboyedov
entitled “Tanks Out Front,’” (appendix 3). It advocates tactics permitting
US patrols and advancing forces to pass through aggressor lines. A
coordinated tank-infantry attack is then made on open flanks and rear
elements with tanks continuing momentum of attack to destroy remaining US
forces. (B-2) .
COMMENT. Considering enemy doctrine that tanks are the decisive arm,
the above tactic is possible, particular y in review of reports of
probable employment of 40 Tk Div (para 1
4. TRAINING.
a. Reference paragraph 3b.
b. Indications of enemy concern for communications security (COMSEC)
is noted in document captured from 2d CAA dated 10 Aug, directing all
subordinate units to immediately initiate intensive training in radio
security and communications procedures. (B-2) .
COMMENT. Ml units confirm enemy lack of radio discipline and states
that security violations increase during reinforcement and relief
operations. Numerous enemy security violations have been noted since
17 Aug, further substantiating reinforcement or relief of 2d CAA units.
5. LOGISTICS.
a. EPW state enemy supply personnel have recently contacted local
merchants, farmers, and fishermen for supplies of most class I items.
(C-6) .
(CLASSIFICATION)
Figure A-30. Sample OB annex (continued).
A-133
(CLASSIFICATION)
COMMENT: Enemy either has critical shortage of class I items or has a
bottleneck in the supply system requiring local procurement of these items.
b. Air and ground reconnaissance patrols have reported enemy
stockpiling large quantities of supplies and equipment in rear areas of
frontline divisions. (B-2) .
COMMENT. Not normal supply procedures. Significance as yet
undetermined. Would indicate enemy may be planning major offensive soon.
6. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS.
a. EPW from 16 MRD and 30 MRD state morale is high but senior officers
are disgruntled because their units always receive difficult missions while
the 32 MRD and 56 Tk Div have, until recently, been assigned lass hazardous
missions. (F-6) .
COMMENT. Analysis of unit history and recent operations of enemy 2d
CAA indicates it has usually been highly successful in combat. This, and
the fact that 2d CAA has always had fine commanders, would account for high
morale in units. This is first indication of dissatisfaction among officer
personnel. Report seems cogent, however, since 32 Mech Div has not baen
engaged in combat with US Forces in this campaign.
b. EPW reports 30 MRD to be redesignated 30 “Fusilier” Mech Div for
superior combat record. (F-6) .
COMMENT. Ill US Corps rates combat effectiveness of 30 MRD from
excellent to outstanding in comparison to other enemy divisions in same
sector. 30 MRD casualties have been comparatively small; no deserters have
been apprehended and its operations have been executed with determination.
7. MISCELLANEOUS DATA.
a. Personalities identified by EPW: (c-l).
CG, 40th Tk Div GD GRIBOYEDOV, Semyon P. (Ref 3b)
CO, 282 MRR Col CARDUCCI, Gherardo S.
CO, 283 MRR Col UNDSET, Bjornstjerna (Acting CO)
CO, 130 Med Tk Regt Col STEENWYK, Martin J.
CO, 132 Med Tk Regt Cot MATTEZ, Mario
(CLASSIFICATION)
Figure A-30. Sample OB annex (continued).
A-134
(CLASSIFICATION)
COMMENT. Confirms previously obtained information.
b. Unit history. Officer EPW stated that unit (32 MRR) trained
extensively in special tactics for assault of river lines. (F-6) .
COMMENT. Special training received by 32 MRD should increase its
overall effectiveness when employed in river-crossing operations. No
evidence of other units so trained.
c. Field post numbers: Captured document reveals enemy FPN being
used as identification symbols on documents and messages. First two and
last three digits are transposed. FPN of 46 MRD will appear as 75031
instead of 31750. (B-1) .
COMMENT. Enemy has employed this system previously as a security
measure. Expect this system of transposing digits will occur in different
patterns during future operations.
Acknowledge.
LEE
LTG
Appendixes: I—Enemy Disp Overlay
2— Enemy Army Organization Chart
3- -Enemy Training Pamphlet
Distribution: Same as PERINTREP 29
OFFICIAL
GRANT
G2
(CLASSIFICATION)
Figure A-30. Sample OB annex (continued).
A-135
STANDARD COLLECTION ASSET REQUEST FORMAT
The standard collection asset request format (SCARF) is used for
intelligence requirements tasking and for requesting information from
higher or adjacent headquarters. At corps and division, intelligence
requirements tasking is directed toward Ml commanders and commanders of
other elements of the combat force capable of collecting the information.
Intelligence requirements tasking provides the selected unit with a
specific requirement, but not with specific instructions for carrying out
the mission. The SCARF specifies--
°The information needed.
“Where to look for the movers, shooters, sitters, and emitters.
“When to look.
“When the information is needed.
“What to look with, in some cases.
Figure A-31 showa the SCARF format.
A-136
A.
B.
c.
unit)).
o.
E.
F.
H.
I .
J.
Requester number.
Originator priority.
Activity or target type (area emitter and size (point, area, or
BE number, ELINT notation or case.
Location (if known or last known).
Ouration--
"Start date-time.
"Frequency.
"Stop date-time.
"Latest acceptable date-time for information utility.
Location accuracy--
"Required.
"Acceptable.
PIR and information desired.
Justification.
Remarks (to include disciplines and collectors recommended).
Figure A-31. SCARF basic format.
A-137
AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE REQUEST
The aerial R&S request is used to request a tactical air
reconnaissance or surveillance mission. The form states requirements,
identifies needs, and, occasionally, specifies the actual air asset to
perform the mission.
Any echelon initiates the request. It is used for both immediate and
preplanned mission requirements. The requester oompletes section I of the
request for each specific mission. Normally, these requests are
transmitted by electrical means. The headquarters receiving the request
adds information required to val idate or complete the request.
Figure A-32 shows the aerial R&S request form. This format is the same as
the format used for joint service operations.
A-138
[p OSSIFICATION
__ uncles
1 reE
[REQUESTOR
Iff
0408007 :
’em)
ACTION:
INFO:
IrtWMl cmtAmmh
i—r
E R0H:
IBFO:
NOT FOR TRANSMISSION
l ORIGINATOR SERIAL NO.
HOOC
L-AIR RECON REQUEST/AIR RECON TASK NO: £0 / / £2
M l TYPE OF SENSOR
M.2 TECHNIQUE
M I-Cfi^lpMOTO HlELECTROWC [T]SLAR [T]|R CD suifuiF
M-2- (Xij^Eimm rn OBLIQUE |T] PANORAMIC [T]
N MAP SERIES SHEET NO
AND EDITION NO.
«- mips Sheet R/OZ Ed 2
0.1 TARGET LOCATION
0 2 TARGET DESCRIPTION
32a AID 7H78<*(* (uTH',
01 TIARA AIRFlD
OBJECT AND
P RESULTS 0ES1RE0
(TARGET CATEGORY)
' CAT 0(0 Tiems 2,3,U f 7
Q PHOTO SCALE
0- BeSt PeSStble | | 1 BEST POSSIBLE
R NO. PRINTS, PLOTS. RPTS
« ZPrR/z Sets Prints Stereo Cover of Am fid
DELIVERY ADDRESS
S DATE TIME REO
s- TPIR to HQ. OC, DefiAtR (NFO 21
LATEST ACCEPTABLE
T DATE TIME FOR DELIVERY
1 ML.T 0108001 Jure 87> Prints (H/Zoo? June S3 l
U SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
U.1 TOT
U.2 PRIORITY
U.3 TARGET SECURITY CLASS
U4 REMARKS
“ TNPLT REP CATO/
U.2- | | PRI-1 | | PRI-2 | | PRI-3
U.3-
U.4-
V TASKING INSTRUCTIONS
V m SOA/j /< RHFC
COPIES TO ARMY CZ3
COMM CTR I I ATTACK I I
CURRENT OPS I I RECOR I I
IRT CZD EW I I
OTHc R
Tdtg
A
INITIALS
Figure A-32. Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance request form.
A-139
Figure A-33 shows an air reconnaissance request and task format that
is keyed to letter designators of message elements. An explanation of
each of these letter designators follows in Figure A-34.
Air Reconnaissance Task
AIR RECON TASK
(Format-not transmitted)
(Example message)
L.
Originators request and
task number.
L.
HQOC 468/82.
M.
Type of recon.
M.
PHOTOGRAPHIC, VERTICAL.
N.
Map series, sheet no and
edition.
N.
M745 SHEET 4102 EDITION 2.
o.
Location and description
of target.
o.
32U ND 747866 (UTM) TIARA
AIRFIELD
P.
Purpose of request and
reporting codes.
P.
CAT OID ITEMS 2, 3, 6, 7.
Q.
Photo scale or limits.
Q.
BEST POSSIBLE.
R.
Products required.
R.
IPIR/2SETS PRINTS PROVIDING
STEREO COVER OF TIARA
AIRFIELD.
s.
Delivery address.
s.
IPIR TO HQOC, DEFAIR INFO 27
SO PRINTS HQOC/TGTS-1,
DEFAIR/DAFIS.
T.
Date-time limitation.
T.
TOT NOT BEFORE 0706002 JUN
83 BUT NOT LATER THAN
0708002 JUN 83. PRINTS
REQUIRED NOT LATER THAN
0912002 JUN 83.
U.
Special instructions.
u.
INFLIGHTREP CAT 01 ITEMS 3,
V .
Tasking and mission data.
V .
14 SON, 1 X R4FC.
Figure A-33. Air reconnaissance request and task format.
A-140
Explanation of letter designators.
L. ORIGINATOR’S REQUEST NUMBER . The originator’s request number usually
consists of a unit identifier and a sequential numbering system. Commands
may assign blocks of numbers to subordinate units to prevent confusion.
if necessary to assist the tasking agency, commands also may establish a
system of priorities for reconnaissance tasking and promulgate priority
designators to be used in the originator’s request number.
M. TYPE OF RECONNAISSA NCE. Visual, electronic, weather, photographic,
and so forth. Additionally, if the requester requires a specific type of
sensor, system, or format to be used for some reason (such as a vertical
photograph for briefing purposes), it is specified. Such detail generally
should be omitted, however, to allow flexibility in planning and tasking.
N. MAP SERIES Z SHEET NUMBER. AND EDITION . Self-explanatory.
o. LOCATION AND DESCRIPTION OF TARGET . The target location or areas to
be searched is indicated by the appropriate coordinate reference. The
coordinate reference system used (for example, UTM grid, latitude or
longitude) is identified clearly. Predetermined search areas or LOC
segments can be nominated by relevant designators. A brief description of
the target, its name and BE number (where known) should be included.
P. PURPOSE OF REQUEST AND REPORTING CODES . It is most important that
tasking agencies and reconnaissance units understand the exact purpose of
the request. Where possible, the code statements in appropriate reference
books are used to identify the target category, reconnaissance purpose,
and items to be reported. Otherwise, a plain language statement of
purpose is provided.
Q. PHOTOGRAPHIC SCALE OR LIMITS . The photographic scale or limits should
not be specified unless there is a specific reason for doing so; for
example, survey photography or imagery is to be used for a particular task
that requires it to be at a nominated scale or physical dimension. If the
scale is nominated, care must be taken to differentiate whether the scale
appl ies to the original film or to the end product requested (item R).
R. PRODUCTS REQUIRED . Specify the reports (RECCEXREP, IPIR, and any
other end product) required. If photographs are required, specify
quantities and the size or scale desired. Photographs should be requested
only when essential and a report will not suffice. Quantities must be
kept to an absolute minimum.
s. DELIVERY ADDRESS . State clearly where the report is to be delivered.
For reports, nominate both action and information addressees.
Figure A-34. Explanation of letter designators.
A-141
T. DATE AND TIME LIMITATIONS . Specify any time constraints on the
mission and follow-up actions. In particular, specify the date and time
after which the information will no longer be of value. If the task
cannot be accomplished by this date, it will be cancel led automatically.
u. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS . Give instructions or information not provided
elsewhere that will aid in the planning or accomplishing of the mission.
This includes control arrangements, communications, security instructions,
details of own forces, or other pertinent entries.
v. TASKING AND MISSION DATA . This is completed by the mission tasking
agency. It generally details the unit and number and type of aircraft.
The mission number for the task is the originator's request number,
abbreviated if necessary.
Figure A-34. Explanation of letter designators (continued).
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE TACTICAL REPORT
The purpose of the SIGINT TACREP is to transmit combat information to
fire and maneuver elements. It also is used to transmit technical data to
traffic and analysis teams or to the TCAE. It is normally sent by
electrical message or by secure FM voice radio means. it is designed to
present highly perishable information in a clear, concise, and
easy-to-read format. Distribution is made according to local guidance or
as directed by higher commands. An annotated format is available in the
classified appendix to FM 34-80.
A-142
MEACONING, INTRUSION. JAMMING. AND INTERFERENCE REPORT
The MIJI report is used to pass information from operators to their
units about actual or suspected enemy attempts to interfere with, jam, or
deceive voice, teletypewriter, or MC signals. The report is submitted by
the operator whose communications means is affected, through the net
control station (in the case of FM voice), to the unit’s C-E officer. The
C-E off icer coordinates this report with the EW officer, the intelligence
off icer and the supporting Ml unit.
MIJI reports are transmitted; however, if they are transmitted over
nonsecure equipment, reports are encrypted using the brevity list. See
FM 34-40 for additional information about MIJI reports and brevity lists.
Figure A-35 shows the MIJI report format.
LINE
1
- Type of report
LINE
2
- Affected station
LINE
3
- Station’s location or. arid coordinates
LINE
4
- Freauencv or channels affected
LINE
5
- Type of equipment affected
LINE
6
- Type emission or audio characteristics of interference _
LINE
7
- Strenath of interference
LINE
8
- Time interference started
LINE
9
- Interference effectiveness
LINE
10
- Operator’s name and rank
LINE
11
- Remarks
m
Figure A-35. Meaconlng, intrusion, jamming, and interference report.
A-143
ORAL REPORTS
Briefings are oral reports that present information to commanders,
staffs, or other designated audiences. The techniques employed are
determined by the purpose of the briefing, the desired response, and the
role of the briefer. There are four types of military briefings:
“Information briefing.
“Decision briefing .
“Staff briefing.
“Mission briefing.
The two most important briefing formats to intelligence officers and
analysts at the tactical level are the information and decision
briefings. An explanation of these two briefings follows.
INFORMATION BRIEFING
The information briefing is intended to inform and gain the listener’s
understanding. The briefing does not include conclusions or
recommendations, or require decisions. The briefing deals primarily with
facts. The briefer states that the purpose of the briefing is to provide
information and that no decision is required. The briefer provides a
short introduction to define the subject and to orient the listener and
then presents the information. Figure A-36 shows the information briefing
format.
DECISION BRIEFING
Decision briefings are intended to obtain an answer or a decision.
They are used to present a staff officer’s or intelligence analyst’s
recommended solution resulting from analysis or study of a problem or
problem araa. They vary as to formality and detail depending on the level
of command and the-decision maker’s knowledge of the problem or problem
area. In situations where the person receiving the briefing has” prior
knowledge of the problem and some information relating to it, the briefing
normally is limited to a statement of the problem, essential background
information, and a recommended solution. However, the briefer is prepared
to present the assumptions, facts, alternative solutions, or reason(s) for
choosing the recommended solution, and any coordination required. If the
person who is being briefed is unfamiliar with the problem or the facts
surrounding it, then a more detailed briefing is necessary. In this case,
the briefing includes any assumptions used in analyzing the problem, facts
bearing on the problem, discussion of the alternatives, conclusions, and
the coordination involved.
A-144
1, INTRODUCTION.
a. Greeting. Use military courtesy, address the person(s) being
briefed, and identify self.
b. Classification. Announce the classification of your briefing.
c. Purpose. Explain the purpose and scope.
d. Procedure. Explain any special procedures such as demonstrations,
displays, or tours.
2. BODY.
a. Arrange main ideas in logical sequence.
b. Use visual aids correctly.
c. Plan for effective transitions.
d. Be prepared to answer questions at any time.
3. CLOSE.
a. Ask for questions.
b. Concluding statement.
c. Announce the next briefer, if any.
Figure A-36. Information briefing format.
In the introduction, it is stated that the briefer is seeking a
decision. At the conclusion, if the briefer does not receive a decision,
the briefer asks for it. The briefer should understand the decision
thoroughly. If there is uncertainty, the briefer asks for clarification.
In this regard, a precisely worded recommendation that is used as a
decision statement, once approved by the commander, assists in eliminating
possible ambiguities. Following the briefing, if the executive officer is
not present, the briefer informs the next highest ranking officer or the
staff secretary of the decision. Figure A-37 shows the decision briefing
format.
A-145
1 .
INTRODUCTION,
a. Greeting . Use military courtesy, address persons being briefed,
and identify seif.
b. Classification . Announce the classification of the briefing,
c. Purpose . State that the purpose of the briefing is to obtain a
dec sion and announce the problem statement.
d. Procedure. Explain any special procedures to be used, such as
add itional briefers. Omit if not required.
e. Coordination . Indicate what coordination has been accomplished,
2. BODY.
a. Assumptions . Must be valid, relevant, and essential to a solution
to the problem. Omit if there are none.
b. Facts Bearing on the Problem . Must be supportable, relevant, and
necessary.
c. Discussion. Analyze courses of action. Use smooth transitions
between discussions of each course of action.
d. Conclusions . Degree of acceptance or order-of-merit for each
course of action.
e. Recommendations . State actions recommended. Must be specific,
not a solicitation of opinion.
3. CLOSE.
a. Ask for Questions .
b. Reguest a Decision .
Figure A-37. Decision briefing format.
A-146
APPENDIX B
AUTOMATION SUPPORT TO INTELL I GENCE ANALYSIS
During the past forty years, the battlefield has evolved from a
relatively simple environment to one that is increasingly sophisticated in
terms of collection systems and communications capabilities. Current
collection systems incorporate state-of-the-art components and advanced
technology. Deployed using Army-approved doctrine against known enemy
capabilities, they exhibit the ability to collect vast amounts of
information from a battlefield environment rich in enemy targets.
Parallel advances in communications capabilities complement sensor system
advances and provide the ability to transmit information faster and more
efficiently than at any other time in history.
As the information flow increases, progressively more time is needed
to identify, verify, and organize the information needed to produce
intelligence. Yet, intelligence production methods and procedures have
not kept pace with the advances made in collection systems and
communications. Information collected by technologically advanced sensor
systems and sent and received over high-speed communications equipment is
still processed individually as it is received by manually sorting,
recording, and filing it. Clearly, to produce the intelligence the
commander needs, when it’s needed, these manual processing functions must
be updated and expanded.
This appendix describes how current and emerging automated systems
support intelligence analysis. It w i 11 - -
° Describe general computer system configuration and basic tactical
military computer system capabilities and limitations.
"Discuss two current tactical semiautomated systems: MICROFIX and
Intelligence Data Processing Set.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS SUPPORT
ADP systems support efficient and timely intelligence production.
This support upgrades the ability of analysts to deal with the vast
amounts of information produced during the course of a battle. These
systems are designed to supplement, not replace, existing manual analysis
support systems. They provide expanded capabilities during the storage;
access, retrieval , and manipulation; recording and record-keeping; and
dissemination portions of the intelligence production process. These
capabilities provide the analyst with substantially more time to devote to
intelligence analysis.
Using ADP systems, the analyst not only stores more information in
less space but the information is consolidated with other information and
with previously produced intelligence. With this additional storage
capacity, the analyst accesses data bases such as IPB or ground OB data
from the same system. Consolidating this data onto one system lets the
analyst quickly and easily retrieve and manipulate the data and
information needed to support the intelligence analysis process. With
more information to work from, the analyst develops a better picture of
the battlefield environment. This reduces risk and uncertainty.
ADP systems also provide the means to access this information quickly
and easily. Data is accessed in seconds, rather than minutes or hours.
By retrieving various types of information and using the computer
capabilities to arrange this information in different patterns,
information is manipulated to test previously established hypotheses or to
create a new hypotheses based upon new or emerging patterns. Through this
process of electronic comparison and contrast, the computer helps the
analyst determine unit identifications, strengths, and enemy commanders’
intent.
Computer system capabilities is used to facilitate and complement
manual methods and procedures. For example, computers are programed to
automatically record message header information into a separate file which
subsequently is printed and placed in a three-ring binder. This provides
a duplicate file that is easy to maintain and keep current and requires a
minimum of time and effort. A record of all intelligence messages and
products is printed. This establishes a record of all outgoing
intel 1 igence products and messages, including a list of all users
receiving that message or product. When manual recording is kept to a
minimum, it leaves more time for the analyst to develop intelligence.
Another example of a manual system being eased with ADP is recording
and storing preprogrammed formats. The computer assists the analyst in
preparing a variety of reports, summaries, and other intelligence
documents and message formats electronically. Once correctly formatted,
previously created lists of addresses and users are selected and
automatically printed. If electronic message sending capabilities exist,
messages are sent directly from the terminal. This capability
significantly reduces the amount of time necessary to prepare, route, and
transmit products to users, and the amount of time the intelligence
analyst spends preparing and disseminating them.
These tasks are continuous and require time and the ability to
assimilate large amounts of data quickly and accurately. The use of ADP
enhances the analyst’s abil ity to perform these tasks. It is a tool which
provides the analyst with the ability to access and use more information
and resources than manual processes provide.
COMPUTER SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
Every computer system is composed of hardware and software. Hardware
is the actual physical equipment-or components--that make up the total
ADP system. Software is a series of commands, recognized by the computer,
it tells the computer how to perform a variety of functions.
B-2
Hardware
Typical system hardware consists of a keyboard; central processing
unit; storage device (disk drive); display or monitor; and printer. These
basic hardware components access files, input new information, manipulate
data and information, and display or print data of information which the
analyst selects to perform analysis and produce intelligence. Figure B-l
shows the basic computer components.
Figure B-1 Basic computer components.
Keyboard . The keyboard serves as the primary input device to the
computer. Normally, the keyboard contains the same letters, numbers, and
punctuation keys as a standard typewriter. The computer keyboard also
contains special function keys which are used to initiate various computer
functions.
B-3
Processor . The processor is the component that executes the commands from
the programs. It controls the flow of information into, within, and out of
the computer. It also contains a limited amount of the computer’s memory.
Storage Devices . Information is stored inside the processor in special
memory locations or in a separate storage device. Examples of storege
devices are floppy or removable disks, magnetic tape, large capacity hard
cartridge or fixed disks, and cassette tapes, or cartridges. The computer
periodically reads these devices during each computing session in order to
perform programs selected by the analyst. Conversely at the end of the
computing session, data is saved to these devices if it is to be
permanently retained. Information solely left displayed on the monitor or
in the processor is lost when the system’s power is shut off.
Display, The display is a cathode ray tube (CRT) (commonly referred to as
a monitor). The monitor displays text, charts, graphs, or maps (depending
upon system configuration and capabilities). It is similar to a television
screen and is monochromatic or color.
Printer. Printers are similar to high-speed typewriters. Information from
the processor is read and the output is printed on computer paper or bond
paper. This provides the analyst with a permanent record (hard copy] of
the information.
Peripherals
Other components are integrated into the basic ADP system to provide
specialized or expanded capabilities. Whether or not components are added
to a system depends upon several factors. First, the original system is
designed so that it can be expanded. Second, expansion modules, add-on
components, or peripherals are compatible with the existing system. Third,
software limitations and design constraints are considered. Depending upon
these factors, some of the following components are integrated into a
tactical ADP system:
"Video disk players (VDPs). VDPS al low map, text, photographs, or
any information that can be stored on video disks to be displayed on
a monitor.
"Modems and communications networks. This equipment allows
information to be passed directly from one computer to another. The
modem connects directly to the telephone jack and transmits and
receives data through telephone lines. Provides interface between
data processing systems over communications lines. Paper tape
reader/punch (PTR/P) devices provide the capability to generate and
read tactical RATT messages via paper tape.
"Video cassette recorders (VCRs). Identical to VCRs used for home
entertainment, some systems have programs that al low a VCR to be
connected to the processor for use as a back-up and restore device.
B-4
Software
Software provides the instructions, tools, and basic programing
required for computer system functions. There are many types of software;
however, every system must have an operating system to be able to
function.
Operating System Software . This software enables the computer to run
applications. This operating system, which also is referred to as a
control program, is thought of as a traffic cop. It regulates all actions
within the processor and determines when any of the peripherals are
activated. Another vital function performed by the operating system is to
act as a translator between the users’ language (English, German, Spanish)
and the computer’s language (binary).
Data Base Management Systems (DBMS) Softwar e. DBMS software turns the
computer into a high-powered, automated filing cabinet. This data base
file is sorted on nearly any variable in the file’s structure. The
computer also extracts records in the file that match a very exacting
criteria, or extract just selected bits of information (fields) about all
the records in the file. This allows the analyst to manipulate data in
varying ways to get a clearer picture of the battlefield and perhaps
identify previously unrecognized patterns.
Word Processing Software . A word processing program turns the computer
into a high-powered, automated typewriter. This software gives the
analyst the ability to compose briefings, reports, and messages, and to
perform editing functions for storage, printing, and display.
Applications Programs . These programs are the actual commands that
perform the automated operations the analyst requires. These are written
in a DBMS or computer language. Some common languages are BASIC, PASCAL,
and FORTRAN.
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Advantages and disadvantages depend on the system, software, and
training. The analyst uses the ADP system to store and manipulate facts
or data that, when analyzed, produce intel I igence.
Advantages
In general, for any system, the advantages of automated support to
intelligence analysis lie primarily in the areas of information management
and dissemination. ADP systems help the analyst disseminate information
with speed and increased accuracy.
Speed. ADP support is particularly useful to the analyst because of the
speed at which computers can perform calculations and assemble specific
data from a large body of information. Given accurate data input, the
computer produces a faster, more accurate output than is obtained through
human calculation. Stress or pressure do not degrade ADP operations.
They carry out prespecified tasks almost indefinitely. A caution about
B-5
computers being more accurate than humans working in a purely manual
mode. Humans respond almost instantly to questions requiring a
judgmental response: “’What are the 10 most significant actions in the
last 12 hours?’” The computer cannot make such a response. To a computer,
a report about the movement of the independent tank battalion carries the
same weight as a report about three wheeled vehicles moving along an
unidentified road.
Report Generation . When ADP systems are equipped with word processing
capability, the analyst creates reports, messages, summaries, or other
intelligence-related documents quickly and easily.
Electronic Communication . If ADP systems are netted, that is, linked
together, data is transmitted directly from terminal to terminal. If they
are not netted, a messenger sends correctly formatted diskettes, as well
as hard copy reports. However, diskettes offer the advantage of being
able to be loaded into the receiving person’s computer. In any case,
copies of the message are produced and then transmitted over established
tactical communications channels. In either event, the ability to
disseminate intelligence products is substantially improved over more
traditional methods of dissemination.
Disadvantages
Understanding the System . Most of the disadvantages of ADP support to
intelligence analysis result from a lack of computer literacy or an
understanding of specific ADP system limitations and capabilities.
Analysts and commanders tend to assign capabilities to the system that it
does not possess. This results in an unrealistic view of the support ADP
provides to the commander and creates a false reliance on the computer
system by the analyst.
Computers perform only those functions they are explicitly told to do.
They do not learn from mistakes, nor will they correct improper input.
Therefore, the data stored in the computer is only as accurate as the data
that is entered. Computers also have a finite capacity to store data.
Design parameters establish this capacity. While additional storage
capacity is provided by add-on component storage equipment, when maximum
storage limits are reached, old data is deleted to make room for new
input. Dual record-keeping procedures, both manual and automated, are
established and kept in an updated status. If ADP capabilities are
interrupted or lost, this ensures that intelligence production continues.
Multi-Processing. Another disadvantage is that some tactical systems
cannot input, process, and output data simultaneously. Others only al lOw
access to a shared data base on a one-by-one basis. Therefore, the
analyst determines which data is most important and balances input,
output, or access functions to best support the mission. This is critical
to appropriate and maximum use of the ADP system.
Environment . Computers also are vulnerable to environmental conditions
and influences like temperature extremes, weather conditions, power
fluctuations, and power outages. Terrain constraints also may affect ADP
access, system mobility, or system capabilities.
B-6
Temperature extremes, like alternating very hot and very cold weather
cause condensation. Condensation inhibits the read and write ability of
the system. Extreme temperatures also result in partial or complete loss
of previously input data. For example, rain, fog, and high or low
humidity cause partial or even complete system failure.
Static electricity also results in partial or complete loss of data.
Planned power outages require shutdown of all computer functions
immediately before and during the length of the outage. Unplanned power
outages or power surges not only shut down computer functions, but also
result in varying degrees of hardware or software damage or data loss.
Severe weather conditions, like lightning or dust storms, produce the
same effects as unplanned power outages or power surges. Dust in the read
and write heads of hard and floppy disk dr ives result in inaccurate input,
output, data loss, or total destruction of disk capability.
Terrain also is a factor in ADP systerm survivabi I ity and use. Each
time the system is moved, leveling is required before the system is
operational . Crossing rough terrain under highly mobile conditions
partially damages or completely destroys the ADP system. Also, while
mobile, current systems are inoperative. Data accumulated while the
computer system is down or inoperative must be saved and input when
circumstances permit. This means that when the system initially returns
to an operational status, it does not provide data for irrrnediate analysis
until the data base has been updated. If the accumulation of data is such
that input requires a substantial amount of time, the analyst finds that
manual systems and data bases support the commander’s intelligence needs
more efficiently.
Many of these disadvantages apply, in whole or in part, to all
tactical battlefield electronic and automated systems. When the
capabilities and limitations of ADP systems are thoroughly understood,
measures are taken to protect the system while making maximum use of ADP
support to intelligence analysis. By taking these factors into account,
ADP support to intelligence analysis is a viable tool which the analyst
uses to give the commander a more complete, accurate, and timely picture
of the battlefield.
CURRENT AUTOMATED SUPPORT SYSTEMS
The US Army currently has two systems deployed specifically to support
tactical SIGINT and all-source intelligence analysis functions: the
MICROFIX and the TCAC. The MICROFIX assists the analyst in fulfilling the
commander’s need for information and intelligence on the AirLand
Battlefield. The TCAC provides a variety of SIGINT and EW asset mission
management functions, as well as to assist the analyst. Both of these
systems are designed to enhance the analyst’s ability to manipulate large
quantities of unprocessed or partially processed data. Information is
quickly and easily added, deleted, or moved. Historical enemy locations,
enemy strengths, equipment, and unit designations, and specific enemy
equipment capabilities and limitations are accessed from previously stored
data base information. In fact, the analyst accesses data that is limited
B-7
only by storage capability, the data bases available for review, and the
information or data the analyst elects to input into the system during the
course of the battle.
Since the TCAC system is found only in USAREUR and XVIII Airborne
Corps, (and is a non-TOE--table of organization and equipment--item) this
manual does not address it in detail.
MICROFIX
MICROFIX was introduced into the Army as a training device. The
system exists to provide Ml soldiers an opportunity to become familiar
with computers before future automated systems, such as the al l-source
analysis system (ASAS), are introduced. The purpose of MICROFIX also is
to support the tactical analyst, as OB analyst (96B), SIGINT analyst
(98C), counter-SIGINT analyst (97G), Cl agent (97B), or a terrain analyst
(12 CMF). The MICROFIX gives the analyst the capability to input data
into complex data bases. The analyst manipulates this data to provide a
source of accurate and frequently updated knowledge about past and present
enemy activities. This information assists the analyst in determining
enemy courses of action and developing counter-strategy. The MICROFIX
system also produces various reports and data files which are generated by
the analyst. The system is menu-driven (all the user’s options are on the
screen at all times) and quite easy to use. Figure B-2 shows the MICROFIX
system.
The system is based on the Apple II Pulse Microcomputer and
incorporates other off-the-shelf components. TEMPEST engineering provides
emission security between components of the system. Expansion cards
provide the capability to control a large amount of peripheral equipment
in the field environment. Figure B-3 outlines the hardware components of
the MICROFIX system.
Figure B-4 shows further details regarding the eight basic components
of the MICROFIX system. The MICROFIX is mounted in an AN/TYQ-5 data
analysis center or in any shelter, tent, or building the G2 considers
appropriate. Since both power boxes, the power conditioner, and the
standby power supply, have surge protectors, the system is powered by
either commercial power or a filed generator. Both styles of VDP and
power box are shown, but only one VDP and one power box comes with each
system.
In addition to the eight basic components shown in Figure B-4, two
special components are available. The VCR and PTR/P are issued on a 1:3
to 1:4 ratio; one component for every three or four MICROFIX systems. The
VCR is used to backup and restore the entire 20 megabyte memory of the
hard disk. The PTR/P is used to cut a five or seven band of paper tape.
The message is generated in the system’s word processor (Wordstar) and,
once properly edited, the MICROFIX system cuts the tape. Figure B-5
provides details on these two components.
B-8
S—1
r!
- M -
B
to*
1
L
tee at
31
Monochrome
Monitor
Color Monitor
CPU
Hard Disk
Keyboard
Standby Power
Supply
■ Printer
Front-Loading
■ Video Disk
Player
View with Front-Loading Video Disk Player
and Standby Power Supply
Monochrome
Monitor
Color Monitor
CPU
Hard Disk
Keyboard
Power
Conditioner
Printer
Top-Loading
Video Disk
Player
View with Top-Loading Video Disk Player
and Power Conditioner
Figure B-2. MICROFIX system.
B-9
HARD DISK SYSTEM. The Corvus 20 megabyte hard disk drive assembly stores and
mantains system software and the master data base.
2. MONOCHROME MONITOR. The monochrome monitor displays MICROFIX TEXT on a
screen in green or black.
3. COLOR MONITOR. The amdck color monitor displays color graphic data. This includes
video disk maps and military symbology.
4. PRINTING. The Apple Dot Matrix Printer operates at 120 characters per second (CPS) and has
graphics capability.
5. VIDEO DISK PLAYER. The VDP reads photos or map sheets from a laser disk, using the same
technology as used on a compact disk player. The photos of the map sheets are displayed on
the color monitor.
6. APPLE II PLUS MICROCOMPUTER. The microcomputer is capable of controlling a large
complement of peripheral equipment while operating in a field environment.
7. KEYBOARD. The keyboard assembly uses a full 128 ASCI character set, joystick and
enhancer board. This equipment provides upper and lower case letter and number capability, in
addition to auto-repeat keying.
8. POWER BOX. The older grey power conditioner has eight outlets on its top, assure protector
and the capability to work with 110 or 220 volts. The newer green standby power supply has six
outlets in the rear panel, a surge protector, a built-in battery pack capable of providing 20-25
minutes of uninterrupted power but works only with 110 volts.
9. VIDEO CASSETTE RECORDER. (Not shown in Figure B-2.) The VCR is used to initialize
the system (hard disk) and acts as a backup or restore device for the hard disk drive assembly.
This expands the potential data base capability of MICRO FIX. The VCR initiatea hard disks and
backups which are quicker and easier to use than floppy disks. VCRs are issued with every three
to four systems, or one per installation.
10. PAPER TAPE READER/PUNCH. (Not shown in Figure B-2.) The paper tape reader/punch
(PTR/P) punches a paper tape coPy of messages prepared on the MICROFIX for transmission
over tactical RATT systems. It also reads paper tape. PTR/P equipment is issued with every
three to four systems, or one per installation.
Figure B-3. MICROFIX hardware components.
8-10
EQUIPMENT SIZES AND WEIGHTS
TM, P. 1-2 thru 1-23 (Equipment Data)
CENTRAL PROCESSING UNIT CPU
HEIGHT 9.00 in. (22.86 cm)
WIDTH 16.62 in. (42^1 cm)
DEPTH 23.50 in. (59.69 cm)
WEIGHT 41 lbs. (18.6 kg)
RECORDER REPRODUCER DIGITAL
HEIGHT 5.50 in. (13.97 cm)
WIDTH 16.62 in. (42.21 cm)
DEPTH 23.30 in. (59.69 cm)
WEIGHT 42 lbs. (19.1 kg)
KEYBOARD DATA ENTRY
HEIGHT 1.75 in. (FRONT) (4.44 cm)
3.12 in. (BACK) (7.92 cm)
WIDTH 19.25 in. (48.90 cm)
DEPTH 7.25 in. (18.42 cm)
WEIGHT 6 lbs. (2.7 kg)
HEIGHT 7.50 in. (19.05 cm) PRINTER
WIDTH 17.00 in. (43.18 cm)
DEPTH 16.00 in. (40.64 cm)
WEIGHT 39 lbs. (17.7 kg)
INDICATOR, DIGITAL DISPLAY COLOR
HEIGHT 14.12 in. (FRONT) (35.86 cm)
11.25 in. (BACK) (28.58cm)
WIDTH 16.62 in. (42.21 cm)
DEPTH 18.00 in. (45.72 cm)
WEIGHT 53 lbs. (24.0 kg)
INDICATOR, DIGITAL DISPLAY
COLOR
MONITOR
KEYBOARD
MONOCHROME
HEIGHT 14.12 in. (FRONT) (35.86 cm) MONITOR
11.25 In. (BACK) (28.58 cm)
WIDTH 16.62 in. (42.21 cm)
DEPTH 18.00 in. (45.72 cm)
WEIGHT 36 lbs. (16.3 kg)
REPRODUCER, VIDEO DISK
HEIGHT 730 in. (19.05 cm)
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FigureB-4. Eight components ofTS/flCROFlX.
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Figure B-5. Additional MICRO FIX components.
PAPER TAPE
READER/PUNCH
(PTR/P)
B -11
MICROFIX SOFTWARE
MICROFIX software provides analysts with the ability to collect,
consolidate, and retrieve information in the area of all-source
production, SIGINT, counter-SIGINT, OPSEC, and topographic analysis.
The analyst uses MICROFIX software to organize information into
categories which facilitate rapid and meaningful analysis. The MICROFIX
software provides the ability to manipulate records in various data
bases, display tactical overlays on the color monitor, cross-correlate
data from different data bases, and print reports. Figure B-6 shows the
baseline software (those files which are found on all MICROFIX systems).
DATABASE APPLICATIONS
Airfields
River Crossings
Attrition
Salute Spot Report
Bridges
TO&E
Location History
Tunnels
Obstacles
Unit Hierarchy
Order of Battle
Water Supplies
I SINGLE FUNCTION APPLICATIONS
Collection Planning Aid
Help
Coordinate Conversion
New Map
CP/M
Paper Tape Interface
Format
Print Graphic Screen
Flex
DEVELOP A NEW APPLICATION
Define
Shape
New Symbol
Symbol Definition
Overlay Definition
JOYSTICK CONTROL
SITMAP
COMMERCIAL SOFTWARE
WordStar
PASCAL
Multiplan
BASIC
dBase II
Figure B-6. Baseline software features.
B-12
The primary advantage of the MICROFIX system is that it provides the
tools to manipulate and retrieve data quickly and accurately. It gives
the analyst the ability to access a much larger collection of data with
more speed than manual systems provide. New information is added to
existing data bases, new data bases are created, and old or inaccurate
data are deleted. Graphic overlays allow the analyst to visually test
theories and develop or discard hypotheses. Hard-copy printouts of text
information, produced at each developmental stage of the analysis process,
provide verification of the logic used to develop the final intelligence
products and also serve as source documents for historical record-keeping
purposes.
Figure B-6 shows all the applications that constitute the software
package known as the all-source production system (ASPS). The baseline
software package forms the foundation for all the other configurations.
The additional software packages are explained in the order in which they
were released.
Topographic Workstation
Members of the terrain analysis team use the topographic workstation.
The topographic software has all the applications of the baseline plus two
topographic-specific applications: Topo and Topows. These applications
al low the user to use digital terrain mapping features (tinted elevation,
slope, or speed overlays; LOS profile; oblique view; perspective view and
visible area plot); weather and environment features (sun rise and set,
phases of the moon; NBC and smoke calculations; affect of weather on night
vision devices, electro-optic sensors, and density altitude calculations);
and a mobility calculator for friendly and enemy wheeled and tracked
vehicles.
Technical Control and Analysis Element Workstation
SIGINT analysts use the TCAE workstation. TCAE software has all the
applications of baseline software pius five SIGINT-specific applications:
“Fix. Allows the user to input and plot lines of bear ng and sjte
locations. The program will calculate and plot the e| lipse of the
intercepts.
"Place. The automated gazetteer.
"COMINT working aid. A collection of four data bases (frequency,
call sign, code word, and case notation) that al lows correlation
across each other.
"ELINT working aid. An automated ELINT parameters list (EPL).
"DATEXT. The data extract (DATEXT) program allows the user to
create a subset from a file of messages. DATEXT allows the user to
identify several key words, phrases, and numbers to cull the entire
file down to a subset of messages which deal with the topic of
interest.
B-13
Counterintelligence Workstation
The counter-SIGINT analyst uses the Cl workstation. The name of the
workstation is a misnomer as the Cl workstation is appropriate only for
the 97G. Cl workstation software has all the applications of the baseline
software plus 11 counter-SIGINT-specific applications:
“Friend y and enemy antenna systems.
“Friend y and enemy SIGINT and REC unit OB.
“Friend y and enemy SIGINT and REC unit location.
“Friendly and enemy SIGINT and REC organization by doctrine.
“Friendly and enemy emitter and collector’s characteristics.
“Enemy fixed station location.
OPSEC Workstation
The OPSEC workstation is designed for use by the intelligence analyst
and supporting the OPSEC staff element. Specific characteristics of the
OPSEC workstation are uncertain.
DISTRIBUTION OF MICROFIX CONFIGURATIONS
Tables B-1 and B-2 depict the number of systems at each echelon. Also
shown is a recommended distribution of the various workstation
configurations.
Table B-1. Workstation distribution (mid- to high-intensity conflict).
TOTAL
ASPS
TCAE
Cl
OPSEC
TOPO
Theater
1
1
Corps
13
6
4
1
1
1
Division
7
2
2
1
1
1
SEPBDEorACR
2
1
1
B-14
Table B-2. Workstation distribution (low- to mid-intensity conflict).
TOTAL
ASPS
TCAE
cl
OPSEC
TOPO
Theater
Corps
Division
SEP BDEor ACR
7
2
2
1
Oo rl
1 o r 2
0 o r 1
2 o r 3
1
1
The G2 determines specifi c al location of workstations for a given
exercise or requirement.
UT ILIZATION OF MICROFIX
Methods of using the MICROFIX system are limited only by the user’s
imagination. Several units are innovators in their use of the system.
Some examples are—
0 Printing the entire OB file (or selected enemy units) for use as
an OB book. Updating the OB book is easier by doing the additions,
deletions, or changes on the computer and then printing the updated
or added records.
0 Printing the unit hierarchy report for the enemy units your unit
is facing. This report includes unit name, parent unit name,
location, and DTG of last ’siting. Gaps in your intelligence
holdings become very evident since the computer prints a blank space
for missing data. This report provides guidance to CM&D, provides a
quick reference for Rlls from adjacent and higher units and, by
posting a copy beside the SITMAP, acts as a quick reference guide
for locating enemy units.
0 Using the location history function to plot the location histories
of key enemy units (that is, independent tank battal ions, RAGs,
DAGs, BMP-equipped MRRs) on the color map screen. Plotting the
movement history of these units provides an indication or
confirmation of enemy commander’s intent. Location history also
indicates variances to doctrinal rates of march. This alone
provides key indications to the enemy commander’s intent or the
terrain and weather influenced limitations not previously identified
in the IPB.
0 After doing your IPB in garrison, various options of enemy attack
are conjectured. These various options are then templated over the
terrain. Each option then is drawn on the color map using the
sketch function and saved for immediate recall . When the exercise
scenario ^real combat) confirms one of your templated options,
considerable time is saved in analyzing the AAs.
B-15
APPENDIX C
INDICATORS OF ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION
Indicators are any positive or negative evidence of enemy activity or
any characteristic of the AO that points toward enemy capabilities,
vulnerabil ities, or intentions. Individual indicators cannot stand
alone. Each indicator is integrated with other factors and indicators
before patterns are detected and enemy intentions established. Indicators
are developed by the ASPS analysts who are assisted by other TOC elements
in the G2 or S2 section. All indicators are developed to answer the
commander’s PIR and IR. The analyst uses indicators to correlate
particular events or activities with probable enemy courses of action.
Indicators are also used to determine what events or activities occur
for an enemy to follow a particular course of action. The ability to read
indicators (including recognition of enemy deception indicators)
contributes to the success of friendly operations.
Enemy deception operations provide indicators in an attempt to create
false or misleading patterns of enemy intentions. Analysts detect these
false indicators and then determine what actual courses of action the
enemy is attempting to initiate. Enemy attempts at deception are
discovered by comparing indicators, intelligence, and combat information
from all sources to arrive at an accurate picture of the battlefield.
INTELLIGENCE INDICATORS
Tables C-1 through C-7 show different types of intelligence
indicators. These lists of indicators are by no means complete, nor are
they intended to apply to all situations or all types of enemy forces.
They give some types of indicators which when incorporated with other
indicators, creates patterns or suggests a series of activities which
point to typical enemy activities or cour ses of action. Analysts are
prepared to develop their own indicator ists for the specific situations
which confront them.
TableC-l. Enemy offensive indicators.
ACTIVITY
EXPLANATION
Massing of motorized elements,
tanks, artillery, and logistical
support.
Areas of secondary importance are
denuded to mass maximum strength
main effort.
often
for the
Deployment of combat element
(motorized rifle, armor,
antitank (AT)) echelons on a
relatively narrow frontage.
Normal attack formation provides for
the second echelon of the regiment to
be located 5-15 km in the rear of the
first echelon, on-line; and the
division second echelon 15-30 km in the
rear of the first echelon.
c-1
Table C-1. Enemy offensive Indicators (continued).
ACTIVITY
EXPLANATION
Forward units disposed on
relatively narrow fronts and
depths.
Concentration of mass toward
e ther or both flanks within
f rst echelon defensive area.
Demonstrations and feints.
Establishment and strengthening
counterreconna issance screen.
Forward movement of hostile
units.
Increased patrolling (ground
reconnaissance) .
Forward CPS located
close to the FLOT. Other
CPS move forward.
Locating a division-sized
operation maneuver group
(OMG) at Army; Army-sized OMG
at front.
A MRR breakthrough zone is from 2-4 km
within an assigned attack frontage,
which varies from 3-8 km. MRR
headquarters located approximately 4 km
from the FLOT during normal attack
posture.
Single or double envelopment normally
is attempted in the offense. Tanks and
motorized units on either or both f anks
may indicate single or double
envelopment.
Local, small-scale attacks or
demonstrations involving motorized rifle
units, tanks, and artillery frequently
precede a general attack.
Counterreconnaissance screens are
used to cover possible assembly areas,
routes of troop movement, or regrouping
of forces to be used in the attack.
Before launching an attack, troops
may be moved to assembly areas from
which they can deploy.
Patrolling by motorized rifle units
usually is more active before an attack.
Preceding an attack, an auxiliary CP
is establ ished, if needed, by Army or
front. The division main CP is located
5-15 km from the FLOT; the division
forward CP is located 5 km from the
FLOT; the regiment main CP is located
2-3 km from the FLOT; and the battalion
CP or OP is located 500-1,000 m from the
FLOT.
OMGS are formed preceding an offensive
operation. They are generally committed
before the conclusion of the first
echelon battle and operate independently
of the main forces. OMGS use a separate
axis of advance from the main body.
c-2
Table C-1. Enemy offensive Indicators (continued).
ACTIVITY
EXPLANAT ION
Massing of artillery units. Large RAGs, DAGs, and Army artillery
groups (AAGs) indicate initiation of
main attack. Enemy norms are 60-100
tubes per kilometer of frontage against
wel l-prepared defenses for main attack;
60-80 tubes per kilometer of frontage
against hasty defenses for main attack;
and 40 tubes per kilometer frontage for
secondary attack. The RAG is usually
located 1-4 km from the FLOT; the DAG
usually 3-6 km from the FLOT; and the
AAG is usually more than 6 km from the
FLOT. AAGs are formed only in the
offense and only to support the main
attack. TMS-65 are within 4 km of the
FLOT for smoke operations.
Extensive artillery preparation The offense is built around the
of up to 50 minutes in duration, striking power and shock of massed
artillery. Preparations of 1/2 to 1
hour normally precede an offensive.
Dispersal of tanks and self-
propelled howitzers to units.
Movement of fire and missile
forward.
Tanks accompanying leading waves of
assault motorized units--with motorized
self-propelled howitzers following the
tanks closely, by bounds.
Enemy SAM control radars
require time to be set up and oriented.
The enemy prefers to establish SAM
capability before moving other forces
forward. In the event of the arrival of
the second echelon, control radars are
establ ished to allow for an overlap of
coverage as the first echelon moves
their SAM radars forward in the offense.
FROG, SS-21, SS-23, and SCUD
units located forward.
2 to 4 ZSU-23-4S located in
forward areas.
Enemy offensive operations also occur
in-depth. Forward movement of SSMS puts
friendly airfields and depots in
jeopardy.
Medium AD guns are displaced before
attack to protect assault forces and to
facilitate forward displacement during
the attack. ZSU 23-4s protecting the
leading battalions are approximately
1.25 km to the rear of the FLOT.
c-3
Table C-1. Enemy offensive indicators (continued).
ACTIVITY
EXPLANAT ION
Increased air reconnaissance,
Air reconnaissance usually is more active
before an attack.
Systematic air bombardment.
Before the attack, the enemy may engage
in the systematic “softening up” of key
positions by bombardment,
Establishment of auxiliary
airfields or activation of
inactive air fields.
Buildup of logistics and maintenance
capability indicates increased
capability to support offense.
Clearing lanes through
obstacles within own position.
Lanes are cleared and marked through
mined areas, and ramps and bridges
prepared over ditches and trenches within
enemy’s own position. This is done
before attack to facilitate forward
movement and grouping, particularly at
night.
Reconnaissance and destruction
of obstacles that are part of
our defenses.
Usually on the night preceding an attack,
enemy patrols reconnoiter friendly
obstacles to determine a plan for
clearing lanes. The patrol destroys only
such obstacles that will not disclose the
direction of the main attack.
River assault crossing units
located forward (providing there
is a water obstacle) .
Amphibious, bridge, and other engineer
units with water-crossing capabilities
are located near the FLOT and also
echeloned to the rear. They are also
collocated with other tactical units of
the attacking force.
Airborne, airmobile, and air
assault attacks on our rear area.
The enemy conducts offensive operations
throughout the depth of the defense.
Heliborne attacks are also made to
facilitate difficult operations, like
river crossings.
Increased enemy agent activity
in rear area.
The enemy attempts to prevent or disrupt
the forward movement of friendly
supplies, equipment, maintenance, and
reinforcements.
Extensive efforts to destroy
nuclear storage areas and
delivery systems by air,
artillery, and sabotage.
Enemy doctrine calls for the
elimination of friendly nuclear weapons
by any means. The enemy considers that
we are more likely to use nuclear weapons
when we are in the defense.
c-4
Table C-1. Enemy
_ ACTIVITY _
Movement of noncombatants out
of the combat zone.
Conducting drills and rehearsals
in rear areas.
Increased activity in rear
areas.
Traffic control units marking
routes to the FLOT.
Forward placement of supply
and evacuation installations.
indicators (continua).
_ EXPLAN AT ION _
Noncombatants hinder rapid forward
movement of follow-on forces.
Major attacks may be preceded by drills
or rehearsals. This is particularly
true of attacks against fortified
positions or strongly defended river
lines.
Before an attack, supply and
administrative activities increase in
the rear areas.
Traffic control points are employed
throughout the march routes to
facilitate march formations. Allied
border guards assist by controlling
traffic through the barrier areas of the
borders.
Supply and evacuation installations
usually are located well forward for an
attack, Technical observation points
are established close to the FLOT.
Repair and evacuation groups are located
at assembly points close to the FLOT to
repair or evacuate damaged vehicles.
The division supply point (ammunition,
petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL),
rations) is located 25-30 km from FLOT.
The regimental ammunition supply point
is located 10-15 km from the FLOT; the
regimental repair point is located
10-15 km from the FLOT; the regimental
POL point is located 10-15 km from the
FLOT, and the regimental rations point
is located 10-15 km from the FLOT.
Battalion ammunition and rations supply
points are located 5 km from the FLOT.
The division repair point for tanks and
weapons is located 2-4 km from the
FLOT. The division repair point for
wheeled vehicles is located 10-14 km
from the FLOT. Rear control points for
the front are located 150-200 km from
the FLOT; for the Army are 25-40 km from
the FLOT; for the division is 20 km from
the FLOT; and for the regiment are 20 km
from the FLOT.
c-5
Table C-1. Enemy offensive indicators (continued).
ACTIVITY
EXPLAN AT ION
Location of maintenance parties
on lateral routes.
When the enemy conducts a march, the
enemy establishes several maintenance
parties on lateral routes to facilitate
march operations.
Medical points and stations
move forward.
Medical units move forward before an
offensive operation to support
anticipated medical and evacuation
requirements. Division medical points
and stations are located 10-14 km from
the FLOT; the regimental medical points
and station at 10-14 km from the FLOT;
and the battalion medical points and
station at 1.5-3 km from the FLOT.
Radio sil ence on nets organ c
to the d vision.
The enemy attempts to deny us
information which can be developed from
intercepting radio traffic.
Abnormal logistics traffic on
command nets.
To expedite supplies to units about to
conduct a main attack, commanders may
get personally involved.
Dummy traffic in radio nets to
cover unit moves.
The enemy will attempt to deceive us
about the location of enemy forces.
Deception operations to cover
unit movement.
Same as above.
Extensive smoke operations.
Smoke operations mask the movement of
units during the period immediately
preceding an attack.
SIGINT and jamming assets
located forward.
SIGINT and jamming assets will move well
forward to within 2-4 km of the FEBA
before attack.
Extensive spot and barrage
jamming of our front line units’
communications nets, as well as
communications systems
associated with tactical air
control systems.
Extensive jamming will precede an
offense to cause the maximum disruption
of our C 2 communications. However,
jamming will cease when enemy forces
reach our main defense area to prevent
interference with their own
communications systems.
C-6
Table C-2. Enemy defensive indicators.
ACTIVITY
EXPLANAT ION
Preparation of battalion and
company defense areas consisting of
company and platoon strong points.
Defense is based on holding prepared
defensive areas and counterattacks by
tank-heavy forces.
Extensive preparation of field
fortifications.
The enemy makes extensive use of
trenches, prepared positions, and
overhead cover in defensive
operations.
Formation of AT strongpoints
in depth along avenues of
logical approach.
AT strongpoints are formed in
depth along logical avenues of
approach for armor. These are made
up of motorized rifle, engineer, and
AT gun and missile units with
positions strengthened by mines,
ditches, and other obstac es.
Attachment of additional AT units
to frontline defensive positions.
In areas where there is a serious
armored threat, the enemy will
concentrate as many as 25 AT guns for
every 1,000 m of front.
Preparation of alternate
artillery positions.
In normal defensive operations, three
positions are prepared for each
firing battery.
Employment of roving artillery.
Roving guns and batteries are part of
normal defensive operations.
Large tank heavy units located
in assembly areas to the rear.
Tank units are held in assembly areas
for employment in counterattacks.
Preparation and occupation of
defensive positions.
In the defense, a security zone and
main defense area are prepared and
occupied.
Presence of demolitions,
contaminated areas, obstacl es,
minefield.
Demolitions, minefield, and other
obstacles are placed to cover AA
to the position.
Deployment of motorized rif e
units on good defensive posi tions.
Preparation of company
strongpoints on key terrain
Dominating terrain that has good
FofFs and is relatively inaccessible
to tanks usually is selected for a
defensive position.
c-7
Table C-2. Enemy defensive indicators (continued).
ACTIVITY
EXPLANATION
Prestocking ammunition and
engineer supplies and equipment
and fortification of buildings.
Prestocking ammunition reduces the
load on logistics throughout the
system once the battle begins,
Engineer tools and equipment may be
used to dig trenches and to erect
obstacles.
Entrenching and erecting bands
of wire.
Digging of trenches and the erection
of wire indicate preparations to hold
the position.
Presence of dummy artillery
observation points.
Dummy artillery observation points
preserve the effectiveness of the
actual artillery positions by
deceiving us as to their location.
Presence of dummy CPS.
Same as above.
Increased activity of SIGINT and
ESM units but decreased activity
of ECM units.
Increased activity is an attempt to
gain information about us before the
attack.
Early warning sites hardened.
When early warning sites are hardened,
it indicates the intention of those
forces to remain in place and to
protect an important facility.
CPS placed in hardened facili ty .
Same as above.
Additional AT units attached
to first eche on maneuver uni ts .
The enemy puts great emphasis on
killing tanks early. The enemy
believes that if the tanks can be
stopped, the attack will fail.
Establishment of a security
zone.
A security zone is established to
enable fortifications to be
constructed away from immediate danger
from our artillery and direct-fire
weapons.
Forward units disposed on
relatively wide fronts and depths
compared to offensive posture.
The defense zone of an MRR varies
from 10 to 15 km depending upon
terrain and the combat availability of
forces. MRR depth varies from 7 to
10 km.
C-8
Table C-2. Enemy defensive indicators (continued).
_ ACTIVITY _ EXPLANATION _
Displacement of logistics and Logistics and medical units are
units towards the rear. displaced to the rear to facilitate
combat force defense and counterattack
operations.
Displacement of artillery and SSM Artillery units are displaced toward
units towards the rear, the rear to reduce the chance that these
units will be lost or destroyed during
the preliminary stages of the battle.
During the defense, deep fires are not
as critical as during the offense.
Presence of large AT reserves Large AT reserves are established (with
with mobile obstacle MOD) to provide a quick reaction AT
detachments (MODS). capability.
Decreased communications The enemy places increased reliance on
intercepts (due to wire in the defense to increase security,
increased use of wire).
AD systems located in rear Destruction of logistics, command,
areas. and artillery units are high-priority
missions for our deep attacks,
Table C-3. Meeting engagement (movement to contact) indicators.
INDICATORS
ACTIVITY
EXPLANATION
Increased air and ground
reconnaissance along MCS.
Accurate information about routes
speeds the advance.
Road junctions, bridges, and
other key features are occupied
by either airborne forces or
forward detachments.
The enemy wants to control high-speed
armor AAs into our key areas.
Increased counterreconnaissance
activity.
Counterreconnaissance is an attempt to
prevent us from gaining information about
enemy dispositions and movements.
Forward movement of columns
dispersed laterally in two or
more MCS.
The enemy prefers to use march
formation when moving to contact.
c-9
Table C-4. Reinforcement indicators.
ACTIVITY
EXPLANATION
Movement of additional troops
toward the front.
This action increases enemy’s present
strength.
Increased traffic toward
present position.
Increased traffic brings up additional
troops, equipment, and supplies.
Identification of new units in
in the combat zone.
The presence of new units--in addition
to units already present-increases
enemy’s strength.
Additional CPS and supply and
evacuation installations.
Presence of additional units causes an
increase in the number of these
installations.
Logistical installations
moved well forward.
indicates preparation for the
resumption of the offensive after
reinforcement.
Table C-5. Delaying action indicators.
ACTIVITY
EXPLANATION
Withdrawal from defensive
position(s) before becoming
heavily engaged.
In delaying actions, units avoid
becoming decisively engaged.
Successive local counterattacks
with limited objectives.
Counterattacks are employed o assist
in disengaging first echelon units,
rather than to restore posit on.
Counterattacks broken off before
position is restored.
Same as above.
Maximum firepower positioned
forward; firing initiated at long
ranges.
Long-range fires facilitate the
delaying action.
Frontages up to four times that
normally assigned to units on the
defensive.
Forces conducting a delaying action
are normally assigned frontages in
excess of that normal for enemy units
on the defense.
Prepositioni ng of nuclear
weapons.
Prepositioning nuclear weapons
facilitates the delaying action.
Discovery of dummy minefield.
Dummy minefield are easier and faster
to prepare than active fields but
cause approximately the same delay to
advancing pursuers.
c-io
Table C-6. Withdrawal indicators.
Indications for withdrawal are generally the same as those for delaying
action with the addition of the following indicators,
ACTIVITY
EXPLANATION
Systematic destruction of bridges,
communication facilities and other
assets in enemy-held territory.
Deliberate demolition and scorched
earth tactics may be employed in
military withdrawals.
Establishment of a covering force
and rear guard.
Cover movement or withdrawal of
main body. The rear guard fights
delaying action, if required,
Increased use of night-driving
devices in all areas.
The enemy will attempt to withdraw at
night, if possible.
Minimum logistical and medical
services.
Nonessential logistics and medical
services are withdrawn first.
Marking withdrawal routes.
Movement and location of traffic
control units or parties to the rear
along the LOCS that are to be used by
major units.
Use of contaminated areas to
camouflage forces and cover
withdrawal .
Contamination hinders reconnaissance
and pursuit.
Presence of rear guard and
covering force.
Minimizes losses and permits main body
more freedom of movement.
Preparation of future defensive
lines behind main defensive
structure.
If the withdrawal is deliberate, the
enemy will want new positions ready
before withdrawing.
Jamming or destruction of
friendly air and ground
battlefield surveillance radars.
Battlefield surveillance radars are
capable of detecting withdrawals at
night or during conditions of poor
visibility.
Engineer reconnaissance and
MOD detected along LOCs, tunnels,
built-up areas, dams, and dikes.
Withdrawing forces will begin to
systematically destroy all crossings
and implement obstacles as they
withdraw.
C-ll
Table C-6. Withdrawal Indicators (continued).
ACTIVITY_EXPLANAT ION
Stockpiling of explosives at
central points. Distribution of,
and the establishment of, small
dumps of explosives and landmines
near bridges, possible abatis
sites, and other demolition target
sites.
Preparation of target for
systematic or hasty destruction.
Deception operations, such as
dummy radio traffic.
Smoke operations to cover
withdrawal operations.
Rearward movement of long-range
artillery.
Movement of small reconnai ssance
parties to the rear.
Displacement to the rear of
emitters associated with
logistics units. Destruction
or removal of logistic material
from existing depot and dump
locations to the rear.
Wit hdrawing forces will attempt to
de ay pursuit with obstacles,
Withdrawing units will attempt to
portray a normal defense.
Withdrawals must be unobserved to be
effective.
Long-range artillery will be moved
back to new positions before the
withdrawal takes place
Logistics are withdrawn first to avoid
being overrun during a possible
pursuit.
Withdrawing units need current
reconnaissance along w thdrawa
routes.
Same as above.
Table C-7. Nuclear weapons indicators.
ACTIVITY
EXPLANAT ION
Heavily guarded movement of
supplies, equipment, and material
Movement of supplies, equipment, and
material of nuclear nature requires
special security measures.
Heavily guarded installations.
Sites for storage of nuclear supplies
and the locations of del ivery units
are heavily guarded.
Preparation of heavy artillery
positions.
Primary and alternate positions for
nuclear del ivery artillery are
prepared before movement of the units.
Movement of small, heavily guarded
convoys, including closed vans,
with a high percentage of
automatic weapons.
Nuclear warheads are moved under heavy
security, usually in closed vans.
Escort vehicles are equipped with
machine guns.
Light aircraft circling over
moving convoy.
Nuclear warhead convoys often use
aerial radio relays to maintain
communication.
Movement of small groups of
heavily armed hel icopters
escorted by tact cat fighters.
Nuclear warheads may be moved by
helicopters, with guards and armed
helicopters as escort, Tactical
aircraft may provide air cover.
Movement of trai ers with rockets
or missile bodies.
Trailers are used to resupply missile
and rocket units.
Identification of tall, slender
objects, like towers, chimneys,
or narrow trees, not previously
in the area.
Ballistic missiles may be camouflaged
as towers, chimneys, or narrow trees,
such as poplars.
5
Large, well-guarded complexes,
including tanks, trucks, radars,
electronic equipment, generators,
and maintenance tents, located
wel 1 to the rear.
SSM units require extensive ground
handling equipment.
Evacuation or exclusion of
civilians from specific areas
suitable for nuclear storage or
delivery sites.
Civilians may be evacuated from
areas selected for nuclear storage or
delivery sites.
C-13
Table C-7. Nuclear weapons indicators (continued).
ACTIVITY
EXPLANAT ION
Presence of meteorological radars.
An END TRAY radar is part of the
organic equipment of both the free
rocket over ground (FROG) and SS-lc
SCUD systems, as wel 1 as other
nuclear-capable systems. (END TRAYS
also are found with conventional
artillery and AF units.)
Construction of FROG, SCUD, or
SCALEBOARD, SS-21 or SS-23
launch positions.
All of these systems have confirmed
nuclear capabilities. A survey-
controlled launch position is
constructed for each
transporter-erector-launcher (TEL)
before occupation.
Movement of SSM TELs to a launch
site within 1/3 to 1/2 maximum
range from the FLOT.
SSM TELs remain in camouflaged
positions until movement to the launch
area.
Passage of wind data from
mid-range position to a command
or technical element.
Enemy SSM accuracy is heavily
dependent on wind data.
Passage of a nonsense word over
command and selected fire
control nets.
May be a code word relative to
preparation for or execution of a
nuclear fire mission.
Volume of traffic on command nets
suddenly increasing then dropping
to a low level or standdown.
May reflect passage of strike warnings
followed by preparation for electro¬
magnetic pulse protective measures.
Identification of SSM
unit-peculiar equipment.
Presence of nuclear-capable systems.
Limited withdrawal of frontline
units without apparent tactical
reason.
Frontline units may withdraw for a
limited distance to avoid casualties
from close-in nuclear explosives.
Sudden and energetic digging
in enemy areas.
Prior to use of nuclear weapons,
frontline units may be ordered to dig
deeper foxholes or take other
individual protective measures.
C-14
Table C-7. Nuclear weapons indicators (continued).
ACTIVITY
EXPLANAT ION
Large concentrations of radios,
radars, and other electronic
equipment located in the vicinity
of suitable sites for guided
missile launching.
Concentration of equipment is
necessary to guide and control guided
missiles, which must be located in
close proximity of the launching site.
Sudden increase in communications
and electronic activity.
Increase may be incident to del ivery
of nuclear weapons, for example , 1 ast
minute orders and warnings, and use of
electronic guidance and control .
Use of smoke cover on front-line
troops.
Smoke may be used to protect troops
against thermal effects of weapons
used in close support.
Disappearance of known enemy
agents from specific areas.
Prior to nuclear attack of an area ,
agents may be ordered to leave the
area.
Increased or unusual air activity.
Delivery of nuclear weapons by air mar
require a temporary degree of lota 1
air superiority, special photo
mission, or practice flight pattern
runs by the del ivery aircraft.
Additional AT elements
with first echelon units.
Enemy will expect friendly forces
to react to indications of a nuclear
strike with an attack of tank-heavy
forces. Also, tanks have greater
survivability under nuclear
conditions.
Movement of small convoys from
the warhead storage areas.
Warheads being moved to be mated to
missiles.
Removal of antennas and other
equipment mounted on the
exterior of vehicles.
To prevent blast damage.
Lowering of windshie Ids on
vehicles.
See above.
Removal of camouflage nets.
See above.
Movement of vehicles to reverse
slopes.
See above.
C-15
Table C-7. Nuclear weapons indicators (continued).
ACTIVITY
EXPLANAT ION
Location of missile and free
rocket units within striking
distances.
Missile and free rocket units are
located within one third of the
maximum range from the 1 ine of contact
on the offense, and one half of the
maximum range on the defense.
Use of missiles or rockets
with high-explosive warheads.
Missiles or free rockets may be used
to deliver high-explosive warheads
either in a normal support role or in
a registration.
Location of very heavy artillery
within supporting distance of
front lines.
Nuclear delivery artillery is located
within one third of its maximum range
from the line of contract on the
offense, and one half of the maximum
range on the defense.
Registration of very heavy
artillery.
Registration may be conducted using
smoke and low charge or high explosive
projectiles prior to firing a nuclear
projectile.
Special or unusual activity by
frontline troops.
Frontline troops may construct
special positions, usually deep or
covered foxholes, before enemy use of
nuclear weapons.
AD weapons are deployed to
cover possible warhead storage
areas.
Enemy expects friendly air to attempt
to destroy nuclear warheads in
storage.
Use of high-explosive warheads
from SSMs-or heavy art illery in
a normal support role.
Indicates presence of nuclear-capable
systems.
Use of missile-associat ed terms
on selected radio nets
See above.
Preparation of future launching
positions.
See above.
Inability to locate previous y
identified missile units.
May be moving to f iring positions.
Additional administrative,
command, fire control, and
logistics nets identified in
the area of interest.
If these nets can be identified as
nuclear-related, they indicate the
presence of nuclear-capable units.
C-16
Table C-7. Nuclear weapons Indicator (continued).
ACTIVITY
EXPLANATION
Presence of heavy artillery,
Deployment of jamming assets.
203 mm SP gun, 240 mm SP mortar, and
towed 203 and 240 have nuclear
delivery capabilities, as do 152 mm SP
guns.
Jammers are deployed to protect
critical targets like nuclear units.
C-17
INSURGENT ACTIVITY INDICATORS
Anything that insurgents do to influence and direct a society toward
overthrowing its government is reflected by some action or indication, no
matter how subtle. These occurrences are referred to as insurgent
activity indicators. By recognizing these indicators, it is possible to
obtain the first clues to insurgent existence and then evidence of the
growth of the insurgent movement. Because there is a great deal of
legitimate activity, there is a requirement to determine which of the
various sociological, economical, political, and other activities
represent insurgent activity.
It is not possible to provide an all-inclusive listing of insurgency
indicators because there are too many possibilities existing in the many
nations of the world. The following indicators, however, do provide a
beginning framework for a detailed analysis of any particular country.
The greater the perception of an insurgency situation within a particular
country and the greater the knowledge of the insurgent involved, the
easier it is to identify the insurgent activity indicators.
These indicators serve as a guide for intelligence officers and
analysts in developing appropriate clues to insurgent activity in a
particular area. Isolated actions of seemingly little significance in one
area show a pattern of an emerging insurgency when coordinated with
reports of indicators from other areas. In developing indicators, or
using these suggested ones, it is important to remember that insurgent
strategy suddenly changes. The insurgent threat unfolds along altogether
different lines simultaneously or suddenly switches from use of military
force, for example, to a political example, to a political offensive.
Such a development is dangerous if it makes the general situation appear
to be much less critical than it” really is. The development of
appropriate indicators not only indicates that an insurgency or potential
insurgent situation exists, but also identifies any problems and
dissatisfaction of the people. The elimination or effective control of
insurgency is based on coordinated internal defense and development (IDAD)
programs which address identified problems or potential prob iems. Before
these programs are developed, the threat is defined. To define the
threat, you first establish insurgent activity indicators.
RURAL INSURGENT ACTIVITY
A rural area includes all farming areas, any town or village up to
5,000 people, and any town or village up to 20,000 people with a
farm-based economy where the townspeople, if not engaged in farming, earn
their livelihood in agricultural service industries. In such areas, where
the interests are so interdependent, insurgency indicators would be
simi lar in both the town and countryside. This is not to say that rural
insurgency is not directed by urban insurgents and coordinated with urban
insurgency; however, some theorists emphasize that the keyy to success is
the countryside and the rural population. In such cases, early insurgency
indi caters are found in the rural areas where the subversive insurgents
are concentrating their initial efforts.
C-18
During the development of a subversive insurgency, some of the first
indicators of latent or incipient insurgency appear in the rural areas.
While some of these indicators are rather obvious, some are not. For the
sake of simplicity, these indicators of insurgency are placed into four
categories: population, propaganda, commodity, and environmental.
Population
Population indicators are broken down further into subcategories of
general activity, insurgent-promoted activity, and activity directed
against the government.
General Activity . This includes--
°Identification of insurgents, their supporters, and sympathizers
who suddenly appear in, or move out of, an area.
“New faces in the community.
“Unusual gatherings among the population.
“Disruption of normal social patterns.
Insurgent-Promoted Activities . This includes--
“Refusal of peasants to pay rent, taxes, or loan payments or
unusual difficulty in the collection of same.
“Trends of demonstrated hosti I ity on the part of the local
population toward government forces.
“Occurrence of actions previously considered taboo by the populace.
“Disappearance of the population from or avoidance by the peeple of
certain areas.
“Unexplained disappearance or dislocation of young people.
Activity Directed Against the Government . This includes--
“Strangers attempting to join local security forces.
“Reports of the people being approached for purposes of
intelligence recruitment.
“Unusual short absences of government employees.
“Failure of police and informant nets to report properly.
“Growth of general hostility toward the government.
C-19
"Unexplained destruction or loss of government identification
papers or passports and increased forgeries thereof,
° Closing of rural schools.
“Murder and kidnapping of local government officials.
Propaganda
Propaganda indicators are broken down further into subcategories of
general activity and activity directed against the established government,
national military forces, and the educational system:
General Propaganda Indicator s. This includes--
"Dissident propaganda from unidentified sources.
"Increase in the number of entertainers with a political message.
"Increasing religious unrest.
"Increased agitation on issues for which there is no identified
movement or organization.
"Renewed activity by insurgent organizations thought to be dormant.
"Circulation of petitions advocating usual insurgent demands.
"Reports from other countries that the country is ready for
revolution.
Directed Against the Established Governmen t. This includes--
"Attempts to discredit and ridicule national or public officials.
"Attempts to discredit the judicial system and POI ice
organizations.
"Characterization of government leaders as puppets and tools of a
foreign government.
"Movement to remove strong anti insurgency leaders.
"Agitation against government projects and plans.
"Rumors designed to gain public acceptance o’f untruths about the
government or governmental leaders.
"Advocacy of popular front government.
C-20
Directed Against the National Military Force s. This includes--
0 Attacks which embarrass or ridicule military officials.
0 Characterization of military leaders as puppets and tools of a
foreign government.
Q Movement to remove strong anti insurgency leaders from the
military.
0 Propaganda directed toward youth to refrain them from joining the
military service or propaganda directed at soldiers to desert.
0 Characterization of the armed forces as the enemy of the people.
0 Civilian avoidance of and reluctance to cooperate with the
military.
Directed Against the Educational Syste m. This includes--
"Appearance of questionable doctrine in the educational system.
"Charges by students and others that the educational system is not
adequate and is only training the youth of the nation to do the
government’s bidding.
Commodity
Commodity indicators are broken down further into crops, animals, arms
and ammunition, clothing, drugs and medicine, and communication activity
subcategories.
C rops , This includes--
0 Diversion of crops from the market.
0 Unexplained decrease in the marketing of a given crop.
0 Increased reports of pilfering foodstuffs.
0 Strangers attempting to purchase crops or produce.
0 Farmers marketing a crop that is smaller than usual, yet showing
no signs of subsequent financial difficulty.
0 Discovery of caches of staple foodstuffs.
0 Increase in crop prices indicating the existence of an insurgent
taxing authority in the area.
Animals . This includes--
"Diversion of animals or meat from the market.
c-2 1
"Reports of loss of hides or diversion of hides from the market.
"Disappearance of wild game from an area in which it was previously
plentiful.
“Disappearance of pack animals or the appearance of unusual numbers
of pack animals in certain areas.
Arms and Ammunition . This includes--
0 increased loss of weapons by military and police forces.
"Increased thefts of weapons.
"Discovery of arms caches.
"Attacks on patrols resulting in loss of weapons and ammunition.
The above factors could be applied not only to weapons but also to any
similarly essential military goods.
Clothing . This includes--
"Unusual scarcity of any type of material that could be used for
footwear. This could include such items as hides of animals and old
tires, in addition to manufactured footwear.
"Discovery of caches of clothing or of materials which may be used
in the manufacture of clothing or uniforms.
Drugs and Medicine . This includes--
"Scarcity of herbs and plants used in or for drugs and medicine.
“Large-scale purchasing or theft of drugs and medicine and of the
herbs used in their manufacture.
Communications. This includes--
"increases in purchase and use of radios.
"Discovery of caches of communications equipment.
"Unusual increase in communications traffic in amateur radio
operations.
Environmental
The environmental indicators include--
"Evidence of increased foot traffic in the area.
"Increased travel within and into remote or isolated areas.
c - 2 2
“Unexplained trails and cold campsites.
“Establishment of new, unexplained agricultural areas, or recently
cleared fields.
“Unusual smoke, possibly indicating the presence of a campsite or
a form of communication.
“Concentration of dead foliage in an area, possibly indicating use
of camouflage.
“Presence of foot traps, spikes, and the like.
“Presence of obstacles such as those used in roadblocks and canal
blocks.
URBAN INSURGENT ACTIVITY
Indicaters of urban insurgent activity also are placed in the four
categor ies of population .propaganda, commodity, and environmental
indicatoors. Many of the same or similar indicators appear for both rural
and urban areas.
Popul ation
Population indicators are broken down further into subcategories of
general activity, insurgent-promoted activity, and activity directed
against the government.
General Activity . This includes--
“Increase in size of embassy or consulate staffs from a country or
countries which support insurgent groups.
“Increase in staff and activities in pro insurgency-oriented
embassies or consulates in neighboring countries, including unusual
patterns in nature and volume of external communications (both
in-country and out-of-country).
“Increased travel by suspected subversives to
pro insurgency-oriented countries or to countries notably under
insurgent influence.
“Influx of insurgent leaders, both foreign and domestic, into the
urban area.
“Reports of locals being trained in pro insurgency-oriented
countries.
“Increase in visitors from pro insurgency-oriented countries
(tourists, technicians, businessmen, and officials).
C-23
"Close connections between the diplomatic representatives of
pro insurgency-oriented countries and the insurgents.
"Disappearance of known or suspected insurgents and d iss ident
elements.
"Increase in insurgent youth gatherings.
"Hosting of trade fairs or similar activities by pro insurgency-
oriented countries.
"Return of nationals from travel or study in pro insurgency-oriented
countries.
"Increase in visits to urban centers by rural officials and leaders
from areas of unrest.
"Establishment of organizations (even very small) of unexplained
origin and of unclear or nebulous aims.
"Establishment of a new organization to replace an exist ing
organizationa i structure with identical aims.
"Appearance of many new members in established organizations like
labor unions,
"Attempts by new groups to obtain control of established
organizations.
"Infiltration of student organizations and unions by known
agitators.
"Appearance of new organizations with titles stressing patriotism,
grievances, or interests of underprivileged or minority groups.
"Reports of large donations to new or revamped organizations.
"Reports of payments to locals for engaging in subversive
activities.
"Reports of the formation of subversive paramilitary
organizations.
"Use of grenades or other explosives in terrorist acts.
"Reports of insurgent I ists of targets for planned terroristic
acts.
"Appearance of professional agitators in demonstrations that result
in violence.
"Evidence of the participanti on of paid and armed demonstrators in
riots.
C-24
Insurgent-Promoted Activities . This includes--
"Reported incidents of attempted recruitment of people to join new
movements or underground organizations.
"Unexplained unavailability or disappearance of doctors, printers,
and other special ists who may be working with and for the
insurgents.
"Habitual criminals and unruly youths who seem to be acting with
and for the insurgents.
"Increased unrest and agitation among laborers.
"Inability or refusal of people to pay taxes.
“Reports of extortion and other coercion by the insurgents to
obtain financial “donations” from the people.
“Disappearance of young men from the city.
Activity Directed Against the Government . This includes--
"Failure of pol ice and informant nets to report properly,
indicating sources are supporting the insurgents or are afraid of
them.
"Decreasing success of government agents in infiltrating subversive
organizations.
"Assessination or disappearance of government agents.
"Reports of increased attempts by insurgent representatives or
suspected subversives to make contact with local leaders or
government officials.
"Reports of attempts to bribe or blackmail government and law
enforcement employees.
"Reports of attempts to get classified information from government
officials or documents from government offices.
"Leakage of classified information to news media.
"Sudden improvement in financial status of certain government and
law enforcement employees.
"Fai lure of government raids on suspected subversive meetings or
headquarters apparently because of forewarning.
"Increased activity against the government and its police, minor ity
groups, foreigners, or similar groups.
C-25
"Demonstrate ions against government forces, scapegoat minority
groups, or foreigners, designed to goad government forces into
acting against crowds.
0 More articles or advertisements in newspapers criticizing the
government.
0 Growth of general hostility toward the government and law
enforcement agencies.
0 Occurrence of strikes in critical areas casting doubt upon the
ability of the government to maintain order and provide for the
needs of the people.
0 Unusual and unsatisfactorily explained absences of government
employees from their offices.
0 Sporadic, unexplained destruction, loss, or forgery of government
identification cards and passports.
0 Unexplained disruptions of public utilities.
0 Reports of extortion attempts on local leaders and businessmen.
0 Terrorist acts and threats against government and business
leaders.
0 Murder or kidnapping of government officials.
Propaganda
Propaganda categories are broken down further into categories of
general activity, and activity directed against the established
government, military and police, and educational systems.
General Activity . This includes--
"Worldwide propaganda by proinsurgency-or iented countries
denouncing conditions and blaming the government of the targeted
country.
"Appearance in-country of antigovernment slogans and pronouncements
by word of mouth, wall scribbling, posters, and leaflets.
"Letter writing campaigns to newspapers and government officials
deploring undesirable conditions and blaming individuals in power.
"Increased use of slogans pinpointing specific grievances.
"Increased use of petitions demanding government redress of
grievances.
C-26
0 Circulation of petitions and pamphlets which appear to follow the
beliefs and policies of a foreign power.
0 More rumors, publications, or leaders from areas occupied by
migrants which focus upon lack of official concern about poor
conditions.
0 More agitation and unrest within the urban population for which
there is no logical explanation,
0 Appearance of committees and organizations whose leaders do not
seem to be from the urban area, yet who purport to speak for the
citizens of that area.
0 increased appeals directed at intensifying general religious
unrest in countries where reiigious competition exists.
0 Mass demonstrations where participants voice standard Communist
demands.
0 Announcements by foreign countries that the concerned country is
ripe for “war of national iteration, ” or words to that effect,
0 Propaganda linking local ethnic groups with those in neighboring
countries.
0 Clandestine in-country radio broadcasts worded to appeai to those
with special grievances or to underprivileged ethnic groups.
0 Use of bullhorns, truck-mounted loudspeakers, and other
sophisticated equipment in “spontaneous”’ demonstrations.
0 Presence of photographers other than newsmen among demonstrators.
0 Widespread propaganda which appeals for sympathetic reception or
participation in strikes or demonstrations.
0 Rallies to honor “martyred” insurgents. Mass demonstrations
honoring revolutionary heroes or dates significant to insurgency.
0 Nationwide strikes tailed to demonstrate the strength of the
insurgent movement.
0 Sympathy strikes or demonstrations taking place outside the
country concerned.
Activity Directed Against the Established Governmen t. This includes--
"Radio propaganda from foreign countries, aimed at the target
country, accusing its government of failure to meet the needs and
desires of its people.
C-27
“Propaganda from foreign countries, aimed at the target country,
denouncing imperialism.
“Demonstrations and violence in foreign countries against
embassies, offices, and consulates of the target country or
countries which support its government.
“Spreading accusations that the government is corrupt and
completely out of touch with the people.
“Agitation against existing or proposed government projects and
plans.
“Accusations that the government is a pawn of a foreign government.
“Calls for a popular front government, including new parties.
“Character assassinations of top government officials.
“Movement to remove strong anti insurgency leaders from office.
“Strikes or work stoppages called to protect government actions.
Activity Directed Against the Military and Police . This includes--
“Spreading accusations that the military and pol ice are corrupt and
completely out of touch with the people.
“Character assassinations of military and police officials.
“Movement to remove strong anti insurgency mi I i tary and police
leaders from the office.
“Calling on the people to stop cooperating with the military and
police.
“Deliberate acts to provoke police reprisals during demonstrations
or strikes.
“Accusations of police brutality or ineffectiveness or claims that
government forces initiated violence when demonstrations end in
riots.
“Publication of photographs purporting to show repressive pol ice
practices.
Activity Directed Against the Educational System . This includes--
“Student unrest manifested by new organizations, proclamations,
demonstrations, and strikes against authority.
“Charges by students and others that the educational system is not
adequate and is only training youth to do the government’s bidding.
“Appearance of quest ienable doctrine in the educational system.
“Clamor for personne I changes in the educat ional system.
Commodity
Commodity indicators are broken down further into subcategories of
foods, arms and ammunition, clothing, and drugs.
£oods This includes--
“Scarce food supplies when there is no report of natural
impediments to agriculture.
“Decline of foodstuffs in a country or province where there is a
tolerated black market, wh ich indicates that the food is being
diverted.
“Sudden shortages of preserved foods or items of food requiring
minimal storage facilities.
“Failure of farmers to transport their products to the city,
indicating a fear of travel on the highways.
“Large-scale purchasing of foodstuffs which may be by purchasing
agents for an insurgent movement.
Arms and Ammunition . This includes--
“ Increase in assaults on police and military personnel which
results in thefts of weapons.
“Increase in thefts and purchases of arms, ammunition, and
explosives.
“Discovery of arms, ammunition, and explosives being clandestinely
manufactured, transported, or cached.
“Increased purchase and theft from salvage yards of metal products
like pipe, casings, wire, spikes, snd nails.
“Increased purchase of surplus military goods.
“Increase in demand for small arms and ammunition on the open
market.
“Reports of large-scale purchasing of weapons, ammunition, and
material used in their manufacture.
“Increase in pilfering of arms and ammunition from the government.
“Increase in the number of armed robberies.
C-29
"Reports of theft or sudden shortages of chemicals which could be
used in the clandestine manufacture of explosives.
"Appearance of arms manufactured in pro insurgency-oriented
countries.
Clothing . This includes--
"Unusual systematic purchase of clothing materials which could be
used for the manufacture of insurgent uniforms or footwear.
"Unusual scarcity of clothing or material used in the manufacture
of clothing and footwear.
"Distribution of clothing to underprivileged classes by
organizations of recent or suspect origin.
"Discovery of caches of uniform clothing.
p ruas This includes--
0 Scarcity of drugs and medical supplies on the market or black
market.
“Large-scale purchase or theft of drugs and other medical supplies,
"Diversion of shipments of drugs.
Environmental
The environmental indicators include--
"Apartments and housing being rented, but not lived in as homes.
"Slogans written on walls, bridges, and streets.
"Defacement of government and police information signs.
"Disappearance of electrical lines. Pollution of the urban area’s
water supply.
"Terror ist acts against physical targets like bridges, dams,
airports, or buildings.
"Changes in residence of suspected subversives.
"Discovery of message drops.
"Apartments and houses being used for purchases other than
residences.
"Increased smuggling of currency, gold, gems, narcotics, medical
supplies, and arms into urban centers.
C-30
“Reports that local currency is being bought up in world markets by
pro insurgency-oriented countries.
"Appearance of abnormal amounts of counterfeit currency.
"Increase in bank robberies.
"Work stoppages or slowdowns in essential industries.
"Marked decline in product quality in essential industries.
"Marked increases in equipment failures in essential industries.
"Mass strikes and sympathy str ikes in essential industries.
"Appearance of known agitators or suspected subversives in picket
lines.
"Escalation of peaceful strikes to violence against property and
nonstriking personnel.
"Explosions in essential utilities and industries,
"Roadblocks and mines on main lines of communication.
"Malicious damage to industrial products or factory mathinery.
C-31
APPENDIX D
ENEMY STRENGTH COMPUTATIONS
Enemy strength undergoes a continuous fluctuation between TOE-type
strengths and varying levels of force, unit, equipment, and personnel
strengths during the course of a battle, campaign, or war. These
fluctuations are a result of unit, personnel, and equipment losses and the
enemy’s ability or inability to provide suitable replacements quickly and
consistently.
Enemy strength computations provide a method for estimating the level
of combat effectiveness of enemy forces. It is computed in terms of
committed forces, reinforcing and supporting units, and the number of
nuclear weapons and chemical and biological delivery systems suspected or
identified as being deployed within the friendly commandar’s AOS or Als.
Based on the analyst’s knowledge of enemy doctrine, OB, and current
information and intelligence on enemy dispositions, locations, and
capabilities, the numbers of committed, reinforcing, and supporting forces
is computed.
Once these enemy forces are determined, individual enemy units can be
identified or located and enemy strength computed. Personnel and
equipment strengths are described as percentages of known TOE-type
strengths, based upon reported enemy personnel and equipment losses and
known or estimated rates of replacement.
COMMITTED FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS
Committed forces are those enemy ground units, currently in contact or
with which imminent contact is expected, whose area of employment is not
expected to change to counter the specific course of action selected by
the friendly commander. Committed forces may change disposition within
their area of employment, but no significant delay is involved in their
employment. Designation of enemy forces as committed forces depends
primarily upon their disposition, location at the time of the estimate,
the echelon at which the estimate is being prepared, and enemy doctrine.
Committed forces are either located, unlocated, identified, or
unidentified units.
Reinforcements are those enemy forces whose area of possible
employment against the friendly force depends on the friendly selection of
a specific course of action and on enemy capabilities. Reinforcements
include all known enemy forces which are neither committed against a
friendly force nor committed outside the friendly zone or sector, but
which reasonably are considered capable of closing with the friendly force
in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission.
Estimates of enemy NBC capabilities usually are prepared at field army
and higher headquarters. Units below field army level usually lack the
means to gather the information to make such estimates. They use the
D-1
estimates of the higher headquarters and modify them with available
information.
The determination of enemy NBC operation capabilities is based
primarily on estimates of numbers and types of weapons and amount and
types of agents available, knowledge of enemy doctrine, past experience,
and estimates of enemy capabilities involving the employment of ground
troops. It is rarely possible to estimate what portion of the available
enemy NBC effort may be used against a division or corps within a field
army or a command in the COMMZ. It is also rarely possible to estimate
the number of nuclear weapons the enemy is capable of using within a
period as short as one day. The period selected is a month or longer,
depending on the available information and past experience. The statement
of the enemy’s capability of using chemical and biological agents includes
the amount, type, and delivery means of available agents.
COMPUTING COMMITTED ENEMY UNITS
The commander and the operations officer use the information the G2 or
S2 provides on enemy comnitted forces and reinforcements for planning and
conducting tactical operations. Accurate information is particularly
important during the commander’s analysis of opposing courses of action.
For example, in planning for an attack, an overestimation of committed
enemy forces and an underestimation of enemy reinforcements could cause
the friendly commander to attack with a small reserve. The intelligence
officer’s error in computing committed and reinforcing forces could al low
the enemy to counterattack with an unexpectedly strong force, inflicting
unacceptable casualties upon the friendly force.
All uncommitted enemy forces are considered as reinforcements if they
are committed in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission. If
there is doubt as to whether an enemy unit is committed or reinforcing, it
is considered as a reinforcement. This reduces the risk of surprise.
Expressing strength in number of units, by type, within an enemy force
is stressed because it is a simple, reliable, and readily understood
method of computing enemy strength. At the same time, the OB analyst
cannot ignore individual unit strength computations. This is particularly
important in arriving at a true picture of the enemy’s strength.
Strength by type of unit includes the total number of enemy units
listed by category and type. Normally, enemy units are counted down to
and including two echelons below the friendly force’s level of command.
Some special purpose units three echelons below may also be counted.
Usually, an intelligence officer accounts for committed enemy forces
by the size of the enemy unit which is opposing the friendly elements. At
the most basic level, state the actual number of weapons systems. Against
an enemy army, a division G2 usually counts committed forces in terms of
battalions;a corps G2 in terms of regiments; and field army and higher
headquarters, in terms of divisions. At headquarters above field army, a
statement of the number of armies and army groups is included. For
D-2
example, “The committed forces facing this army group consist of one army
group (3 combined arms armies with a total of 11 MRDs and 3 tank
divisions). . . When committed forces, such as guerrillas, do not have
a known organization, their strength is stated in total numbers. All FS
weapons systems avai table to the guerrillas, including tanks, infantry
fighting vehicles (IFVs), and artillery, also are listed and expressed in
terms of total numbers.
The brigade S2 considers as committed forces the first and second
echelon companies of enemy MR, tank, or reconnaissance battalions in
contact with the brigade. Although the enemy company is the basic sized
unit used by the brigade S2 in accounting for committed forces, the S2
also accounts for smaller units which have been located as separately
employed.
The battalion S2 considers as committed forces the first and second
echelon platoons of the enemy MR, tank, or reconnaissance companies in
contact with the battalion. Although the enemy platoon is the basic unit
used by the battalion S2 in accounting for committed forces, available
intelligence frequently does not enable the individual platoons composing
the enemy company to be located. Therefore, the battalion S2 considers
that a located enemy company normally consists of three platoons; a
company (-) consists of two platoons. Table D-1 shows the process of
counting committed forces in the defense and in the offense.
The designation of enemy units as committed forces depends primarily
on their disposition and location at the time the estimate is made. Enemy
unit identification facilitates determining if a particular unit is the
reserve of elements in contact with the brigade or battal ion.
When an enemy unit of the size used in accounting for committed forces
is in contact with two adjacent friendly units, the entire enemy unit is
considered to be committed by the G2 or S2 of both friendly units. For
example, if an enemy battalion is in contact with elements of two adjacent
US divisions, both division G2s consider the entire battalion as committed
against their respective divisions. This points up the need for correct
identification and accurate strength computation at each echelon.
All ground FS weapons organic to the enemy MRB or MRR are usually
referred to as normal regimental artillery and are always considered to be
in support of committed forces. That is, each committed unit is assumed
to have available to it its normal proportion of the available supporting
weapons organic to the regiment. These weapons, therefore, need not be
enumerated unless desired. FS weapons not organic to enemy motorized
battalions or regiments which are identified as within supporting range
are enumerated as if in support of committed forces. In the event that
the forces committed against the brigade or battalion have no known TOE
(that is, volunteer or irregular-type units), all FS weapons which are
identified are enumerated.
D-3
Table D-1. Counting committed forces in the defense and offense.
When the US is in the defense,
THE
LOOKS AT
LOOKS FOR
MR
TK
RECON
Battalion
S2
1st Echelon Bns
Pits
Pits
Pits
Brigade S2
1st Echelon Regts
Cos
Cos
Cos
Division
G 2
1st Echelon Divs
Bns
Bns
Cos
When the
US is
in the offense,
THE
LOOKS
LOOKS FOR
MR
TK
RECON
Battalion
S 2
Between LD, LC and
the objective
Pits
Pits
Pits
Brigade S2
Between LD, LC and
the objective
Cos
Cos
Cos
Division
S2
Between LD, LC and
Bns
Bns
Cos
the objective
*Reinforcing units do not need to be expressed in the same units as
committed forces; they should be expressed in the simplest possible
terms.
*supporting artillery may be expressed as “a RAG (or DAG)” of _
battalions”, battery or battalion equivalents (by type). However, if
artillery has been located which is not a normal RAG or DAG asset, the
type and size unit must be expressed. For example, “supported by
a _ battalions, RAG or DAG,” artillery assets, augmented by
one battery of 203 mm guns and one battery of 240 mm mortars.
When enumerating enemy forces in a defensive posture, enemy security
elements forward of the combat outpost I ine are normally considered
reinforcements of the main defensive position until contact with these
security elements is made. The intelligence officer correctly identifies
the enemy's main defensive positions and is not deceived by security
forces. The security forces normally become reinforcements for the main
defense after completing their security mission.
D-4
In addition to determining the enemy’s ground combat unit strength in
terms of committed forces and reinforcements, the G2 or S2 also considers
the enemy’s air and nuclear weapons strength, However, as estimates of
enemy air NBC warfare strength are usually prepared only at field army
level and higher, the G2 or S2 simply restates these capabilities in the
estimate.
Reinforcements are stated conveniently and meaningfully. For example,
if the opposing division has an MRR in reserve, this reinforcemen'<t is
referred to as a motorized regiment rather than three motorized
battalions. When enemy units--either committed forces or
reinforcements—are very much understrength, the estimated remaining
strength is expressed. Two divisions, each at half strength, are usual Iv
more formidable than a single division at full strength because of the
added flexibility of employment and the additional CS probably available.
A half-strength field artillery battalion is more than half as effective
as a full strength battalion,
When only two elements of a unit are located, they are counted as they
appear. By templating, it is possible to determine the approximate
location of the third element. Although this unit should not be counted,
the commander is advised as to its possible location. An exception to
this rule occurs, however, in situations where enemy doctrine normally
precludes elements of a unit operating independently of each other. For
example, if a US brigade S2 detects the presence of one MR company of a
Soviet MRB, then the remaining elements of the MRB are counted as
committed, albeit unlocated , enemy forces. This is because Soviet
doctrine normally precludes the MR companies of an MRB from operating
independently of each other .
COMPITT ING ENEMY REINFORCEMENTS
Factors derived from analysis of past similar enemy movements
determine the time required for an enemy to move troops from one place to
another and commit them. The considerations described below are
applicable in training and as a point of departure for the development of
experience factors in operations against an enemy force.
To determine the time when the enemy employ an uncommitted unit, the
travel time from the unit location to a logical point where the unit can
be committed is calculated. To the travel time, add the closing time
(pass time of a column). Except when observation of enemy units is
continuous, it is assumed that any unit could have started to move
immediately after its last reported location. Therefore, to determine the
earl iest time at which the enemy can reinforce, add the travel plus
closing time to the time last observed. For example, if an enemy
reinforcement was last observed at 0800 hours, and it can deploy to
envelop the northern flank in one hour, it is assumed that the attack can
be launched as early as 0900 hours (0800 plus one hour). In the
exceptional case involving piecemeal commitment of enemy reinforcements,
consider only travel time. Forces which are committed piecemeal do not
close into an assembly area or attack position.
D-5
Because observation of reinforcements is rarely continuous, statements
of enemy reinforcing capabilities should include both the earliest time
and that time after starting movement when the reinforcement is
accomplished. For example, “’the enemy reinforces the attack with the 45th
MRR at 0900 hours, or one hour after starting movement. ” When the time
since the last report is greater than the time after starting movement,
only the time after starting movement is given. For example, “the enemy
reinforces the attack with the 45th MRR now or one hour after starting
movement." When the number of reinforcements is large or the enemy is
capable of reinforcing in several areas, reinforcing capabilities are
presented in tabular form. Table D-2 is an example of this. It shows the
enemy reinforcing the attack or defense with all or part of the following
units at the places and times indicated.
Table D-2. Examples of estimating reinforcements.
UNIT
PLACE
MOTOR
FOOT
45th MRR
RJ 6382
Now or 1 hr after
starting.
091205 Jun or 4 hr
5 min starting
movement.
RJ 8884
090930 Jun or 1 hr
30 min after
starting movement.
091605 Jun or 8 hr 5
min after starting
movement.
37th MRR
RJ 6382
091000 Jun or 2 hr
after starting
movement.
100740 Jun or 23 hr 40
min after starting
movement.
RJ 8884
090920 Jun 1 hr
20 min after starting
movement.
091430 Jun or 6 hr 30
min after starting
movement.
In selecting a logical point for reinforcement, consider the effects
of AO characteristics, such as AAs and logical enemy reactions to friendly
courses of action. For reinforcement of an attack capability, select
locations for commitment of second echelon and reserve forces for enemy
battalions and reg iments and forward assembly areas for enemy divisions
and larger units. For enemy units moving to reinforce a defense, select
defense or counterattack positions. For movements by aircraft, select
logical LZS or’ DZS from which the enemy forces can materially affect the
accomplishment of the mission.
The time required by the enemy to issue extra ammunition, make
detailed reconnaissance, issue orders, and deploy to a line of departure
is not normally considered because all these actions are completed before
starting the operation or simultaneously with movement.
The following guidance is applicable until you develop experience
factors against a particular enemy:
D-6
0
Compute foot marching time for all appropriate reinforcements.
Compute motor movement time only for distances greater than 10
kilometers (6 miles). If a unit is observed in trucks, compute only
the motor movement time.
0 Consider a foot march of more than 32 kilometers (20 miles) as a
forced march. Consider a motor movement of more than 280 kilometers
(175 miles) as a forced march for motorized units and a movement of
more than 224 kilometers (140 miles) as a forced march for tank
units.
0 Compute closing time at the night rate of march if a column begins
to close before the BMNT closing time; if a column begins to close
at or shortly after BMNT, use the day rate of march. If a column
begins to close before the EENT, use the day rate of march; if a
column begins to close at or shortly after EENT, use the night rate
of march.
0 Move and close the entire unit to move an enemy infantry
battalion. To move a unit of regimental or larger size, move and
close two-thirds of the combat elements; that is, two battal ions of
an infantry regiment, two regiments of an infantry division.
COMPUTING COMBAT STRENGTH
The following three situations illustrate the method for computing
combat strength, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs.
SITUATION 1
The 20th Infantry Division is advancing to the south. The advance of
the division is stopped by elements of two MRRs (8th and 12th) of the
enemy 16th MRD. Each of these MRRs has two MRBs in contact and one MRB in
the second echelon. The third MRR (96th) is in contact with the 72d
Infantry Division on the flank of the 20th Infantry Division. About 40
kilometers (25 miles) in rear of the 16th MRD and in the area of the 20th
Infantry Division objective, two MRRs (43d and 75th) of the enemy 12th MRD
are preparing field fortifications.
The four battalions of the 8th and 12th MRRs in contact with the 20th
Infantry Division are considered as committed forces by the 20th Infantry
Division G2. Regardless of the specific courses of action selected by the
commander of the 20th Infantry Division to continue the advance, the area
of employment of these four battalions in contact does not change
appreciably. The second echelon battalions of the 8th and 12th MRRs are
not considered committed since they are not in contact and are employed in
other areas. The 96th MRR is considered committed and mentioned in the
composition subparagraph of the OPORD, but only its second echelon
battalion is listed as a reinforcement by the 20th Division.
The other two battalions are committed against the 72d Division and are
not available as reinforcements against the 20th Division. The 43d and
75th MRRs of the 12th MRD are considered as reinforcements because these
units are not committed against the friendly force and are committed in
D-7
time to affect the mission of the 20th Infantry Division. Although the
two MRRs of the 12th MRD are digging field fortifications in the vicinity
of the division objective, the enemy commander employs these units against
either the 20th Infantry Division or adjacent divisions. Figure D-1 shows
this situation in a schematic sketch.
SITUATION 2
The 20th Infantry Division is attacking to the east. Enemy committed
forces are the 3d MRB, 3d GMRR, the 1st and 3d battalions of the 5th MRR,
and the 1st Battal ion, 7th MRR; the 2d Battalion, 33d GMRR, 2d Battalion,
3d GMRR, and the 3d Battalion, 7th MRR are committed against units on the
20th Infantry Division flanks. The 1st and 2d Battalion, 3d GMRR, 2d
Battalion, 5th MRR, and the 2d Battalion, 7th MRR are not in contact and
are second-echelon battalions which are employed against the 20th Infantry
Division. They are considered as reinforcements. The two enemy regiments
in the assembly area astride the 20th Infantry Division north boundary and
the enemy MRR south of the south boundary are also possible
D-8
reinforcements. From their locations and dispositions, it is apparent
that they are the 2d echelon regiments of the divisions committed against
the 20th Infantry Division. Depending on the course of action selected by
the commander of the 20th Infantry Division and plans of the enemy
commander, all or part of these enemy elements are employed against the
20th Infantry Division, at various times and places, in time to affect the
accomplishment of the division mission. Figure D-2 depicts this
situation.
SITUATION 3
This example discusses the determination of enemy strength opposing
the 1st Brigade, 21st Infantry Division, and each of its composite units:
the 1st Battalion, 69th Infantry; and the 1st Battalion, 70th Infantry.
Figure D-3 shows the 1st Brigade, 21st Infantry Division, with the 1st
Battalion, 69th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 70th Infantry forward
defending positions as indicated in a schematic sketch. Reports from the
D-9
Figure D-3. Schematic sketch, situation 3.
21st Infantry Division indicate the enemy has an unknown number of air and
nuclear weapons available.
The S2, 1st Brigade, determines enemy strength as follows:
"Committed Forces: 1st Brigade is opposed by elements of three
MR companies, one reconnaissance platoon, and one medium tank
company (13 tanks) supported by normal regimental artillery, plus
six 120mm mortars, six 122mm howitzers, six loom AT guns, and all
available air and nuclear weapons.
"Reinforcements: Enemy reinforcements available for commitment in
the sector of 1st Brigade are an unidentified MRB located in the
vicinity of Hill 250.
The three MR platoons northwest of the Highway 82 bridge are disposed
so that they logically constitute one MR company in contact with, and
committed against, the 1st Brigade. The reconnaissance platoon southwest
of Hill 200 and the MR company northeast of the Highway 82 Bridge are in
D-10
contact with, and committed against, the 1st Brigade and its respective
battalions. All three platoons of the company northeast of the Highway 82
bridge are considered as one company committed against 1st Brigade, since
brigades account for committed forces in terms of companies. The MR
company south of Chigger Woods is located so that it is, logically, the
reserve company of an enemy battalion in contact with 1st Brigade and is
therefore considered committed. The MR companies of the 25th and 23d
Regiments, located to the east and west of the 1st Brigade sector, are
totally committed against adjacent brigades and are, therefore, neither
committed nor available as reinforcements against 1st Brigade, 21st
Infantry Division. Twelve medium tanks are located in the vicinity of the
MR companies committed against 1st Brigade and are, therefore, also
committed. The S2, 1st Brigade is equally correct to account for these
committed medium tanks as three medium tank platoons or one medium tank
company. In addition to the 120mm mortars (organic) and the 100mm AT guns
and 122mm howitzer battery (both attached), the enemy MRB is supported by
the artillery group of its parent regiment. The enemy also has an unknown
number of air and nuclear weapons, which are employed in support of
committed forces.
The S2, 1-69 Infantry, determines enemy strength now opposing the
battalion as follows:
"Committed Forces: 1-69 Infantry is opposed by two MR platoons, one
reconnaissance platoon, and one medium tank platoon, supported by
normal regimental artillery, plus six 120mm mortars, six 122mm
howitzers, six loom AT guns, and all available air and nuclear
weapons.
"Reinforcements: Enemy reinforcements available for commitment in
the sector of 1-69 Infantry are an unidentified MRB located in the
vicinity of Hill 250 and an unidentified MR company and medium tank
platoon located in the vicinity of Chigger Woods.
One MR platoon is in sole contact with, and therefore committed
against, 1-69 Infantry. The MR platoon north of boundary 1-69 and 1-70
Infantry is counted as committed against both 1-69 Infantry and 1-70
Infantry. The medium tank platoon in the same vicinity is also in contact
with and therefore committed against both 1-69 Infantry and 1-70 Infantry.
The MR company and tank platoon located in the vicinity of Chigger Woods
which are considered as committed by S2, 1st Brigade could logically be
employed against 1-69 Infantry in time to affect the accomplishment of the
battalion mission and are therefore considered as reinforcements. The
discussion above concerning the battalion vicinity Hill 250, the normal
regimental artillery and nonorganic weapons in support of committed
forces, applies also to the determination by S2, 1-69 Infantry.
The S2, 1-70 Infantry, determines enemy strength now opposing the
battalion as follows:
D-ll
"Committed Forces: 1-70 Infantry is opposed by four MR platoons and
two medium tank platoons supported by normal regimental artillery,
plus six 120mm mortars, six 122mm howitzers, six 100mm AT guns and
all available air and nuclear weapons.
“Reinforcements: Enemy reinforcements available for commitment in
the sector of 1-70 Infantry are an unidentified MRB located in the
vicinity of Hill 250 and an unidentified MR company and medium tank
platoon located vicinity Chigger Woods.
The S2, 1-70 Infantry, considers the individually located MR platoons
vicinity boundary 1-69 Infantry and 1-70 Infantry in the same manner as
does S2, 1-69 Infantry. Two platoons of the motorized company northeast
of Highway 82 bridge are considered committed against 1-70 Infantry. S2,
4-80 Mechanized, could also consider two platoons of this company
committed against the battalion. The discussion concerning reinforcements
and supporting fires applies also in the determination by S2, 1-70
Infantry. (See Figure D-3).
D-12
APPENDIX E
TERRAIN ANALYSIS IN INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
The function of terrain analysis is to reduce the uncertainties
regarding the effects of terrain on combat operations. It allows the
commander to'see the battlefield” and the effects of weather on the
terrain in the AO. In order to accomplish terrain analysis, the
intelligence staff receives support from the engineer terrain teams or
detachments. To effectively use the terrain information developed by the
terrain team, intelligence personnel must understand basic terrain
analysis and its applications to the IPB process. In units where terrain
analyst assets are not available, the intelligence staff collects,
analyzes, and integrates terrain information into the commander’s
decision-making process.
TERRAIN ANALYSIS PROCESS
The terrain analysis process is paramount in prebattle support. Early
in the IPB process planners determine the terrain information required to
support the operations at all levels. Terrain analysis emphasizes the use
of graphics to depict the effects of the terrain on ground and air
operations. It considers the effects of weather on the terrain and how
weather influences operations. The Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) prepares
much of the data base that terrain analysts use. This DMA data is
produced in two standard formats: a planning terrain analysis data base
(PTADB) at 1:250,000 scale and a tactical terrain analysis data base
(TTADB) at 1:50,000 scale. These scales coincide with the planning and
tactical maps used by the US forces. DMA standard factor overlays
produced include--
"Surface configuration (slope).
"Surface drainage.
"Vegetation.
"Surface materials (soils).
Overlays produced depicting factors related to military aspects of
terrain (OCOKA) are-
"Concealment from aerial detection (summer and winter seasons) .
"Obstacles (microrelief).
“Bui It-up areas.
"Transportation.
"Key terrain.
"Cross-country movement (wet and dry conditions) .
E-1
These products have a wide dissemination, but are primarily intended
for use by the terrain teams in support of the IPB process.
TERRAIN FACTOR MATRIX AND TERRAIN ANALYSIS SUPPORT GUIDE
The terrain factor matrix and terrain analysis support guide are tools
for the analyst. They were developed through an analysis process whereby
terrain factors that impact on combat operations are identified and
correlated with specific types of combat operations and battlefield
functions. Figure E-1 shows a terrain analysis support guide. The
terrain factor matrix was introduced in Chapter 4 (see Figure 4-4).
THE TERRAIN DATA BASE
The focus of terrain analysis support in the prebattle is on providing
the combat commander with detailed planning graphics of various terrain
factors. These graphics are expedient, tailored to the mission, and
updated with the changing combat and weather situations. Information
concerning the types and sizes of units involved (both friendly and
enemy), number and types of vehicles and equipment, and type of operation
is needed in this developmental stage.
The process begins with the analyses of the basic terrain factors
(surface configuration, surface drainage, vegetation and surface
materials, built-up areas, and transportation nets). These products are
used to assess the existing situation and further used in combination to
develop the factors of OCOKA and other special purpose graphics. The
analyst produces overlays depicting terrain factors not found on
topographic maps. These factors include, but are not limited to, fording
sites, tree height, stem spacing, stem diameter and canopy closure,
micro-relief, and the effects of weather on soil . This information is
necessary in the development of the OCOKA graphics. The information is
gathered through on-site collection, aerial reconnaissance, photographic
interpretation and analysis, and other collateral sources.
Surface Configuration
Surface configuration portrays and describes the landforms and the
irregularities of the earth’s surface. Maneuver commanders need accurate
intelligence on the surface configuration of the terrain. The aspects of
the various landforms and surface irregularities affect movement of
troops, equipment, and materials from one point to another. Therefore, it
is necessary that the analyst prepare an accurate surface configuration
overlay.
There are three principal landform groups’:
"Plains (less than 150 m difference in elevation between the high
point and the low point and having more that 50 percent of the area
with slope less than 4 percent).
"Hills (150 to 600 m--with low hills of 150 to 300 m and high hills
of 300 to 600 m).
E-2
MILITARY ASPECTS
OF TERRAIN (OCOKA)
ELEMENTS OF TERRAIN
Ini-ORMATION
EXAMPLES OF TERRAIN
ANALYSIS PRODUCTS
Observation and
fields of fire
• Vegetation (summer and winter)
• Surfare configuration
• Battlefield environmental
Effects on the terrain
• Urban areas
■ Horizontal LOS
for DF weapons
and radar
• Emplacement suitability
and performance
ratings for ground
surveillance
Concealment and
cover
• Vegetation (summer and winter)
• Surface configuration
• Obstacles (micro relief)
• Battlefield environmental
effects on the terrain
• Urban areas
• Cover potential from
Direct or indirect fire
(good, fair, or poor)
• Concealment, potential
from horizontal observation
(good, fair or poor)
Obstacles
• Vegetation (summer and winter)
• Surface configuration
• Drainage characteristics
• Natural and manmade obstacles
• Micro-relief
• Surface material (wet and dry)
• Urban areas
• Location of exsisting
natural and manmade
obstacles
• Mobility potential on the
battlefield expressed in
GO, SLOW-GO and NO-GO
for both tracked and
wheeled vehicles
Key Terrain
• Urban areas
• LOCs
• Surface configuration
• Drainage characteristics
• Location of key terrain
features, both natural and
manmade. Examples are:
bridges, chokepoints, high ground,
key military Installations
Avenues of approach
• Vegetation (summer and winter)
• Urban areas
• Surface configuration
• Surface materials (wet and dry)
• Drainage characteristics
• LOCs
• Identification of areas where
movement of friendly and enemy
forces may occur
• Speed prediction
• LZs
• DZs
• Landing beaches
• NOE navigation
Figure E-1. Terrain analysis support.
“Mountains (greater than 600 m with low mountains of 600 to 1500 m
and h igh mountains greater than 1500 m) .
Major I and forms, naturally and culturally dissected land areas, and
micro-relief are depicted. Micro-relief includes escarpments,
embankments, cuts and fills, and ditches less than 2 m in height.
E-3
Relief i s the difference in elevations represented by contour lines,
hypsometric tints, shading, or spot elevations. Slope is the inclined
surface of a hill, mountain, or any other part of the earth’s surface.
Slope is shown in three basic categories:
“Map unit A equals 0-30 percent slope, where the distances between
contour lines can be as narrow as the lines for 30 percent or
wider. Movement and maneuverability are generally unrestricted
except in local areas.
“Map unit B equals 30-45 percent slope, where the distances can be
as narrow as 30 percent or narrower to 45 percent. Movement for
vehicles in these areas is very slow. Maneuverability is difficult
for tracks and large-wheeled vehicles.
“Map unit C equals greater than 45 percent slope, where the
distances between contour lines are narrower than those for 45
percent. Movement is generally precluded and maneuverability is
extremely I imited. These areas are usually designated as NO-GO
areas for most vehicles.
Figure E-2 shows the three basic categories of slope on a terrain and
weather factor combined overlay. These categories may be further divided
to obtain a more descriptive analysis.
E-4
Slope can be expressed in three ways: first as a slope ratio (sometimes
called gradient) represented as a fraction; second, as a degree of slope
labeled in degrees; and third, as percent of slope. The best method of
representation is the percent of slope. Figure E-3 shows how to calculate
percent of slope.
E-5
Percent of slope is represented in the three categories described.
Use a slope template or slope calculator to assist in determining slope
categories.
A slope template or slope calculator is a device used for finding
areas within a given class or slope on a topographic map. Many slope
calculators have been made by various terrain detachments. These
calculators show different contour densities to be used on maps at various
scales with various contour intervals. They are usually reproduced by the
photo lab on transparent plastic. Figure E-4 shows examples of six
different slope calculators combined into one.
There are no significant weather effects on surface configuration.
Most changes to surface configuration occur over long periods of time or
as a result of a natural or artificial catastrophic event.
Surface Drainage
With the concept of rapid mobility, it is vital for commanders to know
what watercourses exist in their AO. Surface drainage is not just
identifying rivers on a map. Military planners need to know types of
watercourses, watercourse characteristics, conditions of the surrounding
area, and artificial features along the watercourse. Figure E-5 shows a
sample watercourse and water body data card. It is essential to military
operations that analysts consider seasonal and short-term weather effects.
Watercourses are classified into four types: perennial , intermittent,
ephemeral , and tidal . There are also 7 drainage patterns. These are
dendr itic, trellis, radial, annular, rectangular, parallel, and pinnate.
Drainage patterns provide information on surface materials (soil types and
geologic structure) and surface configuration. Figures E-6 through E-12
show the different drainage patterns.
Detailing is important in the preparation of the surface drainage
overlay. Include a stream regime in the marginal information. This is a
brief descriptive analysis of the prevalent drainage system(s) in the
area. Rivers are identified as having a gap width greater than 2.84 mm
and a length greater than 20 mm. Streams and canals are classified by
type (perennial, intermittent, ephemeral or tidal) and by size. There are
three sizes of streams:
"Less than .09 mm gap width.
"Greater
than
.09
mm-less
than .36 mm gap width
“Greater
than
.36
mm gap
width.
E-6
Each section, A through F,
is actually a separate calculator.
Select one section for an example.
To measure a 45 percent slope-
Use the contour density in section U C,”
because you are given a map with:
• an RF of 1:25,000,
and
• a contour interval of 20 ft.
Figure E-4. Slope calculator examples.
E-7
Figure E-5. Watercourses and water bodies data.
A random developed, tree-llke pattern composed of branching tributaries to a main stream. It is
the most common pattern and is characteristic of essentially flat-lying and relatively
homogeneous material.
Figure E-6. Dendritic drainage pattern.
A modified version of the dendritic pattern. Main streams generally flow parallel with the
tributaries Joining at right angles. This pattern is indicative of bedrock structure where rock strata
have been folded and main streams now follow the strike of the rock units.
Figure E-7. Trellis drainage pattern.
E - 9
This pattern is characterized by a network ot channels, almost parallel, flowing away from a central
high point. It is found on dome structures, Isolated round hills, or volcanic cones.
Figure E-8. Radial drainage pattern.
Usually associated with radial drainage, as where sedimentary rocks are upturned by a dome
structure. Joints or fractures may control the flow of the tributaries to provide a parallel aspect
Primary drainage will circle around a central high area.
Figure E-9. Annular drainage pattern.
E-10
Sometimes called angulate, (rectangular dendritic or angular dendritic) this pattern js also a
modified version of the dendritic pattern. It Is characterized by abrupt, close to 90 degree, changes
in stream directions and distinct obtuse or acute angles of stream juncture. This pattern is
generally caused by faulting or jointing of the underlying bedrock. It is usually associated with
massive igneous and metamorphlc (intrusive) rocks, though it may be found in any rock type.
Figure E-10. Rectangular drainage pattern.
This drainage pattern is characterized by major streams that are trending in the same direction.
Parallel streams are indicative of gently dipping beds of uniformly sloping topography. Tributaries
characteristically join the mainstream at approximately the same angle. Extensive, uniformly
sloping basalt flows and young coastal plains exhibit this drainage pattern. On a smaller scale the
slopes of linear ridges may also reflect this pattern.
Figure fll. Paraffer dridnage pattern.
This Is a hybrid form of a fine dendritic pattern, it strongly resembles a feather structure in
appearance. The gullies have steep, nearly vertical walls, profusely rilled with possible pinnacle
development. The bottoms are generally flat and broad.
Figure E-12. Pinnate drainage pattern.
An important consideration of streams and rivers are crossing sites
for fording, swimming, and bridging, and bank conditions. Most trucks can
ford depths up to three feet, most tanks up to four feet. Velocity should
be less than five feet per second. Vertical banks greater than one foot
stop trucks and greater than four feet stop tanks. Figure E-13 shows a
sample surface drainage overlay. See terrain matrix (Figure 4-4) for
surface drainage applicability.
Precipitation has a tremendous effect on hydrologic features and
adjacent areas. It affects watercourse depths, velocities, and bank slope
conditions. Evaluate flood plains and areas subject to inundation. The
lack of precipitation also plays an important role in the evaluation of
rivers and streams. The absence of water in various channels and flats
provides concealed movement routes, however, use caution and give
attention to weather forecasting when considering these routes. Wind
affects velocity and surface turbulence on the larger watercourses.
Vegetation
Vegetation has a significant effect on many types of military
activities and is considered carefully in planning operations. There are
many ways vegetation affect military tactics, decisions, and operations.
Perhaps the most important is concealment. Concealment is the ability to
move troops, vehicles, and equipment without being detected from the
ground or air.
Vegetation is defined as the natural plant cover characteristic of an
area. There are four types of vegetation:
E-12
"Trees are greater than 3.05 m tall, perennial wood plants, single
sterrrned, with a definite crown shape. They are either of the
deciduous or coniferous variety.
"Scrub and shrub. Scrub is vegetation noted by its stunted growth
due to poor soil or climatic conditions. Shrub is the undergrowth
of the forested areas, normally the dominant vegetation. It is
either deciduous or coniferous.
"Grasses are all non-woody plants (grasses and forbs) . hey are
classified as tall or short grasses depending on height (less than
one meter is short, greater than one meter is tall).
"Crops are defined as cultivated vegetation (vineyards, arms,
plantations, orchards, and fields).
Ground reconnaissance of vegetation provides the analyst with the
necessary vegetation information to determine concealment possibilities.
Reconnaissance allows the analyst to take precise measurements, thus
producing a graphic or greater accuracy. Current aerial photography is
E-13
essential to accurate analysis of vegetation. The best altitude for
photography for this analysis is less than 12,500 feet for accuracy within
10 percent. Altitude should not exceed 16,000 feet.
Areas are at least one square kilometer in size to be depicted on the
overlay. It is important to check the surface drainage overlay to ensure
the vegetation coincides on both overlays.
Vegetation annotated are those areas marked or those areas greater
than 5 mm in size. Stands with more than 60 percent coniferous vegetation
are designated as coniferous (C), with more than 60 percent deciduous
vegetation are labeled as deciduous (D), and stands with mixed vegetation
(C+D)) in 40-60 percent combinations are marked with an E. Use standard
symbology for other vegetation types (orchards, vineyards, and swamps).
Indicate height and canopy closure for each vegetation type.
Figure E-14 shows mapping capabilities for vegetation data elements in
the US, USSR, and Federal Republic of Germany. Figure E-15 shows a sample
vegetation overlay. See terrain matrix (Figure 4-4) for vegetation
applicability.
Concealment from aerial detection is determinedfrom vegetation type,
percent of canopy closure, stem spacing, and vegetation height. Canopy
closure is normally computed for forested areas and is defined as the
percentage of ground area covered by the tree crown area. Canopy closure
has four categories:
"Category 1 - 0-25 percent closure (poorest concealment).
"Category 2 - 25-50 percent closure.
"Category 3 - 50-75 percent closure.
"Category 4 - 75-100 percent closure (best concealment) .
In categories two and three, concealment depends on theforest mixture
of coniferous and deciduous trees. Tree height and canopy closure hinder
visibility, while stem diameter and vegetation density (stem spacing)
impede movement and maneuverability. Intervals less than 20 feet in
spacing greatly restrict maneuverability. Forested areas with stem
diameters greater than 2 inches stop wheeled vehicles (6-8 inches for
tracks). The vehicles are able to knock down the trees; however, the
brush pileup forms a significant obstacle.
Precipitation and wind affects vegetation by limiting or increasing
visibility. Precipitation also impacts on the effects of vegetation on
t raf f i ca b i I i ty. Consider the fire potential of extremely high
temperatures in conjunction with the lack of precipitation.
Surface Materials
The analysis of soils for military planners has two purposes: first
for the eng i neering and construction uses and second, for military
E-14
UNITED STATES
FEDERAL REPUBLIC
GERMANY
USSR |
DATA ELEMENT
1:250,000
1:50.000
1:250,000
1:50.000
1:200,000
1:50,000
1. Map unit Identification
and vegetation boundaries
Limited to
major
vegetation
boundaries
Limited to
major
vegetation
boundaries
Umited to
major
vegetation
boundaries
Umited to
major
vegetation
boundaries
Umited to
major
vegetation
boundaries
Umited to
major
vegetation
boundaries
2. Mean height to top
ot canopy
Woodland 3m
Scrub 3m
Woodland 3m
Scrub 3m
No
No
Yes
Yes
3. Percent canopy cloture
by season
Umited esti¬
mate tor major
vegetation type
Umited esti¬
mate for major
vegetation type
Umited
Umited
Umited
Umited
4. Number of stems per
hectare
No
No
No
No
No
No
5. Crown diameter
No
No
No
No
No
No
6. Mean stem diameter
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
7. Number of frees In each
stem diameter class per
hectare
No
No
No
No
No
No
8. Stem Spacing
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
9. Species Identification,
seasonality, and
distribution
No
No
No
No
No
No
Coniferous
Deciduous
Mixed only
Coniferous
Deciduous
Mixed only
Coniferous
Deciduous
Mixed only
Coniferous
Deciduous
Mixed only
10. Ground cover type,
percent of cover, and
height
No
No
No
No
No
No
11. Utter type and depth
No
No
Umited
Limited
Umited
Umited
12. Mean height to lowest
branches
No
No
No
No
Umited
Umited
13. A representative
transect
No
No
No
No
No
No
Figure E-
operations, spei
because of their
14. Map cap
cifically, tr
influence
labilities for
afficability
on drainag
vegetatioi
'. Surfac
1 e, veget
n data eiei
:e materi
ation, fie
nents.
al s are
;ld fortifi
important
cations,
and trafficability.
Surface materials are broken down into two groups, soi s ar| d rocks.
Soils are of unconsolidated parent materials and are often called deposits
or materials. Rocks are from consolidated parent material.
The Unified Soils Classification System is the system used ' n
determining soil types and characteristics. There are several
E-15
DIGIT
1st
2d
3d
Vegetation (Height)
TYPE
Forest Type
Coniferous
Deddlous
Mixed
Orchard
Canopy Closure (%)
0-25%
25-50%
50-75%
75-100%
Height (Meters)
0-4.5
4.5-20
Above 20
Figure E-15. Terrain factor overlay Vegetation Height.
CODE
c
D
E
F
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
E-16
characteristics needed to produce a surface materials (soils) overlay.
The analyst identifies soil composition as either fine-grained,
coarse-grained, or organic soils. Figure E-16 shows a sample soil
classification chart. Figure E-17 shows a surface material overlay that
further explains the classification designations. The first digit is the
predominant soil, the second digit is a characteristic description.
Surface roughness is depicted in the third digit. The following example
further depicts the classification system.
GW1 : Well-graded gravels, gravel-sand mixtures with little
or no fines. Soil has no roughness effect. This soil is
generally free of moisture. Soil depth is less than 5 meters.
Note: The subscript character indicates moisture and soil depth.
. . . indicates soil is normally moist.
_ . . indicates soil is normally wet.
_ indicates soil depth is less than 5 meters.
Other characteristics needed are an analysis of remo I d a b i I i t y , soil
depth in meters, moisture content, and soil horizonation . R e m o I d a b i I i t y
is the tendency for a soil to change strength with traffic. Soil depth is
measured in meters and is classified as--
0 Class 1 - 0 - .5 meters deep,
"Class 2 - .5 - 1.5 meters deep.
‘Class 3- 1.5- 3.0 meters deep.
"Class 4 - more than 3.0 meters deep.
Soil moisture content (the ability of the soil to retain moisture)
must consider daily and seasonal changes. Soil horizonation (or layering)
is the natural division of the unconsolidated material into three basic
layers. The three layers are: layer A - surface materials; layer B -
subsurface materials; and layer C - materials of the consolidated parent
material Other sublayers may be present.
A surface materials overlay breaks down the most probable soil types,
characteristics, and distribution. Depicted on a soils overlay (surface
configuration) are common soil types along with exposed rock outcrops (R),
peat (PT), evaporates (E) and permanent snowfields (PS).
SOIL TRAFFICABILITY
The capability of a soil to withstand traffic is referred to as the
soil strength or soil trafficability. Factors affecting soil
trafficability are soil type, characteristics and conditions (wet or dry),
vehicle type and vehicle cone index, and the soils rating cone index. A
rating cone index is the product of the measured cone index and the
remolding index. The vehicle cone index is the minimum soil strength that
permits a given vehicle to complete 1 pass and 50 passes over a section of
terrain. See TM 5-330 for the various vehicles and tables. The analysis
E-17
More than half of material la amatler No 200 eleve size | More than half of material la larger than No 200 ele*e size.
The No. 200 aleve alze la about the emalleat particle visible to the naked eye.
Major Divisions
Group
Symbols
Typical Names
Field Identification Procedures
(Excluding particles larger than 3 in
and basing tractions on estimated
weights)_
Wide rangeTTgrairrsIzesTnd
substantial amounts of all Intermediate
particle sizes
t
o
z
* c
I " I
* o I
5=8,
S - s « *
= N
£ c m
o
islf i
a £ m ^ £
® Z
c c
i§
O o
c • ■*»
I 5 1
oi =
GW
Well-graded gravels, gravel-sand
mixtures, little or no fines
GP
Poorly graded gravels or gravel-sand
mixtures, tittle or no fines
GM
E .o
I 1 = *
sill!
OilSso
Silty gravels, gravel-sand-sllt mixture
GC
Clayey gravels, gravel-sand silt
mixtures
sw
Well-graded sands, gravelly sands,
llttte or no fines
Predominantly one size or a range of
sizes with some Intermediate sizes missing
Non plastic fines or fines with low
plasticity (for Identification procedures
see ML bekiw)
Plastic fines (for Identification
see CL below)
Wide range In grain sizes and
substantial amounts of all intermediate
particle sizes_
Sands
More than hall of coi
traction Is smaller thi
sieve size.
(For visual classlflcatl
eg
Clean
(Little
no fin
SP
Poorly graded sands or gravelly
sands, little or no fines
Predominantly one size or a range of
sizes with some Intermediate sizes missing
Sands With
Fines
(Appreciable
amount
of fines)
D
Silty sands, sand-sIH mixtures
Nonplastic fines or fines with low
plasticity (for identification procedures
see ML below)
sc
Clayey sands, sand-clay mixtures
Plastic fines (for identification
procedures see CL below)
1
Identification Procedures on
Fraction Smaller than No. 40 Sieve Size
_
Dry Strength
(Crushing
characteristics)
DDatancy
(Reaction
to shaking)
Toughness
(Consistency
near PL)
Sills and Clays
Liquid limit Is
less than 50
ML
Inorganic silts and very tines sends,
rock Dour, silty or clayey fine sands
or clayey silts with slight plasticity
None to slight
Quick
to slow
None
CL
Inorganic days of low to medium
plasticity, gravelly clays, sandy days
silty clays, clean days
Medium
to high
None to
very slow
Medium
OL
Organic silts and organic silty clays
of low plasticity
Slight to
medium
Slow
Slight
•» O
£ J5 “>
usS
T> l£
C ^
« -o •
• 3 <0
£ S £
<0 o>
Inorganic silts, micaceous or
diatomaceous
Slight to
medium
Slow to
none
Slight to
medium
CH
Inorganic days of high plasticity,
fat days
High to very
high
None
High
OH
Organic clays of medium to high
plasticity, organic silts
Medium
to high
None to
very slow
Slight to
medium
Highly Organic Soils
Pt
Peat and other highly organic soils
Readily identified by color, odor spongy
feel and frequently by fibrous texture
Figure E-16. Unified soiT classification chart.
E-18
SURFACE MATERIAL (SOILS)
1:50,000
A
SOIL 11’PE
MAP UNil
fl ST TwO OlGlTS)
DESCRIPTION
Gw
Well-graded gravels, gravel-sand mixtures,
little or no lines.
GP
Poorly graded gravels or gravel-sand mix¬
tures, little or no lines.
GM
Silty gravels, gravel-sand silt mixtures.
GC
Clayey gravels, gravel-sand day mixtures.
SW
Well-graded sand, gravelly sands, little
or no lines.
SP
Poorly graded sands or gravely sands, little
or no lines.
SM
Silty sands, sand-silt mixtures.
SC
Clayey sands, sand clay mixtures.
ML
Inorganic silts and very fine sands, rock
flour, silty or clayey line sands, or
clayey silts with slight plasticity.
CL
Inorganic clays of low to medium plasticity
gravelly clays, sandy days, silty days,
lean clays.
OL
Organic silts and organic silty clays of
low plasticity.
MH
Inorganic silts, micoceous or diotomoceous
fine sandy or silty soils, elastic silts.
CH
Inorganic clays of high plasticity fot days.
OH
Organic clays of medium to high plasticity,
organic silts
PT
Peat and other highly organic soils.
RK
Rock outcrops.
EV
E vapor it es
X
Not evaluated.
PS
Permanent snowfields.
w
Open water.
SURFACE ROUGHNESS
MAP UNIT
(3iD DIGITS)
DESCRIPTION
0
No Data
1
No surface roughness effect
2
Area of high landslide potential
3
Stony soil with scattered surface rock
4
Quarry
E-19
of soil trafficability is used in determining cross-country movement and
vehicle maneuverability. (See Figures 4-5 and 4-6 for examples of
over lays.)
Precipitation affects trafficability by changing the physical
properties and characteristics of the soil and the consolidated parent
material . Wind also is important because it decreases the drying time of
inundated areas. Wind reduces visibility by creating dust plumes in
exceptionally dry areas.
MILITARY ASPECTS OF TERRAIN - OCOKA
Terrain analysis focuses on the military aspects of the terrain known
collectively as OCOKA. Military aspects of the terrain are observation
and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and
avenues of approach and mobility corridors.
Observation and Fields of Fire
Observation involves the influence of the terrain on reconnaissance,
surveillance (opt ical and electronic LOS), and TA. Intervisibility is
extremely important. Intervisibility is the unobstructed view from point
A to point B. It is the ability to see from one station to another
station. Vegetation is particularly effective in limiting observation on
plains and plateaus. Prominences that could provide a commanding position
are generally lacking. In areas bare of trees, long distance observation
is good. The rugged topography of hills and mountains offers variable
observation. Terrain masking is the concealment of areas from direct
horizontal optical and electronic LOS by terrain features. Masking plays
an important role in communications and surveillance techniques and
systems emplacement. Consider LOS ( intervisibility and masking effects)
for various electronic and optical systems. (See Figure 4-12.)
FofF is the effect that the terrain has on weapons and weapons systems
effectiveness. LOS is considered for LOS direct fire weapons. Indirect
fire should consider surface configuration at the target site. It is
important to indicate distance and direction of observation. For FofF
indicate direction, trajectory angle for indirect fire to clear vegetation
(or other obstructions) from a specific point, and the extent of the
firing fan. (See Figure 4-11.)
Concealment and Cover
Concealment is protection from air and ground observation. Cover is
protection from the effects of fire, both direct and indirect.
Concealment and cover is derived from the surface configuration,
vegetation, and built-up area overlays. Slopes greater than 30 percent,
dense forested areas, and large bui It-up areas offer good cover. Fair
cover is outl ined by slopes 10-30 percent, medium forest density, and
medium built-up areas. A medium built-up area is equal to nine square
kilometers. It is important to accurately calculate percent of roof
coverage of a built-up area when determining concealment. The best
E-20
concealment is described as 0-25 percent chance of detection . Concealment
is evaluated for summer and winter seasons.
Cover , concealment, or defilade in the plains regions is generally
poor. Those areas having low topographic features (micro-re | ief), such as
escarpments, cuts and fills, and embankments afford some protection. The
rugged terrain of the hills and mountainous regions provide abundant
opportunity for concealment and cover. Above the timberline movement
across most slopes or crests is exposed to view in many directions.
Obstacles
Obstacles are natural or artificial features that stop, impede, or
divert military movement and maneuverabil ity. Obstacles occur on the
ground and in the air. The effects of removing, overcoming, or bypassing
the obstacles must be considered in the planning of the overall
operation, Hills and mountains usually are considered obstacles to
movement and generally favor the defense. History records many cases in
which forces inferior in numbers and equipment have held off superior
attackers in mountainous areas. There have been many instances in which
such obstacles have been effectively achieved by moving over the hilly and
mountainous terrain instead of through adjacent corridors where the enemy
was prepared. However, factors unfavorable to troop movement must be
considered. These conditions include difficulty in movement, lack of
maneuvering space, and the vulnerability of the LOC. Consider vegetation,
built-up areas, and surface drainage, in addition to the surface
configuration and micro-relief features in determining obstacles.
Key Terrain
Key terrain is any feature or area, natural or artificial, that the
seizure or control of offers a marked tactical advantage to the occupant
over the opposing force. Examples of natural key terrain features include
DZS, high ground, route constrictions or choke points, and fording sites.
Manmade key terrain features are a little harder to define. These include
key bridges, communications and logistics sites, major built-up areas
(urban, industrial , or commercial), major transportation centers
(airports, rail facilities, ports and harbors, and roadway networks).
Significant military, political, or governmental facilities and
installations are considered key terrain.
It is important to be selective in determining what features are key.
Selective criteria includes the following questions: Will control of this
feature provide me with a tactical advantage over the enemy? Is control
of this feature crucial to the success of the mission? Is this feature
along a major LOC or in a major MC? How will weather affect this
feature? What size force can this feature accommodate and are there ready
access routes? Additional considerations in selecting key terrain
includes concealment and cover and observation and FofFs. It is important
to indicate why the selected features are considered key terrain and what
effect control has on friendly and enemy forces.
E-21
Avenues of Approach and Mobility Corridors
AAs and MCS are routes by which a force may reach key terrain or an
objective. AAs and MCs address maneuver support potential, degree of
canal ization, concealment and cover, observation and FofFs, obstacles, and
the access to key terrain and adjacent avenues or corridors. There are
three types of AAs: ground, air, and rear area AAs.
Ground Avenues of Approach . A ground AA is broad enough and contains
sufficient MCs to support rapid movement and maneuver of forces along its
entire course. It should be free of obstacles. If obstacles are present
they should be few in number and require reasonable engineer support to
remove them. The avenue also affords good to excellent concealment and
cover.
Air Avenues of Approach . These are much the same as ground avenues. They
should be free of obstructions or have adjacent corridors to permit bypass
of obstructions. It is important to consider avenues and corridors in
layers as to reflect different altitudes of approach. This considerate ion
would depend on the level and size of the operation.
Rear Area Avenues of Approach . These are avenues that provide the rap id
movement of rear threat elements and the additional service support
elements to the front I ines.
Note: It is extremely important to indicate the width of the avenues and
corridors and what size element can pass through. Note any major choke
points that canalize movement along the AA into designated MCs as key
terrain. (See Figure 4-13 for examples of AAs and MCs.)
THE MODIFIED COMBINED OBSTACLES OVERLAY
The MCOO is the graphic terrain analysis on which all other IPB
products are based. It is one of the two templates (the other being the
DST) that is always prepared at all echelons. At echelons where the IPB
process is more formal, the terrain analyst produces detailed combined
obstacles overlays and AA overlays that may be combined or modified to
form the basis of the MCOO. At lower echelons however, the MCOO is
normally prepared by the intelligence staff as a single graphic.
A combined obstacles overlay is made up of built-up areas, LOCS,
surface drainage, surface configuration (including micro-relief), surface
materials, and vegetation. These component factors reflect average
weather effects for wet and dry conditions. These features are outlined,
highlighted, or marked to show their significance to movement and
maneuverability. There are three movement categories: NO-GO, SLOW-GO,
and GO.
A MCOO is produced for the IPB process when key terrain features, AAs
and MCs for air and ground forces, and a friendly operations graphic are
added to the combined obstacles overlay. Detail depends on the level and
type of operation. The MCOO contains at a minimum registration marks,
classification, titling data, and a legend. As a general rule the
following information is depicted:
E-22
o
NO-GO terrain.
° SLOW-GO terrain.
° Bui It-up areas.
° LOCs.
° Rivers and water obstacles.
° Obstacles.
° Key terrain.
° AAs and MCs.
° Objectives.
CONCLUSION
Weather and terrain have more impact on the battle than any other
physical factor, including weapons, equipment, or supplies. The terrain
on which battles are fought presents opportunities to both sides. Most
battles are won by the forces that use the terrain and weather to their
advantage in both offensive and defensive operations. The resurgence of
terrain analysis in today's Army and the recognition of terrain as a
potent multiplier of combat power makes each of us responsible for terrain
information.
E-23
GLOSSARY
Acronyms and Abbreviations
AA
avenue of approach
AAA
air avenue of approach
AAG
Army artillery group
AD
air defense
ADA
air defense arti11ery
ADM
atomic demolition munitions
ADP
automatic data processing
ADPS
automated data processing system
adv
advance
AE
aerial exploitation
AF
Air Force
AFCENT
Al1ied Forces Central Europe
AFSCOORD
assistant fire support coordinator
A 1
area of interest
Al IF
Automated Installation Intelligence File
AKA
also known as
AMC
Army Materiel Command
ammo
ammunition
AO
area of operations
AOB
air order of battle
AP
antipersonne1
A PC
armored personnel carrier
appl
app1ication
approx
approximate1y
arty
arti11ery
AS
aeria 1 survei11ance
ASAS
all-source analysis system
ASL
authorized stockage list
ASPS
all-source production section
at
antitank
ATGL
antitank guided launcher
ATGM
antitank guided missile
AUD
arbitrary unit designator
Aug
August
AW
air warning
AWS
Air Weather Service
BAT-D battlefield deception
BDA battle damage assessment
bde brigade
BE basic encyclopedia
B1CC battlefield information coordination center
bks barracks
bldg building
BMCT beginning of morning civil twilight
BMNT beginning of morning nautical twilight
Glossary-1
BMP
designation of
a type
bn
battalion
BOMREP
bombing report
BTF
battalion task
force
btrv
battery
of Soviet armored personnel carrier
C
C 2
c 3
C 3= CM
CAA
ca I
CARVE
CAS
cav
CB
cc
CDP
cd r
C-E
CEWI
CFA
CG
cGy/hr
C-HUMINT
cl
CIA
CIAS
CID
C-IMINT
cm
CM&D
CML
COA
co
COL
COLT
comd
COM I NT
COMMZ
COMSEC
COMZEALAND
CONUS
coord
COP
COSCOM
CP
CPA
CPFL
CPS
coniferous
command and control
command, control , and communications
command, control , and cormnunications countermeasures
combined arms army
caliber
criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability,
and effect
close air support
cavalry
chemical biological
cloud cover
company distributing point
commander
Communications-Electron ics
combat electronic warfare and intell igence
covering force area
commanding general
centiGray hour
counter human intelligence
counter inte I I igence
Central Intelligence Agency
counterintelligence analysis section
Criminal Investigation Division
counter imagery inteligence
centimeter
countermeasures
collection management and dissemination
chemical
course of action
company
colonel
combat observation and laser team
command
communications intelligence
communications zone
communications security
Commander, Allied Land Forces, Zealand
Continental United States
coordinate
command observation post
corps support command
command post
collection planning aid
Contingency Planning Facilities List
characters per second
Glossary-2
CPT
CRT
CRTA
CS
CSA
CSG
C-SIGINT
Css
CTL
CTOC
CTOCSE
CTT
CUBIC
CUCV
cw
capta i n
cathode-ray tube
commander rocket troop artillery
combat support
corps support activity
corps support group
counter signals intelligence
combat service support
critical task list
corps tactical operations center
corps tactical operations center support element
commander’s tactical terminal
Commnon Users Baseline for the Intelligence Commnunity
commercial utility cargo vehicle
continuous wave
D
DA
DAG
DATEXT
DBMS
DCS
def
deg
DF
DIA
d i v
D 1 VARTY
DMA
DMz
DOD
DO I
DP
DS
DST
DTG
DTOC
DTOCSE
DZ
deciduous
Department of the Army
division artillery group
data extract
data base management system
Defense Communications System
defense
degrees
direction finding
Defense Intelligence Agency
division
division artillery
Defense Mapping Agency
demilitarized zone
Department of Defense
date of information
decision points
direct support
decision support template
date-time group
division tactical operations center
division tactical operations center support element
drop zone
E
ea
EAC
EACIC
EAM
ECB
ECCM
ECM
EECT
EEF I
EE I
evaporates (soil type)
each
echelons above corps
echelons above corps intelligence center
event analysis matrix
echelons corps and below
electronic counter-countermeasures
electronic countermeasures
end of evening civil twilight
essential elements of friendly information
essential element of information
Glossary-3
EENT
end of evening nautical twilight
EEOB
enemy electronic order of battle
elm
e 1 ement
EMCON
emission control orders
en
enemy
engr
engineer
EOB
electronic order of battle
EPL
ELINT parameters list
EPW
enemy prisoner of war
ESM
electronic warfare support measures
est
estimated
EW
electronic warfare
F
Fahrenheit
FA
field artillery
FAC
forward air controller
FAIO
field artillery intelligence officer
FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEBA
forward edge of the battle area
FIST
fire support team
FLOT
forward line of own troops
FM
field manual
FO
forward observer
Fof F
field of fire
FP
field post
FPN
field post number
FRAGO
fragmentary order
FRG
Federal Republic of Germany
FROG
free rocket over ground
FS
fire support
FSCOORD
fire support coordinator
FSE
fire support element
FSO
fire support officer
f t
feet
FVD
full unit designation
fvdfwd
forward
G1
Assistant Chief of Staff, G1
(Personnel)
G2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
(Intelligence)
G3
Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 1
[Operations and
G4
Assistant Chief of Staff, G4
(Logistics)
G5
Assistant Chief of Staff, G5
(Civil Affairs)
GE
Germany
GEOREF
Geographic Reference System
GMT
Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu)
GPS
grid producing source
GS
general support or general staff
GSR
ground surveillance radar
GTA
government training aid
Plans)
Glossary-4
HB
high burst
HD
horizontal ground distance
HF
high frequency
HHC
headquarters and headquarters company
HOTPHOTOREP
hot (high priority) photographic report
how
howitzer
HPT
high payoff target
HQ
headquarters
hr
hour
HUMINT
human intelligence
hv
heavy
HVT
high value target
hwy
h i ghway
1A
imagery analysis
ID
identification
1 DAD
internal defense and development
1 ED
imitative electronic deception
IEW
intelligence and electronic warfare
1 FV
infantry fighting vehicles
HR
intelligence information report
IMINT
imagery intelligence
inf
infantry
1NSCOM
Intelligence and Security Command
i nst 1
installation
intg
interrogation
1 NTREP
intelligence report
1 NTSUM
intelligence summary
1 PB
intelligence preparation of the
battlefield
1 PI R
initial programmad interpretation
report
IR
information requirements
ITAC
Intelligence and Threat Analysis
Center
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
J2 Intelligence Directorate
J3 Operations Directorate
KIA
killed in
action
km
kilometer
kph
kilometers
per hour
LIC low-intensity conflict
LOC lines of communication
LOS line of sight
LP listening post
LTG lieutenant general
LZ landing zone
Glossary-5
m
maint
MAJ
MAS[NT
ma x
MBA
MC
MCOO
MD
MDC I
MDCI SUM
mech
MED
METT-T
MG
Ml
Ml Jl
MIJIFEEDER
min
MISREP
mm
MOD
mort
MOPP
MORTREP
MOV
MP
MR
MRB
MRC
MRD
MRR
m/s
msg
msl
MSR
MTLR
mtr
mvr
meter
maintenance
major
measurement and signature intelligence
max i mum
main battle area
mobility corridor
modified combined obstacles overlay
map distance
multidiscipline counterintelligence
multidiscipline counterintelligence summary
mechanized
manipulative electronic deception
mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available
machinegun; major general
military intelligence
meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference
meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference report
feeder
minute or minimum
mission report
millimeter
mobile obstacle detachment
mor tar
mission oriented protective posture
mortar bombing report
military owned vehicle
military police
motorized rifle
motorized rifle battalion
motorized rifle company
motorized rifle division
motorized rifle regiment
meters per second
message
missile
main supply route
moving target-locating radar
motor
maneuver
NAI
NATO
NBC
NBCE
NCO
NLT
no
NSA
NTR
NW
named areas of interest
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
nuclear, biological, and chemical
nuclear, biological, and chemical element
noncommissioned officer
no later than
number
National Security Agency
nothing to report
northwest
Glossary-6
06
obj
OCOKA
off
OIC
OMG
OP
OPLAN
OPORD
OPSEC
org
order of battle
object
observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover,
obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach, and mobility
corridors
officer
officer in charge
operational maneuver group
observation post
operations plan
operations order
operations security
organization
PERINTREP
PERINTSUM
PIR
PL
PLL
pit
PM
POL
pos
ps
Psns
PSYOP
pt
PTADB
ptl
PTR/P
periodic intelligence report
periodic intelligence summary
priority i ntelligence requirement
phase line
prescribed load list
platoon
provost marshal
petroleum, oils, and lubricants
position
permanent snowfields
positions
psychological operations
peat
planning terrain analysis data base
patrol
paper tape reader/punch
R
R&D
R&S
RAG
RATT
RC
RD
REC
RECCEXREP
recon
regt
res
RF
R11
ROIPB
rpt
RRII
RSTA
rock outcrops
research and development
reconnaissance and surveillance
regimental artillery group
radio teletypewriter
reserve component
road
radioelectronic combat (not a US term)
reconnaissance exploitation report
reconnaissarnce
regiment
reserve
representat ive fraction
request for intelligence information
rear operations intelligence preparation of the battlefield
report
response to request for intelligence information
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
Glossary-7
/ s /
52
53
SA
SALUTE
SAM
SATRAN
SCARF
Sc I
SCUD
SEAD
SED
SHAPE
SHELREP
sig
SIGINT
S I GSEC
SIR
S I TDEV
S I TMAP
S I TREP
SLAR
SOP
SP
SSM
STANAG
str
SUPINTREP
SUPIR
Swo
TA
TAC-D
TACREP
TA I
TARDEV
TCAC
TCAE
TDA
TDI
TEL
TEMPEST
TF
tgt
Tl
tk
TLE
tng
TOC
signature
Intelligence Officer (US Army)
Operations and Training Officer (US Army)
special agent
size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment
(spot report format)
surface-to-air-missile
definition is classified (see FM34-60A (S-NFD))
standard collection asset request format
sensitive compartmented information
nickname of a missile system
suppression of enemy air defenses
simulated electronic deception
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
shell report
signal
signals intelligence
signal security
specific information requirements
situation development
situation map
situation report
side-looking airborne radar
standing operating procedures
self-propel led
surface-to-surface missile
standardization agreement
strength
supplementary intelligence report
supplemental programed interpretation report
Staff Weather Officer
target acquisition
tactical deception
tactical report
target areas of interest
target development
technical control and analysis center
technical control and analysis element
target damage assessment
target data inventory
transporter-erector- launcher
an unclassified name for studies and investigations of
compromising emanations
task force
target
technical intelligence
tank
target location error
training
tactical operations center
Glossary-8
TOE
TPL
t r p
TSS
TTADB
TTY
TVA
UAV
UHF
Ul
UNCLAS
Unk
us
USAF
USAIA
USA I CS
USAREUR
Uses
USSI D
USSR
UTM
VCR
VDP
veh
VHF
v i c
WETM
WIA
WNA
wpn
yr
table of organization and equipment
time phase line
troops
target selection standards
tactical terrain analysis data base
teletypewriter
target value analysis
unmanned air vehicle
Ultra-high frequency
unidentified
unclassified
Unknown
United States
United States Air Force
United States Army Intelligence Agency
United States Army Intelligence Center and School
United States Army Europe
Unified Soils Classification System
United States Signals Intelligence Directive
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)
universal transverse mercator (grid)
videocassette recorder
video disk player
vehicle
very high frequency
vicinity
weather team
wounded in action
would not answer
weapon
year
Glossary-9
References
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
Required publications are sources that users must read in order to
understand or to comply with this publication.
Field Manuals (FMs)
FM 34-1 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations
FM 100-5 Operations
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
Rslated publications are sources of additional information. They are
not required in order to understand this publication.
Army Regulation (AR)
105-31 Message Preparation and Processing
Field Manuals (FMs)
3-3 NBC Contamination Avoidance
3-12 Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense
3-22 Fallout Prediction
5-26 Employment of Atomic Demolition Munitions
21-26 Map Reading and Land Navigation
34-10 Division Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
Operations
34-25 Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
Operations
34-37 Echelons Above Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
Operations
34-40 (U) Electronic Warfare, Secret
34-60 Counter intelligence
34-60A (U) Counterintelligence Operations, Secret
34-80 Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and
Electronic Warfare Operations.
References-1
34-81 Weather Support for Army Tactical Operations
34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
90-2 Battlefield Deception
101-5 Staff Organization and Operations
101-5-1 Operational Terms and Graphics
101-10-1 Staff Officers Field Manual: Organizational ,
Technical , and Logistical Data
101-31-1 Staff Officers’ Field Manual: Nuclear Weapons
Employment Doctrine and Procedures
Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications (JCS Pubs)
JCS - Pub 1 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms
JCS - Pub 25 Title Unavailable, Top Secret.
Training Circulars (TCs)
34-41 Jamming Handbook
34-52 Intelligence interrogation
34-55 Imagery intelligence
Fieid Circular (FC)
1 oo-l 5-1 Corps Deep Battle
Standardization Agreements (STANAGs)
1059 National Distinguishing Letters for Use by NATO Forces
2003 Patrol Reports
2008 Bombing, Shelling, and Mortaring Reports
2014 Operation Orders, Annexes to Operation Orders, and
Administration and Logistic Orders
2020 Operational Situation Reports
2022 intelligence Reports
2019 Military Symbols
References-2
2029 Method of Describing Ground Locations, Areas and
Boundaries
2033 Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW)
2073 NATO Intelligence Subject Code
2077 Order of Battle (Non-NATO Troops)
2084 Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and
Documents
2097 Nomenclature for Soviet Bloc Army Weapons and
Equipment
2103 Raporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical
Attacks, and Predicting and Warning of Associated
Hazards and Hazard Areas
2104 Friendly Nuclear Strike Warning
2112 Radiological Survey
2118 Intelligence Estimate
2134 Offensive Air Support Operations
2149 Intelligence Request
3277 Air Reconnaissance Request and Task Form
3377 Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Report Forms
3596 Air Reconnaissance Target Reporting Guide
6004 Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming, and Interference Report
STANAGs can be obtained from: Naval Publications and Forms Center,
5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19120.
References-3
INDEX
Al. See area of interest
ADP. See automatic data processing
aerial fire support officers (FSO), 7-10
AirLand Battle, 1-1
area of operation (AO), l-l
deep attack, sample of, 1-2
HVT, 1-2
IPT, 1-2
intelligence support to
close operations, 1-3
daep operations, 1-3
rear operations, 1-3
all-source production section (ASPS), 2-2
analysis, 2-4, 2-17
area of operations, A-108
pattern, 6-9
annotated jntelljgence estimate, A-10
for stability operations, 1-4, A-26
applications programs, B-6
arbitrary unit designators, 3-28, 3-30
area of interest (Al), 1-4, 4-7
area of operations, 1-1, 1-4, A-108
area study files, 10-7
ASPS. See all-source production section
assessment, 2-17
attack options, 7-7
delay, 7-7
disrupt, 7-7
limit, 7-7
automatic data processing (ADP), B-l
automation support to intelligence analysis, B-1, B-4
current automated support systems, B-7
MICROFIX, B-7
TCAC, B-7
hardware, B-2
keyboard, B-3
modems, B-4
monitor, B-4
peripherals, B-4
printer, B-4
processor, B-4
storage device, B-4
video cassette recorders, B-4
video disk players, B-4
software, B-2
applications program, B-S
data base management system, B-6
operating system, B-5
word processing, B-S
avenues of approach and mobility corridors, 4-10, 4-16, E-22
Index-1
BAE. See battlefield area evaluation
battlefield area, 1-4
Al, 1-4
AO, 1-4
Cl, 1-4
Ew, 1-4
ECCM, 1-6
ECM, 1-6
ESM, 1-6
IEW mission, 1-4
one-up and two-down formula, 1-4
situation development, 1-4
make sound tactical decisions, 1-4
target development, 1-4
battlefield area evaluation (BAE), 1-4, 4-7, 7-6
battlefield information coordination center (BICC), 1-8, 1-9
biases, S-11
BICC. See battlefield information coordination center
blue element, 5-7
bombing, shelling, and mortaring report, A-87
canopy closure, E-14
capabilities, 6-1
cathode ray tube (CRT), B-4
CC. See cloud cover
checklists of white, red, and blue questions, 5-8
CIAS. See counterintelligence analysis section
civil-military operationa file, 10-9
close operations, 1-3
cloud cover (CC), 4-13, 4-22
CM&D. See collection management and dissemination
COA. See course of action
collecting, 2-2
collection management and dissemination (CM&D), 2-2
COLT. See combat observation and laser team
combat
effectiveness, 3-1, 3-5, D-1
forces, 10-14
observation and laser team (COLT), 7-10
combined
intelligence operation, 10-1
obstacle overlay, 4-6, 4-8, 4-12, 4-22, E-22
commander, 1-8
intent of, 4-6, 4-27, 4-30
committed forces, D-1
composition, 3-1, 10-13
concealment and cover, 4-8, E-20
conceptual model, 6-1
contents of an OB book, 3-9
Index-2
coordinate register, 3-22, 10-9
counter-human intelligence (C-HUMiNT), 9-2
counter-imagery intelligence (C-IMINT), 9-3
counterinsurgency, 10-1
counterintelligence (Cl), 1-4
analysis, 9-1
analysis section (CIAS), 9-1
C-HUMINT collection, 9-2
C-IMINT coi llection, 9-3
C-SiGINT collection, 9-2
EACIC, 9-1
ITAC, 9-1
rear operations, 9-2
counter-signals intelligence (C-SIGINT), 9-2
workstation, B-14
course of action (COA), 6-3
credibility, 2-14
of information, 2-15
critical nodes, 7-7
CRT. See cathode ray tube
current automated support systems, B-7
current propaganda and PSYOP file, 10-7
data base management system (DBMS) software, B-5
DBMS. See data base management system
decide. See targeting process
decision
briefing, A-144
points (DP), 4-30, 4-32, 7-5
supper t
matrix, 4-32
templates (DST), 4-1, 4-5, 4-26, 4-29, 4-32
decisive terrain, 4-10
deduction, 2-17, 2-18
deep attack, 1-1
sample of, 1-2
delay. See targeting process
deliver. See targeting process
planned target, 7-12
target damage assessment, 7-13
targets of opportunity, 7-13
destroy, 7-1
detect, 7-3, 7-8
aerial FSO, 7-10
COLT, 7-10
FIST, 7-8
forward area alerting radar, 7-10
moving targe’t-locating radar, 7-10
target location errors (TLE), 7-’11
Index-3
target selection standards (TSS), 7-11
directing, 2-1
disposition, 3-1, 3-2, 10-14
dissemination, 2-18, 10-12
disrupt, 1 -1, 7-1, 7-7
doctrinal, 4-7, 4-11, 4-24, 4-32
templates, 4-5, 4-14, 4-25, 4-27, 6-4
OP. See decision point
EACIC. Sea echelons above corps intelligence center
echelons above corps intelligence center (EACIC), 1-6, 9-1
effectiveness, 10-18
effects of weather, E-l
on mobility, 4-13
electronic
counter-countermeasures (ECCM), 1-6
countermeasures (ECM), 1-6
order of battle (EOB), 3-5
technical data, 3-1, 10-19
electronic warfare (EW), 1-4, 6-1
intelligence required for ECCM, 8-3
intelligence required for ECM, 6-2
intelligence required for ESM, 8-2
electronic warfare support measures (ESM), 1-6
enemy
combat effectiveness, 3-28
strength computations, D-1
combat effectiveness, D-1
committed forces, D-1
reinforcements, D-1, D-5
EOB. See electronic order of battle
evaluation, 2-4, 2-13, 10-10
event, 4-3, 4-29
analysis matrix, 4-14
template, 4-1, 4-5, 4-26, 4-28, 4-32
EW. See electronic warfare
factors analysts should consider, 5-1
feedback, 5-2
fire support team (FIST), 7-8
FIST. See fire support team
formats, A-1
analysis of area of o pe ra t io ns , A-108
annotated intelligence estimate, A-10
for stability operations, A-25
bombing, shelling, and mortaring reports, A-87
fragmentary order, A-127
initial and supplemental programmed interpretation report, A-59
Index-4
intelligence annex, A-29
intelligence estimate, A-1
intelligence report, A-43
intelligence summary, A-44
interrogation and translation report, A-61
meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference report, A-143
mission report, A-129
NBC attack reports, A-09
oral reports, A-144
decision briefing, A-144
information briefing, A-144
patrol report, A-126
periodic intelligence report, A-48
periodic intelligence summary, A-51
reconnaissance exploitation report, A-68
SIGINT tactical report, A-142
situation report, A-42
spot report, A-1
standard collection asset request format, A-136
forward area alerting radar, 7-10
fragmentary order, A-127
FSO. See aerial fire support officer
G2/S2, 1-8
G3/S3, 1-8
handbook of military forces, 3-8
hardware, B-2
high payoff target (HPT), 1-2, 4-31, 7-4, 7-6
high value target (HVT), 1-2, 4-24, 4-32, 7-6
historical studies, 10-20
hot file, 10-7
HPT. See high payoff target
WT. See high value target
identify enemy HVTs, 1-2
IEW. See intelligence and electronic warfare
incident map, 10-4
indicators, 6-3
information briefing, A-144
information requirements (IR), 2-2
initial and supplemental programmed interpretation report, A-59
installation handbook, 3-10
insurgency analysis worksheet, 10-7
insurgent situation map (SITMAP), 10-4, 10-5
integration, 2-17, 10-10
intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) mission, 1-4
Index-5
ntelligence
analysis, B-1
ADP, B-1
automation support to, B-1
CRT, B-4
hardware, B-2
keyboard, B-3
modems, B-4
monitor, B-4
peripherals, B-4
printer, B-4
processor, B-4
software, B-2
applications program, B-5
DBMS, B-6
operating system, B-6
word processing, B-5
storage device, B-4
video cassette recorders, B-4
video disk players, B-4
annex, A-29
director, coordinators, and producers, 1-8
estimate, 10-2
dissemination, 1o-l2
evaluation, 10-10
integration, 10-10
interpretation, 10-11
recording, 10-4
area study files, 10-7
civil-military operations file, 10-9
coordinate register, 10-9
current propaganda and PSYOP file, 10-7
hot file, 10-7
incident map, 10-4
insurgency analysis worksheet, 10-7
insurgent SITMAP, 10-4
personalities and contracts map, 10-5
personality and organization file, 10-7
population status map, 10-5
resource file, 10-7
trap map, 10-6
file, 2-7
journal, 2-6
report, A-43
required for ECCM, 8-3
required for E(X, 8-2
required for ESM, 8-2
support to
combatting terrorism, 9-14
counterinsurgency, 10-1
Index-6
summary, A-44
workbook, 2-12
intelligence analysis system, !-6
BICC, 1-9
duties of, 1-8
commander, 1-8
coordinator, 1-8
director, 1-8
producers, 1-8
staffs, 1-8
G2/S2, 1-8
G3/S3, 1-8
TCAE, 1-9
TOC support element, 1-9
Intelligence cycle, 2-1
collecting, 2-2
CM&D section, 2-2
directing, 2-1
ASPS, 2-2
IR, 2-2
PIR, 2-2
dissemination, 2-18
processing, 2-3
analysis, 2-4
assessment, 2-17
deduction, 2-18
integration, 2-17
evaluation, 2-4, 2-13
credibility, 2-14, 2-16
pertinence, 2-14
reliability, 2-14
of source and agency, 2-1S
recording, 2-3, 2-6
intelligence journal, 2-6, 2-8
intelligence file, 2-7
intelligence workbook, 2-12
OB SITMAP, 2-10
working SITMAP, 2-9
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), 4-3,
application of, 4-5
commander’s intent, 4-6, 4-27, 4-30
event template, 4-6, 4-28, 4-32
MCOO, 4-6, 4-8
template, 4-6
battlefield area evaluation (BAE), 4-7
Al, 4-7
METT-T, 4-7
MCOO, 4-6, 4-8
avenues of approach and mobility corridors, 4-16
one-down, two-down rule, 4-11
4-34
Index-7
one-up, two-down rule, 4-11
concealment and cover, 4-8
key terrain, 4-8, 4-28
decisive, 4-10
observation and fields of fire, 4-8
obstacle, 4-6, 4-8, 4-10, 4-22, 4-25
OCOKA, 4-8
combined obstacle overlay, 4-6, 4-8, 4-12, 4-22
effects of weather on mobility, 4-13
in support of LIC, 10-2
line of sight analysis, 4-15
process, 4-1, 4-11, 4-24, 4-26, 4-34
decision support, 4-1, 4-5, 4-26, 4-29
doctrinal template, 4-14, 4-25, 4-27
event, 4-3, 4-29, 4-32
situation, 4-3, 4-5, 4-26, 4-32
products, 4-2, 4-5, 4-7, 4-11, 4-21
templates
decision support, 4-1, 4-26, 4-32
doctrinal, 4-14, 4-25, 4-27
event, 4-6, 4-28, 4-32
situation, 4-6, 4-26
terrain factor matrix, 4-11
threat evaluation, 4-1, 4-24
doctrinal template, 4-25
threat integration, 4-3, 4-21, 4-26
decision support template, 4-1, 4-26, 4-29, 4-32
decision points, 4-30, 4-32
decision support matrix, 4-32
TAI, 4-31
time phase lines, 4-30
event analysis matrix, 4-29
event template, 4-6, 4-28, 4-32
PIR, 4-27, 4-32
situation templates, 4-26
weather analysis, 4-1, 4-15, 4-21, 4-26
cloud cover (CC), 4-13, 4-22
precipitation, 4-13, 4-17, 4-23
visibility, 4-9, 4-13, 4-18
wind speed and direction, 4-22
weather factor analysis matrix, 4-24
intelligence support
of close operations, 1-3
of rear operations, 1-3
to combatting terrorism, 9-14
to deep operations, 1-3
interpretation, 10-11
interrogation and translation report, A-61
ITAC. See intelligence and threat analysis center
Index-8
keyboard, B-3
Key terrain, 4-8, 4-28, E-21
limit, 7-1 , 7-7
line of sight analysis, 4-16
logistics, 3-1, 3-4, 10-17
make sound tactical decisions, 1-4
MCOO. See modified combined obstacle overlay
MOCI. See multidiscipljne counterintelligence
MDCISUM. See multidiscipline counterintelligence summary
meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference report, A-143
METT-T. See mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available.
MICROFIX, B-7, B-8
Cl workstation, B-14
OPSEC workstation, B-14
TCAE workstation, B-13
topographic workstation, B-13
military installation file, 3-22
miscellaneous data, 3-1, 3-6
mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T), 4-7
mission report, A-129
modems, B-4
modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO), 4-6, 4-8, E-22
monitor, B-4
moving target-locating radar, 7-10
multidiscipline counterintelligence (MDCI)
estimate, 9-10
situation overlay, 9-7
summary (MODCISUM), 9-7
threat assessment, 9-7, 9-14
named areas of Interest (NAI), 4-32
neutralize, 7-1
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attack raports, A-89
observation and fields of fire, 4-8, E-20
observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key
terrain, avenues of approach, and mobility corridors (OCOKA), 4-8, E-1
obstacles, 4-8, 4-10, 4-13, 4-25, E-21
one-down, two-down rule, 4-11
one-up and two-down formula, 1-4
one-up, two-down rule, 4-11
operating system software, B-5
operations security (OPSEC) workstation, B-14
Index-9
oral report, B-144
decision briefing, A-144
information briefing, A-144
order of battle, 10-12
combat forces, 10-14
composition, 10-13
disposition, 10-14
effectiveness, 10-18
electronic technical data, 10-19
factors, 3-1
combat effectiveness, 3-1, 3-6
composition, 3-1, 3-2
disposition, 3-1, 3-2
electronic technical data, 3-1, 3-5
logistics, 3-1, 3-4
miscellaneous data, 3-1, 3-6
personality file, 3-6
unit history, 3-6
strength, 3-1, 3-3
tactics, 3-1, 3-3
training, 3-1, 3-4
historical studies, 10-20
logistics, 10-17
personalities, 10-19
Phase I of an insurgency, 10-12
Phase II of an insurgency, 10-13
Phase III of an insurgency, 10-13
political structure, 10-14
records, 3-11
card, 3-17
coordinate register, 3-22”
military installation file, 3-22
organizational worksheet, 3-22
personality file, 3-18
SITMAP, 2-10, 3-14
strength worksheet, 3-22
unit workbook, 3-12
workbook, 3-12
references, 3-6
book, structure of, 3-7, 3-8
handbook of military forces, 3-8, 3-9
Installation handbooks, 3-10
miscellaneous, 3-10
STANAG 2077, 3-6
strength, 10-15
tactics, 10-16
training, 10-17
patrol report, A-126
pattern analysis, 6-9
patterns and signatures, 9-3
index-10
periodic
intelligence report, A-48
intelligence summary, A-51
peripherals, B-4
personalities, 10-19
and contacts map, 10-5
fries, 3-6, 3-18
pertinence, 2-14
Phase I of an insurgency, 10-12
Phase II of an insurgency, 10-13
Phase III of an insurgency, 10-13
PIR. See priority intelligence requirements
planned targets, 7-12
planning terrain analysis data base, 7-12
population status map, 10-5
precipitation, 4-13, 4-17, 4-23, E-12
printer, B-4
priority intelligence requirements (PIR), 2-2, 4-27, 4-32
processing, 2-3, 10-3
processor, B-4
rear and deep operations, 1-3
rear operations, 9-2
reconnaissance exploitation report, A-58
recording, 2-3, 2-6, 10-4
area study file, 10-7
civil-military operations file, 10-9
coordinate register, 10-9
current propaganda and PSYOP file, 10-7
hot file, 10-7
incident map, 10-4
insurgency analysis worksheet, 10-7
insurgent SITMAP, 10-4, 10-5
personalities and contacts map, 10-5
population status map, 10-5
resource file, 10-7
trap map, 10-5
red element, 5-6
reinforcements, D-1, D-5
reliability, 2-14
of the source and agency, 2-15
relief, E-4
report formats, A-1
intelligence estimate, A-1
spot report, A-1
resource file, 10-7
risk, 5-3
index-n
S2/G2, 1-8
S3/G3, 1-8
SIGINT. See signals intelligence
signals intelligence (SIGINT) tactical report, A-142
situation
development, 1-4, 6-1
capabilities, 6-1
courses of action, 6-3
indicators, 6-3
pattern analysis, 6-9
weighting indicators, 6-10
working SITMAP, 6-4
doctrinal templata, 6-4
report, A-42
template, 4-6, 4-26, 4-32, 7-5
software, B-2
spot report, A-1
staffs, 1-8
STANAG 2077, 3-6
standard collection asset request format, A-136
storage devices, B-4
strength, 3-1, 3-3, 10-15
computations, D-1
worksheet, 3-22
structure of an OB book, 3-8
suppress, 7-1
surface materials, E-14
tactical
operations center (TOC) support elements, 1-8, 1-9
terrain analysis data base, E-1
tactics, 3-1, 3-3, 10-16
target
damage assessment, 7-13
development, 1-4, 1-5, 7-1
attack options, 7-7
delay or limit, 7-7
disrupt, 7-7
decide function, 7-3
HPT matrix, 7-4
target selection standards, 7-4
detect function, 7-3, 7-8
aerial fire support officers, 7-10
combat observation laser teams (COLT), 7-10
first support teams (FIST), 7-8
forward area alerting radar (FAAR), 7-10
moving target locating radar (MTLR), 7-10
target location errors (TLE), 7-11
target selection standards (TSS), 7-11
index-12
deliver function, 7-4
IPB, 7-5
and BAE, 7-5
decision point, 7-5
situation template, 7-5
TAI, 7-5
terrain evaluation, 7-5
weather analysis, 7-5
location errors (TLE), 7-7
of opportunity, 7-12, 7-13
planned, 7-12
selection standards (TSS), 7-4, 7-7
value analysis, 7-6
critical nodes, 7-7
HPT, 7-6
HVT, 7-6
target areas of interest (TAI), 4-30, 7-5
targeting process, 7-1
functions, 7-1
decide, 7-3
HPT matrix, 7-4
target selection standards (TSS), 7-4
deliver, 7-4
detect, 7-3
objective of, 7-1
delay, 7-1
disrupt, 7-1
limit, 7-1
destroy, 7-1
neutralize, 7-1
suppress, 7-1
target location error (TLE), 7-11
target selection standards (TSS), 7-7, 7-11
TCAC. See technical control and analysis center
TCAE. See technical control and analysis element
technical
control and analysis center (TCAC), B-7
control and analysis element (TCAE), 1-8, 1-9
workstation, B-13
templates, 4-5
decision support, 4-1, 4-26, 4-20, 4-32
doctrinal, 4-14, 4-25, 4-27, 6-4
event, 4-6, 4-28, 4-32
situation, 4-6, 4-26, 7-5
terrain
analysis, E-1
avenues of approach and mobility corridors, E-
combined obstacles overlay, E-22
concealment and cover, E-20
effects of weather, D-1
Index-13
key terrain, E-21
modified combined obstacles overlay (MCOO), E-22
observation and fields of fire, E-2o
observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles,
key terrain, avenues of approach, and mobility corridors (OCOKA), E-1
obstacles, E-21
planning terrain data basa,E-1
precipitation, E-12
tactical terrain data base, E-1
vegetation, E-12
evaluation, 7-5
factor matrix, 4-11
masking, E-20
military aspects of, E-20
avenues of approach and mobility corridors, E-22
concealment and cover, E-20
key terrain, E-21
observation and fields of fire, E-20
terrain masking, E-20
obstacles, E-21
threat
evaluation, 4-1, 4-24
doctrinal templates, 4-25, 4-27
integration, 4-3, 4-21, 4-26
decision support matrix, 4-32
event analysis matrix, 4-29
PIR, 4-27, 4-32
templates
decision support, 4-1, 4-26, 4-29, 4-32
decision points, 4-30, 4-32
TAI, 4-31
HPT, 4-3, 4-31
HVT, 4-1, 4-24, 4-31
time phase lines, 4-30
event, 4-6, 4-28, 4-32
NAI, 4-28, 4-32
situation, 4-26
model, 5-5
checkist of white, red, and blue questions, 5-8
blue element, 5-7
red element, 5-6
white elements, 5-5
time phase lines, 4-30
TLE. See target location error
TOC. See tactical operations center
topographic workstation, B-13
training, 3-1, 3-4, 10-17
trap map, 10-5
TSS. See target selection standard
index-14
unit workbook, 3--12
unit history, 3-6
user of intelligence, 5-1
vegetation, E-12
video cassette recorders, B-4
video disk players, B-4
visibility, 4-9, 4-13, 4-18, 4-22
weather analysis, 4-1, 4-15, 4-21, 4-26, 7-5
cloud cover, 4-13, 4-22
precipitation, 4-13, 4-17, 4-23
visibility, 4-9, 4-13, 4-18, 4-22
weather factor analysis matrix, 4-24
wind speed and direction, 4-22
weighting indicators, 6-10
white elements, 5-5
word processing software, B-5
working SITMAP, 2-9, 6-4
index-15
fm 34-3
15 MARCH 1990
B Y Order of the Secretary of the Army:
CARL E. VU0N0
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
Wl HI AM J . MEEHAN II
Brigadier General, United States Armv
The Adj lit ant Gener al
Dl STRI BUTI ON:
Active Army, USAR, and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance with
DA Form 12-IIE, requirements forFM 34-3, Intelligence Analysis
(Qty rqr block no. 1119).
*U.S.GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:1996 406-421/62005
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